

THE NOTIONS *mēnōg* AND *gētīg* IN
THE PAHLAVI TEXTS AND THEIR RELATION
TO ESCHATOLOGY

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The Zoroastrian religion is primarily known as dualistic in the sense that the opposition between the powers of good and the powers of evil occupies in its thought a central position. In addition to this opposition there is, however, in Zoroastrianism another pair of notions, which is no less important for a proper understanding of Zoroastrian ideas: the contrast between the notions of *mēnōg*, Avestan *mainyava-*, 'that which is non-material, non-sensual, intelligible', sometimes best translated 'ideal' in the sense of a conceptual prototype of a concrete existence, on the one hand, and *gētīg*,¹ Avestan *gaēiθya-*,² 'the material, earthly (world), that which can be apprehended through the senses', on the other. This pair of contrasting notions is neutral to the ethical dualism

¹ The word is often spelled in the Pahlavi texts *gyt̄x*, and was read by H. S. Nyberg **gētāh* or *gētēh*, to distinguish between the substantive and the adjective, read by him *gētik*; cf. *Hilfsbuch des Pehlevi*, II, Uppsala 1931, 80f., and *Journal Asiatique*, 219 (1931), p. 31 ff. There is however no evidence for a vocalization -ā- in Middle or New Persian texts. Pāzand *gētī*, *gēθī*, *gīθī*, NP *gētī*, MPT *gytyg*, can all be best explained as reflecting a MP *gētīg*. The fact that an additional suffix -yk is usually added to the word in order to form the adjective (to be read *gētīgīg*) shows that the basic word had no formal distinction between substantive and adjective as Nyberg suggests, in the same way as *mēnōg* is a substantivized adjective, with a secondary adjectival form *mēnōgīg*. (In this I believe I am following the view of W. B. Henning.)

² In the Avestan text the same opposition was often expressed by other words. It is found already in the Gāthās, expressed for example as follows: *dāvōi ahvā astvatasčā hyatšā managhō*, Y 28,2 (and similarly Y 43,3).

of Zoroastrianism and cuts through it. As it occupies a prominent position in the Zoroastrian religion, and particularly in the later literature, it has not been neglected by modern research, and a discussion of the terms can be found in the various general descriptions of the Zoroastrian religion.³ Even so, some of the main aspects connected with them still require a detailed exposition; a thorough historical study of these concepts is called for, as well as a systematic description of their theological position in the Pahlavi writings. The twin concepts are crucial for understanding the mythological as well as the theological texts, and as they underwent considerable change of sense and usage from the Avestan period until the ninth century, when most of the extant Pahlavi texts were committed to writing, it is necessary to show how they developed; there is no doubt that they absorbed at least some amount of outside influence.⁴ Leaving the historical problems aside, we shall here content ourselves with making some observations of a more general nature, with the aim of elucidating the theoretical position which this pair of opposites occupies in the

³ The fullest discussion of this subject, as far as the Avestan material is concerned, was done by H. Lommel, *Die Religion Zarathustras nach dem Awesta dargestellt*, Tübingen 1930, 93 ff. Cf. also L.-C. Casartelli, *La philosophie religieuse du mazdéisme sous les Sassanides*, Paris-Bonn-Londres 1884, 63 ff.; R. C. Zaehner, *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism*, London 1961, 200 ff.; J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *La religion de l'Iran ancien*, Paris 1962, 311 ff., and the remarks of H. S. Nyberg, *Die Religionen des alten Iran*, Osnabrück 1966 (Neudruck der Ausgabe 1938), 20 f., and in *Journal Asiatique*, 219 (1931), p. 31-36. [Also G. Gnoli, *AION*, N.S. 13 (1963), p. 163-193, which came to my attention when the article was in press.]

⁴ Cf. P. J. de Menasce in his edition of *Škand-gumānik Vičār*, Fribourg 1945, p. 102 f.; R. C. Zaehner, *Dawn and twilight*, p. 200 f. It is not quite clear to me how it is possible to arrive (as Zaehner does) at the conclusion that *mēnōg*, in the sense of "the totally unformed primal matter of Aristotelian philosophy", was considered a third principle, besides the two spirits of orthodox theology. There is no evidence for this, apart from the general statement made by Eznik that some Zoroastrians accept three principles, a statement which can be better explained in other ways. It is, on the other hand, improbable that a philosophically inclined Zoroastrian, who defined *mēnōg* as meaning "a single, uncompounded substance without parts, invisible and intangible" (*ibid.*, p. 200), would at the same time regard it as a member in a triad; even more so when we consider that the two other members of this group are supposed to be the two principles of good and evil— notions of a completely different order.

structure of late orthodox Zoroastrianism, as it is seen in the Pahlavi books.

In Pahlavi the terms have two distinct usages, which in the Avestan language were kept separate by a morphological distinction between *mainyava-* (adj.) and *mainyu-* (m. substantive). When used as adjectives or abstract nouns, they denote, first, two modes of being as cosmological ideas, the non-material as opposed to the material. When used as substantives they denote classes of beings.

The essential difference between the two modes of being is usually expressed by the contrast between visible *gēlīg* and invisible *mēnōg*, but this criterion does not seem to hold in every case. Thus, for example, the clouds are said to be *mēnōg* beings carrying in them *gēlīg* water;⁵ the sky is held to be *mēnōg*;⁶ the sun is apparently considered *mēnōg*, at least in one passage.⁷ There are also various references to 'seeing *mēnōg*', as with regard to Zoroaster,⁸ or when a new-born child is said to have the capa-

⁵ GBd 222.9f.; *Pahlavi Rivāyat*, ed. Dhabhar, p. 163.14f.

⁶ GBd 221.15. I am not sure of the precise meaning of the phrase: *u-š dāštārīh (i) gēlīg nēst*, Pahl. Rivāyat, p. 128.11, where it refers to *asmān*, and op. cit. p. 129.7f., where it refers to *zamīg*.

⁷ DkM 42.20f.; cf. Appendix B, note 12 (below, p. 97).

⁸ DkM 645.16. In a Middle Persian passage which is found in the *Pāzend Texts* (ed. E. K. Antīā, Bombay 1909, p. 62ff.) immediately after the *Bundahīšn*, and which follows in the Munich manuscript M6 the book *Šāyast ne šāyast* (cf. *Pahlavi Texts*, translated by E. W. West, Part I, Sacred Books of the East, vol. V, p. 372ff.), Zoroaster addresses Ohrmazd saying: 'Thy head, hands, feet, hair, face, and tongue are in my eyes just like those even which are my own, and you have the clothing men have; give me a hand, so that I may grasp thy hand' (West's translation). Ohrmazd's answer is: *man mainyū agarftār ham dastī man gərəftan na tuā*, "I am an intangible spirit. It is not possible to grasp my hand". Zoroaster is worried by the fact that Ohrmazd and the Amahraspands are intangible: when he departs from the presence of Ohrmazd and will no longer see him, there will be no way of experiencing the divinity by the senses. Ohrmazd's answer to this is that the specific material creations of Ohrmazd and of each of the Amahraspands (righteous man, cattle, fire, metal, earth and virtuous woman, water and vegetation) represent their concrete presence in the world, even when they themselves are invisible. Another text shows Zoroaster's capacity to see *mēnōg* with regard to the *druj*: he is said to have been the only one who saw the onslaught of the demon (although the text can be construed differently): *ka druz ō dām dwārist be zardušt az gēlīgān kas-ez ne dīd* (*Pahlavi Rivāyat*, p. 130.6f).

city to see *mēnōg*.⁹ Ohrmazd is said to see the spirit of men, 'for Ohrmazd sees everything'.¹⁰

There is, however, no justification, as far as I can see, for saying, as H. S. Nyberg does,¹¹ that *mēnōg* was conceived to be corporeal, and to have a body and a form. When a *mēnōg* being makes an apparition in front of a human being it is said to put on a bodily form, and this form, one can generally deduce from the context, does not belong to it organically. A characteristic example is found in the story of Wahman who came towards Zoroaster in the form of a man:

*ka az hān ul raft zardušt, ā-š mard dīd ka raft az *rapīθwīn-tar nēmag. hān būd wahman, ud hān awe sahist wahman pēš-karb, ku pad-tan-cašm-tar bawēd, ud pēš-nēwag, ku pad harw ciš pēš būd, hān awe sahist wahman cand hān ī 3-mard-nēzag bālāy . . .* (DkM 624.8-12; facsimile edition, p. [496]).¹²

"When Zoroaster went up from there, he saw a man who was going from the southern direction. That was Wahman. Wahman seemed to him as one who has the form in front, so that he might be more visible to bodily eye, and as one who has goodness in front, namely, he was to the fore in everything. Wahman seemed to him to have the height of three spears of a man . . ."

The text seems, by its syntax and by the fact that it contains epithets which require a somewhat strained interpretation in Pahlavi, to be a translation from an Avestan original.

The same type of conception is seen with regard to the mythical figure of Vərəθrayna, who assumes a number of forms according to Yašt 14,¹³ and also with regard to the various incarnations of

⁹ DkM 747.8f.; cf. Bailey, *Zoroastrian problems in the ninth-century books*, Oxford 1943, p. 98 n. 1.

¹⁰ Dādestān ī Dēnīg XXX, 6 (this text is quoted according to the divisions in the edition of Anklesaria).

¹¹ *Journal Asiatique*, 219 (1931), p. 33.

¹² Cf. G. Widengren, *The Great Vohu Manah and the Apostle of God*, Uppsala 1945, p. 60. (In transcriptions from Pahlavi I have not generally noted W or Y added to or omitted from the text.)

¹³ Cf. B. Geiger, *WZKM*, 40 (1933), p. 98-100; E. Benveniste and L. Renou, *Vftra et Vθrayna. Etude de mythologie indo-iranienne*, Paris 1934, p. 32f.

Xwarr, the concept of fortune.¹⁴ Similarly, Ohrmazd is said to have put omniscient wisdom in Zoroaster's hand "in the form of water", which Zoroaster was made to drink.¹⁵ *Dēn*, Avestan *daēnā*, is another instance for this phenomenon. It appears in the form of a maiden in eschatological scenes and has to declare its identity to the man whose religious ego it represents: it is apparently not supposed to be recognized by its mere form.¹⁶

Notwithstanding these observations, the contrast between *mēnōg* and *gētīg* is regularly defined by the adjectives 'invisible' as against 'visible' in the Pahlavi writings.

wimand ī gētīg wēnišnīg gīrišnōmand ciš. harw ce pad pad tan cašm wēnišnīg ud pad tan dast gīrišnōmand gētīg (DkM 120.20–22; reading corrected from facsimile edition, p. [90].13–15) [cf. de Menasce, *Pratidānam* (Festschr. Kuiper), p. 194.]

"The definition of *gētīg* is: a visible, tangible thing. Whatever is visible with bodily eye and tangible with bodily hand is *gētīg*."¹⁷

Or similarly in another text:

a-wēnišnīg mēnōg a-gumēzišn ō wēnāfdāg stī ud wēnišnīg nimūnag, mēnōg-waxšag ruwān andar gētīg-rawišnīg tan nēwag xwadāy kard (Dādestān ī Dēnīg II, 13).

"He made the unseen and unmixed *mēnōg* over to visible existence,¹⁸ a model perceptible by sight. He made the soul, existing in *mēnōg*,¹⁹ the good lord in the body, flourishing in *gētīg*."²⁰

¹⁴ H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 29 ff.

¹⁵ *Zand-i Vohāman Yasn*, ed. B. T. Anklesaria, Bombay 1957, p. 8; cf. Bailey, *op. cit.*, p. 29, n. 2.

¹⁶ Cf. the texts collected by Jal Dastur Cursetji Pavry, *The Zoroastrian doctrine of a future life*, New York 1926, p. 33 ff., and M. Molé, "Daēnā, le pont Činvat et l'initiation dans le Mazdéisme", *RHR*, 157 (1960), p. 155–185.

¹⁷ Cf. for this passage especially the remarks made by P. J. de Menasce in his edition of *Škand-gumānik Vižār*, p. 102 f., where further passages are discussed. Dēnkard III, chapter 123 (DkM 119 ff.), also defines *gētīg* in these terms.

¹⁸ On the term *stī* cf. Appendix B, below p. 89 ff.

¹⁹ The expression *mēnōg-waxšag* as opposed to *gētīg-rawišnīg*, is discussed in Appendix A, below p. 87 ff.

²⁰ The translations of this passage by M. Molé, in his book *Culte, mythe et cos-*

These two modes are also conceived of as being two realms or domains, differentiated as it were geographically, as in the phrase which occurs in the famous catechism of the *Pand-Nāmag*:

az mēnōg mad hēm, ayāb pad gētīg būd hēm? (Pahlavi Texts, ed. Jamasp-Asana, p. 41).

'Have I come from *mēnōg* or have I been originated in *gētīg*? (The proper Zoroastrian answer to this question is, of course, the first alternative).

In this text, however, the underlying meaning of the two terms cannot be made clear only by reference to a cosmological difference between two zones or spheres of existence. There is also a certain value symbolism attached to the two concepts: the first, *mēnōg*, stands for the religious values, and the second represents the secular world. This difference is connected with the idea that *mēnōg* is also a term for the eschatological world and for what it stands for: the trial of the spirits, reward and punishment. A person can be said to attach himself to *mēnōg* as opposed to *gētīg* in the sense that he leads a life dedicated to virtue, constantly meditating about the final judgement.²¹

Apart from this abstract usage of the two terms, they can also denote two classes of individual beings belonging respectively to the two modes of existence. To this category of usage belong phrases like *mēnōgān ud gētīgān*, 'mēnōg and gētīg beings';

mologie dans l'Iran ancien, Paris 1963, p. 478, and M. F. Kanga in *J. M. Unvala Memorial Volume*, Bombay 1964, p. 134, differ from the one offered here. The sense of this passage is close to the one in Škand-gumānik VIĕār VIII, 33: *nun acāri šāyaŕ dānastan ku in gōthi i vīnašnī girašnī az mainyō i avīnašnī agrašnī dāŕ būŕ ǝstǝŕ* "It is now possible to know with certainty that this visible and tangible *gētīg* was created from an invisible and intangible *mēnōg*". The same meaning of *mēnōg* and *gētīg* is also seen in the passage Dēnkard VI, 79 (DkM 488.7-14) about Ardwahišt who is seven months in *gētīg* and five months of the year in *mēnōg*, a statement which is interpreted as referring to the "manifestation" or non-manifestation of the plants.

²¹ A typical text illustrating this point is: *xīr i gētīg a-paymān ne ārayišn, ce gētīg a-paymān-ārāy mard mēnōg-wišōb bawēd* (Dēnkard VI, 149; = DkM 505). "One ought not to embellish the things of *gētīg* in excess of the measure, for a man who embellishes *gētīg* in excess of the measure becomes one who corrupts *mēnōg*".

mēnōgān yazdān, 'the *mēnōg* ones, the gods'; or the expression *mēnōg* when applied to the two antagonistic spirits, Ohrmazd and Ahreman.²³

So much for the definition of the two terms. When they are examined as used in the context of creation,²³ we notice that the *Greater Bundahišn* describes the process by which the world came into being as consisting of three stages. The relevant passage runs as follows:

ōhrmazd pad amahraspandān brīnōmand mad ka-š dād būd hēnd 3 rad. ce-š abāz ō gētīg abāyast dādan, u-š nōg-tar pad tan ī pasēn anāgih az-eš be a-paydāg burdan. u-š dām ī mēnōg mēnōgihā dārēd, u-š dām ī gētīg mēnōgihā dād, u-š did be ō gētīgihā dād (GBd 13.7-13). "Ohrmazd came to be a possessor of time divisions, three periods, through the *amahraspands*, when he created them. For he had to create them back into *gētīg*, and then again to extinguish evil from them in the future body. He holds *mēnōg* creation in *mēnōg* form, he created *gētīg* creation in *mēnōg* form, and he created it again into *gētīg* form".²⁴

We seem to have here two alternative interpretations of an earlier, presumably Avestan, tradition concerning the three periods connected with the creation of the Amahraspands. The first version is incomplete: a reference to the first creation, in *mēnōg*, is missing. This omission can be explained either as the result of a scribal error, or preferably as an ellipse, made by the author, of an obvious idea which the reader is certain to complete for himself. The three stages should be, according to the first

²³ Examples for this can be seen in H. S. Nyberg, *Hilfsbuch des Pehlevi*, II, p. 150.

²³ The main Pahlavi texts which deal with the double creation, *mēnōg* and *gētīg*, have been discussed more than once, but they still await definitive publication. They are most conveniently given in transcription and translation in R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan: a Zoroastrian dilemma*, Oxford 1955, p. 276 ff., where references to earlier literature will be found. Of subsequent publications, some of the remarks on textual matters in M. Molé's article entitled "Le problème zurvanite", *Journal Asiatique*, 247 (1959), p. 431-469, are particularly important. Interesting observations are also made by U. Bianchi, *Zamān i Ōhrmazd*, Torino 1958, p. 95 ff.

²⁴ Cf. M. Molé, loc. cit., p. 438 f., where a somewhat different translation is given.

version: (creation in *mēnōg*), creation in *gētīg*, the eschatological period.

The alternative interpretation tries to distinguish between three moments in creation by itself, without taking eschatology into account. The three stages thus obtained are: (1) *mēnōg* creation in *mēnōg*; then *gētīg* creation (2) first in *mēnōg*, (3) then in *gētīg*. The first, or pure *mēnōg* creation, may not involve a creation strictly speaking at all, for the verb used is *dārēd* "holds". The first moment here indicates a state of existence before any material creation of the world is envisaged; this is followed by a first stage of 'real' creation: the prototype of the material world being fashioned in "ideal" form, which is then translated into *gētīg*. The two interpretations have in common the fact that one of the "three periods" falls outside the proper existence of this world: in the first it is eschatology, in the second it is the periods preceding the proper existence of the universe. Both interpretations of this tradition depend upon the statement that the three periods came into being with the creation of the Amahraspands, which statement belonged, so it seems, to the original Avestan sacred text on which the Pahlavi elaboration is based.

The text of the first chapter of the Bundahišn is in fact based on a conception of creation in three stages, on the lines of this second interpretation.²⁵ It also presents the creation of the world as a process in which the Amahraspands take part.²⁶ The essential trait of the Bundahišn's description is that the world was first formed in a *mēnōg* form, and that this conceptual or *mēnōg* world was later translated into a visible and tangible form, into *gētīg*. This mythology of creation seems to interpret in temporal terms a duality of existence which is taken to characterize life in the world. The *mēnōg* world is taken here to precede *gētīg*. *Gētīg* does not exist on its own. It is foreshadowed by a *mēnōg* prototype, from which it is derived and on which it continues to be in a sense dependent.

The same type of relationship between *mēnōg* and *gētīg* in the context of creation is formulated in theological terms in a

²⁵ This point is made by M. Molé in his analysis of the chapter, loc. cit., p. 442-445.

²⁶ GBd p. 14, ch. I (§ 33-35 in Zaehner's numbering).

number of texts in the third book of the *Dēnkard*. To quote a fairly short but representative chapter:²⁷

*abar dām mēnōgīg āfurdan, az mēnōgih ō gēlīgih rasīdan
paydāgih. az nigēz ī weh-dēn.*

- (1) *hād mēnōg āfurišn bawišn ast ī a-hambūd wāspuhragānīh
ast ī a-wēnišnīg a-gīrišnīg, ud bun ast ī gēlīg.*
- (2) *ud gēlīg dahišn ham-bawišnīg ī bawišn ī mēnōg, ud dahiḡ
ud paydāgih ast ī mēnōg, u-š wāspuhragānīh ast ī wēnišnīg
gīrišnōmand.*
- (3) *ud ēd paydāg ku mēnōg bun ī gēlīg. ēn-ez paydāgih ka gēlīg
ciš az ham-bawišnīh ciš wišāyihēd abāz ō bawišn mēnōg rasēd
ī-š ast bun.*
- (4) *ud mēnōg bawišn ēwaḡ ast ī a-bahr, ōh-ez mēnōg, dādār
fradom azešīg āfurišn ī xwānīhēd bawišn.*
- (5) *ud gēlīg ham-bawēnišnīh dahišn *ast *ī dādār az fradom
azešīg āfurišn bawišn ham-bawēnīd.*
- (6) *ud dām fradom pad mēnōg dād, az mēnōgih gēlīgih āwurd.
weh-dēn nigēz ēn-ez paydāgih.*

“On creating the creatures in *mēnōg*, their manifestation coming from *mēnōg* to *gēlīg*. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

- (1) *Mēnōg* creation is ‘becoming’ (*bawišn*), without adversary. It has a special quality:²⁸ invisible and intangible. It is the root of *gēlīg*.²⁹
- (2) *Gēlīg* production³⁰ is a ‘co-existent’ (*ham-bawišnīg*)³¹ of

²⁷ *Dēnkard* III, chapter 416; DkM 398f.; facsimile edition, p. [310]f. The text corresponds partly to the first part of chapter 105; DkM 98f.; facsimile edition, p. [72]f. [Cf. Gnoll, *AION* N.S. 13 (1963), 187].

²⁸ The latest discussion of the word *wāspuhragān* ‘special, particular’ is by W. B. Henning in *Indo-Iranica, Mélanges Morgensterne*, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 95–97. Numerous occurrences are recorded, especially in *Dēnkard* and *Škand-gumānik Vičār* (VII, 2, the abstracts *pasāxtai ciharanīdai wāspuhargāni*, ‘being fashioned, being given nature and having special qualities’, stand in juxtaposition; and similarly further in the same chapter).

²⁹ This simile occurs more than once. Thus in *Škand-gumānik Vičār* VIII, 24: *gāθī bar ī mainyō vaš mainyō bun*, ‘*Gēlīg* is the fruit of *mēnōg*, *mēnōg* is its root’.

³⁰ There is a consistent terminological distinction between *āfurdan* (*āfurdan*), which is the verb reserved for *mēnōg* creation, and *dādan*, *dahišn*, a verb which

- mēnōg* 'becoming'. It is a product³² and a manifestation of *mēnōg*. It has a special quality: being visible and tangible.
- (3) This is revealed: *mēnōg* is the root of *gēlīg*. This is also a revelation: when a *gēlīg* thing is loosened from 'co-existence', it comes back to 'becoming', *mēnōg*, which is its root.
- (4) *Mēnōg*, viz. 'becoming', is one, undivided. Even this is *mēnōg*, the first originated³³ creation of the Creator, called 'becoming'.

is used when the secondary character of *gēlīg* production is to be emphasized. The etymology of *āfrīdan* favours a spiritual connotation; cf. W. B. Henning, 'Das Verbum des Mittelpersischen der Turfanfragmente', *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, IX, 1933, p. 200f. This verb was exclusively used in the Manichaean texts for expressing the idea of creation, conveyed in Syriac by the verb *qerā*, 'to call'; see F. C. Andreas and W. B. Henning, *Mitteliranische Manichaica aus Chinesisch-Turkestan*, I, Berlin 1932 (Sitzungsberichte der preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, phil.-hist. Klasse, 1932), p. 179 n. 5. H. Junker (*Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 1921-22, p. 134) reads this word *āwurišn*, but this is unfounded. The verb *dādan* was perhaps chosen for *gēlīg* creation because it could convey the notion of a transference or 'giving over' of what has previously existed in *mēnōg*. In the last sentence of our text the verb *āwurd* in which the idea of motion is even more stressed, is substituted. In that phrase it comes in opposition to *dād*, which designates there *mēnōg* creation (*dād* being also used as the general word for creation). [Cf. Gnoli, op. cit., p. 174 and n. 37.]

³¹ The precise meaning of *hambawišn* can be deduced from *hambūd* 'that which exists together, a rival'. In DkM 99.5ff. we read: *ud rōšn mēnōg . . . az a-ham-būd mēnōg bawišn ō ham-bawišn ī hān gēlīg waštān sāyēd* 'the luminary *mēnōg* . . . can turn from *mēnōg* 'being' lacking a rival into the 'co-existence' of that *gēlīg*'. The word is used with a different emphasis in the following passage: *dādār ēwag ēwag stī az bun ī stī nērōg ud waxš az bun ī waxš zōr abāz xwāst, ud ēwēnagōmand ud kar-bōmand pad abēzagīh ō-z ruwān ham-bawēnēd, abāg-ez ruwān anōšagēnēd* (DkM 345.15ff.). 'The Creator has sought back each *stī* from the root of the force of *stī* and each spirit (*waxš*) from the root of the force of the spirit, and he joins them in purity, equipped with *ēwēnag* and *karb*, to the soul, and he makes them immortal, together with the soul'. The precise sense in which this verb and its derivatives are used to designate a stage in the development of the embryo escapes me. It may denote the stage of the embryo's 'differentiation' or 'materialization'. Cf. GBd p. 16, and Zaehner, *Zurvan*, p. 305, note to line 173.

³² *dahīg* 'product' is frequent in the Dēnkard. Cf., e.g., DkM 202.22; 203.2, 5, 6, 8; 208.4, 7; 350.8; 384.5; 417.18; 420.20; 421.5.

³³ *azešīg* 'originated, derived': the existence of this adjective shows that the postposition *az-eš* is not considered merely as a preposition with an enclitic pronoun but constitutes a separate lexeme. On the use of the postposition cf. M. Boyce,

- (5) *Gētīg* is a production brought into 'co-existence', which the Creator caused to come into co-existence from the first originated creation, 'becoming'.
- (6) He produced the creatures first in *mēnōg*; from *mēnōg*-ness he brought out *gētīg*-ness.

This too is a revelation from the instruction of the Good Religion."

The chapter seems to present here the twofold scheme familiar to us now from the Bundahišn. There is the basic opposition between *mēnōg*-creation and *gētīg*-creation, which are designated by the traditional technical terms *bawišn* and *ham-bawišn*, 'becoming' and 'co-existence'. The first term in this twofold scheme, *bawišn*, occupies also the first stage in a fourfold conception of creation, which consists of *bawišn*, *bawišn-rawišnih*, *bawišn-astīšnīh*, *stī*.³⁴ The underlying idea in our chapter is however very close to the one which distinguishes three stages of creation, just like the Bundahišn text discussed above.

It does not seem as if this type of text dealing with cosmogony attaches any greater moral value to one of the two concepts, *mēnōg* or *gētīg*. The only warranted statement which can be made on the basis of these texts is that *mēnōg* is primary and *gētīg* is secondary, not only in the chronological sense, but also in the logical order of things. Thus, *mēnōg* is a datum, a pre-existent fact; it is the root. *Gētīg*, being created, is in need of explanation or justification, and this is done by stating the functions for which it was created.³⁵ Even texts of a more mythological character, in which, for example, the fire or the frawahrs express their

'Some Middle Persian and Parthian constructions with governed pronouns', *Dr. Unwala Memorial Volume*, Bombay 1964, p. 49-56.

³⁴ This scheme is briefly discussed in Appendix B.

³⁵ Thus, for instance, in Dēnkard III, chapter 305 (DkM 350.5-7): "From the 'wheel' (proceeded) the hot-moist 'becoming' possessed of wind; for arresting the demons which reside in *mēnōg*, it is, with assembled forces, the begetter of *gētīg* creations, the seed of seeds" (cf. Appendix D). Zaehner's translation of this passage, *Zurvan*, p. 374, is quite different. The reason given here for engendering *gētīg* creations is the need to check the progress of evil and ultimately to vanquish it; cf. also below, notes 40 and 41.

refusal to be created into the material world and have to be coaxed into willingness,³⁶ cannot be adduced as a proof of the inferior position of *gētīg*. Life in the material world is full of hardship because of the interference of the evil power, but it is not said to be bad by itself. In fact, as we shall see, evil has no 'real' existence in the material world.

A discussion of the position and constitution of *gētīg* occurs in Dēnkard III, chapter 123, which begins with the following definition:³⁷

"*gētīg* is a (mode of) being (*stī*)³⁸ which is visible and tangible in corporeality. Its creation was for that which wages battle against [the oppression and] the oppressor, which itself is repelling the opponent of creation.³⁹ It is connected to the eternal good motion (*jāyēdānīg nēwag-rawišnīh*).

Its work is that for which it was created. This, too, is revealed of it: when there are no *gētīg* creations, the work of repelling the oppressor is not accomplished (lit. the work is bare of repelling the oppressor).⁴⁰

According to this text (and this is a commonplace idea in the Pahlavi literature),⁴¹ the object of the material creation is to

³⁶ For the fire, cf. *Pahlavi Rivāyat*, p. 58 ff., and DkM 796.17 ff.; on the frawahrs, GBd 38.14 ff.

³⁷ DkM 120.15–20, facsimile edition, p. [90]. The text of the chapter is transcribed completely in H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian problems*, p. 205–209, but the reading can now be revised in some points. I had the privilege to read this chapter, as well as other texts, with the Rev. Father J. de Menasce in the winter of 1963, and wish warmly to acknowledge the benefit I derived from him. [Cf. now translation of ch. 123 by de Menasce in *Pratidānam* (Festschrift Kuiper), The Hague-Paris 1968, pp. 193–200.]

³⁸ See P. J. de Menasce, *ŠGV*, p. 102. Bailey's reading, *gēlik hast gēlik*, is not intelligible. The difficulty in reading is caused by the word *stī*, which resembles *gētīg*. The scribes do however distinguish between them by writing *sty* for *stī* and *st'x* (*gy'x*) for *gētīg*. See Appendix B.

³⁹ Reading: *u-š dahišn ō kōxšišnīg ī ōštāb ud ōštābāg ī xwad ast dahišn-hamēštār-spōzīh*. The words *ōštāb ud ōštābāg* appear to be a dittography; the original scribe may have meant to cross out *ōštāb* when he supposedly replaced it by *ōštābāg*.

⁴⁰ *ka nēst hēc gētīg-dahišnān kār brahmag az ōštāb-spōzīh*.

⁴¹ The idea is expressed also in a Pahlavi text which summarizes a lost Avestan original, the Dām-dāt Nask. It says: *abar kunišn *ī dādārīh ud dādan ī dām pahlom*.

serve as the battle-ground for the fight against evil. It is in fact the only plane on which the struggle can at all be favorably decided. It is for this reason that it is crucially important to have a continuous existence of the material world, and for this reason it is also promised that there never will be a period in which man will not exist in the material world,⁴² man being the main carrier of the battle against the evil spirits.⁴³ We thus see here a certain dialectic relationship obtaining between *mēnōg* and *gētīg*. *Mēnōg* is the primary existence, but as it is invisible and immovable, it lacks an aspect of reality. The real clash between the good *mēnōg* and the evil *mēnōg* can only occur on a *gētīg* level. At the same time, however, the fight which takes place between the two parties is not conceived to be a straightforward war between equal rivals. Only Ohrmazd and his creations 'really' exist in *gētīg*, while Ahreman and the demons have no *gētīg* at all,⁴⁴ and they only participate in the life of *gētīg* in a secondary way, parasitically as it were:

dām ī ōhrmazd mēnōg ud gētīg-ez. awe ī druz nēst gētīg, be wad ī mēnōgīh abyōzēd ō gētīg. ce'ōn sam ī hāwandīh-ez drāz andar ēwag, a'ōn abarwēzīh paydāg ī mēnōgān ud gētīgān ī weh abar mēnōgān ī wad (Dd XXXVI, 51; cf. M. Molé,

fradom pad mēnōgīh, cand ud ce'ōn dāstan ī pad mēnōg, waštan ī az-eš, gētīg cīhrēnidag ud sāxtag ō andar ēbgadīg kōšīšn, pallādan ud rāyēnidan ud paywastag šāyastan ō frazām ī drang ī ēbgadīgīh (DKM 681.11-15; facsimile edition, p. [529]f.; cf. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 390, for a slightly different transcription and rendering). "On the making of creation, and creating the creatures best. First in *mēnōg*; how much and in what manner it was kept in *mēnōg*; its being turned away from it; *gētīg* being originated and fashioned for the fight against the Assault; its enduring, its being ordered, and the possibility of its being joined to the end of the period of the Assault". On *drang*, 'period, duration', cf. R. C. Zaehner, *BSOS*, 9 (1937/39), p. 319. See also note 35 above.

⁴² Cf. *Dādestān ī Dēnīg*, pūrsīšn XXXIV, 2 (ed. T. D. Anklesaria, p. 71): *ēn gētīg hamēšag az āfurišn tā-z ō abēzag fraškardārīh hagrez abē-mardom ne būd ne-z bawēd*. "This *gētīg* (world), from its creation to the pure rehabilitation, never was and never will be without man". The whole chapter is transcribed and translated by M. Molé in *RHR*, 155 (1959), p. 157f.

⁴³ Cf. the texts collected by Molé in *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 469ff.

⁴⁴ The theme is discussed in some detail in *Studies in Mysticism and Religion* presented to G. Scholem, Jerusalem 1967, p. 227-234.

Journal Asiatique, 247 [1959], p. 453. I have used here some of the variants which seem preferable to Anklesaria's text).

"The creation of Ohrmazd is both *mēnōg* and *gētīg*, while that of the demon has no *gētīg*: but the evil of *mēnōg* is joined to *gētīg*. Just as there is long fear of (their) having equal power in one (of the contenders), so the victory of the good *mēnōg* and *gētīg* beings over the evil *mēnōg* ones is manifest".

If the function of *gētīg* is to serve as the decisive battle ground between the two powers, it is clear that it was created for this purpose because it affords undeniable superiority to Ohrmazd. *Gētīg* is the place where the existence of Ahreman can be ontologically denied, and where the outcome of the battle can be foreseen with confidence, despite the fear which the apparent equality of powers arouses.

Gētīg is thus the stage where the proper activity of the world takes place, *mēnōg* in a sense becoming, after the stage of creation, a derivative mode of being: it is affected by the events of *gētīg* and seems merely to echo the happenings which go on in *gētīg*.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ This idea is expressed in Zātspram, chapters XXXIII: *ce'ōn nimūd pad handāzūg ud andar nibīgān ī *hanbūdīgān (?) ku awe ke-š andar gētīg kunišn-ē ayāb tawān-*nērōgīh-ē ayāb mehīh-ē ayāb xwēškārīh-ē pad-eš sazāgīg, u-š bandihēd pad rāstīh *ud dārēd pad sād ud sazēnēd, hān ēwēnag dānišn ud tawān-nērōgīh ud mehīh ud xwēškārīh ō hān ī awe ruwān paywandēnd, u-š pad-ez mēnōg ham-brahmagīh pad-eš bawēd*. "As was shown by analogy and in the composite (?) writings, a person who is worthy in the *gētīg* of action, craftsmanship, dignity or a vocation, and by whom it is performed (lit. tied) in truth, and who possesses it for (causing) benefit, and who makes it seemly, the same kind of knowledge, craftsmanship, dignity and vocation will be joined to his soul, and even in *mēnōg* the same manner will be in him". The implication is that one's worth in fulfilling one's vocation in *gētīg* is reflected in one's *mēnōg* position. The observations made by R. C. Zaehner (*Zurvan*, p. 259) are not borne out by the text, even if his reading were accepted. (Incidentally, the membership of the four classes being assigned to the category of *kunišn*, mentioned by Zaehner in this connection, does not presumably mean the fact of *belonging* to the class, which would be absurd, for this is decided by birth; it means rather fulfilling the functions of one's class properly.) The next chapter in Zātspram ends in a statement which phrases this idea sharply: *a'ōn ce'ōn pad gētīg āb-lāzidār būd, hān ī mēnōgīg wārān kardār* (p. 134): "Just as if one was in *gētīg* a pourer of water, and in *mēnōg* a maker of rain". The texts are discussed also by Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 107, who shows the continuity of orthodox tradition on these points.

This aspect of the relationship between *mēnōg* and *gētīg* is particularly prominent in the eschatological descriptions.

The original primacy of *mēnōg* is however not in doubt. All good in this, the *gētīg* world, derives from *mēnōg*, and all evil likewise.⁴⁶ Good and evil in this world are not only derivative, and therefore lacking, as it were, original force, they are also subject to the special condition of this *gētīg* world, which is that of being in a state of 'mixture', *gumēzagīh*. For this reason neither good nor evil can be experienced in this world in their full force, in purity. They are here inextricably welded together. They are blended in such a way that they can only be conceived separate in *mēnōg* or in eschatology: the eschatological moment in this contrast is naturally brought into play for answering questions of theodicy.⁴⁷

How good and evil are conceived to be mixed in *gētīg* can be seen from a passage which describes the evil experienced by the wicked in hell:

u-š nēst andar hēc āsānīh ud xwašīh ud urwahnīh, u-š andar ast hamāg gandagīh ud rīmanīh ud anāgīh ud dušxwārīh. u-š ne hangōšīdag hēc gandagīh ud rīmanīh ud dard ud anāgīh ī gētīgīg, ce ne hangōšīdag gumēzag anāgīh ī gētīgīg ō hān ī-š a-jumāy nēwagīh, u-š dmšn az bun-kadag ī anāgīh (Dd XXVI, 3-5; p. 54). "There is no comfort or pleasure or joy in it. There is in it all stench and pollution and pain and evil and discomfort. No stench and pollution and pain and evil of *gētīg* is similar to it, because the mixed evil of *gētīg* is not similar to that with which there is no goodness, and which issues (?)⁴⁸ from the source of evil".

The text of this chapter, which denies the similarity between the evil of hell, which is *mēnōg* and pure, and that found in the

⁴⁶ This is clearly stated, for example, in chapter VIII of *Škand-gumānik Vičār*.

⁴⁷ This is the theme of *Dādestān ī Dēnīg*, pūrsīšn V, which tries to answer the question: 'Why does evil always come more to the good than to the wicked'. One of the ways to answer this question is to accept the existence of a balance of reward between *mēnōg* and *gētīg*; according to this view one person cannot get reward or punishment twice, on both planes. The idea is also present in the famous 'joyful thoughts' of Ādurbād (DkM 572f., and parallels).

⁴⁸ On the word *dmšn* see Appendix C.

gētīg world, has a parallel in the preceding chapter of *Dādestān ī Dēnīg*,⁴⁹ where a similar idea is expressed with regard to the goodness of paradise in relationship to this world.

In a non-theological context⁵⁰ the same thought occurs in a story which can here be paraphrased: Weh-dād ī Ādur-Ohrmazdān, who was a chief *mōbad*, saw in a place by which he happened to pass two priests (*ērbad*) who carried fire-wood from a mountain on their backs, chanting together the Avesta and the Zand. He questioned them as to the reason for their action, and they answered: As every person must undergo the evil created by Ahreman either in *gētīg* or in *mēnōg*, it seems to us better to go through our share of evil in *gētīg*, where we see, at the same time as we suffer evil, the sun and the moon, where we get food and possessions and remedy for maladies, rather than undergo it in *mēnōg*, in hell, where nothing good is intermixed with the evil.⁵¹

The relationship between *mēnōg* and *gētīg* is also expressed in spatial and temporal terms. *Mēnōg* is unlimited, *gētīg* is limited; *mēnōg* is intransient, *gētīg* is transient:

be pad āgāh-dārīh ī ō gētīgān nimūnag guftan ud nimūdan ī az gētīg ēnyā kanāragōmand abāg a-kanārag, ud a-sazišnīg abāg sazišnīg, ud kahišnīg abāg a-kahišnīg ham-hangōšīdag ne bawēd. ud gētīg ast kanāragōmand ud sazišnīg ud kahišnīg, hān ī a-sar-rōšnih ast a-sazišnīg ud a-kahišnīg (Dādestān ī Dēnīg XXX, 18f.). “Except for the purpose of making known to the people of *gētīg*, telling them and showing them an example taken from *gētīg*, there is no likeness between that which is limited and that which is unlimited, that which is constant and that which is transient, that which diminishes and that which is undiminishing. *Gētīg* is limited, transient,

⁴⁹ Chapter XXV, discussed in Appendix C.

⁵⁰ DkM 571f.; Dk VI, D5. An edition with a translation of Dēnkard, Book Six, is in press.

⁵¹ The same idea about the joy of paradise is also found in Dd XXX, 17. On a cruder level of reasoning, the fact that *xīr ī gētīg*, ‘the things of this, the material, world’, are less perfect than *xīr ī mēnōg*, is explained (in *Mēnōg ī Xrad*, Chapter 12) as due to the influence of the planets on *gētīg*.

diminishing, and the endless light is intransient and undiminishing”.

One should perhaps add that these epithets are applied to the contrast between *gētīg* in the meaning of the actual, transient, life in this world, as against *mēnōg*, the world of eschatology. In GBd, p. 9, the term *mēnōg a-be-wardišnih*, “the non-reversibility of *mēnōg*”, occurs, as one of the phases in the process through which creation came into being.^{51a}

The distinction between the two concepts of *mēnōg* and *gētīg*, it may be not superfluous to point out, is not equivalent to any contrast between divine and human beings or between creating powers and the created world. Such a contrast seems alien to Zoroastrianism.⁵² The world was first created in *mēnōg*, and thus an aspect of creation falls under *mēnōg*. In *gētīg*, on the other hand, there are also divine beings. Thus the usual formula for gods refers to ‘gods (*yazdān*), both *mēnōg* ones and *gētīg* ones’.⁵³

The two worlds, the ideal world of *mēnōg* and the material world of *gētīg*, are thus separate from each other only on the plane of creation and eschatology. In the actual world the separation can only be done by intellectual analysis. Although this is never explicitly said, the actual world could perhaps be described as one of mixture in this sense too, that *mēnōg* and *gētīg* are blended in it together.⁵⁴ This mixture is indeed stated

^{51a} Cf. Molé, *JA*, 247 (1959), p. 435f.

⁵² H.S. Nyberg, *Journal Asiatique*, 219 (1931), p. 34, seems to be wrong when he applies to *mēnōg* the label ‘divine’.

⁵³ Cf., e.g., *Škand-gumānik Vičār* I, 4; *Pahl. Rivāyat*, p. 72.14: *yazdān ī mēnōgān ud yazdān ī gētīgān*. The formula is already Avestan; cf. *xšnūmaine yazatanqm ašaonqm mainyavanqm gaēθyanqm* in Yasna 7, 4; *Altiranisches Wörterbuch*, column 1279.

⁵⁴ Cf. DkM 140.11 ff.; facsimile edition, p. [106]: *andar gumēzagih gētīg ud mēnōg bahrān winārtišn ud kārīgih pad ham-yuxth ud paywastag-zōrīh ī ēwag abāg did būd (- - -) u-šān az wiškanišn ī zōr ēwag az did wišōbišn ud a-kārīh paydāg*. “In the ‘mixture’ the arrangement and the effectiveness of the parts of *gētīg* and *mēnōg* are (attained) by their being joined together and having their powers united with each other. . . . From the separation of their forces from each other there is manifest disintegration and loss of effectiveness”. The term “mixture” here, as elsewhere, refers to the state of the present world, where good and evil are mixed together; the subject-matter of the chapter, however, is the need to enable the

to be an essential condition for its proper functioning. The parables adduced for the way in which *mēnōg* is invisibly present in the *gētīg* world are those of the raw material from which a material object is made, such as the wool from which the woolen garment is fashioned or the parent's seed in the offspring.⁵⁵

Every material object, as well as every intellectual concept, seems to be represented by a *mēnōg* prototype or to have a *mēnōg* counterpart.⁵⁶ At the same time, on the other hand, *mēnōg* ideas have their visible incarnations, as we have seen above.

Various material bodies are said to have a *mēnōg* which dwells in them. It is difficult as a rule to decide whether a *mēnōg* which is associated with a particular object is a 'prototype', which exists separately, or a cosmic *mēnōg* which is inherent in that individual. Sharp differentiation is never made in the texts between the different categories of *mēnōg*, and the distinction may be taken to be irrelevant to the Zoroastrian authors. Separate but inherent *mēnōgs* can however sometimes be clearly noticed in the texts. As an example, the following passage may be quoted. To the question whether Ohrmazd can be seen by the spirits after death a negative answer is given, and the reason is this:

be hān ī ka pad wuzurg-andēših ī dādār mēnōgān gētīgīg-wēnišnīhā paymōzēnd ayāb ō gētīgān mēnōg-sōhišnīg wēnišn abyōzēnd ēnyā, axw pad gētīg-sōhišn mēnōgān dīdan pad hān hangōšīdag lawān ce'ōn ka tanīhā wēnēnd ke-š ruwān andar,

mēnōg and the *gētīg* components of this world to work in harmony and assist each other. That both elements are given equal standing is evident from the discussion which follows in the chapter, where various *gētīg* and *mēnōg* concepts which are dependent upon each other are listed, and a table is drawn to make the point clear.

⁵⁵ The text which presents the theory around the presence of *mēnōg* within *gētīg* in the clearest manner is chapter 191 of Dēnkard III (DkM 202f.; facsimile edition, p. [157]f.); it is given in Appendix D. The idea occurs also in chapter 194 (DkM 207f.; facsimile edition p. [161]f.), and in chapter 276 (DkM 290; facsimile edition, p. [221]).

⁵⁶ Examples are: 'the spirit of the body' of man, *Dādestān ī dēnīg* XV, 7: *mēnōg ī tan ud abāriq weh mēnōgān* (also *ibid.* XVI, 4, 13). 'The spirit of creation' (*mēnōg ī dahišn*) and 'the spirit of the worship of the religion of the Mazdeans' (*mēnōg ī yazīšn ī dēn ī mazdēsān*) are mentioned in Dd XXI, 1. 'The spirit of the Gāthās', DkM 790.14; 'the spirit of the wind', *Zātspram* III, 10, 11; 'the spirit of the sky', GBd 18.13.

ayāb ka ātaš wēnēnd ke-š warhrān andar, ayāb āb wēnēnd ke-š xwēš mēnōg andar ast (Dādestān ī Dēnīg XXX, 5).⁵⁷

"Except in cases when through the great consideration of the Creator, the spirits are clothed in visible *gētīg*, or when *gētīg* people are endowed with sight which is in the nature of *mēnōg* perception, the self (of men) can see the spirits with *gētīg* perception by that similitude, like when bodies are seen in which there is soul, or fire in which there is Warhrām, or water in which its spirit is found".

Every group of objects seems to have its collective *mēnōg* representation.⁵⁸ Such are, for example, the Amahraspands, who represent the 'elements' of this world, each of which is a species of beings. The Amahraspands are described in one place as the *mēnōg* and the *xwadīh*, 'selfness', of *gētīg* beings:

ud abārīg-ez gētīg dahišnān pad hān ī-šān mēnōg amahraspand ke-šān ast xwadīh a-marg, ud pad dēsag sāwišnōmand hēnd, pad ham-dar dādestān hān ī mardom (DkM 43.11-14, facsimile ed. [32].6-8). "And the other *gētīg* creations, as to their *mēnōg*, the Amahraspand, who are their selfness, are immortal, and as to their form are corruptible. Man is in the same category."⁵⁹

In addition to the previous categories of *mēnōg*, every group of *mēnōgs* may have a *mēnōg* idea or chief of its own.⁶⁰ We thus

⁵⁷ Cf. H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 112f.

⁵⁸ A *mēnōg* which represents the totality of a species can be often defined either as denoting a collective of beings or a corresponding abstract notion. Nyberg's contention that all abstracts in Iranian are merely 'disguised' collective nouns (*Die Religionen des alten Iran*, p. 87) does not carry conviction. The opposite can be claimed with equal validity.

⁵⁹ The original Avestan term for this idea is *ratu-* (cf. Yasna 12), sometimes reflected in the Pahlavi term *rad*. Cf. the note of J. Darmesteter in his *Zend-Avesta*, (Reproduction photographique) Paris 1960, I, p. 122f., n. 1.

⁶⁰ This is a probable, though not entirely proven, deduction from certain references which are found in the texts. Thus, in a passage which is concerned with repentance from a sin committed by a person, 'the demon in front of whom he committed that sin' (*hān druz ke pēš wināh kard*) has to depart from the body

obtain several layers of *mēnōg*, which differ from each other by the distance by which they are removed from the material world.⁶¹ Ohrmazd is regarded, in accordance with this conception, as the *mēnōg* of (all) the *mēnōgs*, the ideal prototype of all *mēnōg* existence.⁶² The pure *mēnōg* world, the world of Ohrmazd and the Amahraspands, as well as that of Ahreman and his host, is stated to be eternal. But there must be numerous *mēnōgs* whose existence is ephemeral, or who are at least generated in time. These are, for example, the spirits of the good deeds and of the

of that man and to come in front of the *mēnōg* demon (*druz i mēnōg*: Dēnkard VI, 315; DkM 544). The *mēnōg* demon seems to be a prototype of the individual demons, themselves *mēnōg* beings representing the sins committed by individual people. The arch-demon would seem to be called *mēnōg* to distinguish it from those individual demons which are 'inherent' in the *gēlig* world. Cf. also with regard to Ohrmazd, *infra*, note 62.

⁶¹ We encounter such epithets as: *hān ī ōhrmazdtg xrad, hān ī mēnōgtg xrad* (*Dādestān ī Dēnīg* XXXVI, 13, p. 78) 'The wisdom of Ohrmazd, the *mēnōg* wisdom'. Since every wisdom is a *mēnōg* concept, the epithet may in this case stress the particularly elevated *mēnōg* character attributed to the wisdom of Ohrmazd. *Gēlig* seems also to have several layers of concreteness. In Dēnkard III, 365, the expression 'the finest (or thinnest, keenest: *dārmag-tom*) *gēlig* self' is found, cf. Appendix D.

⁶² *ōhrmazd ī weh dahagān dādār andar-ez mēnōgān mēnōg, u-š mēnōgān-ez wēntšn ōh *ādan ī mēnōgān abar gēligān paydāg* (*Dādestān ī Dēnīg* XXX; 4, Anklesaria's edition, p. 59): 'Ohrmazd, the Creator of the good creatures, is a *mēnōg* even among *mēnōgs*. His being seen by the spirits is similar to what is known of the spirits being seen to *gēlig* beings'. The same idea is expressed *ibid.*, XVIII, 3: *ōhrmazd-ez andar mēnōgān mēnōg*, and XXXVI, 10: *awe ī abartom rōšnān xwadāyān xwadāy-tom mēnōgān mēnōg-tom wispagān ōhrmazd ī dādār*. "He who is the highest of the luminaries, the most lord of the lords, the most spirit of the spirits, Ohrmazd the creator of all"—the peculiar syntax here may suggest an Avestan original to the formula (*wispagān* should be a genitive depending on *dādār* by analogy with *weh dahagān dādār* in Dd XXX, 4, quoted above). The context makes it clear that what is meant is that Ohrmazd stands in the same relationship to *mēnōg* beings as the latter in their turn stand with regard to the visible world. In *Škand-gumānik Vičār* I, 2, *andarica mainyuā mainyō*, we should therefore translate accurately: 'he is a *mēnōg* even with regard to the (other) *mēnōgs*', who are like *gēlig* in relation to him. (The translation '*mēnōg* entre les *mēnōgān*', does not bring this point out with sufficient clarity). Chapter 206 of Dēnkard III (DkM p. 225f., facsimile ed., p. [176]f.; cf. Appendix D) presents a scheme according to which the *mēnōg* and *gēlig* products of Ohrmazd occupy each a supreme position in its class. Among all *mēnōg* beings the *mēnōg* product of Ohrmazd is endowed most with *mēnōg*-ness; and the same applies to the *gēlig* product of Ohrmazd.

bad deeds of man.⁶³ We do not know whether predestination was taken to such an extreme position as to require the pre-existence of all the *mēnōg* correspondences relating to the individual person, or of single events, but it is reasonable to assume that such individual *mēnōgs* were considered to be manifestations of a general and eternal 'idea'.⁶⁴

Man constitutes a problem by itself in this scheme. Here, as in other fields, man represents on a smaller scale the same structural relationship, in this case between *mēnōg* and *gētīg*, which obtains in the world. Man's existence in this world is preceded by a *mēnōg* prototype, which seems to be eternally pre-existent, the *fravaši*, or *frawahr* in Pahlavi; the way in which the *frawahr* is transferred from *mēnōg* existence to 'being clad in flesh' in the *gētīg* world is described in some detail in Dd XXXVI, 25 f.⁶⁵ His material existence in the actual world is a blend of a

⁶³ *mēnōg ī kirbag* is mentioned in an eschatological rôle in Dd XXX, 2. The three spirits, representing the good thought, speech and deed of a wicked person, come to comfort him during the first three nights after his death, according to Dd XXVI, 4. Above, note 60, the expression 'that demon in front of whom the sin was done' was noticed. In Dk VI, 290 (DkM 535), we encounter the idea of a light (*rōšnīh*) which emerges from a good thought, speech or action, leading the man towards *dēn*, and likewise a darkness which is the outcome of an opposite situation. This idea has probably some affinity with that of a *mēnōg* which represents pious deeds or sins, although it shows that the system of thought is not very tight in this respect.

⁶⁴ The ambiguity is striking, and may be conscious, in chapter 137 of Dēnkard III (DkM 140-142; facsimile ed., p. [106]f.). Thus, for example, where there is a scheme of *gētīg-mēnōg* correspondences in the life of the individual person: *gētīg tan* (body) corresponds to *mēnōg ruwān* (soul); similarly *xwāstag* (possession), in *gētīg*, corresponds to *kirbag* (pious work) in *mēnōg*; *āzarm* (honour) to *frārōn-luxšāgīh* (righteous effort); *pādexšāyīh* (rule) to *dēn* (religion); *hudahišn* (good instruction); *dahišn*, 'instruction', is to be discussed in another publication), to *dānāgīh* (knowledge). *Mēnōg* in these correspondences, it should be noticed, is not the 'idea' of its *gētīg* pair, but its pious counterpart.

⁶⁵ The passage is treated in Appendix B. Of the extensive literature on the subject of the *fravaši*, H. Lommel's introduction to Yt. 13 in his *Die Yāst's des Avesta, übersetzt und eingeleitet*, Göttingen-Leipzig 1927, p. 101 ff., and R. C. Zaehner, *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism*, p. 146 f., may be pointed out. That *frawahr* is a permanent *mēnōg* existence of man can best be seen in the passage of GBd 34.10 ff. (text and translation in Bailey, *Zoroastrian problems*, p. 112): 'When during the period of the Assault people die, the body is joined to the earth, the *jān* to the wind, the *ēwenag* to the sun, the soul (*ruwān*) to the *frawahr*'.

purely material body, *tan*, also termed *karb*, and a 'form', *ēwēnag*,⁶⁶ with a soul which marks his existence in the actual world, *ruwān*, the two being linked together by a vital soul, *jān*.⁶⁷

Man is defined as consisting of *tan* and *ruwān*, the latter perhaps signifying in this context all the *mēnōg* forces in man, in the following passage:

ud hān ke xwadīh a-marg u-š paymōzan sāwišnīh hamar-gānīhā mardom ī pad hān ī-šān xwadīh ruwān a-marg, ud paymōzan ī tan andar gumēzaqīh sāwišnōmand, pad hamīh ī āgnēn xwānīhēd mardom ī pahlom hēnd gētīg dahišnān (DkM 43.5 ff.; facsimile edition, p. [32].2 ff.). "That whose self is immortal and whose clothing is corruptible is the totality of men, in whom the self, viz. the soul, is immortal, and the clothing, viz. the body, is corruptible in the state of mixture. They are called men by the combination of both. They are the best of the *gētīg* creations".

Further in the chapter *ruwān* is called 'the guardian of the body' (*ruwān ī pānag ī tan*, DkM 43.15, facsimile edition [32].9), in the moral literature, the opposition between *tan* and *ruwān* denotes the contrast between worldly values and the higher aims of religion, representing the contrast between *gētīg* and *mēnōg* inside man.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ For the constitution of man in general we have a thorough study with a most valuable discussion of sources in the chapter entitled 'Martōm', p. 78 ff., of H. W. Bailey's *Zoroastrian problems*. On the terms *tan*, *karb*, *ēwēnag* see op. cit., p. 96 (where the three are apparently taken to be identical), and p. 118; the identity of *tan* and *karb* is certain. The two terms never come together, and they interchange as variants (cf. GBd 72.11, where DH has *ktp*' for the text's *tn*'). The term *ēwēnag* seems however to be a distinct concept, though close in significance to the other two. The frequent occurrence of the pair *karb ud ēwēnag*, or in reversed order (cf. Bailey, loc. cit.) shows that the two are not identical. *Tan* and *ēwēnag* also come side by side, as for example: *tan abāz wirāyēd, ēg-šān ēwēnag be dahēnd* (GBd 223.8; Bailey, p. 97): "He restores the body, then *ēwēnag* is given to them". It may be assumed that *tan* or *karb* both mean the physical body, while *ēwēnag* means perhaps the 'shape' of the body. This would explain why *ēwēnag* 'is implied' in the *karb*, as noticed by Professor Bailey (loc. cit.).

⁶⁷ The way in which *jān* and *ruwān* come from "mēnōg existence" to "being clad in *gētīg*" is described in Dd XXVII, 2.

⁶⁸ Cf., e.g., *Pahlavi Texts*, ed. Jamasp-Asana, p. 148 f., 153 § 76; p. 50 § 55.

The function of *jān* is defined in the following manner:

*ōh-ez guft *pēšēnīg frazānagān ku jān ast mēnōg ī zīwēnāg andarg ruwān ud tan. tā ruwān ham-kadag ī tan zīndagīh dārēd tan, widard tan zīndagīh ī ruwān ast* (Dd XXII, 4).

"The ancient wise men said thus too: *jān* is the vivifying spirit between *ruwān* and *tan*. As long as the *ruwān* is a dweller of the body, it (*jān*) keeps the body alive. Once the body has departed, it is the life of the *ruwān*".

In the scheme which occurs in chapter 137 of Dēnkard III,⁶⁹ visualized in the table given at the end of that chapter, *jān* occupies a mediating position between *tan* and *ruwān*, and also, interestingly, between *gētīg* and *mēnōg*. *Jān* has an affinity with the wind, *wād*,⁷⁰ which itself occupies an ambiguous position in the division of the world into *mēnōg* and *gētīg*: it is not directly visible, but it is perceptible through its action.

The ethical or religious self of man has its own representation in the form of *dēn*, which also plays a part in his judgement after death, but which is at the same time an objective existence of a social and perhaps also cosmic nature.⁷¹ Man's activity in the actual world is marked by several *mēnōg* beings; there is, as it were, a *mēnōg* echo or reflection to every thought, speech or deed of man in the actual world.⁷² As a species man is represented in *mēnōg* by Ohrmazd,⁷³ just as the other earthly elements are

⁶⁹ DkM 140-142; facsimile edition, p. [106]f.; above, note 64, for a partial summary.

⁷⁰ Cf., e.g., GBd 34.10ff., quoted above, note 65.

⁷¹ The ambiguity is already Avestan. The attempts to distinguish between two separate concepts miss a characteristic point of Zoroastrian thought, for this ambiguity is typical of *mēnōg* notions. On *daēnā* cf. above, note 16. As opposed to the *fravaši*, which is an eternal *mēnōg* person, *dēn* is chiefly man's religious consciousness in this world and his moral self after death.

⁷² Above, note 63.

⁷³ GBd 33.15ff., 163.8f.: *u-š gētīg daxšag mard ī ahlaw ke mard ī ahlaw rāmēnīd ayāb bēšīd ēg-eš ohrmazd rāmēnīd ayāb bēšīd bawēd*. "His (sc. Ohrmazd's) *gētīg* mark is the righteous man. Whoever has caused a righteous man joy or affliction, has caused joy or affliction to Ohrmazd". Cf. Lommel, *Die Religion Zarathustras*, p. 106f. On the mythological plane man is represented by Gayōmard.

represented by the Amahraspands.⁷⁴ At the same time, however, by a different approach, every part of man is said to belong to a particular *mēnōg*: man's non-material faculties belong to Ohrmazd, while the components of his body are divided between the Amahraspands.⁷⁵

Apart from these instances, which belong to what may be called the *mēnōg* accompaniment to man's earthly existence, there is also man's involvement with the world of *mēnōg* beings, his relationship to the cosmic beings on the *mēnōg* plane. Man's function on earth is to fight the demons and to help the good spirits,⁷⁶ and the relationship formed between man and the cosmic spirits is quite intimate. The spirits, apparently both good and evil, wish to reside in man, and man's duty is to try and drive away the evil spirits from him while making the good spirits take dwelling in him.⁷⁷ The phrase 'a man's *Srōš*', occurs, *Srōš* being the spirit of obedience, one of the major divinities of Zoroastrianism.⁷⁸ Such a phrase makes it possible to assume that the conception of divine spirits should be taken in a more abstract

⁷⁴ Cf. Lommel, loc. cit.

⁷⁵ GBd 196.1-5; cf. A. Götze, *ZII*, 2 (1923), p. 70; G. Widengren, *The Great Vohu Manah*, p. 53.

⁷⁶ *ōhrmazd ī xwadāy harw dām ēn-ez 2 sūd rāy dād, ēbgad pad-eš absihēnīdan ud gugāhīh ī xwēš rāy* (DkM 502.12ff.; facsimile ed., p. [392].7ff.; Ms. K43, fol. 199v). "The Lord Ohrmazd created every creature even for these two benefits, in order to annihilate through it the Assault, and so as to have a witness for himself". According to Ādurbād son of Zardušt every person should know the answer to a number of questions, one of which is: "For what purpose am I here (sc. in this world)?" (*cim ēdar hēm*). The correct answer is, "I am here in order to make the demons powerless" (*a-pādexšāy kardan ī druz rāy ēdar hēm*): DkM 573.18ff.; facsimile ed., p. [454].

⁷⁷ To quote but one example: . . . *hamē tā mard kirbag ud ahlāyīh menēd ēg yazd ī andar tan andar tan mānēnd ud dēwān staw bawēnd ud be šawēnd* (DkM 524.18ff.; facsimile ed., p. [412]f.). "As long as a man thinks pious deeds and righteousness, the gods which are in his body remain in the body, and the demons are beaten and depart".

⁷⁸ Cf. the following quotation from Dēnkard VI, 90: "Just as among vessels of gold, silver and other metals, those which are purer and freer from defects have sweeter sound, so also a man who is purer in the things of the gods and freer from defects in himself, . . . his *Srōš* produces the best sound . . ." (*ēg-eš srōš wāng ī pahtom barēd*, DkM 491; facsimile ed., p. [382]; Ms K43, fol. 191r.). An alternative rendering of the latter phrase could be: "Srōš produces for him the best sound", which does not go against the observations offered here.

manner than the apparent wording of many passages suggest; one must reckon with the possibility that certain mythological formulations were understood in a figurative sense. There is, it should be remembered, a high degree of abstraction in Zoroastrian literature right from the *Gāthā*, where the whole pantheon consists of terms which denote abstract ideas. Even when they are conceived in the most personified manner, they never seem to lose their character as concepts, as general abstractions.⁷⁹ On the other hand, it is very likely that on the lower level of religion these expressions were taken literally, and the concepts of demonology, as well as those connected to the relationship between man and the good spirits, were understood in concrete form.

Man in the actual world is thus presented as the main battleground for the spirits. The outcome of the battle is in fact entirely dependent on man, the ultimate victory is effected by man's ability to vanquish the demons within himself.⁸⁰ In this we have another instance to the 'echo' character of *mēnōg*: the fate of the *mēnōg* world is determined by the battle conducted here by man.

The relationship between *mēnōg* and *gētīg*, as we have seen it work in the actual world, can now be examined against the conception of eschatology. Eschatology presents a well-known problem in the history of religions, which I believe can be solved in the context of Iranian religion by reference to the structure outlined above. It consists in the Pahlavi texts⁸¹ of three distinct themes: individual eschatology (i. e., life after death, individual judgement and reward, paradise and hell), apocalypse (the cataclysm leading to the end of the world and the figure of the Saviour), and universal eschatology (resurrection, universal judgement, the rehabilitation of the world).

The problem arises from the duplication of events,—the double ordeal, judgement and reward, resurrection coming after what

⁷⁹ This observation does not include, of course, the divine persons which do not form part of the original Zoroastrian system, such as Mithra, Anāhitā etc., or the mythological figures, such as Gayōmard etc.

⁸⁰ Cf. Dēnkard VI, 130 (DkM 501; K43, fol. 198v.f.); 264 (DkM 530f.; K43, fol. 211r.).

⁸¹ As well as in the fully developed Judaeo-Christian tradition. The clearest general account of the events of eschatology according to the Pahlavi sources is to be found in R. C. Zaehner, *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism*, p. 302 ff. Several pertinent remarks are made by Molé, *RHR* 162 (1962), p. 211 ff.

seems like eternal bliss in paradise for the righteous, etc. To quote J. Duchesne-Guillemin: 'Les âmes jouissent de la béatitude dans la Maison du Chant, dans la lumière, dans la présence de Dieu. Pourquoi faut-il alors qu'il y ait une résurrection? A quoi bon le corps, instrument de lutte, quand la lutte est finie?' That author concludes: 'Deux doctrines, évidemment, ont cherché à se combiner: celle de l'immortalité de l'âme et celle de la résurrection des corps' (*La religion de l'Iran ancien*, p. 352).⁸²

When we consider, however, that in the field of eschatology, just as in the parallel subject of creation, the interplay between *mēnōg* and *gēlīg* must have occupied an important position in Iran, whether completely consciously or only partly so, the conception of Zoroastrian eschatology may seem more coherent.

Interpreted in these terms, the first, or individual stage in eschatology means a transference of man, at death, from the material world into *mēnōg*. This removal follows a certain period of transition, during which it is apparently not entirely clear whether the separation of man's *mēnōg* aspect, notably the soul, and his body, is going to be final. This transition of the *mēnōg* parts of man at death back to the *mēnōg* world is compared to the birth of man, at which the same *mēnōg* constituents move from *mēnōg* to settle in *gēlīg* existence. In both cases this is a critical process, fraught with danger, and should be accompanied by the appropriate religious rites.⁸³ Death is thus regarded as an inverse reflection of birth; it is the individual's birth into *mēnōg*.

⁸² The problem was earlier formulated by H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 116f. One ought however to remark that the observations on *Dādestān ī Dēnīg* XXX, 9, on p. 117 of *Zoroastrian Problems* (followed by Duchesne-Guillemin), are not quite accurate. The text is: *ud āmār ī pad wināh ud kirbag abar wahištīgān ne bawēd. xwad andar ēn mādiyān škišt purstšnīh, ce ruwān ī widardagān be ō wahišt kard-āmārih ud tuxt-*wināhīh ēdōn rasēd *ku-š tā fraškard anōh gāh ud ō nōg āmār a-niyāz.* "There is no reckoning for sins or pious deeds with the people of paradise. The question itself in this matter is surprising, for the souls of the departed reach paradise having their reckoning done and having their sins atoned for, in such a way that they have their place there until the Renovation and there is no need for a new reckoning". The question asked of Mānušcihr at the beginning of this chapter clearly referred to the problem of whether the just in paradise undergo reckoning while they are there, and Mānušcihr regards this as a 'surprising' question. There is no talk here of the problem of the double judgement.

⁸³ Cf. Dd XXVII.

When death in *gētīg* is total, the life of the soul after death begins, this being a summary and a judgement of life on earth. The descriptions of it in the Pahlavi literature suggest a dramatic reflection of man's ethical accomplishment in actual life. This stage of eschatology, conducted as it is in purely *mēnōg* terms, consists essentially of an ethical echo of one's *gētīg* life.

Universal eschatology, on the other hand, is entirely enacted in *gētīg*. The events leading to the rehabilitation of the world, the events of the apocalypse, constitute a phase in the history of the world in which the battle between the two ethical principles becomes fiercest, and the conditions of material life sink lowest. The world undergoes a considerable worsening of its situation. This stage in the life of the world is comparable to the death pangs in the life of the individual. Then comes the final stage of eschatology. The world does not cease to be, nor does it stop being *gētīg*. But *gētīg* existence itself undergoes profound change. It is no longer a 'mixture' but is purified from evil and elevated.

ōhrmazd abāg srōš-ahlaw ul ēstēd ud srōš-ahlāyīh āz be zanēd, ōhrmazd gannāg-mēnōg . . . yašt-ē be kunēd ud zamīg 3 nēzag bālāy ul šawēd . . . pad panjom yašt ō star pāyag rasēd ud garōdmān az hān gyāg frōd ō star-pāyag āyēd (Pahlavi Rivāyat accompanying Dd, p. 156f.).⁸⁴

"Ohrmazd will stand up together with Srōš the Righteous. Srōš's Righteousness will smite (the demon) Āz (concupiscence), and Ohrmazd will smite the Evil Spirit. He will perform a sacrifice, and the earth will rise to the height of three spears . . . , at the fifth sacrifice, it will reach the station of the stars and Garōdmān (the highest paradise) will descend from its place down to the station of the stars".

The text goes on to say that Ohrmazd, the Amahraspands, all the gods and men will be together in one place. At the same time the world also sheds away some of the distinctive marks of

⁸⁴ Cf. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 117; Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 89. The same idea occurs also in DKM 824.11 ff.; West *SBE*, XXXVII, p. 235) and Widengren (*Hochgottglaube*, p. 119) understood the passage as containing a reference to Mithra, but this is unfounded.

materiality. There is no more hunger, thirst, old age or death. There is sexual satisfaction without procreation:

mardom pad tan dād ī 40 sālag humānāg hamāg a-ōš ud a-murg ud a-zarmān ud a-sūyišn ud a-pūyišn (Pahlavi Rivāyat, p. 157.10 ff.);

ka-šān pas az hān gōšt-xwarišnīh ne abāyēd pad hān cim rāy ce-šān pad harw zamān mazag xwašīh ī hamāg gōšt andar dahān ēstēd (ibid., p. 158.8 ff.).

“They will not need to eat meat, because they will have the sweet taste of meat always in their mouth”,⁸⁶

ud mard ud zan ēwag abāg did kāmāg bawēd rāyēnēnd ud kunēnd be-šān zāyišn ne bawēd (ibid., p. 158.12 ff.).

“men and women will have desire for each other and will satisfy it, but they will have no offspring”.⁸⁶

In these details it is clear that the change that occurs in the eschatological existence does not imply a transformation in the essential nature of *gētīg*; only what may be termed the unpleasant weight of *gētīg* existence is removed, while pleasurable experiences lose nothing from their effect. The elevation or purification of *gētīg* in eschatological times does not imply any negative attitude towards earthly pleasures, as has sometimes been concluded by scholars.⁸⁷ This is *gētīg* existence, one might say, which has become nearly *mēnōg*; or, more accurately, it has come as close to *mēnōg* as it is possible to do without ceasing to be *gētīg*. For Zoroastrianism, the ideal type of existence is one which combines ‘the best of both worlds’, in a very literal sense.

Thus, if our interpretation is correct, there is a parallel movement in individual and universal eschatology. The individual moves from *gētīg* existence (made worse by death pangs) over to *mēnōg*; the world moves from *gētīg* existence (through a debased stage) over to a purified, *mēnōg*-like, *gētīg* eschatological epoch.

⁸⁶ Cf. also Dd XXXIV, 3.

⁸⁶ Cf. also *Pahlavi Texts*, p. 107.

⁸⁷ See R. C. Zaehner, *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism*, p. 313.

In addition, however, the human *mēnōg* returns, in resurrection, to the purified *gētīg* of the world, and thus comes to its ultimate fulfilment, which is an existence in an elevated kind of *gētīg* where the distinction between *mēnōg* and *gētīg* is perhaps neutralized. The whole history of the world is seen as a kind of dialectic movement: from *mēnōg* creation into *gētīg* actuality, and thence into the reality of *gētīg* endowed with the advantages of *mēnōg*.⁸⁸

APPENDIX A

mēnōg-waxš(ag)

The fixed idiomatic expression *mēnōg-waxš*, *mēnōg-waxšag* (or *waxšīg*), which occurs in *Dādestān ī Dēnīg* II, 13 (cf. above, p. 63), where it comes in antithesis to *gētīg-rawišnīg*, deserves to be noticed in detail.¹ It seems to be characteristic of the style of Mānušcihr, though it occurs at least once outside the treatise *Dādestān ī Dēnīg*, in DkM 350.5–7.² The following passages help to establish the precise meaning of this expression.

jān ud ruwān ka az mēnōg-waxš be ō gētīg-paymōgih rasēd
(Dd XXVII, 2): "When the *jān* and the soul come from *mēnōg* existence to being clad in *gētīg*".

⁸⁸ If this attempt at a structural interpretation of Zoroastrian eschatology in terms of *gētīg* and *mēnōg* is accepted, it may conceivably be used as an argument in the old debate about the possibility of Iranian influence in the development of Judaeo-Christian eschatology. The fact that the duplication of eschatological events makes good sense in Iran, forming as it seems to do an essential part of an organic whole, and the complementary fact that this is not the case in Judaism, should not be regarded as less significant than the observation, so often made in this connection, that certain eschatological themes are not to be found in the scanty remains of ancient Zoroastrian literature. There can be little doubt that the choice of themes which have survived in the fragments of the Avesta is not comprehensive.

¹ Several examples are quoted by H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 118f. For the word *waxš* and its derivatives cf. also H. W. Bailey, *BSOS*, 6 (1930/32), p. 280f.; *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 105, note 1 (in the example from GBd 178.15 ff., quoted there, it would seem more natural to take *waxšagih* as the antithesis to **tanēgirdih*).

² The whole chapter is given in Appendix D; it also contains similar expressions, such as: *waxšōmand mēnōgān* (DkM 349.10f.); *mēnōg ī waxš-nērōg*, opposed to *mēnōg ī cīhr-nērōg* (ib., lines 7–8).

In this passage an idiomatic play on words occurs, similar to the one which can be noticed in Dd II, 13. The material counterpart to *mēnōg-waxš* here is *gētīg-paymōgīh*.

az hān ce'ōn pāsbānīh ud pānagīh ī gētīgān az dādār framān srōš-ahlāy xwēškārīh, ud āmārgar-ez pad setōš ēwag srōš-ahlāy, hān ī ruwān 3 rōz ud šab mēnōg-waxš gāh andar gētīg pānagīhēd pad hān ī srōš pādārīh ud āmārihēd pad-ez hān ī srōš āmārīh (Dādestān ī Dēnīg XXVII, 6): "As the preservation of and guardianship over *gētīg* creatures is the work of Srōš the Righteous, by the Creator's command, and the one who does the reckoning during the three days following death is also Srōš the Righteous alone—that soul [of a person who has just died] is guarded by the guardianship of Srōš and is reckoned with through the reckoning of Srōš for three days and nights, a period of *mēnōg* existence inside *gētīg*".

We notice here again that *mēnōg-waxš* comes in close relationship to *gētīg*, though they do not form here a parallel.

harw 3 andar dāmān meh, u-š mehmānīh pad pahlomīgān mardān ahlawān, mēnōgīg, pad hān ī abēzag frawahr mēnōg-waxšihā ō druz kōxšāg ud spōzāg ud wānāg ud ānābāg, hān ī yazdān spāh zōrēnāg, mēnōg xwadāyīh ī ōhrmazd. gētīgīhā, pad gētīg paymōgīh, hambandīh ī tan ud jān (Dd I, 3): "All three are the greatest among the creatures. In *mēnōg* their residence in the best righteous men is by the fact that the pure *frawahr* is, in *mēnōg* existence, a fighter against the demons, one who rejects them, vanquishes them and weakens them, one who strengthens the army of the gods, the *mēnōg* lordship of Ohrmazd. In *gētīg* (their function is) to connect the body to the *jān* by being clad in *gētīg*".³

This passage is particularly illuminating as we have in it, besides the contrast *mēnōg-waxšihā: pad gētīg-paymōgīh*, also the explicatory opposition *mēnōgīg — mēnōg-waxšihā*, which parallels *gētīgīhā — pad gētīg-paymōgīh*.

³ Cf. for this passage M. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 475; M. F. Kanga, in *Indo-Iranica, Mélanges G. Morgenstierne*, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 100.

Another relevant passage is somewhat more difficult to interpret. The following reading is offered tentatively:

*anōh haspihast ud ēstēd mēnōg-waxšīg hān ī band-drubuštīh ke-š harwisp bandān nigāh *ud aweš xwad ast wuzurg xwarr ke-š harwisp bandān nigāh ud dēn ī abēzag ī gumān-wizār brāzihast bāmīg ud dūr-pērōg ce'ōn a-sazišn-yazdān (?), star-pēsīd mēnōgān-tāšīd weh-dēn ī mazdēsān, ēdōn-ez brāzīd rōšnān ī purr-xwarrān (Dd XXXVI, 35): "There (sc. in Garōdmān) came to rest⁴ and there stands in mēnōg existence that barricade-fortress which has the supervision of all barricades, and to it itself (belongs) the great splendour (xwarr), which has the supervision of all barricades; the pure religion, resolving doubts, shone, lustrous and with far-reaching radiance,⁵ like the incorruptible gods (?),—the good religion of the Mazdaeans, star-ornamented, fashioned by the spirits, thus also shone the luminaries full of splendour".⁶*

The passage is by no means lucid, partly because it is not easy to assign each of the epithets which it contains to its appropriate owner. It seems, however, that the 'barricade-fortress' in *Garōdmān*, the supreme heaven, is meant to represent the Mazdaean religion, mentioned at the end of this passage.

APPENDIX B

*stī*¹

The word *stī* has two distinct uses. It designates an abstract notion, 'existence, being', as well as the individual possessor of

⁴ For the verb *haspih-* cf. R. C. Zaehner, *BSOS*, 9 (1937-39), p. 901. The reading here is assured by the occurrence of the corresponding noun in a similar context earlier in the same chapter, in § 17 (Dd, ed. Anklesaria, p. 81): *ud ēwarzēnd ō haspēn pad hān ī amahraspandān abāgīh ud hān ī dādār xwarr*: 'and they arrive for resting in the company of the Amahraspands and the *xwarr* of the Creator'.

⁵ The word *pērōg* 'radiance' has two alternative spellings in the Pahlavi script: *pylwk'* (as given here and in DkM 421.6; 434.18), and the more archaic spelling *ptlwk'* (*Zātspram* V, 3; XXXV, 40).

⁶ M. Molé, in *RHR*, 155 (1959), p. 150f., gives a different translation of this passage.

¹ See above, note 38 (p. 70), and the text from *Dēnkard* III, chapter 123.

being, a person or a thing. As there are a number of other terms for existence in Middle Persian, it would be of interest to try and define the meaning of *stī* more closely, in a way which would distinguish it from *astīh*, *astīšn(ih)*, both of which designate 'being, existence'. The term *astīh* has a negative counterpart, *nēstīh*, and so it can be taken to imply the positive fact of being as against non-being. It occurs also in contrast to *paydāgīh*, the two forming the pair of notions 'being' and 'manifestation', in Dēnkard III, chapter 132 (DkM 132 f.; facsimile edition, p. [99]f.; cf. Zaehner, *BSOS*, 9 (1937–39), p. 871 f., 880):

abar astīh ud paydāgīh ud juttarīh ī astīh az paydāgīh.

"On being and manifestation, and the difference between being and manifestation".

The text of the chapter also contains a nice contextual contrast between *astīh* and *stī*:

**astīh hamāyīg ohrmazd-dādār, ud dēn-dānāgīh ī-š pad nērōg, ud *gāh ud gyāg ī-š stī abar, ud zamān ī-š ast hamāyīgīh.*

paydāgīh ī-šān astīh hān ī ohrmazd-dādār az dahišn kardagīh, hān ī dēn-dānāgīh saxwan ī kāmīg ud dānāgīhā kār, hān ī zamān ud gāh pad zamān andar gyāg dādan šāyastan-ez ī dahišn.

*ud juttarīh ī astīh az *paydāgīh ēn-ez ka hān astīh [ī] abē-paydāg *be ō mardom pad-xwadīh būd, was būdan šāyēd: a-bun, bun ud bunōmand ast ī a-paydāg ō mardom, ud ne hēc paydāgīh ī abē-astīh būdan šāyēd.*

"Being is: the eternal Ohrmazd, the Creator; the knowledge of religion which he has in his power; space and place upon which his *stī* is found; time which is his eternity.

The manifestation of their being is: as for Ohrmazd the creator, from the activity of creation; as for the knowledge religion, speech which expresses will and action done with knowledge; as for time and space, to be able to create in time and place.

The difference between being and manifestation is this: when a non-manifest being belongs to a man's selfness, it can be of many (kinds): it is either without root, (being itself) a root, or having a root, and is non-manifest to man.

There can be nothing manifest which lacks being."

The term *astīh* clearly refers to the fact of being: *stī* can be said here to imply the being of a particular individual: this meaning will be discussed further in this Appendix.

If *astīšn* has a characteristic connotation which would differentiate it from *astīh*, it probably is the fact of being in a place or in time: *astīšn* does not seek to affirm the existence of an object or a person, but rather to define and attach or relate it.² The contrast between *astīšn* and *stī* is seen in the following passage:

abar astīšn ud winārišn ī harw 2 mēnōg pad xwēš stī (DkM 831.17-18): "On the existence and the arrangement of the two *mēnōgs* in their own (mode of) being".

The term *stī* ought, apparently, to be taken in a more restricted meaning than that of *astīšn*: it seems to designate a manner or mode of being. A similar meaning can be noticed in the following passage:

bawišn stī ī pad hamīh ī nērōg ī waxš ud zōr ī mēnōg gōhr az dādār mēnōgīg bawēnīdārīh (DkM 345.6-8): "bawišn is a (mode of) being which the creator brings into existence in *mēnōg* form through the conjunction of the power of *waxš* and the force of the *mēnōg* substance".

A definition using similar terminology is given to *ham-bawišn* (DkM 345.8-10). In the passage quoted above, Dk III, chapter 123 (DkM 120.15 ff.), the word *stī* is used in the same manner.³

² In the term which occurs in the theological discussions of the process of creation, *bawišn-astīšnih*, and which comes in opposition to *bawišn-rawīšnih* (see further below in this Appendix), the element *astīšn* can be taken to imply the stage in which 'becoming' comes to be established and fixed, whereas in *bawišn-rawīšnih* the movement and change are probably implied.

³ Likewise in *Škand-gumāntk Vičār* IV, 16, 21: *stī ī rōšanā* in the Pazand text (in the edition of J. de Menasce transcribed in both case *stīh* but translated *gētīh*,

As *stī* seems to designate a mode of being, it is often qualified by an adjective or some other qualifier which specifies the particular kind of existence intended. Thus several occurrences of the combination *rōšn stī* 'luminous entity' are recorded:

abar drōzanīh ī arš dēw ud jud-bunīh ī rōšn ud tam, ud wehīh ī hān ī rōšn stī pad wizīn ud waršt ud wadīh ī hān ī tam (DkM 829.5-7):

"On the deceit of the demon Arš, and the separate origin of light and darkness, and the goodness of the luminous being through choice and action, and the evil of the dark (being)".⁴

The soul of man is also said to be *rōšn-stī* 'of luminous existence', or 'luminous entity' (DkM 18.13; 286.6, 14f.).⁵

Another adjective which is found to qualify *stī* is *gētīgīg*:

ud ka ō gil-paymōgīh⁶ ī stī ī gētīgīg paydāgīh frēstihast (DkM 434.12-13, facsimile ed., p. [493]):⁷ "when he (sc. Zoroaster) was sent to appear in a garment of clay, which is *gētīg* (mode of) being".

The same process is described in similar terms with regard to a different subject in the following passage:

*u-š brihēnīd be ō pītān-paymōzīh ī awad ast stī [ī] paymōgīh-ez gil ī *tanīg ahlawān frawahrān* (Dd XXXVI, 25; cf. H. W.

probably an error of oversight. The term is properly interpreted in the glossary and the detailed commentaries).

⁴ The term is somewhat differently translated in M. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 205.

⁵ Cf. J. de Menasce in his edition of *Škand-gumānik Vičār*, p. 157, 237f.

⁶ The reading *gil-paymōgīh*, literally 'being clothed in clay', is undoubtedly right. H. W. Bailey reads *karp-patmōkīh* (cf. following note), but the text has only one *-p-*. The reading *gil-* is confirmed by DkM 816.13 *gil-karb* (cf. H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 29), where the word *gil* is written by the ideogram TYNΛ. Cf. also *Pahlavi Rivāyat*, ed. Dhabhar, p. 136.12f.: *u-š mardom az hān gil ke-š gayōmard az-eš kard . . .*, and the expression *gil-šāh*, used as an epithet of Gayōmard (DkM 29.1f.), which survives in NPersian (cf. *Burhān-i Qāfi'*, ed. Mo'ni, III, Tehran 1342, p. 1826f.).

⁷ Cf. H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 33.

Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 33, note 1, p. 112, note 2; G. Widengren, *The Great Volu Manah*, p. 51; M. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 106).

"He fashioned forth the righteous *frawahrs* towards being clad in flesh, which by itself is a (mode of) being whose garment is the bodily clay".

The text goes on to describe the process by which the *frawaši* come to material existence:

u-š payrāst ku zamānag zamānag pad xwēš gōhrag ēstēnd ud rasēnd be ō gētīg paymōgīh, hān ī gilān-ramag-ez, tā bawandag ō hān ī zamānag kār zāyēnd . . . (Dd XXXVI, 26; Molé, loc. cit.). "He established that from time to time they should stand by their own substance and come to the garment of *gētīg*, that which is of the flock of clay, until there are born in order to accomplish the work of the time (the following persons:) . . .".

In these two passages *stī* and *paymōgīh* stand in close proximity to each other and seem to correspond to *gētīg-paymōgīh*, but the best sense of the text seems to be obtained when we do not try to emend one of the two expressions so as to conform to the other, thus achieving perhaps a superficial parallelism.

The term *stī* occurs also in a Pahlavi summary of the lost Spand Nask of the Avesta as one of the aspects of the human existence of Zoroaster, in the series *stī, frawahr, xwarr*,—a series of notions from which it is obvious that *stī* cannot be taken to denote merely 'existence'. Each of these notions was first created in *mēnōg* and then transferred into *gētīg* (DkM 690.12–14).⁸

The concept of *stī* is clearly and sharply defined in chapter 194 of Dēnkard III (DkM 207–208). The process of the world's creation is analyzed as consisting of four stages, starting from *bawišn*, which is defined as unformed, primary matter. The simile for this stage in the organic world is the parent with regard to his offspring; in the human world the simile is that of the raw material from which the artisan fashions an object. The second aspect in this process is the one called *bawišn-rawišnīh*, defined as the

⁸ Cf. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 276f.

form (*dēsag*) given to the offspring inside the parent and to the object by the artisan. The next stage, or aspect, in this process is *bawišn-astīšnīh*, which seems to signify, by a simile, the embryonal stage in the organic world and the elementary stage of fashioning forth a material object by an artisan. The whole process is finished by the emergence of *stī*, which is the completed, individuated, fully-qualified being:

*ud stī wimandīg ēw-lāgīg tanān, ce'ōn wahmān ciš wahmān kas, cihrīg, ce'ōn bawandag nigārdagih ī zahag andar burdār uruθwar,*⁹ *ud kīrrōgīg, nāmcīštīg abisar ud dēm ī kīrrōg zar-rēgar az zarr, ud nāmcīšt taxt ud dar ī kīrrōg dōrgar az dār kunēd; ud stī būdag ast ī az bawišn-astīšnīh, [ce'ōn dēm gōwēd ku az bawišn-astīšnīh]*¹⁰ *be stī frāz būd. ud az stī nāmcīštīg ciš ud kas ud kār ī hān ciš ud kas, ce'ōn dēm gōwēd ku az stī be hān ī andar harw 2 mēnōg ō ham būd, frārōnīh ud abārōnīh* (DkM 208.14–22, cf. facsimile ed. p. [162].17–[163].3): “The definition of *stī* is the individual bodies, like such-and-such a thing, or such-and-such a person; (as regards) nature, as the complete acceptance of form of an offspring in the womb, (as regards) craftsmanship, a particular crown or diadem which a skilled goldsmith makes of gold, or a particular bed or door which a skilled carpenter makes from wood. *Stī* comes into being from *bawišn-astīšnīh*, [for the Religion says that from *bawišn-astīšnīh*] *stī* was fashioned forth. From *stī* the particular things and persons (come into being), and the work of those things and persons, as the Religion says: From *stī* those which are in the two *mēnōgs* were constituted, namely righteousness and wickedness”.¹¹

⁹ The double designation for ‘womb’: *burdār uruθwar*, in which the first term is the Middle Persian word and the second a transcription of the Avestan word, occurs also in DkM 496.3–4.

¹⁰ The phrase in brackets can be supplemented with some confidence by the parallelism with the other sections in this chapter. Without it the sentence is incomplete.

¹¹ [Cf. J. de Menasce, *Prattdānam*, p. 195 f., n.] R. C. Zaehner, *The dawn and twilight of Zoroastrianism*, p. 201 ff., discusses this chapter as well as chapter 191, mentioned further below. His approach calls for some reservations. I do not think it is justified to call the views presented in this chapter “a purely mechanistic

A quotation from the 'Religion', i. e., the Avestan tradition, regards *stī* as being the final stage of differentiation, after which comes only the stage of moral divisions between righteousness and wickedness.

A parallel text to the one just quoted, chapter 191 of Dēnkard III, presents the process of creation from a different point of view: it describes how the world moves from *mēnōg* to *gēlīg* in two stages, called *āfurišn* and *dahišn*. But that text, though using traditional terminology, tries to harmonize it with philosophical ideas, chiefly Aristotelian, it seems:

"The word *āfurišn* is: the creation (is) first in *mēnōg*, that is, matter and *mēnōg* seed; and it is shown in *gēlīg* in potentiality" (cf. Appendix D).

The word *dahišn* is defined further in the text as the transference of creatures from *mēnōg*-being to *gēlīg*-being, or in other words as a realization of that which was *in potentia*. This Aristotelian view is then brought into syncretism with the former scheme, which seems to be a traditional Zoroastrian one. Thus the stage called *bawišn* is equated with the state of being *in potentia* (*pad-nērōg*), and is further said to be called 'the seed of seeds, unformed *stī*'. The following stages, *bawišn-rawišnīh* and *bawišn-astīšnīh*, are then defined in terms which conform to this approach. The last stage, which in chapter 194 of Dēnkard III was called *stī*, is here, in chapter 191, named *tan*, 'body', person' (DkM 203.14), which reminds one of the definition given above to *stī*

and atheistic doctrine which was grafted on to the Avesta" (op. cit., p. 203). The fourfold scheme: *bawišn*, *bawišn-rawišnīh*, *bawišn-astīšnīh*, *stī*, seems to me to belong to the original Zoroastrian tradition. This can be seen from the constant references to *dēn*, which usually designates a quotation from an Avestan source. These quotations contain all four terms. Besides, the effort made in chapter 191 to harmonize between the twofold Aristotelian conception of potentiality and actuality and our fourfold scheme strengthens the view that this scheme is part of the local tradition. The harmonizing attempt of chapter 191 is not crowned with striking success. The two views are presented there side by side and are not interwoven into a single system. It is true that the creator is not mentioned in chapter 194 of Dēnkard III, but this does not yet prove that the conception is atheistic: the chapter's concern is merely to describe the mechanism of creation. The creator is mentioned in chapter 191 (see Appendix D).

by the phrase *ēw-tāgīg lanān* 'the individual bodies'. (The whole chapter is given in Appendix D).

stī, "the differentiated being, the existent person", gives meaning also to the following passage, which has been elucidated by J. de Menasce:

*u-š lawān pad hān ī andar šāyēn frawastag kanāragōmand, ud pad hān ī a-brīn a-kanārag; ce'ōn kanāragōmandīh-ez ī-š pad stī, ud a-*kanāragīh ī-š pad zamānag* (DkM 199.4–6; facsimile edition, p. [155]; cf. R. C. Zaehner, *BSOS*, 9, 1937–39, p. 872, 880; J. de Menasce, *ŠGV*, p. 42). "His being powerful is limited as regards that which is included within that which is possible, it is unlimited as regards that which is undecreed. Similarly, that which he has in individual existence (*stī*) is limitation, and that which he has in time is limitlessness".

Another text where the word *stī* signifies 'individuated existence' seems to be the following:

zamān xwad hamē, u-š xwadīh drang, ud pad-eš ast kardārīh ī nērōg ī stī. ast hamāyīg hān ī-š pad nērōg. u-š kanārag jumbīšn ī stī andar wāy pad spāš, ce'ōn rōšnān wāzišn ud wād wāyīšn ud āb tazišn ud urwar rōyišn ud harw wīr kār andar wāy . . . (DkM 207.3–7; facsimile edition, p. [161]; Cf. Zaehner, *BSOS*, 9, 1937–39, p. 872, 880 f.).

"Time by itself is eternal. Its selfness is of long duration. The effectiveness in it is the power of individuated being (*stī*). It is eternal as regards that which is in its power, its limitation is the movement of an individuated being (*stī*) inside the atmosphere (?) through space. Such is the procession of the luminaries, the blowing of the wind, the flow of water, the growth of plants, and the action of every man inside the atmosphere (?) . . .".

This passage, connected as it is to the previously quoted one, sheds some light on it and is in its turn made intelligible by the aid of this comparison.

This definition of *stī* as an individuated being stands very close to the use of the word *stī* in order to designate separate entities, whether *mēnōg* or *gēlīg*. Thus, in chapter 51 of *Dēnkard III*, the Amahraspands are said to belong to the class of 'invisible beings' (*a-wēnišnīg stīān*, DkM 42.11 f.), and the sun is mentioned as an example of 'visible beings' (*wēnišnīg stīān*, DkM 42.20 f.),¹² cattle and men are enumerated among 'gēlīg beings' (*wēnišnīg stīān*, DkM 43.9–11), each of which classes has various characteristics which do not concern us here.

The following text seems also to use the term *stī* in the sense of an individual being, although the translation of the passage is not certain:

ud andar hān ī būd pahlomān hu-xwadāyān hu-xwadāy yim pahlom būd, kardār-tom stī pad ruwān ī mardom ud pad tan, ud az pahlomān dēn-dastwarān spitāmān zardušt pahlom būd, kardār-tom stī pad ruwān ī mardom (DkM 334.6–10, facsimile ed., p. [256]).

"Among those who were best beneficent rulers, the beneficent ruler Yima was the best, the most effective entity as regards the soul of men and their body. Of the best authorities of religion, Zoroaster the Spitamid was the best, the most effective entity as regards the soul of men".¹³

APPENDIX C

dmšn

The reading of the word *dmšn*, which occurs in the passage *Dādestān ī Dēnīg XXVI*, 3–5,¹ is not known to me. The contexts in which the word occurs seem to favour an interpretation which would connect it to a theoretical verb *dam-* (probably unconnected with 'to breathe') or *jam-* (which could be Old Iranian *gam-*), with a meaning 'to have an evil effect, to come forth, to issue (in a bad sense)'.

¹² The sun seems according to this scheme to belong to *mēnōg*, although it is visible.

¹³ M. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie*, p. 38f., gives a different translation of this text.

¹ See above, p. 73.

The word occurs in the following passages:

- I. The text already mentioned above, Dd XXVI, 5:
u-š dmšn az bun-kadag ī anāgīh, "its evil effect is from the source of evil".

The whole of that passage (quoted above, p. 73) gains in clarity by comparison to the parallel text in Dd XXV, 3–5, where the goodness and pleasure of paradise are described:

u-š andar ast hamāg āsānīh ud rāmišnīh ud urwahn ud šēdāyīh ud nēwagīh ī wēš ud weh az-ez hān ī mahīst ud abardom nēwagīh ud rāmišn ī pad gēlīg. u-š nēst hēc niyāz ud dard ud bēš ud duš-ḫwārīh. u-š ḫwašīh ud nēwagīh jahān az hān ī hamēšag-sūd gāh ud ganz ī purrr ī a-kaḥīšn an-absīhīšn a-kanārag. "There is in it all ease and joy and happiness and brilliance and goodness which are more and better even than the greatest and highest goodness and joy which are in this world. There is no want, pain, affliction or unpleasantness. Its sweetness and goodness spring from the place of everlasting benefit, from the full treasure which never diminishes, which is undecaying and unlimited".

The precise parallel to *dmšn* in XXVI, 5 seems to be *jahān* in XXV, 5.² In both cases the words in question signify the movement from the source to the places of goodness or evil.

- II. *ḫwad ka ḫwad wattarīh pad abārīgān tawānīgān meh-zōrān wēš-dmšnyx ī az-eš anāgīh rāy gēhān ziyān-tar ud wattar pāyag pāyag tā hān ī abardom, *ce pad hān ī abar anāgīh ud ziyān az-eš frāy *ku pad hān ī azēr* (DkM 41.14 ff.; facsimile ed., p. [30]f.). "The same evil in highly-placed people, in mighty ones and in those endowed with great power, is more

² *Jahān*, 'arising from, originating from', is connected to the verb *jastan*, *jah-* 'to jump, spring, come about'. In the same chapter of Dādestān ī Dēnīg there occurs also an adjective derived from it: *jahānīg* (Dd XXV, 7), 'inconstant, ephemeral', or perhaps 'originated', like Arabic *muḥdath* (?). G. Widengren, *The Great Vohu Manah*, p. 84, reads here *yazdān*. [Both passages are now given by P. Gignoux in *JA*, 1968, p. 230 f., 236 f.]

harmful to the world and is worse, advancing by degrees up to the highest one, because evil issues more from them. For evil and harm are more from those above than from those below”.

The phrase *wēš-dmšnyx ī az-eš anāgīh rāy* in this passage has a good counterpart in the same chapter of Dēnkard III: *nēwaqīh wēš-waxšišnīh rāy* (DkM 41.4): “because goodness grows more”.

III. Our word occurs twice more in the same chapter (Dēnkard III, Chapter 50):

garān-dmwštl ud wēš ziyān-tar (DkM 41.21 f.). “having graver evil effect and more harm”.

*abāg kast ud winast wehīh grāy *dmwšntl* [written: *xmwšntl*] *ud garān ziyān-tar az harw wadīh* (DkM 42.5 f.). “When good diminishes and becomes defective, there is more evil effect and graver harm from every evil”.

IV. *u-š ō hayyārīh ī hān razmīgān ēstēnīd dōgān-ez wasān parīgān tamīgān-gōhrān, ke-šān paymuaxt rah ī rōšnīgān, ku padēnd ud dwārēnd ud gardēnd azēr rōšnān wāzišnīgān pad rāh-dārīh ī andak (?) mēnōgān, ud gētīgān nihumbišn hān ī awē-šān rōšnīh ud xwarr, ud *apparēnd hān ī az awē-šān xwarr-baxšišnīh, ud dmšnyx az xwēš ō dāmān xīndagīh-ez ī ast dard ud mard hammist anāgīh ī mān ō-šān dēw* (Dd XXXVI, 44; Anklesaria ed., p. 90). “In order to assist those doing battle, he (sc. Ahreman) stationed very many parī-s of dark substance, who clothed themselves in the carriage of the luminaries, so that they might revolve and run and turn round underneath the rotating luminaries, by robbing the lesser (?) spirits, and hiding from material beings the light and splendour which is theirs, and so that they might snatch away the dispensation of splendour which comes from them, and issue from their own to the creatures disease, namely pain and death, together with (other) evil which is appropriate (?) to those demons”.

APPENDIX D

*A selection of texts for the relationship of
mēnōg and gētīg*

I. Dēnkard III, Chapter 191.

DkM 202.16–203.15, corrected by aid of the facsimile edition, p. [157]f.; cf. H. Junker, *Vorträge der Bibliothek Warburg*, 1921–22, p. 158, n. 25.

See above, note 55, p. 76, and Appendix B (p. 95 f.).

TEXT

abar ('w') āfurišn ud dahišn ī dādār-ōhrmazd dām. az nigēz ī weh-dēn.

(1) hād āfurišn ēwāz dām fradom pad mēnōgih ī ast mādag ud tōhmag ī mēnōgīg, ud pad nērōg gētīg nimāyišn, ce'ōn *pašm ke rištāg *wahān-ez, ud zarr ke abisar-ez, ud sēm ke jām-ez, ud āhen ke bil-ez, ud dār ke dar-ez, ud bun ke bar-ez, ud zahāg ke zahag, ud abāriḡ mādag ke xwēšīg dahīg pad-nērōg.

(2) ud dahišn ēwāz dām az mēnōgih ō gētīgih wardēnidan, ī ast dahīg az mādag ī-š pad nērōg būd, ce'ōn rištāg az pašm, ud abisar-ez az zarr, ud jām-ez az sēm, ud bil-ez az āhen, ud dar-ez az dār, ud bar az bun, ud zahag az zahāg, ud abāriḡ dahīg az hān ī-š xwēš mādag.

(3) ud bun mādag ī dahīg pad nērōg xwānihēd-ez tōhmagān tōhmag ud a-dēsīdag stī ud dahīgān bunyašt, u-š dēniḡ nām bawišn-ez.

(4) ud miyānag-ez mādag ast dahīg [ī] pad nērōg, ce'ōn ādur ud āb, ke-šān pad nērōg zīndag-ez dēsagān, xwānihēd tōhmag dēsag-ez, fradom azeših, stī bunyašt, u-š dēniḡ nām bawišn rawišnīh.

(5) ud abdom mādag pālūdag az-eš dahīg, ce'ōn mardom az-eš mādagih hān ī xwad ham-karb, ce'ōn pid mādag ast ī hān ī xwad ham-karb pus, xwānihēd-ez *šōhišn (?) dēsag, u-š *dēniḡ nām bawišn-astišnīh, ke-š azēr ēwāzig tan ī ēd and mardom u-šān kār ī and *gōnīh (?).

TRANSLATION

On *āfurišn* and *dahišn* of the creation of Ohrmazd the Creator. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

(1) The word *āfurišn*¹ (means): the creation is first in *mēnōg*, that is matter and *mēnōg* seed, and it is shown in *gētīg* in potentiality, like the wool which is the cause of the thread, gold of the crown, silver of the goblet, iron of the spade, wood of the door, root of the fruit, the parent of the offspring, and the other kinds of matter whose own products are (in them) in potentiality.

(2) The word *dahišn* (means:) to turn creation from *mēnōg* existence to *gētīg* existence, which is the product (emerging) from the matter where it was in potentiality, just like the thread (coming) from wool, crown from gold . . . (etc.), and the other products from that which is their own matter.

(3) The root matter, (in) which the product is in potentiality, is called 'seed of seeds', 'unformed (mode of) being', the foundation of the products'. Its religious² name is *bawišn*.³

(4) The middle matter is potentially the product,⁴ like fire and water, to whom belong in potentiality the living forms. It is called 'the seed of form', 'the first production', 'the foundation of existence'. Its religious name is *bawišn-rawišnih*.

(5) The last matter is one from which its product is refined, like a man whose matter is of the same shape as himself, just as a father is the matter of his son who has the same shape as himself. It is called *perceptible⁵ form. Its religious name is

¹ On the distinction between the verbs *āfrīdan* and *dādan* see above, p. 67f., note 30.

² The term *dēnīg* refers presumably to the Avestan name, the Pahlavi equivalent of which is given, just as the formula *ce'ōn gōwēd pad dēn*, "as he says in the Religion", regularly introduces a quotation from the Avesta.

³ *bawišn* means literally 'becoming'. The connection between this term and the concept of 'root-matter' seems somewhat far-fetched, and this fact may strengthen the impression that we are faced here with two systems whose origins are different and which are only being harmonized with some effort. The formal justification for connecting *bawišn* with *bun-mādag* may lie in the potential quality of the latter, i.e. that it can be realized only in its products.

⁴ The formula here resembles closely that which is found in the previous paragraph, in both cases the text has *dahīg pad nērōg*. The translation reflects an attempt to interpret the phrase in two different ways according to the context.

⁵ **sōhišn*: the text has *dyn' aw-*. The normal reading of the phrase as written

bawišn-astišnīh, under which appellation (?)⁶ are the bodies of so many people⁷ and their work of so much variety (?).

II. Dēnkard III, Chapter 206.

DkM 225 f.; facsimile edition, p. [176]f.

See above, p. 78, note 62. Owing to the difficulty of the text, the translation should be regarded as merely tentative.

TEXT

abar ohrmazd xwad, xwadīh, u-š mēnōg ud gētīg nām, ud paydāgīh, ud ane⁸ jud, ud az-eš. az nigēz ī weh-dēn.

(1) hād ohrmazd xwad abzōnīg mēnōg, wisp-wehīh nērōg stī.

(2) u-š xwadīh passazag. *xwad-ē⁹ harw mēnōgīg ud gētīgīg weh, wehīh azešīh.

(3) u-š mēnōg andar azešīh ī harw a-wēnišnīg a-gīrišnīg ciš ī weh. pad hamāg mēnōg, mēnōg-tomīh ī mēnōg menēnd.

(4) u-š gētīg andar azešīh ī harw wēnišnīg gīrišnīg ciš ī weh. pad hamāg gētīgīg ī weh, gētīg-tomīh ī gētīgān xwad-ē.

(5) u-š mēnōg-gētīg andar azešīh ī harw wēnišnīg a-gīrišnīg, gīrišnīg a-[wēnišnīg] ciš ī weh. pad hamāg mēnōg-gētīgīh ī weh, mēnōg-gētīgān mēnōg-gētīg.

(6) u-š xwadīh arzānīgīh ī spanāg-mēnōg ī dādār-ōhrmazd, ud yazd ī abāriḡ ham passazag.

(7) u-š paydāgīh xwadīhā.

(8) ane jud hamāg azešīg ī jud az awe azešīh, ud ō awe azešīh xwad a-passazag pad azešīh.

(9) harw azešīh pad xwadīh winardan šāyastan rāy hān azešīh az ane ī aweš ham-passazag, xwad sazēd, ī-š nām xwadīh arzānīg.

could be *xwānihēd ce'ōn hu-dēsag*, which conveys nothing intelligible. For *sōhišn* cf. H. W. Bailey, *Zoroastrian Problems*, p. 97, n. 2, and p. 229, and the passages collected by J. de Menasce, *ŠGV*, p. 239 (see also there, *Addenda et Corrigenda*, ad p. 284). Also *Transactions of the Philological Society*, 1959, p. 111, n. 2 (H. W. Bailey).

⁶ Both reading and translation of the whole sentence are doubtful.

⁷ An alternative translation may be: "so many individual people", taking *tan* as signifying 'an individual person'.

⁸ *ane*: written *ZK'd*. Cf. other examples for this spelling in *Pahlavi Yasna and Visperad*, ed. B. N. Dhabhar, Bombay 1949, p. 115.

⁹ *xwad-ē*: Ms *xwtokw'd*.

(10) *gannāg-mēnōg marzēnidārīh, ud dēw ud druz ī abārīg ham-passazag.*

(11) *u-š paydāgīh az xwad azešīh.*

(12) *kēš-dārān ke wad jumāy nēwag yazd azešīh kēš ī-šān, abar yazd gannāg-mēnōgīh-ez guft, ud spanāg-mēnōg azeš be guft bawēd.*

TRANSLATION

On Ohrmazd himself, his selfness, the name of his *mēnōg* and *gētīg*, the manifestation, that which is different,¹⁰ the product. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

(1) Ohrmazd himself is the beneficent *mēnōg*, an entity endowed with the power of doing all-good.

(2) To his selfness the individual self of every good *mēnōg* and *gētīg* being corresponds. Goodness is the product.

(3) His *mēnōg* is (found) in the product of every invisible and intangible good thing. In the whole of *mēnōg*, it is considered to be the most endowed with *mēnōg*-ness of *mēnōg*.

(4) His *gētīg* is (found) in the product of every visible and tangible good thing. In the whole of *gētīg*, it is a self most endowed with *gētīg*-ness of *gētīg* beings.

(5) His (compound) *mēnōg-gētīg* is (found) in the product of every visible and intangible, (or) tangible and in[visible] good thing. In the whole of (compound) *mēnōg-gētīg* existence, it is the *mēnōg-gētīg* (par excellence) among *mēnōg-gētīg* beings.^{10a}

(6) His selfness is the worth of the Bounteous Spirit of the Creator Ohrmazd. The other gods are similar.

(7) His manifestation is according to the self.

(8) 'The other' is all product that is different from his own product, and that by itself does not correspond to his product for being (his) product.

(9) In order to be able to arrange every product through selfness, that product, (as distinguished) from 'the other' which

¹⁰ *ane jud*: both words signify approximately the same thing. The addition of *jud* may be a gloss to help in identifying the uncommon *ane*, written with an ambiguous spelling. The more regular spelling of *ane*, with the ideogram *AXRN*, is no less ambiguous.

^{10a} Cf. G. Gnoli, *AION*, N.S. 13 (1963), p. 189 n. 82, who refers to GBd 194.8 for this concept.

resembles it, is by itself suitable. Its name is 'worthy of the selfness'.

(10) The Evil Spirit is destruction; the *dēw* and the other demons resemble him.

(11) His manifestation is the product which comes from himself.

(12) Those who hold the view that the product of the gods is bad together with good, apply (in fact) the nature of the Evil Spirit to the gods, and say (in fact) that the Bounteous Spirit derives from him.

III. Dēnkard III, Chapter 365.

DkM 349f.; facsimile edition, p. [268]f.

This chapter presents the 'evolutionary' process of the creation of the world. See above, p. 69, n. 35. Cf. R. C. Zaehner, *Zurvan*, p. 371–374.

TEXT

abar bun bawišn ī gētīg dahišn (dahišn). az nigēz ī weh-dēn.

(1) hād abzār ke dādār az hān ī anayr-rōšnīn brihēnīd ud dām andar hangerdigēnīd paydāgih ī-š abastāgīg nām āθrō. kahrpa 2. ēwag hān ī mēnōg dahišn, ēwag hān ī gētīg dahišn andar hangerdigēnīd.

(2) andar hān ī mēnōg dahišn andar hangerdigēnīd mēnōg ī waxš-nērōg, ud andar hān ī gētīg dahišn andar hangerdigēnīd mēnōg ī cīhr-nērōg.

(3) wēšīšt abzār ī mēnōg dahišn hangerdigih kard spurīg, ud pad-eš kār ī pad dahišn ī andar hān abzār abāyišnīgih. u-š wizārd waxšōmand mēnōgān yazdān ēwag ēwag ō hān ī-šān ('w) xwēškārīh.

(4) ud andar abzār ī gētīg dahišn hangerdigih pad dādār kām warzēn cīhr-*nērōg mēnōg pad dādan ī waxš-nērōg mēnōg *hamīgihā¹¹ ō dārmag-tom gētīg grīw paydāgih.

(5) fradom nihang ī-š abastāgīg nām kut, ud pad ēwāz ī gēhān *kyš* (*styšk'*) srišūdag-ez xwānd.

¹¹ The Ms has *xmryx'*. The emendation is supported by analogy with *hamīg*, which occurs below, § 8, as an epithet of *mēnōg*.

(6) az nihang ī kut srišūdag-ez nām wahānag (?), ī-š abastāgīg nām xwardagih ud gabrih-ez ud pad ēwāz ī mardom stunag (?) *kyš*-ez (?) xwānēnd. ud xīg ast ī kut u-š kut [*kard*]¹² andar.

(7) ud az wahānag ī xwardagih ud gabrih ud stunag-*kyš*-ez nām *wašn ī-š abastāgīg nām *wiškīdōmandih, ud pad ēwāz ī mardom wistardagih-ez xwānēnd. ud xīg ast ī wahānag u-š wahānag kard-ez andar.

(8) ud az wašnīh ī *wiškīdōmandih ud wistardagih-ez nām waxš-nērōg ī hamīg ī fradom tan ī-š abastāgīg rah ud spahr-ez nām, ud pad ēwāz ī mardom spahr-ez xwānēnd, ī-š zahag andar hēnd.

(9) rōšnān xwaršēd ud māh ud starān ham-bun ō wisp dām ī-š ēr, rāyēnidār ast ī cihrān, ud xwad cihrān abardom.

(10) ud az rah bawišn ī garm-xwēd ī wādōmand, pad ham-bastagih ī druz ī mēnōg-waxš, ham-zōrihā zahag ī gētīg dahišnān ī tōhmagān tōhmag.

(11) az bawišn [bawišn-]rawišnīh ī zahāgān ī dahīg ī bawišn ī xwānihēd ristagān-ez.

(12) az [bawišn-rawišnīh] bawišn-astišnīh ī zīndagān ī-š andar gōspand ud mardom stī ke hēnd gētīg *dahīg karb.

TRANSLATION

On the original 'becoming' of material creation. From the instruction of the Good Religion.

(1) The manifestation of the powers which the Creator fashioned from Endless Light and with which he accomplished the creation, —the Avestan name of which is 'the form of fire',¹³—is twofold. One is that with which he accomplished *mēnōg* creation, and one is that with which he accomplished *gētīg* creation.

(2) In that with which *mēnōg* creation was accomplished, the *mēnōg* of spiritual force (is found), and in that with which *gētīg* creation was accomplished, the *mēnōg* of substantial force (is found).

¹² *kard* was probably omitted here by haplography, after *kut*, both words being written identically *kuł*.

¹³ There can be little doubt that this much debated word (which occurs also in GBd 12.7–11) should be read in the form given here. Cf. J. Duchesne-Guillemin, *Dr. J. M. Unvala Memorial Volume*, Bombay 1964, p. 14–17.

(3) He made perfect mainly the power with which *mēnōg* creation is accomplished, and through it (he carried out) the work of creation suitable for that power. He assigned each one of the gods residing in *mēnōg* to his particular task.

(4) In the power of accomplishing *gētīg* creation there was manifest, by the will of the Creator, the marvellous *mēnōg* of substantial force by the creation of the *mēnōg* of spiritual force, by association to the finest¹⁴ *gētīg* self.

(5) First (proceeded) *nihang* ('a little'), the Avestan name of which is *kut*,¹⁵ called in the language of the world *kyš slyšwtk'*.¹⁶

(6) From *nihang*, the name of which is also *kut*, *slyšwtk'*, (proceeded) *wahānag* ('cause' ?), the Avestan name of which is 'embryo'¹⁷ and 'hollowness';¹⁸ it is called in the language of the people 'a trunk'¹⁹ (?) *-kyš*. It is the container²⁰ of *kut*, and he made *kut* inside it.

(7) From *wahānag*, whose name is also *xwardagīh*, *gabrīh*, *stunag-kyš*, (proceeded) *wašn*,²¹ the Avestan name of which is 'having ramifications' (?);²² it is called in the language of the people 'being scattered'. It is a container for *wahānag*, *wahānag* was made inside it.

¹⁴ For *dārmag* cf. H. W. Bailey, *JRAS*, 1934, p. 511f.

¹⁵ This word, which is apparently connected to Avestan *kutaka-*, 'small', could also be read as the Pahlavi **kōd*, like *kōdag*. The other *dēnīg* words in this chapter have all Pahlavi forms.

¹⁶ I can find no explanation for these words. *kīš* may be the word for 'circle'.

¹⁷ For *xwardagīh*, which describes a stage in the development of the embryo, cf. GBd 16.4: *pas az gumēzagīh xwardagīh bawēd, daštāg humānāg*, "after the mixture there is the (development of) the embryo, resembling *daštāg* (= 'foetus')". This reading of the word seems to me preferable to Zaehner's *āvartakīh* (cf. *Zurvan*, p. 305, note to line 173).

¹⁸ I.e., the stage in which the hollowed areas in the body are formed. Cf. GBd 16.6.

¹⁹ Or 'a column, pillar'. Cf. DkM 242.1: *ce'ōn ka stun ī kadag *škanīhēd, kadag hanbahēd*. "Just as when the pillar of the house is broken, the house collapses".

²⁰ *xīg* means properly 'a water skin'.

²¹ *wašn* could mean 'the male', cf. NPersian *gušn*. The NPersian word means also, by extension, 'conception', and this meaning might also apply here, although this does not seem the proper place for the concept.

²² The spelling in line 22 of DkM 349 allows the reading *wīškōmandīh*, or possibly **wīškanōmandīh*. On the word in the form as emended here cf. R. C. Zaehner, *BSOS*, 9 (1937-39), p. 318.

(8) From *wašn*, whose name is also 'having ramifications' and 'being scattered', (proceeded) the *mēnōg* of spiritual force, the associate, the first body, the Avestan name of which is 'the wheel' and 'the sphere'. It is also called 'sphere' in the language of the people. Its offspring are inside (it).

(9) The luminaries: the sun, moon and stars, are the common origin of all the creatures which are underneath them. They²³ control the substances, and are themselves the highest of the substances.

(10) From 'the wheel' (proceeded) hot and moist 'becoming', possessed of wind; for arresting the demons residing in *mēnōg*, it is, with assembled forces, the begetter of *gēlīg* creations, the seed of seeds.

(11) From 'becoming' (proceeded) the 'movement of becoming', which is the begetters of the product of 'becoming'. It is also called 'the elements'.

(12) From ["the movement of becoming"] (proceeded) 'the stable existence of becoming', which is the living beings which are in it; the entities of cattle and man, which are the *gēlīg* shape of the product.²⁴

²³ The verb in the text is in the singular.

²⁴ The text remains largely obscure, but it is hoped that this attempt may have contributed something towards understanding it.

[This article was completed in 1967. Some additions and changes made in the proof stage in 1970 are marked by brackets.]

ONCE UPON A TIME

A study of *Yeki Būd, Yeki Nabūd*, the first collection of short stories
by Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī Jamāl-Zādeh

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Introductory Note.

The present article is based on a more extensive study of *Yeki Būd, Yeki Nabūd, Once Upon a Time*, which is to be the second chapter of a comprehensive biography on the life and works of Sayyid Muḥammad 'Alī Jamāl-Zādeh, now undertaken by the present author. When completed, the study will be larger in scope than any other existing study in the field of modern Persian literature in both European languages and Persian. The fact remains that at present it is difficult to point to works which are aimed at examining the life and literary endeavors of a single author in modern Persian prose or poetry. The studies thus far have had different aims, but, most of them fall into the category of general surveys—a distinct necessity due to the fact that modern Persian literature is so little known to the European reader and studied seriously so little by literary critics in Persia. Hence, the difference in approach in the present study. Because of the space which the author has made available to himself, it was possible to examine the stories from different points of view while paying special attention to their literary merits.

The literary evaluation is supplemented in this study with a short synopsis of every story and various translated passages for the sake of illustration.

The first chapter of the study, when completed, will consist of a sketch of Jamāl-Zādeh's life. The other chapters will deal with