Verse 2.441(a)

English translation of verse 2.441(a):

441(a). The powers relating to the mental objects (pratyayārthātmānaḥ) are not clearly determined. Nor are their forms obtained elsewhere (than in the sentence-meaning).

Commentary

This verse is not found in Puṇyarāja’s text but it is found, in some manuscripts of the verses only and it is there in the only manuscript of the Vṛtti which shows that it is not a recent interpolation. It is older than Puṇyarāja, for some reason, the manuscripts of Puṇyarāja’s commentary, utilised for this edition, do not have it. I have included it as it is authenticated by the Vṛtti. As it is connected in meaning with 441 and in order not to disturb the numbering of the following which agrees with R and RP, I have numbered it 444(a) verse.

The Vṛtti on this is not too clear. In one place, there is a gap also. It seems to point out the difference between the external object and the idea of it which figures in the meaning of the individual word. The latter is only an imitation of the former and yet that is all which we have in order to understand the sentence-meaning. Through it a division is made in the sentence-meaning and this division is the means of understanding the sentence-meaning: Tatra bāhyārthaviṣayāṇāṃ śaktīnām abhāvād anukāramātram upādāya bhedaḥ prakramyate. Ayam eva hi bhedaḥ pratipatterupāyaḥ.

What is said in 441 and 441(a) may be briefly stated as follows, though the idea is not too clear—“The meaning of the individual word, understood as a constituent of the sentencemeaning, is something mental only, but it appears to be external. There is, of course, the external object, but it figures in the mind as the meaning of the individual word. Then it is only mental and it appears to be identical with the sentencemeaning which is wholly mental. After the sentence-meaning is understood, it is analysed out of it. The powers of the sentence meaning, favourable to the understanding of the wordmeanings, are analysed out of the former. These powers are not clearly determined. According to the view that the sentence-meaning is mental and indivisible, it can have no powers leading to division. How can they be then analysed out of it? If they exist anywhere, it can only be in the external object and they are only inferred. Without looking upon the external object and the one figuring in the mind as endowed with powers, worldly transactions cannot take place. The latter is identified with the former and this is what is meant by bāhyīkrtya in 441. Because of the identification of powers, this analysis of the mental sentence-meaning is possible. If the mental object, identified with the external object, is unreal, then the external object is real. Otherwise, the mental object is real and not the external object.]

Another question is raised. When there are several phrases, each having a verb and each incomplete and requiring the others, do they make up one sentence or should they be looked upon as many sentences?