Dialectical terms (13): Inconclusive reason (savyabhicāra)

A cause must be consistently concomitant with the effect. If it is inconsistent, it cannot be accepted as a cause. This “inconsistency” is called inconclusiveness.^[1] For example, when a medicine is prescribed for a particular disease, the medicine suggested may or may not be suited to cure the disease. Hence, the medicine which is stated as the cause has no invariable concomitance with the effect. Savybhicāra is treated as a division of fallacies of reason by Akṣapāda. He calls it anaikāntika.^[2] When a reason or the middle term (hetu) stated is found to be concomitant with neither the major term (sādhya) only nor the negation of the major term only, but with both, then it is said to be tainted by indecision.^[3] Such a reason has the tendency to prove both the major term and its negation due to its connection with both the major term and its negation. Hence it raises doubt about the major term. Taking note of this nature Kaṇāda calls it “the doubtful” (sandigdha).^[4] Annaṃbhaṭṭa, Viśvanātha and others call it by the name savyabhicāra itself and classifies it into three, namely general (sādhāraṇa), peculiar (asādhāraṇa), and non-exclusive (anupasaṃhāri).^[5]

Whatever might be the division, the lack of invariable concomitance leading to inconclusiveness is the key concept of savyabhicāra. Hence the knowledge of savyabhicāra has got a prominent role in ascertaining accurate reason.