Chapter II.d - Khyātivādas and their refutation

The Jainas define pramāṇa as the knowledge which is vyavasāyātmaka, i.e., determinate. The opponent argued that this adjective is useless, because there is not found any viparyaya or error or doubt which it can serve to exclude. They also ask the Jainas what is found in the knowledge of viparyaya or error. Is it dharma or dharmī? If dharmī is found in viparyaya, then does it can be true or false? If there is found dharma in viparyaya, then does it can be puruṣatvarūpa or sthāṇutvarūpa or ubhayarūpa? But the Jainas reject this view. They hold that error or doubt is possible;everybody feels error in everyday life. When one who questions about the possibility of error, and then he is himself making use of an error. Prabhācandra asks the opponent how has one to disprove the existence of error? Does one prove it that there is no error because of the non-existence of its causes or because of the nonexistence of its peculiar nature or because of the non-existence of its peculiar objects? The first argument is not correct, because every error has some causes of its existence. These are: the perception of the common qualities and non-perception of the specific qualities. The second argument is also asiddha, because the peculiar nature of error is experienced by anyone in day to day life. The third argument is also not correct, because every error has its object to know its well; so, there is no non-existence of the object of error. In this way, the existence of viparyaya-jñāna or error or doubt is proved.

The theory of error is termed as khyātivāda in Indian philosophy. All the schools of philosophy uphold their own views regarding the nature, cause etc. of error. In Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Prabhācandra has discussed the different kinds of the theory of error and their refutations in details. According to Prabhācandra, there are seven kinds of khyātivādas in Indian philosophy. These are: akhyāti, asatkhyāti, prasiddhārthakhyāti, ātmakhyāti, anirvacanīyakhyāti, viparītakhyāti and smṛtipramoṣa.

(a) Akhyātivāda:

Prabhācandra has referred to the theory of error of the Cārvāka as akhyātivāda in his work Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. But, generally the word akhyāti is used for Prabhākara’s theory of non-apprehension of difference between two cognitions, viz., a perception and a memory. According to the Cārvākas, nothing is apprehended in viparyaya or error. The Cārvākas puts the question thus: what would be the object of the viparyaya-jñāna? In case of mirage where one wrongly perceives water is it water or non-existence of water or mirage or some other thing? Firstly it cannot be water, because if water is the object of mirage, then that knowledge would be a true knowledge; it will not be an error. The non-existence of water cannot be the object of viparyaya-jñāna, because it is not apprehended thus;it is apprehended positively as water. The mirage itself is also not the object of viparyaya-jñāna, because if the mirage appears as mirage, then that knowledge would be a true knowledge and not anerror. It cannot be also said that the mirage is apprehended in the form of water, because one thing cannot appear in the form of another, just as the jar cannot appear as a cloth. Thus, the viparyaya-jñāna or error has no object.

Prabhācandra rejects this view. He asks the Cārvākas what is meant by the word akhyāti? Does it mean no object or the non-existence of the object? If there is no object of viparyaya-jñāna or error, then how can an error or viparyaya have some specific form like “this is silver” or “this is water”? If akhyāti means the nonexistence of object, then there would be no difference between error and the state of suṣupti, because in the state of suṣupti, there is non-existence of all objects. Therefore, the theory advocated by the Cārvākas about viparyaya is not correct.

Hence, akhyātivāda is not acceptable.

(b) Asatkhyātivāda:

Asatkhyātivāda theory is upheld by the Mādhyamikas. The Mādhyamikas argue that the object that appears in error is not real, but non-existent. The Mādhyamikas maintain that nacre does not appear as nacre, but as silver, which is not existent in the nacre. So, the object of viparyaya-jñāna is asat and as such this view is called asatkhyātivāda.

Refuting this view Prabhācandra argues that a non-existent object cannot appear at all, just like the sky-flower which cannot appear. The appearance of the non-existent object would be a contradiction. Only an existent thing appears. If the object of viparyaya-jñāna or error would be asat or non-existent, then there would be no difference amongst the different kinds of errors, because according to the theory of asatkhyāti, there would not be any difference among the knowledge and its object. Hence, the object of viparyaya-jñāna is not asatkhyāti.

(c) Prasiddhārthakhyātivāda:

According to Prabhācandra, this view is upheld by the Sāṃkhyas. The Sāṃkhyas argue that the apprehended object of viparyaya-jñāna is not nonexistence, because it appears as a real object, just like one perceives his own palm, so also in error one perceives a real object in a different way. A thing may appear first and afterwards disappear, but this disappearance is not being the cause of the non-existence of the things. As for instance, the lightning first appears in the sky and then afterwards it disappears, but it does not mean that lightning is a non-existent thing. Thus, in error the object cannot be non-existent, it is real, i.e., prasiddhārtha.

Prabhācandra points out that if the object of error or viparyaya-jñāna is accepted as a real object, and then there will be no difference between the object of error and the object of true knowledge. The object of error would also be apprehended like the object of true knowledge. Prabhācandra also points out that if one perceives real water in mirage, then afterwards when that water disappears, then also some marks of water in mirage will be found. But practically this does not happen, because the knowledge of water in mirage is wrong. So, the object of error is not real. Hence, the object of viparyaya-jñāna is not prasiddhārtha.

(d) Ātmakhyātivāda:

The Yogācāra’s theory of error is called ātmakhyāti. According to the Yogācāras, all the objects are known only through ideas, there is no external object. There is no difference between the knowledge, knower and the object. Knowledge has the form of the object. The knowledge of silver in the shell is also subjective, but due to avidyā, this subjective form of knowledge appears as external. So, in viparyaya-jñāna, only knowledge has the form of the object, external objects are not real, because without knowledge an external object cannot be known.

But the Jainas reject this view point. They point out that the theory of ātmakhyāti can be correct if one also accepts that knowledge has the form of the object and that knowledge knows only itself. But, both these points of view are rejected by the Jainas. Prabhācandra argues that if all knowledge knows only its own form, then there would be no difference between the true and false knowledge. Again, if the form of silver is a form of knowledge, then it would be impossible, because it will never appear as external, just as pleasure and pain which never appear to be external. The knower would also never have the pravṛtti to acquire knowledge of the external objects, because knowledge which is internal possesses that form. Moreover, knowledge is constantly changing. If the Yogācāras say that it is because of beginningless avidyā that the internal vijñāna appears as external, then their view will not be different from viparītakhyāti. Therefore, the object of viparyaya-jñāna is not ātmakhyāti.

(e) Anirvacanīyakhyātivāda:

According to the anirvacanīyakhyātivāda view of the Advaita Vedāntins, the object of error is indefinable. Whatever is apprehended in knowledge that should be accepted as its object. In case of knowledge of water, water is apprehended and not any other thing. Hence in error, if water is apprehended as water, then there would not arise any false knowledge. Thus, the object of error cannot be sat. On the other hand the object of error cannot be asat i.e. non-existent, because it is impossible for a non-existent entity to appear. A sky–flower which is totally non- existent can never appear. The object of error cannot be both sat and asat, because identity of sat and asat is not possible, being contradictory. So, in viparyayajñāna or error, the object cannot be defined either as existent or as non-existent, therefore, it is called anirvacanīya or indefinable.

Prabhācandra rejects the Advaita Vedāntin’s point of view about the theory of anirvacanīyakhyāti. He argues that in case of the erroneous knowledge of water in a mirage, water is apprehended as real, as belonging to a particular time and place and not as something anirvacanīya. The existence of water in mirage is apprehended in a particular place and time, then how can it be called anirvacanīya or indefinable? Desire of the person who sees it is also directed towards real water. One cannot have such behavior towards water that is anirvacanīya. Moreover, what is apprehended should not be called indefinable? So, the object of viparyayajñāna is not anirvacanīya.

(f) Smṛtipramoṣavāda:

The theory of smṛtipramoṣavāda is upheld by the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsakas. Prabhākara advocates that the knowledge of a nacre as a silver is not one knowledge, but there are two knowledges. Because two different effects are produced by two different causes. In the judgment “this is silver”, ‘this’and ‘silver’are two different knowledge having produced from two different causes. Knowledge of ‘this’is caused by perception and ‘silver’is caused by memory. The sense-organ cannot perceive an absent object, the presence of a defect in the causes can only prevent the production of the effect, but a defective cause cannot produce a new effect. For an example, if a seed of an apple tree is defective, then it will not produce an apple tree, but it cannot go on to produce an orange tree. In the same way, the sense-organ cannot perceive an absent object. Therefore, there are two knowledges of ‘this’and of ‘silver’. The shell is apprehended as something present, but silver is not present, it appears in the shell due to the memory of the past perception of silver. So, when the memory of the past experience of silver and the present experience of the shell are mixed up, then the shell appears as silver. In this case of error, the memory of silver does not appear as memory. So, this theory of error is called as smṛtipramoṣa by Prabhākara.

But the Jainas reject the Prabhākara Mīmāṃsaka’s point of view. They hold that the view that the presence of a doṣa cannot produce a new effect is not correct. Prabhācandraargues that the defect or doṣa of the eyes is the cause of wrong knowledge. It is because of the defect of sense-organs that a non-existent object seems to appear as existent. Though there is not found asatkhyāti in the knowledge of a shell as silver, yet the error is arising due to the similarity of shell and silver. But, there is not found any similarity in the theory of asatkhyāti, because it is always like the knowledge of sky-flower. There is not also found ātmakhyāti, because the knowledge of silver in the shell is not a form of knowledge. The knowledge of silver is rather caused by saṃskāra together with doṣa and similarity. Hence, the defect of the sense-organ would be the cause of wrong knowledge.

Prabhācandra also asks Prabhākara: what is meant by the word smṛtipramoṣa? Does it mean the absence of memory? Does it mean the apprehension of something other than the remembered object? Does it mean the apprehension of the opposite form? Does it mean the apprehension of the past object as present? Does it mean an apprehension in which memory and present perception get mixed up without distinction like milk and water? The first alternative would not be right, because if the absence of memory would be smṛtipramoṣa, then how can the silver perceived in the past be apprehended in the present shell? If the memory is absent, then there would be no difference between smṛtipramoṣa and the states of deep-sleep. So, smṛtipramoṣa does not mean the absence of memory. In the second case, smṛtipramoṣa cannot also mean the apprehension of something other than the remembered object. Because, if it were so, then the question may arise thus: is this apprehension arises in the same time as the memory or does it take place after the memory? In the former case, if there is perception of a jar during the memory, then there will be smṛtipramoṣa, which is absurd. In the latter case, if the appearance of the other takes place after the memory, then it cannot bring about smṛtipramoṣa, which is asiddha, because if it could do so, then every succeeding knowledge could bring about a pramoṣa of the preceding memory. So, smṛtipramoṣa does not mean the apprehension of something other than the remembered object. In the third case, smṛtipramoṣa cannot also be the apprehension of the opposite form, because if it is so, then it may be the same with the viparītakhyāti. It may also be asked what the opposite form is? If it could be known as the clear form of the object, then there would not arise the knowledge of memory, because of clearness it would be perception. In the fourth case, smṛitipramoṣa cannot also be the apprehension of the past object as present. Because in that case, there must be the absence of clearness in the memory of the silver, as in the case of other memories. But, this is not so, because here clearness is found in silver. So, smṛtipramoṣa does not mean the apprehension of the past object as present. In the fifth case, smṛtipramoṣa cannot also be the mixture of memory and present perception without distinction, like milk and water. It may be also asked what is meant by non-distinction? Does it mean the apprehension of two different things as identical? Is it a relation of saṃśleṣa or contact between the two? Is it origination together? In the first case, one has to accept viparītakhyāti, which view is also accepted by the Jainas. In the second case, saṃśleṣa is not possible between the two knowledges, because it is found only in mūrta substances. In the third case, any kind of two knowledges arising together could be undistinguished, but this is not so. The knowledge of the double moon is not memory, because there should not be a relation of universal co-presence and coabsence between its knowledge and the sense-organ. So, smṛitipramoṣa does not mean the mixture of memory and present perception without distinction like milk and water. Hence, the object of viparyaya-jñāna is not smṛtipramoṣa.

(g) Viparītakhyāti:

The Jainas upheld the view of viparītakhyāti. According to them, the object of viparyaya-jñāna is viparītakhyāti. Viparītakhyāti means an illusory experience which is not a complex web of perception and memory, but it is a single perception. It is the apprehension of an object in its opposite nature. Prabhācandra accepts the view of viparītakhyāti. He holds that in the knowledge of a tree as a man, the error consists in wrong apprehension of the qualities of the object. The error arises due to the defects of eyes or some other causes. So, the object of viparyaya-jñāna is viparītakhyāti. Thus, the Jainas accept the view of viparītakhyāti.