

## CHAPTER I

## HISTORICAL STUDY OF NYĀYA SYSTEM

The word 'Nyāya' popularly signifies 'right' or 'justice'. The Nyāya system is, therefore, the science of right judgement or true reasoning.<sup>1</sup> Technically the word 'Nyāya' signifies a syllogism (or a speech of five parts), and Ānvikṣikī was called Nyāya Śāstra, when Nyāya constituted its special topic.<sup>2</sup> That the word 'Nyāya' actually signifies a syllogism, is evident from an observation quoted by Vātsyāyana<sup>3</sup> that "Nyāya functions neither with regard to things unknown nor with regard to things that are definitely known, but it functions only with regard to things that are doubtful." Again, Vātsyāyana defines<sup>4</sup> Nyāya as an examination of objects by evidences, but he takes evidences to signify a syllogism which consists of 'proposition' based on verbal testimony, a 'reason' based on inference, an 'example' based on perception, an 'application' based on comparison, and a 'conclusion' based on all the previous four avayavas.<sup>5</sup> Viśvanātha explains Nyāya-Svarūpa as the essential form of a syllogism which consists of its five parts, and

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1. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa, History of Indian Logic, Page 40.

2. *Ibid.*

3. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, 1.1.4.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Viśvanātha, Nyāya-Sūtra-Vṛtti, 1.1.25; 1.1.31; 1.1.38; 1.1.40.

Mādhvācārya<sup>1</sup> understands by the term 'nyāya' as inference for the sake of others in which a syllogism is specially employed. In view of this technical meaning we may interpret Nyāya Śāstra as the science of syllogism or the science of inference for the sake of others, i.e., the science of demonstration.

### Origin of Nyāya System

Though no definite date is found for the origin of the science of reasoning, yet it may be traceable in Upaniṣadic period. In this period, the art of discussion was regarded as a subject of study and it probably passed then by the name of 'vākovākya'. We find references to such an art under the name of the Nyāya and Vākovākya in some of the Upaniṣadas. In a dialogue narrated in Chāndogya Upaniṣad between Santatkumār and Nārada, the former asks Nārada to enumerate the sciences studied by him so far. Amongst the sciences enumerated by Nārada, there is a mention of Vākovākya,<sup>2</sup> which has been explained by Śaṅkrācārya and others as the science of reasoning. The entire yājñavalkya khaṇḍa of Brahāraṇakya Upaniṣad is based on a very high type of reasoning. In other Upaniṣads also such as Chāndogya,<sup>3</sup> Kāṭha,<sup>4</sup> Kena,<sup>5</sup> and

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1. Mādhvācārya, Sarva-darśana Saṅgraha under the head Akṣepāda-darśana, Page 114.
  2. Chāndogya Upaniṣad, 7.1.1.
  3. Ibid., Ch. 6.
  4. Kāṭha, 11.7.
  5. Kena, 1.6.

others, we find ample proofs of the existence of the science of reasoning.

Mahābhārta is also full of references to the science of reasoning. In the Ādiparva of Mahābhārta,<sup>1</sup> it is mentioned along with the Veda and Cikītsa (the science of medicine), and the hermitage of Kaśyapa<sup>2</sup> is described as being filled with sages who were versed in the Nyāya-tattva (categories of logic), and who knew the true meaning of a demonstration, objection and conclusion. The Śāntiparva<sup>3</sup> refers to numerous tenets of Nyāya supported by reasoning and scripture, while in the Aśvamedhaparva<sup>4</sup> we find that the sacrificial ground of Yudhiṣṭhira was crowded by logicians who employed arguments and counter-arguments to vanquish one another's idea. In the Sabhāparva,<sup>5</sup> the sage Nārada is described as being versed in logic and skilful in distinguishing unity and plurality, conjunction and co-existence, genus and species, etc., capable of deciding questions by evidences and ascertaining the validity and invalidity of a five-membered syllogism. Besides, the Mahābhārta has mentioned the word 'Nyāyatāntra'<sup>6</sup>

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1. Mahābhārta, Ādiparva, Ch. I.
  2. *Ibid.*, Ch. 70.
  3. Mahābhārta, Śāntiparva, Ch. 21.
  4. Mahābhārta, Aśvamedhaparva, Ch. 85.
  5. Mahābhārta, Sabhāparva, Ch. 5.
  6. Mahābhārta, Śāntiparva, Ch. 210, Verse 22.

used by the debaters. Similar other instances of the popularity of the science of reasoning may be cited from the Mahābhārta.

Many proofs are available in various learned documents which establish the value of reasoning for ascertaining the highest truth. In Padma-Purāṇa, logic is included among the fourteen principal branches of learning, promulgated by God Viṣṇu.<sup>1</sup> In Matsya-Purāṇa, Nyāya-Vidyā together with the Vedas, is said to have emanated from the mouth of Brahma himself.<sup>2</sup> Gautama-Dharma Sūtra<sup>3</sup> prescribes a course of training in logic (Nyāya) for the king and acknowledges the utility of 'Tarka' or logic in the administration of justice though in case of conclusions proving incompatible, ultimate decision is directed to be made by reference to persons versed in the Vedas.<sup>4</sup> Manu says that dharma or duty is to be ascertained by logical reasoning not opposed to the injunctions of the Vedas. He recommends logic as a necessary study for a king and a logician to be an indispensable member of a legal assembly.<sup>5</sup> Yājñavalkya counts nyāya or logic among the fourteen principal sciences. Kautilya<sup>6</sup> in his Arthasāstra characterizes ānvīksikī (logic)

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1. Padma-Purāṇa--Vide Muir's Sanskrit Text, Vol. III, Page 27.

2. Matsya-Purāṇa, 3.2.

3. Gautama Dharma Sūtra, Ch. II.

4. Manu Samhitā, Ch. 12, Verse 106.

5. Yājñavalkya Samhitā, Ch. I, Verse 3.

6. Kautilya, Arthasāstra, Ch. II.



as the lamp of all sciences, the resource of all actions and the permanent shelter of all virtues.

Science of reasoning was called 'Hetu-Śāstra' or 'Hetu-Vidyā', as is evident from the Manusmhitā,<sup>1</sup> Mahābhārta,<sup>2</sup> etc. It was also called 'Tarkavidyā', the art of debate, or 'Vāda-Vidyā',<sup>3</sup> the art of discussion as is referred to in Manusmhitā,<sup>4</sup> Mahābhārta,<sup>5</sup> Skandapurāṇa,<sup>6</sup> Gautama-dharma-Sūtra,<sup>7</sup> Rāmāyana<sup>8</sup> and Yājñavalkya-smhitā.<sup>9</sup> The above mentioned analysis points out that the science of reasoning existed in an early age.

This science of reasoning was termed as 'Ānvīksikī' in the very early days. Menu<sup>9</sup> uses the term 'Ānvīksikī' as an equivalent for Ātma-Vidyā. But the scope of 'Ānvīksikī' was not merely limited to Ātma-Vidyā but it also comprised many other elements as mentioned by eminent scholars. Kautilya<sup>10</sup> recognized Ānvīksikī as a distinct branch of study over and above the three, viz., Trayī (the Vedas), Vārttā (commerce) and Dandanīti (polity). While the Ātma-Vidyā embodied certain dogmatic assertions

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1. Manusmhitā, 2.11.
  2. Mahābhārta, Ādiparva, 1.67; Śāntiparva, 210, 22 and Asvamedhaparva, 85.27, etc.
  3. Manusmhitā, 6.50; 8.269; 12.106, 111.
  4. Mahābhārta, Śāntiparva, 180.47 and 246.18.
  5. Skandapurāṇa, Kalikākhaṇḍa, Ch. 17.
  6. Gautama-Dharma-Sūtra, Ch. 11.
  7. Rāmāyana, 1.13.23; 7.53.15.
  8. Yājñavalkya Smhitā, 3.292.
  9. Manusmhitā, 7.43.
  10. Kautilya, Arthasāstra, 1-2, Page 6.

about the nature of the Soul, Ānvīksikī contained reasons supporting those assertions. Ānvīksikī in fact, treated of two subjects, viz., the Soul and theory of reasons. Vātsyāyana<sup>1</sup> observes that Ānvīksikī without the theory of reasons would have like the Upaniṣad been a mere Ātma-Vidyā or adhyātmavidyā. It is the theory of reasons which distinguished it from the same. The Ānvīksikī continued, however, for many centuries to be used in the general sense of a science which embraced both the subjects of philosophy and logic. Kautilya<sup>2</sup> uses the term 'Ānvīksikī' in the sense of general philosophy as he includes Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata in Ānvīksikī. Later on, it assumed a more specific form and became the science of pure reasoning and developed into logic. Subsequently, with the introduction of syllogism or proper reasoning, it came to be known as Nyāya. This is evident from the Nyāya-Bhāṣya of Vātsyāyana when he considers Nyāya-Vidyā as the fourth science of Ānvīksikī.<sup>3</sup>

But the term 'Nyāya' in the sense of logic was never used before the first century A.D. Pāṇinī (about 350 B.C.) did not know the word 'Nyāya' in the sense of logic. He derives this word from the root 'nī' evidently in the sense

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1. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.1.1.  
 2. Kautilya, Arthasāstra, 1-2, Page 6.  
 3. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.1.1.

of justice, in his *Astādhyāyī*.<sup>1</sup> The interpretation of the word 'Nyāya' may be traceable in the disputations and debates amongst scholars trying to find out the right meaning of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices, and also in those disputations which took place between the adherents of different schools of thought while trying to refute one another. It seems that those laws which clarified the idea of a sentence were called 'Nyāya'. This is why 'Nyāya' was applied for *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* to find out the right meaning of the Vedic texts. Bühler<sup>2</sup> pointed out the application of the word 'Nyāya' for *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* in *Āpastamb Sūtra* (11.4.8.13 and 11.6.14.13). In many treatises of *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*, as *Nyāya-Kaṇṭhikā*, *Nyāya-Ratnākara*, *Nyāya-Ratan-Mālā*, etc., the word 'Nyāya' has been used for *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā*. Among those laws which were fixed in *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā* to find out the right meaning of the Vedic texts for use in sacrifices, inference was most important. In our daily life also, we find that inference occupies an important place in comprehending the phenomenon. Because of the pivotal position of inference, it can be named as 'Nyāya'. When inference was explained comprehensively for the right meaning of the Vedic texts, it came into being as an independent science, and thus the

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1. Pāṇinī, *Astādhyāyī*, 3.3.122; 4.2.60.

2. Bühler, *Sacred Laws (S.B.E.)*, Part I, *Āpastamb Sūtra*, Introduction, Page 27.


word 'Nyāya' of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā was now used for this new science or new philosophy. Any how, this new philosophy could not be confined to the knowledge of inference only, as every philosophical system should be perfect in its scope from all sides, though it may be specially interested into the enquiry of a particular field. So, Nyāya took its philosophical structure from Vaiśeṣika. Although Nyāya concentrates on inference but along with this, it examines the concepts of 'self', 'pleasure', 'pain', and 'mokṣa', also.

#### Stages of Nyāya

Though the Nyāya-system cannot be differentiated yet we can gauge the two directions in which the Nyāya system can be approached. The first part is called 'Categoristic' founded by Gautama in his 'Nyāya-Sūtra', and the second part is called 'Epistemological', which was founded by Gaṅgeśa in his exclusive book 'Tattva-Cintāmaṇi'. The first part is known as 'prācīna Nyāya', which mainly deals with epistemology and the problems of logic. The latest stage of Nyāya-system comes when the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems were amalgamated into one and they became allied systems. So we can divide Nyāya-system into three stages:-



## MAIN AUTHORS AND TEXTS OF NYĀYA-VAISĒSIKA



- (a) Old or Prācīna Nyāya
- (b) Navya-Nyāya or Modern Nyāya
- (c) Syncretic School

(a) Old or Prācīna Nyāya

Now, we shall discuss the main authors and their contributions to this system.<sup>1</sup>

(1) Gautama

Undoubtedly the science of reasoning in India is very old and as we have seen, it was a full-fledged science before Gautama. But it is very difficult to say anything definite about the nature of that science. It is totally dependent on the present Nyāya-Sūtra of Gautama. Gautama, though not the founder of Nyāya but is its chief exponent who first gave an elaborate and systematic account of the already existing branch of knowledge, called 'Nyāya', and codified it in the form of the Sūtras or aphorisms. Gautama, the author of 'Nyāya-Sūtra' holds that the true knowledge of the sixteen categories, beginning with pramāṇa, will enable one to achieve the highest end according to the particular angle of vision represented by the Nyāya-system.<sup>2</sup> He believes that by acquiring the

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1. For the detailed list of the authors of this system see Appendix (a).  
 2. Gautama, Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.1.

knowledge of the objects of the gross universe in its various aspects, the ultimate end will be realized. His outlook is wide. He visualizes the objects of the universe from an ordinary common-sense stand-point.

Of the sixteen categories, the first, namely, *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) is required for acquiring the correct knowledge of the *Ātma*. In fact, Gautama aims only at the true knowledge of the *Ātma*, but has<sup>1</sup> mentioned twelve varieties of knowables (*prameyas*), namely, *Ātma*, *śarīra*, sense-organ, the objects of sense-organs (*artha*), intellect (*Buddhi*), *manas* (mind), activity (*pravṛtti*), defect (*doṣa*), existence after death (*pretyabhāva*), fruition (*phala*), pain (*duḥkha*), and freedom from all miseries (*apavarga*). But the last *prameyas* are meant to elucidate the true nature of the *Ātma* itself.

Here the question arises that after all what was the necessity to mention the last fourteen categories separately when all these can easily be included under the first or second categories namely, *pramāṇa* and *prameya* alone? But we may answer that *Nyāya Sūtra* was really composed, not only for discussing the nature of the *Ātma* and other knowables of the physical world from

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1. *Ibid.*, 1.1.9.

common sense view point, but also for defeating the arguments of the Buddhists who were, antagonistic to the non-Buddhist ideas. It was, therefore, that Gautama had to include even in his philosophical work, Vāda (discussion in order to arrive at the truth), Jalpa (disputation wherein there is assertion of one's own stand-point and denial of other's stand-point by means of casuistry, wrong rejoinder and clinchers), Vitandā (wrangling wherein there is no establishing on one's own point), Hetvābhāsa (fallacious arguments), Chala (casuistry which consists in opposing a proposition by assigning to it a meaning other than that which is intended), Jāti (false rejoinder which is either incapable of putting aside the opposite view, or which involves self-contradictions), and Nigrahasthāna (clinchers, that is, a wrong position taken up by a party which prevents it to proceed further in argumentation), as essential factors in order to establish a valid argument. The very nature of these categories shows that there was some peculiar opposition for the refutation of which all the above mentioned categories were found very essential to be included even in a philosophical work, the ultimate end of which was to realize the nature of the Ātmā. With the help of the various forms of disputations discussed in



Nyāya Sūtra,<sup>1</sup> the wrong arguments of the Buddhists were refuted and the position of the non-Buddhists was defended. Vātsyāyana<sup>2</sup> himself apprehended this very question when he says--"The mention of doubt and the rest is superfluous because, all these being included either among the means of cognition or among the knowables, cannot be regarded as different from these. To this object the answer has been given that even then these are separately mentioned simply to distinguish the scope of the science of reasoning from that of other systems." It, therefore, becomes quite clear that the last fourteen categories are the specific topics dealt with exclusively in this system alone.

Scholars have different views about the period of Gautama. Dr. S.C. Vidya Bhūṣaṇa has fixed 6th century B.C. for the composition of the first chapter of the work, the later chapters, according to him, being subsequent additions from different sources. He is of the opinion that the author of the Nyāya Sūtra is identical with the author of the Gautamanadharmasūtra and the Pitrmedh Sūtra.<sup>3</sup> But then again, Dr. Vidya Bhūṣaṇa says in his 'History of Indian Logic'--"The Nyāya Sūtra, which was criticized by

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1. Gautama, Nyāya Sūtra, 1.1.1.1.

2. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.1.1.

3. Introduction to the Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama, S.B.H., Pages V-VIII.

Nāgārjuna referred perhaps to the Caraka-Saṁhitā under the name of Āyurveda. Akṣapāda seems, therefore, to have flourished before Nāgārjuna (Circa 250-320 A.D.) who employs many logical terms presumably from the Nyāya-Sūtra, and after Caraka whose saṁhitā compiled about 78 A.D., embodies logical doctrines of a cruder form than those of the Nyāya Sūtra. The date of Akṣapāda may, therefore, be approximately fixed at about 150 A.D.<sup>1</sup> From this it appears that Dr. Vidyā Bhūṣaṇa changed his views from 600 B.C. to 150 A.D. as the date of the Akṣapāda.

M.R. Bodas in his introduction to Tarkasaṁgraha holds that Gautama's work should be assigned to the end of the 5th century or the beginning of the 4th century B.C.<sup>2</sup>

Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasāda Shāstri has shown on Chinese evidence, that Akṣapāda, the founder of Nyāya was a pre-Buddhistic teacher. But he thinks that the Sūtras as we have them are comparatively modern, being probably post-Mahayanic. So he places Gautama in the 2nd Century A.D.<sup>3</sup>

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1. S.C. Vidyā Bhūṣaṇa, History of Indian Logic, Page 50.
  2. Bombay Sanskrit Series Edition, Page 33.
  3. J.A.S.B., 1905, Pages 177-80.

Professor Jacobi holds that the sūtras and the Bhāṣya are later than the origin of Śūnyavāda, that is, the end of the 2nd century A.D. and earlier than that of Vijnānavāda, that is the end of the 5th century A.D.<sup>1</sup>

Professor Garbe believes that the Nyāya-darśana as such was known to Pañcesīkha, the sāmkyha teacher, who must have lived between 100 and 300 A.D. Hence, Gaṭama must have been his contemporary and cannot be placed before the Christian era.<sup>2</sup>

Professor Luigi Sanli mainly accepts the views of Jacobi but places the composition of the Sūtra work between 300 and 350 A.D.<sup>3</sup>

Professor Stecherbatskoi finds references to Vijnānavāda in the Nyāya Sūtras and so he places the work posterior to 500 A.D.<sup>4</sup>

We have seen the different views by different scholars. But, in fact, we can say, that Gaṭama's Nyāya Sūtra mentions and criticizes the Mādhyamika doctrine of śūnyavāda and vijnānavāda of Lanāvātāra-sūtra. Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika school

1. J. A. O. S., xxxi, 1911, Pages 2, 13.
2. Die Sāmkyha philosophie, Page 33.
3. Introduzione allo studio della Filosofia Indiana, Page 14.
4. J. A. O. S., 1911, Pages 4-5.

of *sūnyavāda*, flourished in 200 A.D. The original *lankāvatārasūtra* is assigned to 300 A.D. Kautilya (300 B.C.) mentions *Ānvīksikī* and includes *sāṅkhya*, *yoga* and *lokāyata* in it in *Arthasāstra*. Probably 'yoga' here means the *Nyāya*. *Ānvīksikī* is described as the lamp of all branches of learning. It is mentioned in the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Mahābhārata* and the *Manusāhitā*. The *Mahābhārata* refers to the *Nyāya*, *Tarkasāstra* and the five-members inference.<sup>1</sup> The *Manusāhitā* mentions *Hetusāstra*.<sup>2</sup> So the original *Nyāya Sūtra* was not later than 200 B.C.

The *Sūtra* work is divided into five chapters, each sub-divided into two 'Āhnikas'. According to the *Nyāya Sūtrinibandha* of *Vācaspati Miśra*, the work contains 84 sections, 828 *sūtras*, 196 *padas* and 8385 letters. As pointed out by *Vātsyāyana*, the *Nyāya-Sūtra* treats of its categories through the process of enunciation (*uddesya*), definition (*lakṣaṇa*), and examination (*perīkṣā*).<sup>3</sup> Enunciation is the mere mention of the categories by name; definition consists in setting forth that character of a category which differentiates it from other categories; and examination is the settlement, by

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1. *Anuśāsanaparva*, Ch. 37, 12, *Sabhāparva*, Ch. 5.5.  
 2. *Manu Saṁhitā*, Ch. 11, 11, Ch. VII, 43.  
 3. *Vātsyāyana*, *Nyāya-Bhāṣya*, 1.1.2.



reasoning, of the question whether the definition of a certain category is really applicable to it. Book I of the Nyāya Sūtra deals with the enunciation and definition of the sixteen categories, while the remaining four books are concerned with a critical examination of the categories. Here are some important points from the sūtras:-

1. Gautama says that the existence of the Ātman is provided through inference. It cannot be an object of direct perception through Manas.<sup>1</sup> It is, therefore, due to this reason that he has not mentioned manas as a sense-organ in his work.

2. Gautama believes that there are only five sense-organs, namely, olfactory, gustatory, visual, tactile and auditory. He obviously mentions the sense organs of cognition above and omits the five sense-organs of action.<sup>2</sup> Vācaspati Mīśra says that hands, feet, etc., are not the probans for the existence of the Ātman, hence these are not regarded as sense-organs.<sup>3</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa holds the same view.<sup>4</sup>

3. Gautama does not mention anywhere in his work that

1. Gautama, Nyāya Sūtra, I,1.10.

2. *Ibid.*, I.1.12.

3. Vācaspati Mīśra, Tātparyatīka on the Nyāyasūtra, III, 1, 61.

4. Jayanta, Nyāyamanjarī, Pages 482-84.

'manas' is a sense organ. Vātsyāyana and others have discussed this matter at great length and have come to the conclusion that Gautama has recognized manas as a sense-organ, though not directly.<sup>1</sup> It seems that Gautama takes a very ordinary common sense view of indriya according to which the five sense organs of cognition alone are bhogasādhana and so he did not recognize manas as a sense-organ.

4. From the use of the words 'tan trādhikarāṇa',<sup>2</sup> 'Sarvatāntṛa', 'Pratitāntṛa' in the Sūtra, it seems that Gautama had before him several systematized schools of Indian philosophy at the time when he composed his Sūtra-work, otherwise how could he mention them as different 'tantras'?

5. Gautama is of the opinion that there is only one visual sense-organ which is divided by a nose-bone and so it looks as if it were two.<sup>3</sup> This view of the Sūtrakāra has been interpreted in a different way by the Bhāṣyakāra who thinks that there are two distinct visual sense-organs. Vārtikakāra, however, supports the Sūtrakāra.

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1. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 3.1.61.

2. Gautama, Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.26-29.

3. Ibid., 3.1.7.

6. The Sūtrakāra believes that Isvara depending upon the actions of the Jīvas, is the instrumental cause of the universe.<sup>1</sup>

(11) Vātsyāyana

The earliest commentary available on the Nyāya-Sūtra is the Nyāya-Bhāṣya by Vātsyāyana also known as Pakṣiśvāmin.<sup>2</sup> He closely followed Gautama in interpreting his aphorisms. He has given a flood of light to the sūtras. In our view, Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya is more important and necessary for the clear understanding of Nyāya system, than the sūtras, because Bhāṣya gives more clearly the distinctive features of the sūtras. Without a Bhāṣya, the sūtras remain in dark. No body with the low knowledge of the subject can perfectly and completely understand the meaning of the sūtras as desired by the author of the sūtras. Any bhāṣyakāra has to understand the mind of the sūtrakāra very closely. Vātsyāyana closely followed Gautama while writing his bhāṣya. Vātsyāyana's bhāṣya works like a key to the lock of the sūtra, where these sūtras are not clear. Vātsyāyana neither criticized nor

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1. Ibid., 4.1.19-21.

2. The name Pakṣiśvāmin has been used by Vācaspati Miśra in the introductory remarks of the Nyāya Vārtika-tātparyatīkā, Page 1, and also in the Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha by Mādhvacārya.

appreciated the philosophy of Gautama, but removed the darkness spread over the sūtras. For instance, Gautama<sup>1</sup> has divided inference into three parts, viz., Pūrvavat, Śeṣavat, and Sāmānyatodrṣṭa, but he has not defined them. Vātsyāyana<sup>2</sup> has defined them as he thought that Gautama wanted to say this or that about these forms of inference. But we can say that of all the works on Prācīna Nyāya, Vātsyāyana's Nyāya Bhāṣya is the most difficult one. Its style is very obscure, so at many places it becomes difficult to connect the bhāṣya with the sūtras. This again is due to the distortion of the texts by the scholars of the opposite views. Besides, the Bhāṣyakāra following the sūtrakāra, has introduced so many old theories in his work and in such a way, that it has become much more difficult to trace them to their sources.

Evidently, Vātsyāyana is not the immediate successor of Gautama, since his work contains passages of the character of Vārtikas, which state in a condensed form the results of discussions carried on in the school of Gautama. Vātsyāyana offers different explanations of some sūtras indicating thereby that there were earlier commentators who did not all agree on the interpretations

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1. Gautama, Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.5.

2. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.5.



of the sūtras<sup>1</sup>

Dr. S.C.Vidyābhūṣaṇa believes that Vātsyāyana was a native of South India and flourished about fourth century A.D. According to him, "The earliest limit of his age is 300 A.D., when the Mādhyamika-sūtra and Lanāvātāra-sūtra are supposed to have been composed. As Dignāga lived about 500 A.D. and Vasubandhu about 480 A.D., Vātsyāyana who preceded them could not have lived after the latter date." Taking the mean between the earliest and latest dates we may approximately fix the date of Vātsyāyana at about 400 A.D.<sup>2</sup> Keith<sup>3</sup> and Bodas<sup>4</sup> agree with this view. According to Dr. Radha Krishnan, "Nāgārjuna, the author of Upāyakaśālyā and Vigrahavyāvartanī, is certainly earlier than Vātsyāyana, who attempts to combat the views of Nāgārjuna. Dignāga criticized Vātsyāyana's interpretations from the Buddhist point of view. From all this, we may infer that Vātsyāyana lived some time before 400 A.D."<sup>5</sup>

Jacobi and Suali are inclined to place him about the beginning of the sixth century A.D., or a little earlier.

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1. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.5, 1.2.9. Vātsyāyana refers to other interpreters in 1.1.32 in the usual style: eke, some, kecit, certain, anye, etc.
  2. S.C.Vidyābhūṣaṇa, History of Indian Logic, Page 116.
  3. A.B.Keith, Indian Logic and Atomism, Page 28.
  4. M.R.Bodas, Introduction to Terka Saṅgraha.
  5. Dr. Radha Krishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Page 38.

Haraprasād Śāstri makes Vātsyāyana a successor of Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, since he is familiar with the Mahāyānist doctrines of momentariness, śūnyavāda, individuality, etc.<sup>1</sup>

We would like to take side of Harprasād Śāstri because Vātsyāyana criticizes the Mādhyamika School of Śūnyavāda and Vijñānavāda of Lankāvatārasūtra. It is not earlier than 200 A.D. or 300 A.D. Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika School of Śūnyavāda, flourished in 200 A.D. H.Ui<sup>2</sup> and Winternitz<sup>3</sup> have fixed the date of Nāgārjuna in the middle or at the close of the second century A.D. So Vātsyāyana must have been flourished after 200 A.D. Again, Vātsyāyana must have flourished before Dignāga (500 A.D.), as the latter criticizes him in connection with his explanation to the mind (manas) as a sense-organ, and positively also before Vasubandhu (450 A.D.) whose theory of syllogism, so antagonistic to that of Gautama, has not been controverted, nay even referred to, by Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-Bhāṣya. So he must be earlier than Dignāga and Vasubandhu. From all this, we can place Vātsyāyana some time before 400 A.D.

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1. J.A.S. of Bengal 1905, Pages 178-79.

2. H.Ui, Vaisesika Philosophy, Page 43.

3. Winternitz, A History of Indian Literature, Vol. II, Page 304.

There is no doubt that Vātsyāyana has stressed on logical part of the sūtras. He has given high light to the pramāṇas. However, the main features of his bhāṣya may be mentioned here as follows:-

1. Vātsyāyana believes that through the peculiar type of contact between the Ātmā and the manas, the former can be directly perceived.<sup>1</sup>

2. Vātsyāyana asserts that manas is also a sense-organ and that it has been separately mentioned apart from other sense-organs simply because its peculiar nature, that is, its being a non-bhautika element.<sup>2</sup> This might have been due to the fact that Vātsyāyana needed a sense-organ for the perception of the Ātman. So he recognized manas, like the Vaiśeṣikas.

3. For the first time, Vātsyāyana introduced the six positive categories of the Vaiśeṣika, namely, substance, quality, action, generality, viśeṣa and inherence into the Nyāya Śāstra and also implied that these categories were in vogue even before the Nyāya Śāstra of Gautama.<sup>3</sup>

4. While explaining the three terms indicating the

1. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.3.

2. Ibid.

3. Ibid., 1.1.9, 2.1.35.

types of inference Vātsyāyana has given first his own interpretation. But perhaps he is himself not satisfied with it, so he gives other alternative interpretations and begins with 'athvā'.<sup>1</sup> In fact the types of inference Purvavat, etc., are the technical terms which have been used by Sāṅkhya, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and other systems also. All the authors of the different systems appear to be quite doubtful about their correct meaning. It seems that long before these authors flourished, the correct meanings of the terms were lost and later on, the scholars have attempted to give the meaning which are confusing and not very satisfactory.

5. Vātsyāyana holds that the four types of pramāṇa which are used by human beings, are equally used by shining ones (devas) and those beings which do not move straight (tiryaḥ)<sup>2</sup> for their activities.

6. He gives in detail the process of cooking rice for food.<sup>3</sup> This indicates that Vātsyāyana lived in that part of the century where cooking of rice was common.

7. While dealing with the examination and verification aspect of the categories, Vātsyāyana has

1. Ibid.

2. Ibid., 1.1.7.

3. Ibid., II.1.43.



clearly shown how the propounders of the opposite view used the various wrong methods of reasoning, namely, disputation (jalpa), wrangling (vitanadā), casuistry (chala), futile rejoinder (jāti), and clinchers (nigrahasthāna) against the Nyāya views.<sup>1</sup>

8. Vātsyāyana has not only commented upon the Sūtras but has also added his own original views in many places with a view to elucidate the Nyāya stand-point.<sup>2</sup>

9. There are many points where Vātsyāyana apparently differs from the author of the Sūtras.<sup>3</sup>

After Vātsyāyana, there flourished many writers on Nyāya. They belonged not only to the orthodox systems, but also were amongst the Jainas and the Buddhists. There was a great difference between Āstikas and Nēstikas regarding the interpretations on the Nyāya-Sūtra of Gaṅgama. Both the parties had different method of treatment of the scope of Nyāya darśana. Āstikas dealt with epistemology as well as metaphysics and allied problems. The followers of the Buddha, on the other hand, confined themselves exclusively to inference (anumāna) and other aspects connected with it. Orthodox scholars did not

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1. Ibid., II, 1.11.  
 2. Ibid., II, 2.2.35; 1.1.4, etc.  
 3. Ibid., 2.2.36.



Like to disconnect the science of reasoning from metaphysics, ethics, etc., because in their view the only object of *pramāṇa* is to explain the *prameyas* representing all other aspects. But the followers of the Buddha separated the science of reasoning from the rest of the sciences and thus confined it to its own limited scope as if it has nothing to do with the *prameyas*.

The Buddhistic logicians like *Nāgārjuna* (2nd century A.D.), *Asaṅga* and *Vasubandhu* (4th century A.D.) and *Dignāga* (450 A.D.) criticized the *Nyāya Sūtras* and *Nyāya Bhāṣya*. *Dignāga* in his work '*Pramāṇa-smuccaya*' laid the foundation of his realist-idealistic epistemology, and threw a challenge to the realism of the orthodox schools and thus added fuel to fire. From this it is evident that there was a good deal of cleavage between *Āstika* and *Nāstika* logicians. There was a mutual intellectual difference between the two parties in which many scholars from both the sides took active part.

#### (iii) Uddyotakara

*Uddyotakara* wrote a sub-commentary named '*Nyāya-Vārtika*' on the *Nyāya Bhāṣya* of *Vātsyāyana* in order to defend the stand point of *Nyāya* against the attacks and wrong interpretations of the Buddhists like *Dignāga* and others. This is evident from the opening lines of the

Nyāya-Vārtika in which he says: "Akṣapāda, the foremost of sages propounded a śāstra for the peace of the world; and I shall write an expository treatise on it, remove the veil of error cast by quibblers."<sup>1</sup> Thus the challenge of Dignāga was met on the orthodox side by Uddyotakara in his Nyāya Vārtika. The family name of Uddyotakara was Bhāradvāja, and in the Colophon of the Nyāya-Vārtika, he is styled as 'Pāsuṭācārya'. With regard to his date, we are fortunate enough as there is a reference to his name in Subandhu's Vāsvadattā<sup>2</sup> which itself is mentioned in the Harṣacharita<sup>3</sup> of Bāṇa. The Harṣacharita<sup>4</sup> describes Bāṇa as a poet who lived at the court of King Śrī Harṣa or Harṣavardhana. Bāṇa belonged to the middle of the seventh century. If, therefore, Subandhu is placed in the beginning of the seventh century, we can conclude that Uddyotakara might have lived in the end of the sixth century.

About the style of explanation, we can say that his method of explanation is very lucid and sometimes very elaborate. He gives first one explanation of the text, but it seems that not being satisfied with it, he proceeds

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1. Uddyotakara, Nyāya-Vārtika Opening Lines.
  2. Subandhu, Vāsvadattā, Page 235, Hall's Edition.
  3. Bāṇa, Harṣacharita, Uchhvāsa I, Verse II.
  4. Ibid., Uchhvāsa II, Page 58 Iśvara Candra Vidyāsāgar's Edition.

further to explain his own words in greater detail. He refers to very previous views, specially of the Buddhists, and refutes them with cogent reasons. He seems to be more of a lover of debates. He uses all the methods right or wrong, to defeat his opponents. Thus it can be said that there is not so much philosophical depth in Vārtika.

(iv) Vācaspati Mīśra

The position of the Nyāya School as established by Uddyotakara was assailed by Dharamkīrti, the successor of Dignāga. To defend the Nyāya System from the attacks by Buddhist logicians, Vācaspati Mīśra, a great name in the history of Indian philosophy, wrote an elaborate commentary on the Nyāya-Vārtika called the Nyāya-Vārtika Tātparyatikā. Vācaspati Mīśra in his masterpiece in which the conflict with the Buddhists reaches its climax, lays a firm foundation of the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika realism.

Vācaspati must have flourished in the first half of the ninth century A.D., as he compiled his Nyāya-sucinibandha in the year 898, which evidently refers to the Vikrama era corresponding to 841 A.D.

Vācaspati Mīśra was the master of all branches of learning. He enriched all the orthodox systems of Indian

philosophy.<sup>1</sup> His exposition of every philosophical system is so faithful that it appears as though he were a follower of the school upon which he is writing. From the study of his works it is difficult to trace his personal inclination towards any particular branch of learning. This shows his grasp and depth of understanding. He is undoubtedly, the greatest master and the greatest expositor of Indian philosophy.

(v) Jyanta Bhatta

Next we come to Jyanta Bhatta, an Āstika Naiyāyika of great learning and wide reputation. He is the author of Nyāya Manjarī, an independent, elaborate and lucid commentary on the Nyāya Sūtra. Nyāya Manjarī is of great authority for its exhaustive treatment of the Nyāya logic and ontology and penetrating criticism of the rival schools. The style of Nyāya-Manjarī deserves special mention. It is unique of its kind, easy, humorous, brilliant, with a poignancy that is almost biting in its

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1. The following is the list of the known works of Vācaspati Miśra
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|-------------------|--|
| On Nyāya-         | Nyāya-Vārtika Tātparyā Tikā and Nyāya-<br>sūtrī Nibandha |
| On Sāṅkhya-       | Sāṅkhya Tattva Kaumudī                                   |
| On Yoga-          | Tattva-Vaiśārdī  |
| On Pūrva Mīmāṃsā- | Nyāya Kanikā and Tattva Bindu                            |
| On Vedānta-       | Bhāntī   |



pointedness. This treatise has been written by Jayanta in prison. We get this idea from a verse of Nyāya-Manjarī in which Jayanta says: I have been thrown by the king into this dark dungeon where even a sound is not heard. Here I have passed my days by the diversion of writing this book.<sup>1</sup> His Nyāya Kalikā is a very brief explanatory commentary on the first Sūtra of the Nyāya Sūtra of Gaṅgama.

About his date, we are fortunate enough as his son, Abhinanda, in the introduction to his Kādambarī-Kathāsāra, has left a definite clue. According to Abhinanda, Śaktisvāmin, his great grand father, was a minister of the king Muktipāda (alias Latitāditya) of Kashmir whose reign ended in 735 A.D. Allowing some sixty years for the two intervening generations, the period of Jayanta would fall in the beginning of the ninth century. It means that Jayanta belonged approximately to the age of Vācaspati Miśra but we have found nothing about their knowing of each other.

(vi) Bhāsarvajña

To the close of ninth century or the beginning of the tenth century, there flourished a great and independent thinker named Bhāsarvajña. He wrote a book named Nyāya Sāra

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1. Jayanta-Bhaṭṭa, Nyāya-Manjarī, Page 303.



on Nyāya system. As the name implies, Nyāya Sāra is a survey of the Nyāya philosophy. It became so popular that it was commented upon by great scholars of the period and there were eighteen commentaries on it, as was recorded by Guṇaratna<sup>1</sup>.

Nyāya Sāra is divided into three chapters in accordance with the three means of right knowledge (pramāṇas), namely, Pratyakṣa pariccheda, Anumānapariccheda and Āgmapariccheda. Bhāsarvājña discarded the upmāna-pramāṇa which was a vulnerable point of the Nyāya school. Bhāsarvājña is blamed to follow the line of the Jainas and the Buddhists in the treatment of logical problems. But this is quite wrong because the difference between the two kinds of treatment of logical problems is that the orthodox scholars followed Gaṇṭama and dealt with pramāṇas and prameyas and other allied topics, while the Jainas and the Buddhists confined themselves to the treatment of pramāṇa alone and thereby restricted their treatment of logic rigidly to the science of reasoning. We find that the latter portion of Nyāya Sāra is wholly devoted to the treatment of prameyas, like any other work of orthodox school. Hence, the view held by Dr. S.C. Vidyā Bhūṣaṇ<sup>2</sup> that Bhāsarvājña followed the

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1. Guṇaratna's commentary on Sarva Darśana Saṅgraha, Page 94.

2. S.C. Vidyābhūṣaṇ, History of Indian Logic, Page 359.

lines of the non-orthodox scholars and confined his treatment of logic mainly to its limited though rigid sense, that is, the treatment of pramānas, is not correct.

Bhāsarvājña, while treating the prameyas (though treated somewhat on different lines), believes that amongst the prameyas, Ātmā and Apavarga are the only two main prameyas, like Gautama and Vātsyāyana.

From all this, we can say that Bhāsarvājña occupies a unique position in the Nyāya system and tells us many things about the earlier aspects of this system.

(vii) Udayana (1050 A.D.)

The last representative of the Old Nyāya is Udayana who may be easily said to be the greatest of the thinkers of this period. It was he who took the cudgel against the Buddhists and gave a final blow to their views. It is, therefore, that we do not hear much about these Buddhist scholars after Udayana. The credit to put an end to the old academic quarrel between the Buddhists and non-Buddhists, is given to Udayana. Udayana is both a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika. He has written a commentary named Nibandha or Parisūdhī on Tātparyatikā. By writing this treatise he can be placed in the direct line of the commentators of the Nyāya Sūtra of Gautama and hence he

is a Naiyāyika. His another two works Nyāya-Kusumāñjalī and Ātmattvaviveka, have been written from the common stand-point of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. Besides this, Udayana has made most valuable contribution to the Vaiśeṣika school of philosophy. So Udayana can be called both a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika. His Nyāya-Kusumāñjalī is perhaps the most outstanding work in Indian philosophy, dealing with the problem of God. In this work, the attack is against the Mīmāṃsakas who hold that there is a settled order of things in this world, which needs no God either for its establishment or for its maintenance. This work of Udayana attempts to prove that there is a God who is the creator of this universe and who is also the regulator of the moral order in this world.

In his Ātmatt<sup>t</sup>vaviveka, Udayana establishes that there is a permanent self in man, which endures after the death of the individual, which carries with it the residue of its actions in the past life to a later life and which, after a series of such lives, attains final release in course of time.

No doubt, the two schools of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika flourished separately and independently of each other from the very beginning, but it is also a fact which cannot be gainsaid that they had inter-relations on many problems. The credit, however, to combine these two schools for the

first time into a syncretic school is traditionally given to Udayana. This is clear that Udayana has freely syncretized the characteristic doctrines of one school with those of the other. For example, it is well known that the Vaiśeṣika system does not admit Upamāna and Śabda as distinct pramāṇas. But Udayana as a Naiyāyika, proves that their separate character cannot be denied. Again, it may be pointed out that the Vaiśeṣika includes dream cognitions under anubhava and so distinct from śruti, while the Naiyāyikas hold that dream-cognition is not anubhava. Though there are somewhat confused opinions on this topic amongst the Naiyāyikas,<sup>1</sup> yet the prevailing view of the Naiyāyikas is that dream-cognition is not anubhava, but it is a kind of śruti. Udayana being both a Naiyāyika and a Vaiśeṣika, hold that it should be accepted as anubhava. Thus, it seems that Udayana has made a sort of compromise between the two schools.

Although the modern school of Nyāya is commonly believed to have been founded by Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya, who only consolidated it, but a careful study of the works of Udayana shows that the methodology of the Modern Nyāya had actually started even at the time of Udayana. Gopinātha

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1. Umesh Misra, *Dream Theory in Indian Thought*,  
Pages 273-78.




Kavirāj says: "Personally I am disposed to believe that the distinction between the old and the new school in the history of Nyāya philosophy dates from after Udayana and Śridhara."<sup>1</sup>

There remains no topic in Gaṅgeśa's work, which had not been already argued by Udayana in his main works and specially in the *Kusumāñjali*. It is only in the method and mode of expression that Gaṅgeśa excelled over Udayana. In the words of Dinesh Bhaṭṭācārya: "The real founder is the great Udayanācārya, who had the supreme privilege of occupying the threshold to ring out the old and usher in the new age by his monumental works. On the one hand, Udayana's *Parisūdhī* forms the last part of the surviving classics of the older school of the Nyāya, and on the other, his *Kusumāñjalī* is uptill now a text book of Navya-Nyāya."<sup>2</sup>

Till now, we have treated the main authors and writers of the Old Nyāya who explained and developed the ideas contained in the Nyāya Sūtra and also defended them against the attacks of the hostile critics. The Old Nyāya is thus, a development of the Sūtra philosophy of Gaṅgama through a process of attack, counter-attack and defence among the

- 
1. Gopināth Kavirāj, Princess of Wales, Saraswati Bhavan Studies, Vol. II, Page 200.
  2. Dinesh Chandra Bhaṭṭācārya, History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā, Page 1.





Naiyāyikas and their hard critics. In this stage of Nyāya, the system was studied as a whole and much more attention was given to the study of the knowables (prameyas), and the study of means of right knowledge (pramāṇas) occupied a subordinate place and were taken up only to explain the knowables. The commentators of the Nyāya Sūtra adhered to the old practice of treating epistemology as a part of metaphysics. Vātsyāyana and his worthy successors discussed both the logical and metaphysical problems more fully and also many other questions of general philosophical interest. The result is a fully developed and complete system of philosophy. In other words, the treatment of the Old Nyāya writers is complete and proceeds to realize the ultimate end of philosophy.

(b) Navya Nyāya or Modern Nyāya<sup>1</sup>

(1) Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya

In the twelfth century, Gaṅgeśa laid the foundation of a new methodology in his exclusive book "Tattvacintāmaṇi". He treated Nyāya as pure epistemology and logic, divesting it of all its metaphysical appendages. He took out the third sūtra of the first śāhika of the first chapter of

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1. For detailed list of the authors of Navya Nyāya, see Appendix (b).

Nyāya Sūtra and wrote his treatise called *Tattvacintāmaṇi*, in four chapters, one chapter devoted to each of the four *pramāṇas*, namely, perception, inference, comparison and testimony, which became the nucleus for the study of the system only as the *Pramāṇasāstra*. But simply writing on *pramāṇas* only, one cannot be called a *Navya Naiyāyika*. We know that before Gaṅgeśa, the Buddhists logicians like Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, and the Jainas like Vidyānanda and Devasūrin, had already dealt with the problem of *pramāṇa* in their works which Gaṅgeśa must have seen, but what made Gaṅgeśa's the greatest intellectual giant of our country, is the particular methodology based on sharp and subtle distinctions in the connotations of logical terms, which Gaṅgeśa had adopted.

Gaṅgeśa's treatment of the epistemological problems of validity of knowledge and criteria of truth anticipates the modern western theory of realism, idealism and pragmatism. His contribution to logical thought is profound and extensive. His logical discussion is not merely verbal and formal, and does not consist in hair-splitting arguments aimed at merely logical accuracy of definitions. He elaborates the views and thought of Udayana, criticizes some of his views and directs logical thought in new channels. He invents technical terms which have been elaborated and complicated by his followers to give precision to logical thought, though they are made unintelligible to the uninitiated. In

Gaṅgeśa's work, the logic of Nyāya attains its final shape. In the words of Keith: "It has now assumed proportions through the efforts of all the best Indian brains in Navya-Nyāya, which is a world's wonder in the field of intellectual feats, though to the uninitiated it is only a vast mass of perverted ingenuity."<sup>1</sup>

Gaṅgeśa's achievement is quite unique in the history of philosophical literature in India. There is not another scholar who had such a spectacular success through one single book, which has attracted the attention of almost all great scholars of philosophy of past and also of present to write direct and indirect commentaries on it.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, the study of other śāstras, such as Vyākaraṇa, other Darśanas and even Kāvya-Sāhitya, etc., began to be taught through the same methodology and terminology propounded in Gaṅgeśa's work. In the words of Dr. Radha Krishnan: "Whatever other specialized studies a student may take up later, the preliminary course includes logic, which is the basis of all studies. Every system of Hindu thought accepts the fundamental principles of Nyāya logic and even in criticizing the Nyāya system, uses the Nyāya terminology and logic. The Nyāya serves as an introduction to all systematic philosophy."<sup>3</sup>

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1. A.B.Keith: Indian Logic and Atomism, Page 35.

2. For the detailed list of the commentaries on Tattvacintāmaṇi, see Appendix (e).

3. Dr. Radha Krishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, Page 32.

(11) Vardhamāna Upādhyāya (1250 A.D.)

Amongst the successors of Gaṅgeśa, Vardhamāna, his own son, was the first to offer his contribution to the Tattvacintāmani. He wrote a commentary on the same known as 'Cintāmani Prakāśa'. Vardhamāna was a great scholar of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. He is the author of a large number of works of merit, though he does not possess the brilliance of his father. His style is not so complicated as that of the later scholars of this age. His other works are as follows:-

(1) Anvikṣā-tattva-bodha--a commentary on the Chapter V of the Sūtras of Gautama.

(2) Nyāya-nibandha-prakāśa, a commentary on Nyāya-Vārtika-tātparya-parisūddhi of Udayana.

(3) Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa-prakāśa, a commentary on Udayanācārya's Nyāya-pariśiṣṭa.

(4) Kusumānjali prakāśa, a commentary on the Nyayakusumānjali of Udayana.

(5) Kirṇāvali-prakāśa.

(6) Nyāya-līlāvati-prakāśa.

(7) Khandana-prakāśa.

Vardhamāna tried to bridge the gulf between the two schools of orthodox logic--the old and the new. As we have just seen, he commented on the old classics,

current in his days. But the views of his illustrious father were always uppermost in his mind and he made the best use of them in his works.

(iii) Pakṣadhara Miśra alias Jayadeva (1775 A.D.)

He is the only scholar of the post-Gaṅgeśa period in Mithilā who succeeded in setting up a new school of Navya-Nyāya through his immortal work--the Āloka on the three parts of Gaṅgeśa's work (omitting the upamāna part). He also wrote Dravya-pedārtha on the Dravya-kirṇāvalī-prakāśa; and Līlāvati-vivēka on the Līlāvati-prakāśa. Pakṣadhara had two disciples named Vāsudeva Miśra (his nephew), and Rucidatta Miśra.

(iv) Vāsudeva Sarvabhauma (about 1450-1525 A.D.)

About the middle of the fifteenth century scholars in Bengal became fully aware of the learning, name and fame of Mithilā in the advancement of Navya Nyāya scholar from Bengal began to come to Mithilā, the home of Nyāyasāstra for studies in Navya-Nyāya. Vāsudeva was the first who came to Mithilā, where he was admitted into the academy of Pakṣadhara Miśra, the foremost logician of the place at that time. After finishing his studies in Mithilā, he came to Navadvīpa and set up the first great academy of logic in Nadīā, where students flocked in large numbers.



Sārvabhauma wrote a commentary called Sīrāvalī on the Cintāmani.

(v) Raghunātha Sīromani (1477-1547 A.D.)

After Gaṅgeśa, Raghunātha is regarded as the second great figure of the Navya-Nyāya school. He was an independent thinker. Besides his famous Didhīti, a commentary on 'Tattvacintāmani', he also wrote a short treatise called 'Padārtha-tattva-nirūpaṇa' in which he refuted the Vaiśeṣika categories, particularly the category of Viśeṣa.

(vi) Mathurānātha Tarkavāgīśa (about 1570 A.D.)

He wrote numerous valuable commentaries on logic which are known under the general name of Māthuri. His method of writing was easier and elaborate. He tried to explain the most difficult portions of the texts easily. He was the author of the following works:-

- (1) Tattva-cintāmani rahasya
- (2) Tattva-cintāmani āloka rahasya
- (3) Didhīti rahasya
- (4) Siddhānta rahasya
- (5) Kirṇāvalī-prakāśa-rahasya
- (6) Nyāya līlāvati-prakāśa-rahasya
- (7) Nyāya līlāvati-prakāśa-didhīti-rahasya
- (8) Bauddhā-dhikkāra-rahasya

(9) Ayur-daya-bhāvanā

(vii) Jagadīśa Tarkālakāra (about 1625 A.D.)

Jagadīśa, the famous writer of the Navya Nyāya School, was the author of the following works:-

(1) Tattva-cintāmani-didhīti-prakāśikā, familiarly known as Jāgīdīśī.

(2) Tattva-cintāmani-mayūkha, a commentary directly on Gaṅgeśa's works, of which only portions have survived.

(3) Nyāyadarśana or Nyāya-sarāvalī, dealing with the doctrine of causality.

(4) Śabdāsakti-parīkṣā on the force of words, etc., a grammatico-philosophical treatise.

(5) Tarkāṅgta

(6) Padārtha-tattva-nirṇaya

(7) Nyāya-līlavatī-didhīti-vyākhyā

(viii) Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya (about 1650 A.D.)

Gadādhara has been called "the prince of Indian schoolmen" with whom modern logic reached its climax. His collected works are called Gādādhari and are spread all over India, especially Southern India. He was the author of the following chief works:-

(1) Tattva-cintāmani-didhīti-prakāśikā

(2) Tattva-cintāmani-vyākhyā

(3) Tattva-cintāmanyāloka-tikā

(4) Muktvāvalī-tikā

(5) Ratna-koṣa-vāda-rahasya

With all these works to his credit, Gaḍādhara lived a pretty long life. He was the last of the great Navadvīpa scholars. So says Prof. D.C. Bhaṭṭācārya also. "The most glorious period of Navadvīpa has definitely ended with the death of Gaḍādhara in 1709 A.D. and the signs of a distinct revival of the ancient glory of Mithilā were discernible at Mangroni."<sup>1</sup>

(c) Syncretic School

The Syncretic School of Nyāya is a later development of the Nyāya philosophy into the form of a synthesis or an amalgamation between the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika systems. As we have seen, the Nyāya, although a metaphysical school, was chiefly concerned with the methods of debate and syllogism and the Vaiśeṣika system formulated its ontological structure on the basis of the six categories. The syncretic writers combined the two schools into one, recognized perception, inference, analogy and testimony as pramāṇas like Nyāya and accepted the ontological structure of the Vaiśeṣika system.

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1. D.C. Bhaṭṭācārya, History of Navya Nyāya in Mithilā, Page 197.

Although the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika were separate in their origin and in their early development, but a link between the two schools seems to have been existed from the very beginning. In Mahābhārta,<sup>1</sup> Nārda is mentioned as Proficient in the Nyāya; and although the Vaiśeṣika is not named, the subjects of Nārda's proficiency, besides those of the Nyāya proper, include such topics as unity, plurality, conjunction and inherence which belong to the Vaiśeṣika school. It means that these terms were regarded as included in the Nyāya. There are good many Sūtras in the Nyāya, specially relating to physical theories, which appear to have been borrowed from the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras.<sup>2</sup> On the other hand, there are some Sūtras in the latter which seem to have been suggested by the Nyāya-Sūtras.<sup>3</sup>

There are some Sūtras in the Vaiśeṣika which have not been explained by Praśastapāda--a fact which clearly indicates that they did not exist in his time.<sup>4</sup> The fact

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1. Mahābhārta, Sabhāparva, Ch. 5.3, quoted in History of Indian Logic by S.C. Vidyā Bhūṣaṇ on Page 43.
  2. H. Ui in his Vaiśeṣika Philosophy pointed out the following examples where the Nyāya Sūtras are based on Vaiśeṣika Sūtra  
Nyāya Sūtra 3.1.36 - Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 4.1.8.  
Nyāya Sūtra 2.1.54 - Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 7.2.20.
  3. Bodas in his Introduction to Tarkasaṅgraha thinks that Vaiśeṣika Sūtra 3.2.4 is clearly an amplification on the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.10.
  4. Bodas, Introduction to Tarkasaṅgraha, Page 29.

that some of those interpolated Sūtras of the Vaiśeṣika were composed under the influence of the Nyāya Sūtras, indicates the syncretic spirit existing in two schools. Deva, the successor and disciple of Nāgārjuna, has given many Vaiśeṣika theories which he has quoted from the Nyāya Sūtras, of course without mentioning the latter.<sup>1</sup> The same spirit of alliance continues and further develops at the time of Vātsyāyana who regards the Vaiśeṣika as an allied system. For instance, he says that the manas should be regarded as one of the senses in accordance with the theory of the other system (the Vaiśeṣika).<sup>2</sup> The two schools are technically said to be samānatantra, i.e., allied systems.<sup>3</sup> Further more, Vātsyāyana has approvingly quoted the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika school.<sup>4</sup> In Uddyotakara the practice of introducing the Vaiśeṣika ideas and phraseology into the Nyāya seems to have been carried further.<sup>5</sup>

In the writings of Vācaspati Miśra, the process of developing the Nyāya position in collaboration with the Vaiśeṣika ideology is in full-swing. Indian tradition

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1. H.U1, Vaiśeṣika Philosophy, Pages 53-54.
  2. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-Bhāṣya, 1.1.4.
  3. Gautama, Nyāya-Sūtra, 1.1.29.
  4. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya Bhāṣya, 1.1.9.
  5. Phrases like Samuktasamavāya or Samuktasamveta Samavāya used by Uddyotakara in his Nyāya Vārtika 1.1.4, in naming the six kinds of sense-object contact clearly belong to the Vaiśeṣika System.




regards Udayana as the first writer who conceived the idea of formally combining the two systems. Śrīdhara gives to his Vaiśeṣika work, the title of Nyāya Kandī which indicates that the two schools were so much allied that the work of one system could bear in its title the name of the other system. It is thus clear that the two schools had a close connection from the very beginning. In the course of their development, they came closer and closer till they were amalgamated into a single syncretic system. In fact, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika philosophies supplemented each other in respect of their subjects and styles. Hence the two philosophies were called Samāntantra or allied systems.

In the syncretic school, manuals were written in different styles. There are some who though primarily belonging to the Nyāya, entirely absorbed the six or seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika. In others, the Nyāya categories of pramāna in its developed form were actually absorbed in the treatises on Vaiśeṣika philosophy. Some treatises dealt with some topics of Nyāya and some topics of Vaiśeṣika independently.

As instances of Nyāya absorbing the Vaiśeṣika categories, we may cite the cases of Tārkikarakṣā of Varadarāja and Tarkabhāṣā by Keśava Miśra. Varadarāja who deals with all the sixteen categories of Nyāya, includes in the second category, viz., prameya, not only the twelve objects of Nyāya,

such as Ātma, etc., but also the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika, such as dravya, guṇa, etc. Keśava Miśra on the other hand brings the six categories of the Vaiśeṣika under 'artha' which is one of the twelve objects included in the second Nyāya category, i.e., Pramēya. This can be depicted as follows:-

(1) According to Tārkikaraksā by Varadarāja



(11) According to Tarkabhāṣā by Keśava Miśra

Padārtha

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1. Pramāna, 2. Pramāya, 3. Saṁśaya, 4. Prayojana, 5. Drṣṭānta,  
 6. Siddhānta, 7. Avayava, 8. Tarka  
 9. Nirṇaya, 10. Vāda, 11. Jalpa,  
 12. Vitandā, 13. Hetvābhāsa, 14. Chala  
 15. Jāti, 16. Nigrahasthān

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1. Ātman,	2. Śarīra,	3. Indriya,	4. Artha,	5. Buddhi,
				6. Manas
				7. Pravṛtti
				8. Doṣa
				9. Pretyabhāva
				10. Phala
				11. Duḥkha; and
				12. Apavarga


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1. Dravaya, 2. Guṇa, 3. Karma, 4. Sāmānya,  
 5. Viśeṣa 6. Samavāya





Similarly, Annam Bhatta's Tarka Saṅgraha<sup>1</sup> deals with seven categories, viz., substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence and non-existence. Quality is of twenty-four kinds of which Buddhi (intellect) is one. It is of two kinds--experience (anubhava) and smṛti (recollection). Anubhava may be right or wrong. Right anubhava is of four kinds, viz., perception, inference, analogy and testimony. Thus, the four pramāṇas are included under Buddhi which is one of twenty-four types of qualities. This can be shown as under:



1. For the detailed list of commentaries on Tarkasaṅgraha, see Appendix (d).



From the above picture, we see that in Nyāya-Siddhānta Muktāvalī, pramāṇas assume an important position. Here the pramāṇas, instead of being treated under guṇas which is the usual way of Vaiśeṣika manuals, are dealt with under ātman and a separate chapter is devoted to each of the four pramāṇas. After the treatment of the four pramāṇas, the qualities are dealt with; and strangely enough, a part of epistemology (i.e., topics like illusion, doubt, validity of knowledge, etc.) is treated under guṇa (buddhi) according to the usual Vaiśeṣika scheme.

In the Tarkāmṛta of Jagadīśa, the seven categories of the Vaiśeṣika and the four pramāṇas of the Nyāya have been combined in an ingenious and reasonable manner. This treatise has been divided into two parts. In the first part called "Viśaya-Kāṇḍa", the seven categories of Vaiśeṣikas have been enumerated. The second part of Tarkāmṛta, called "Jñāna-Kāṇḍa", Jagadīśa treats of right knowledge (pramā) which is derived through four means called perception, inference, comparison and verbal testimony.

A scheme of combination of the Vaiśeṣika and Nyāya categories is given below:-





all the topics of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy, are treated. In the words of Dr. D.N. Shastri: "The syncretic Nyāya Vaiśeṣika School occupies a unique position in the development of Indian philosophical thought. The terminology of this school has played an important role in giving shape in Indian philosophical thinking in general. A preliminary study of a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika manual like *Tarka-Saṅgraha* or *Nyāya Siddhānta-Muktāvalī* is considered essential for introduction to any other system of Indian philosophy. Nyāya phraseology, and to some extent even ideology, seems to have influenced all other schools."<sup>1</sup>

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1. D.N. Shastri, *Critique of Indian Realism*, Page 9.