Sūtra 3.13

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 3.13:

एतेन भूतेन्द्रियेषु धर्मलक्षणावस्थापरिणामा व्याख्याताः ॥ ३.१३ ॥

etena bhūtendriyeṣu dharmalakṣaṇāvasthāpariṇāmā vyākhyātāḥ || 3.13 ||

etena—by this. bhūta—in the objective phenomena, indriyasu—and in the instrumental phenomena. dharma—the characteristic quality.

lakṣaṇa—the second ary quality, avasthā—condition of all these three, pariṇāmāḥ—the changes, vyākhyātāḥ—are described.

13. By this are described the changes of characteristic (dharma), secondary quality (lakṣaṇa), and condition (avasthā) in the objective and instrumental phenomena.—119.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

It must be understood that by describing as above the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition with reference to the mind, the change of characteristic, the change of secondary quality and the change of condition with reference to the objective forms of matter and instruments of action and sensation have also been described.

There, the disappearance and appearance of the characteristics of the outgoing activity and suppression were the modifications of characteristic (primary quality) in the characterized (the object as existing independently of the quality); also the modification of secondary quality. Suppression has three secondary qualities; it is connected with three paths of being (adhvā).

Having given up the first path of being which consist of the secondary quality not yet manifested, it takes it up as a secondary quality existing in the present, although it has not thereby overstepped its primary quality. It is in this secondary quality which manifests in the present that its true nature is manifested. This is its second path of being. It is not devoid of the past and the yet-unmanifested qualities (lakṣaṇa).

Similarly is the outgoing activity possessed of three secondary qualities and is connected with three paths of being. Having given up the present secondary quality, but not having given up its characteristic, it puts it on as the second quality of the past This is its third path of being, and it is not devoid of the secondary qualities of the future and the present.

Similarly, inclining again to outward activity, it gives up the yet-unmanifested secondary quality; but not having given up its characteristic of existence as such, it gets on to it as the secondary quality of the present, where manifesting its true nature, it acts as such. This is its second path of being. And it is not devoid of the past and the future secondary qualities.

Similarly, suppression again and outgoing activity again.

Similar is the modification of condition. During moment of suppression, the suppressive potencies are being strengthened; and the potencies of the outgoing activities are being weakened. This is the modification of the conditions of the characteristics.

Thus the objective changes by means of the characteristics; the characteristics possessed of three paths of being are changed by means of secondary qualities; the secondary qualities too are modified into conditions.

Thus is it that the functioning of the “qualities” is never devoid even for a moment of the changes of the characteristics, secondary qualities and conditions; and the functioning of the qualities consists in ceaseless activity. It has further been said that the cause of the activity of the ‘qualities’ is their very nature.

By this must be understood the three-fold change in the objective and instrumental phenomena, due to the conception of a distinction between the characteristic and the characterized. In reality, however, there is but one change, because the characteristic is the very being itself of the characterized; and it is the change of the characterized alone that is detailed by means of the characteristic. It is only the characteristic present in the characterized object that changes states in the past, the present and future, the substance is not changed. Thus when a vessel of gold is broken to be made into something else, it is only the condition that changes, not the gold.

Another says:—The characterized is nothing more than the characteristic, inasmuch as the reality of the former does not overstep the latter. If it were something co-existent, it would change as an independent existence only, simply changing into distinct anterior and posterior conditions.

This is no defect. Why? Because constancy is not found therein. Thus the three worlds give up their individual appearances, because eternity has been denied to them. Yet they exist in the case of disappearance also, because destruction has been denied to them.

Further its subtlety is due to conjunctive existence; and it is not perceived on account of its subtlety.

The change of secondary quality is the moving of the characteristic along the paths of being. The past characteristic joined to the past secondary quality, is not devoid of the future and the present secondary quality.

Similarly, the present (characteristic) joined to the present secondary quality is not devoid of the past and the future secondary quality. Similarly, the future joined to the future secondary quality is not devoid of the present and past secondary qualities. For example, a man who is attached to one woman, does not hate all the others.

Others find a fault in this change of secondary qualities. They say that all the qualities being in simultaneous existence, their paths of being must be confused, (and thus overlapping one another cannot be considered as distinct and different).

This is thus met with. That the characteristics do exist as such requires no proof. When there is such a thing as a characteristic, the differences of the secondary qualities also must be posited. It is not only in the present time that the characteristic characterizes. If it were so the mind would not possess the characteristic of attachment, seeing that attachment is not in manifestation at the time of anger. Further the three secondary qualities are not possible of existence in one individual simultaneously. They, may however appear in succession by virtue of the operation of their several causes. And so it has been said:—‘The intensities of nature and those of function are opposed to each other; but the ordinary manifestations co-exist with the intense ones.’ Therefore, there is no confusion. For example, attachment being in the height of manifestation with reference to some object, it does not for that reason cease to exist with reference to all other objects. On the contrary it is then ordinarily in existence with reference to them.

Similar is the case with the secondary qualities. It is not the characterized object that is posssessed of the three paths of being. It is the characteristics that are possessed of the three paths. They may be visible or latent. Of these the visible ones assume different conditions, and are termed accordingly differently because the conditions are different and not the substance. This is in the same way as the figure of 1 means ten in the place of ten, hundred in the place of hundred, and one in the place of unity. Or again a woman, although one, is called a mother, a daughter and a sister.

Some make the theory of change of condition defective as rendering independent existence necessary. How? There being intervals between the operations of the paths of being a characteristic is the future one, when it does not perform its function; it is the present one when it does; it has become the past when it has ceased to operate.

Now the defect that the opponents find is that in this way, the characteristic and the characterized object, as also the secondary quality and the condition must necessarily be considered as independent existences.

This is no defect. Why? On account of the variety due to the interaction of the ‘qualities’ even in case of the ‘qualified’ being permanent. As the coining together of the indestructible qualities of sound, &c., is only a characteristic having a beginning and is destructible, so also is the undifferentiated phenomenal state of matter with a beginning, and is only a characteristic of the indestructible ‘qualities’ of Essentiality, &c., and is as such destructible. It is for this reason that it is termed a ‘Vikāra,’ a product. Here is an illustration in this connection. Clay is an object possessed of characteristics. Its existence in the shape of a sod is a characteristic thereof. Given up this particular characteristic it takes up another; and thus takes up another characteristic when it takes up the form of a jar. In the form of jar its secondary quality gives up its futurity and comes to possess the secondary quality as manifested in the present. It thus changes its secondary quality. The jar changes, showing comparative oldness and newness every moment. This is change of condition.

Another characteristic taken up by the characterized substratum is but a change of condition. Of the characteristic too another secondary quality is a change of condition. It is, therefore, the change of one substance only that is thus shown by differentiation. In this way this may be applied to other things also. Thus it is that the change of characteristic, secondary quality and condition do not overstep the being of the characterized substratum, and it is for this reason that there is but one change which runs through all these specializations thereof.

Well what is this change? Change is the manifestation of another characteristic on the removal of the previous characteristic of a substance which remains constant.—119.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

The author classifies the changes of the objective and instrumental phenomena of matter, whose use will be described later, but whose occasion has come now:—‘By this the changes of characteristic, secondary quality and condition in the objective and instrumental phenomena have been described.’

The Commentator explains:—‘It must be understood, &c. The question is that it is the fact only of mental change that has been mentioned, not its modes in the shape of characteristic secondary quality and condition. How is it then that they are spoken of here over and above that? For this reason he says:—‘There the disappearance and appearance of the characteristics of outgoing and suppression, &c.’ The brief meaning is that the words uf characteristic, secondary quality and condition have no doubt not been used, but it is not that for that reason the changes themselves of characteristic, secondary quality and condition have not been described. Thus in the aphorism:—‘The suppressive modifications’ &c. (III. 9), the change of characteristic, is spoken of.

Further he says that by showing this change of characteristic, the change of secondary quality also in the characteristic taken as substratum indicated:—‘So also the change of secondary quality.’

Secondary quality stands for ‘Lakṣaṇa.’ It means that by which something is indicated. This quality is due to difference in time. It is by time that a thing is given certain qualities by means of which it is differentiated from certain things standing in a different relationship to time.

Suppression has three different secondary qualities. It is but another mode of saying that it is related to three paths of being. The word ‘adhvā,’ path of being, implies time.

“Having given up the first path of being, which consists of the secondary quality not yet manifested.”

The question arises, ‘Does this suppression, while giving up the first path of being, overstep the nature of the characteristic too in the same way as it gives up the path of being?’ The Commentator says that it does not:—‘Although it has not overstepped its primary quality too.’

It does not overstep its characteristic, but takes up the secondary quality as existing in the present. The same suppression which had not manifested yet, has now come into present existence, not that suppression has become non-suppression.

The meaning of the nature of a thing existing in the present is now described:—‘It is in this secondary quality which manifests in the present that its true nature is manifested.’

‘True nature’ is that which performs the function proper to its existence as such.

Manifestation means its essentialization as such.

With reference to the yet unmanifested first path of being this is its second path of being.

Well if it be so that it gives up the yet unmanifested path of being and takes up the present, and that having given up the present state, it will pass on to the past path of being, then, it necessarily follows that paths of being are subject to birth and destruction. This however is not proper, because nothing is born that exists not, nor is anything that exists destroyed. For this reason the Commentator says:—‘And it is not devoid of the past and the yet unmanifested secondary quality,’ which go on existing in their generic unspecialized state.

Having shown the secondary quality of the present existence of the yet unmanifested suppression, the Commentator now shows the third path of being, the passing on to the past of the present outgoing activity:—

“Similar is the outgoing activity, &c.”

Well then does suppression alone exist in the yet unmanifested state, not outgoing activity? The Commentator says No:—‘Similarly inclining again to outward activity, &c.’

This repeated manifestation of the outgoing activity is not the manifestation of any individual output thereof. It is a manifestation of the same class only. That which has passed cannot come back.

“The manifestation of true nature is the essentialization of the object as possessing the capacity of performing its proper function.”

It is this change of secondary quality thus described, which appears with reference to objects of the same class over and over again. For this reason the Commentator says:—‘Similarly, suppression again, &c.’

Now he describes the changes of condition which is indicated by the change of characteristic ‘Similar is the modification, &c.’

The strength and weakness of the characteristics in their present path of being, are their conditions. The increase or decrease of weakness and strength every moment is the change of condition.

He summarizes:—‘This is the modification of the conditions of the characteristics.’

Now he determines the different relation of the different changes ‘Thus the object changes, &c.’

Is then this change of the ‘qualities’ only occasional? He says No ‘Thus it is that the functioning of the qualities is never, &c.’

But then why is this change ever-existent? He says The functioning of the qualities consists in ceaseless activity.’ The word ‘and’ in this sentence means a cause.

Functioning means action. But whence this functioning itself? He says:—‘It is of their very nature.’ ‘It has been said’ here in before.

This three-fold change of the mind is taught by the author of the Aphorisms to be existing in the objective and instrumental phenomena of matter. He says: ‘By this must be understood, &c.’

‘This’ means the distinction between the characteristic and the characterized. When the distinction between the characteristic and the characterized is kept in sight, the physical elements of Pṛthvī, &c., are the objects characterized, and the bodies of cow, &c., or the jar, &c., are the changes of the characteristic thereof. The forms which the characteristics put on in the past and the yet unmanifested and the present ones constitute the change of their secondary quality. When the cow, &c., have taken up the secondary qualities as existing in the present, their change of condition consists in their taking up the states of the newly-born calf, a little advanced in age, youth and old age. In the case of the jar, &c., too, their newness and oldness are their changes of condition.

Similarly are the instrumental phenomena the characterized objects. The taking in of this or that blue, &c., is the change of characteristic of the sense of sight. The change of secondary quality consists in the assumption by the characteristic of the qualities due to the existence in the present, &c., as such. The present sensation of a jewel, &c., may be distinct or indistinct. This is its change of condition.

The change of the objective and instrumental phenomena is described, looking upon the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition as distinct from the characterized.

Now the Commentator speaks of them when they are looked upon as the same:—‘In reality, however, there is but one change, &c.’ The word ‘however’ turns away from the other view according to which the characteristic and the characterized are looked upon as distinct. Its reality is made known here, not that the nature of change is denied to the other. For what reason? Because the characteristic is the very being of the characterized.’

The question is that if the characteristic is only a modification of the characterized, how is it that people do not confuse the notions of the changes? For this reason he says:—‘And it is the change of the characterized alone that is detailed through the characteristic.’ By the word “characteristic” here are understood all the three things, namely, characteristic, secondary quality and condition. All this is the modification of the characterized alone by means of them. There is, therefore, but one change of the characteristic, &c., one not confused with the others, because there is no real distinction between them, the characterized objects themselves do not overlap one another.

The question arises that inasmuch as the characteristic and the characterized are not different from each other, and because the paths of being of the characteristic objects are different, the characteristic also must in this case behave as the characterized object, on account of the characteristic and the characterized object being the same. For this reason he says ‘It is only the characteristic present in the characterized, &c.’

‘That changes states’:—The word ‘state’ here means a different arrangement of the thing, a different appearance. Thus when vessels of gold are styled differently as a Rucaka and Svastika, they differ only so far; not that the substance gold becomes not-gold. The reason is evident. They do not differ entirely. This will be stated further on.

The Commentator brings forward the example of the Bauddha, who holds that the characteristic only is what exists:—“Another says:—It is only the characteristics of the Rucaka, &c., that are being thus born, which are the realities. There is no such thing as gold which might be looked upon as a substance remaining the same among more changes than one. If there be such a thing as substance which remains constant even though the characteristics are being changed, then that thing would be immutable like the power of consciousness. It would become an independent reality; independent, that is to say, of the change which is of the very nature of the thing appearing to change. As the power of consciousness does not give up its nature even though the ‘qualities’ are constantly putting on different appearances, and is therefore independently eternal, so also would gold, &c., become independently eternal. This, however, is not desirable. Therefore the characteristic is not different from the characterized; the substance is not different from the qualities.”

The Commentator refutes this argument:—‘This is no defect. Why? Because constancy is not found therein.’

We might admit this if we found that as a matter of fact the substance was constant in its so-called eternity like unto the power of consciousness. We, however, do not find this constancy of eternity. On the other hand the whole of this world, to say nothing of one substance only, is seen giving up its individual appearances; the appearances, that is to say, that are meant to perform certain functions.

How is this? On account of eternity being denied to them by the authority of reasoning. If a jar of earth did not give up its individuality of appearance, it would plainly be seen as a jar even when it existed in the condition of a half-jar or in that of powdered clay, &c.; and it would go on performing its function too all the same as before. Hence the three worlds are non-eternal.

Well then let it be non-eternal alone, being practically quite non-existent as it is like the lotus of the sky, on account of its universality and the non-performance of any function. For this reason he says ‘It exists in the case of non-appearance also, because destruction has been denied to it.’

The meaning is that it is not so very insignificant as to be altogether non-eternal and therefore to be classed as non-existent. Why? Because destruction has been denied to it by reason.

Thus stands the reasoning

That which is non-existent is never visible and does not perform any function, as the lotus of the sky.

The three worlds, however, sometime have some functions and are visible.

So are the following causes proving its existence to be mentioned. A thing is seen being born; characteristic secondary quality and conditions are ever found appearing therein. For this reason they are out of the category of such non-existent things as the lotus of the sky and the horns of a man.

It is not, therefore, constant in its eternity, so that it may be classed with the independent reality of consciousness. On the contrary it is only in a way eternal. This also proves that it is changeful. It is eternal in its change.

By this it must be understood that in a piece of clay exist its effects the states of the jar, &c., which have not yet expressed themselves. Well, let that be. But if it exist even if removed, how is it that it is not perceived as before? For this reason the Commentator says:—‘It becomes subtle on account of conjunctive existence, that is, on account of its mergence into the casual state. It becomes unperceivable on account of its subtlety and is not, therefore, perceived.’

Having thus explained the change of characteristic the Commentator now explains the change of secondary qualities also as such secondary qualities.

‘The change of secondary qualities, &c.’

The meaning is that each secondary quality is followed by others along with itself. The question is that inasmuch as at the time of conjunction with one secondary quality, the others are not perceived, how can it be said that the others also are present along with it? For this reason the Commentator says:—‘For example, a man who is attached to one woman, &c.’ The non-existence of perception does not disprove the existence of anything, proved to exist by other means of knowledge. The birth itself of a thing at different places is a reason for its existence. Nothing that exists not, can be born. As for example, the horn of a man.

The Commentator states a defect suggested by another:—‘Others find a fault in this change of secondary quality.’ If the past and the present, exist at the time when the present characteristic is in existence in the present, then the three paths of being must overlap one another. If, however, the paths come into being one after the other, then it comes to this that the non-existent comes into existence. This is the meaning.

He refutes the argument:—‘This is thus met with, &c.’ The existence of the characteristics in the present is only proved by perception. It also gives the knowledge of its existence in the past and in the future as related to the present. It is plain that the non-existing does not come into existence and the existing is not destroyed. He says the same:—‘If it were so the mind would not possess, &c.’ The mind is found possessing the characteristic of attachment after the time of anger has passed away. If it be that attachment did not exist at the time of anger as capable of manifestation in the future, how could it be born? And if not born, how could it be perceived?

It may be so. Even then, however, how is it proved that paths of being do not overlap? He gives the answer:—‘Further the three secondary qualities, &c.’ The three secondary qualities are impossible of existence simultaneously. Where? In one mental modification. In succession, however, one of the qualities does come into manifestion by virtue of its manifesting cause. The ascertainment of the secondary qualities being dependent upon the thing qualified thereby, it is along with the form of the thing qualified that the mind becomes possessed of the qualities. He quotes Pañcaśikhā Ācārya on this very subject:—‘And so it has been said, &c.’ This has been explained before. He summarizes Therefore there is, &c.’ On account of the contrary characteristics of manifestation and disappearance remaining merged in the cause, the paths of being do not overlap. He gives an illustration:—‘For example, attachment to, &c.’ The knowledge of the existence of attachment with anger was explained before. Now, however, is explained the existence of relationship existing between attachment with respect to one object and attachment with reference to another. He applies the illustration to the subject to be illustrated ‘Similar is the case with secondary qualities &c.’

The question is that inasmuch as identity can exist even though the identical object may not be perceived as such altogether, it follows that characteristic, secondary quality and condition being distinct phenomena, the characterized object which is nothing separate from them, should also be considered to be distinct from itself under each and every one of these varying states. He says that this view is not desirable, because it is contradicted by the perception of the identical substance remaining the same under all varying states. ‘It is not the characterized object that is possessed of the three paths of being,’ because the characteristics which are not distinct from it, are possessed of the three paths of being, The fact of the taking up of the three paths of being of the characteristics is further elucidated They are either visible, i.e., essential, present, or latent, that is not in esse, These are the past and the future. Of these, visible ones assume different states of strength and weakness, &c., and are termed accordingly differently, because the states are different, not the substance. By the word state are to be understood here all the three things, namely, characteristic, secondary quality and condition. This is the meaning It is only perception as such that establishes the distinction from, or the identity of the characterized object with the characteristic, the secondary quality or the condition. If there were unqualified identity between the characterized object and the characteristic, &c., then characteristics, &c., would no longer be what they are. They would not qualify, characterize and condition, as does not the very substance of the characterized object itself. Nor would they qualify the characterized object in case of unqualified distinction; as the horse and the cow can in no way become the characteristic, secondary quality and condition, each of the other. Perception establishes that the characteristic and the secondary quality are neither totally distinct nor completely identical with the characterized object, and it also shows that the characteristics, &c., have all of them the properties of appearance and disappearance, and that during these changes the object remains the same; and it also shows that the characteristics are not mutually exclusive. This is so perceived by every individual self. We follow this common perception. It is not competent to us to leave that aside and establish some theory of the perception of characteristics which may please ourselves.

The Commentator gives on this very subject an illustration from the world:—‘This is in the same way as figure of 1 &c.’

As the nature of unity remains the same, although with reference to its relative position it is styled as hundred, &c., so also the nature of the characterized object remains the same but it is styled differently on account of the differences brought about by the distinctions of distinct characteristics, secondary qualities and conditions. This is the meaning.

He gives another illustration to elucidate the subject to be illustrated:—‘Or again a woman, although one, &c.’

In this connection he introduces the discussion of a defect considered as existing in this by others:—‘Some make the theory of the change of conditions, &c.’

In the change of condition, i.e., the change of condition, of characteristic and secondary quality all the three, the defect of the imminence, of the independent existence of the characterized, the characteristic, the secondary quality and the condition is pointed out.

He puts the questions:—How? The answer is:—‘There being intervals between the operations of the paths of being, &c.’ The existence of milk as such in the present is the operation of the yet unmanifested path of being of curds. When on account of being intercepted thereby, the characteristic of changing into curds does not operate notwithstanding its presence in milk, then it is said to be yet unmanifested. When it does come into manifestation, it is said to be in present operation. When having achieved the change, it ceases from the operation of setting in the formation of curds, &c., then it is said to exist in the past. Thus the characterized, the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition existing as they do all of them in all the three times, must be recognized as independent existences. Eternity is but existence for ever. Further, there being existence for ever, all the four are never born. And this much and no more is the description of independent eternity (kūṭastha nityatā). The meaning is that the independent eternity of the power of consciousness too has no other speciality.

He refutes the argument:—‘This is no defect.’ Why? On account of the variety due to the inter-action of the ‘qualities’ even in the case of the qualified being permanent. Inter-action means the relation of overpowering and being overpowered by each other. The variety is of the inter-action. This is the meaning. Although the qualified and the qualities, all the four always exist, the eternity does not consist in being independent of phenomenal changes, because the nature of their change consists in the appearance and disappearance of their modifications, which modifications although brought about by the variety of the inter-action of the qualities, are of the very being of the thing modified.

The power of consciousness, however, does not put forth any such modifications of its own being as periodical appearance and disappearance. Its eternity, therefore, is independent of phenomenal change. As they say:—‘He whose nature is not destroyed, the wise call constant in eternity.’

Now he shows that the variety of inter-action is the cause of the variety of modification in the substratum (prakṛti) and the Vikāras, the phenomena thereof. As the coming together, which may be described as the change into Pṛthvī, &c, has a beginning and is destructive, that is a disappearing characteristic only of sound, &c., i.e., of the five Tanmātras of sound, touch, form, taste and smell, which in relation to their effects are indestructible, i.e., do not pass into latency.

He shows the same in the case of Parkṛti:—‘So also the undifferentiated phenomenal state of matter, &c.’ That is termed a product. Not however subject to such changes is the power of consciousness. This is the substance.

Having illustrated the Prakṛti and the product (vikṛti), which are proved by philosophers, he new takes an illustration from the product itself well known in the world, in order to show the variety due to the inter-action of the qualities which is the cause of the changes of the characteristic, the secondary quality and condition: ‘Here is an illustration of this connection, &c.’

It is not necessary that there, should be change of condition in the case of secondary qualities only. The characteristic, the secondary quality and the condition are all implied here by the word condition (avastha) in the text. All, therefore, is a change of conditions. For this reason he says:—‘Another characteristic taken up by an object, &c.’

He gives the definition of Change (pariṇāma), which covers the whole connotation of the word ‘Change is the assumption by an existing object, &c.’—13.