Verse 1.10 - Two types of pramāṇa (valid knowledge)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Tattvartha sūtra 1.10:

तत्प्रमाणे ॥ १.१० ॥

tatpramāṇe || 1.10 ||

These (five kinds of knowledge) are the two types of pramāṇa (valid knowledge). (10)

Hindi Anvayarth:

अन्वयार्थ: [तत्] उपरोक्त पाँचों प्रकार के ज्ञान ही [प्रमाणे] प्रमाण (सच्चे ज्ञान) हैं।

Anvayartha: [tat] uparokta pamcom prakara ke jnana hi [pramane] pramana (sacce jnana) haim |

Explanation in English from Ācārya Pūjyapāda’s Sarvārthasiddhi:

It has been said that knowledge (jñāna) is attained by means of pramāṇa and naya. Some consider pramāṇa to be the knowledge, some others consider pramāṇa to be the connection, and yet others consider pramāṇa to be the senses. This sūtra declares that only the five kinds of knowledge mentioned in the sūtra are pramāṇa.

What is the purport of ‘tad’–‘that’? It is intended to preclude any other pramāṇa invented by others. Some consider the connection with objects as pramāṇa. Some others consider the senses as pramāṇa. The word ‘that’ is used in order to preclude these. Only the five kinds of knowledge (jñāna)–sensory knowledge, etc.–constitute pramāṇa, not any other.

What is wrong if connection or the senses were considered to be pramāṇa? If connection were pramāṇa then there would be no knowledge of infinitesimal, concealed and remote things. These cannot be contacted by the senses. Hence there would be no omniscience. If the senses were considered pramāṇa, it would result in the same fallacy. The range of the senses such as the eyes is small, and the objects are endless.

Further, connection does not apply to all the senses, as the eyes and the mind do not come in contact with the objects. This is discussed later.

It is argued that if knowledge is pramāṇa then there is no fruit. But attainment of knowledge is accepted as the fruit, and nothing else. If knowledge and pramāṇa are one and the same, no separate fruit is possible. But pramāṇa must have fruit. If the connection or the senses are considered to be pramāṇa, knowledge, which is different from these, is fit to he considered the fruit. But such a contention is untenable. If connection were the pramāṇa and knowledge of objects the fruit, then, as connection rests in two things–the object and the sense-organ–the fruit, i.e., knowledge, must also reside in two things. Hence knowledge must be in the objects–the pot and the board–too, and the objects would become knowledge. This is not tenable.

But the opponent says that the soul is characterized by consciousness, and so knowledge inheres in the soul and not in other objects. No. If the soul is not of the nature of knowledge, everything would become non-conscious (acetana).

Now, it has been contended earlier that there is no fruit if knowledge is pramāṇa. It does not matter. There is satisfaction in the attainment of knowledge. The soul, whose nature of knowledge is clouded by the foreign matter of karmas, finds satisfaction in determining the nature of substances with the help of the senses. That is spoken of as the fruit. Equanimity (upekṣā) or the disappearance of ignorance (ajñāna) may be considered as the fruit. Equanimity is freedom from attachment (rāga) and aversion (dveṣa). The disappearance of ignorance, which is like darkness, is also called the fruit. It has been said in texts dealing with the science of thought–nyāya–that the fruit of the first kind of pramāṇa–direct (pratyakṣa) or omniscience (kevalajñāna)–is equanimity (upekṣā). The fruit of the other kinds of pramāṇa–indirect (parokṣa)–is discernment, i.e., acceptance (grahaṇa) or rejection (tyāga); besides, of course, equanimity (upekṣā), as stated above. Destruction of ignorance (ajñāna) about the self, however, is the actual fruit of all methods of knowledge (pramāṇa).^[1]

That which knows rightly, that by which anything is known, or knowledge alone, is pramāṇa. What is known by pramāṇa? The soul and the other substances. Now, if pramāṇa is the means for knowing the soul and the other substances, then there must be another pramāṇa for knowing pramāṇa. And that will lead to a regression. No, there is no regression. Pramāṇa or knowledge is like the lamp. The lamp is the cause of illuminating objects like the pitcher. It is also the cause of illuminating its own nature or form and, therefore, there is no need to seek another illuminating cause. It must be admitted that pramāṇa also is like the lamp. If another pramāṇa were necessary to ascertain pramāṇa then due to the absence of self-knowledge, there would be no memory or remembrance. And then there would be no social relationship.

The dual is used for pramāṇa in accordance with the divisions mentioned later. The next two sūtra say, ‘the first two are indirect’, and ‘the rest are direct’. The dual is intended to ward off any other enumeration of pramāṇa.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Vijay K. Jain (2015), ‘Ācārya Samantabhadra’s Āptamīmāṃsā (Devāgamastotra)–Deep Reflection On The Omniscient Lord’, verse 102, p. 158.