Sūtra 3.14

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 3.14:

शान्तोदिताव्यपदेश्यधर्मानुपाती धर्मी ॥ ३.१४ ॥

śāntoditāvyapadeśyadharmānupātī dharmī || 3.14 ||

śānta—to the latent. udita—to the rising. avyapadeṣya—the unpredicable. dharma—characteristics. anupāti—common, closely following. dharmī—the object characterised.

14. “The object characterized” is that which is common to the latent, the rising and unpredicable characteristics.—120.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Characteristic is the virtue (or power) of an object differentiated by fitness. The existence of this fit and proper virtue of an object is inferred by the production of specific results thereof, as found to be of one sort in one and of another sort in another (object). Of these characteristics the present is that which is showing itself in operation; and it differentiates between those that have become latent and those that are unpredicable yet. When, however, it coincides with the generic quality common to all these states, then it becomes of the very nature of the object alone; then what is it in itself, and by what does it differ?

Now of the characteristics of an object that are either latent, rising or unpredicable, the latent are those that have been in operation and ceased. The rising characteristics are those that are in operation. They are immediate postcedents of the yet unmanifested secondary quality. Those that have passed are the postcedents of the present ones. Why are not the present ones the immediate consequents of the past? On account of the absence of the relation of antecedence and postcedence (between the two). As the relation of antecedence and postcedence exists between the present and the future, not so between it and the past. It is not, therefore, the immediate antecedent of the past. For this reason it is only the yet unmanifested that is the antecedent of the present.

What then are the unpredicable? All are of the nature of all. With regard to this it has been said:—The variety of all forms of juice, &c., due to the changes of earth and water, is seen in stationary objects. So also of the stationary in the self-moving and of the self-moving in the stationary. Thus all is of the nature of all without the destruction of species. This is subject to the limitations of time, space, form and disposing cause. Their natures certaintly do not manifest simultaneously.

‘The characterized object’ is that constant nature thereof which remains common to all these manifested and unmanifested characteristics and which is the substratum of both the generic and the specific. In the case of him, however, to whom this is a characteristic only without a substratum, there must be absence of experience. How is it possible to adopt one cognition as the enjoyer of the action done by another? Further there would be no memory thereof, because no one can remember what has been seen by another. Further a substratum common to changing states does exist, because objects are called back to memory and recognized as such. It is this constant substratum that is identified as such even when it has taken up a different characteristic. For this reason it is not a mere characteristic, not common to different states.—120.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

The word ‘characteristics’ is used here to denote characteristic, secondary quality and condition, because that is the basic quality. The Commentator describes the characterized object which is subject to this three-fold change, by the aphorism:—“The ‘characterized object’ is that which is common to the latent, the rising and the unpredicable characteristics.” The characterized object is that which is possessed of a characteristic. It is not possible of being known without the characteristic being known. He explains the characteristic ‘Differentiated by fitness, &c.’ The characteristic is the virtue of a substance, such as clay, &c. That is the power of its producing a powder, a kneaded lump, a jar, &c. All these exist therein in a state of latency (non-manifestation).

If the characteristics exist in a state of latency in an object, they have to manifest themselves. But they do not manifest without the help of such adjuncts as water, &c. Water, &c., do not however exist in the causal states of the objects that are produced Whence then do they come? For this reason he says:—‘Differentiated by fitness. The power producing jars, &c., is differentiated by the fitness (capacity) of being dependent for action upon the action of water, &c. Hence jars, &c., derive the capacity of being helped into manifestation by water, &c., from their causes themselves. They are not accidental. This is the meaning.

Or, it might be that the words, “characterized by fitness” are an answer to the question. ‘What is a characteristic?’ It is the virtue (power) of an object. The meaning is that it is their fitness alone that is the characteristic, Hence it is proved that the characterized object is what is possessed of that. He mentions authority for its existence:—‘The existence of this fit and proper virtue of an object is inferred by the production of specific results thereof, as found to be this or that, that is, the different appearances as powder, kneaded lump, a jar, &c. The meaning is that it is seen to be distinct in different objects by the observation of its effects, and the difference that is apparent in its effects. ‘Found’ means observed.

He now describes how a lump of kneaded clay which is perceived as existing in the present, differs from the state of its existence as powder which has now become latent and the state of its existence as a jar which is yet unpredicable:—‘Of these characteristics the present is that, &c.’ The meaning is that if they did not differ, the operations of the powder and the jar would also become similar to those of the kneaded lump, and overlapping be the result.

He now says that the distinction described is not possible in the case of a lump which is yet in the state of latency:—‘When however it coincides with the generic quality, &c.’ What is it in itself and by what distinguishing trait should it differ?

Having thus described the distinguishing traits of characteristics, he now divides them:—‘Now’ of these characteristics of an object. &c.’

The rising characteristics are those that exist in the present.

Now he explains the antecedence and postcedence of the pathways of being:—‘They are the immediate postccdents, &c.’ Ho asks the reason:—Why are not the present ones the immediate consequents of the past? He states the reason:—On account of tho absence of the relation of antecedence and postcedence between the two. He explains the non-perception of a thing by the object in which it exists:—He also shows the non-perception of the existence by being the opposite of the perception thereof:—‘As the relation of antecedents and postcedence between the yet-unmanifested and the present, &c.’ He summarizes:—For this reason the yet-unmanifested is the only immediate antecedent of the present, because the yet-unmanifested precedes the present. The past cannot be the antecedent of the present. The present precedes the past and is therefore its antecedant, not unpredicable of it. Hence is it established that the past is the least important of the pathways of being.

Well, let that be. It is possible to distinguish the present and the past as being and having been perceived respectively. The unpredicable characteristics, however, from the very fact of their being unpredicable, are incapable of being distinguished. With this in mind he puts the question What are then the unpredicables? And in what objects are we to examine them?’ He answers the question:—‘All are of the nature of all.’ With regard to this it has been said:—(He establishes the same). ‘The variety of all forms of juice, &c., due to the changes of earth and water, &c.’ The liquid is possessed of the soniferous, tangiferous, luminiferous and gustiferous ultimateatoms. The earth (solid) is possessed of the soniferous, the tangiferous, the luminiferous, the gustiferous and the odoriferous ultimate atoms. A modification of all these is seen in the variety of all the forms of juice, &c„ found in the roots, fruits, flowers, leaves, &c., of tree, creeper and cane-plant, &c. All these cannot be the modifications either of the solids or of the liquids different in nature from themselves. It has of course been shown that nothing can come out of nothing.

Similarly the modifications of unmoving objects are seen in moving objects in the shape of a variety of chyle, &c. It is of course the use of these fruits, &c., that brings about the wealth of the variety of forms, &c.

Similarly is seen the modification of animals into plants. It is well-known that pomegranates become as big as the fruits of Tāla by obtaining a suck of blood.

He concludes ‘Thus all is of thé nature of all, &c? Thus all, i.e., liquid and solid, &c., is of the nature of all, i.e., juice, &c. He gives the reason thereof:—‘Without destruction of species.’ The liquidity and solidity (earthiness), the generic qualities of these, are recognized as existing everywhere, and they are not therefore destroyed.

Well, but if all this is of the nature of all, then everything being present everywhere always and in all possible modes, even those results which do not exist simultaneously should manifest at onco. For certainly, when all the necessary causes of an effect are present, it would not delay in its appearance. For this reason he says This is subject to the limitations of time, space, &c. Although everything can of course become the cause of everything, yet the operation of the cause is limited by space. Thus Kāśmīra (Cashmere) being the country of saffron, it will not grow in the Pāñcāla country, even though the other causes of its growth were all present there. Hence saffron does not grow in the Pāñcāla and other countries.

Similarly there are no rains in the summer season; therefore no growth of rice is possible in that season. Similarly a deer does not give birth to a man; the form of man cannot arise out of that of a deer. Similarly, a man who is not virtuous, does not enjoy the nature of pleasure; the disposing cause of virtue does not operate in him. Therefore it is that on account of the limitations of space, time, form and disposing cause, the nature, i.e,, existing objects, are not produced simultaneously.

Having thus divided the characteristics, he now describes the substratum as being common to all these states:—‘The characterized object is that common, &c.’ The generic is the nature of the characterized, the substratum; and the specific is the characteristic. The substratum is of the nature of both these. This is the meaning.

Having shown that the substratum, the characterized object, appearing in all the states thereof, is proved by direct knowledge, he now calls to mind the undesirable consequences of the theory of the Vainaṣika philosophers, who say that no independent substratum exists, and that the mind is but a momentary act of cognition:—‘In the case however, &c.’

Further the object is called back to memory and recognized as such. Yajñadatta does not call back to mind what has been seen by Devadatta. For this reason whoever has been the seer must be the recogniser.—14.