Prameyas in the Nyaya-sutra of Gautama

by Sri Panu Podder | 2014 | 41,257 words

This essay studies the theory of Prameya as discussed in the Nyaya-sutra of Gautama and commentaries. The Nyayasutras belong to a separate branch of Indian Philosophy (darshana) and can be dated to at least the 6th century B.C. They primarily deal with logic and knowledge such as the topics of Pramana (instruments of valid Knowledge) and Prameya (o...

Chapter 3 - Body, Sense, Object of sense, Cognition and Mind

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According to Gautama, body (śarīra) is the second prameya. It has been first defined in the first āhnika of the first chapter.^[1] Gautama’s definition is simple. The body is the substratum (āśraya) of action (ceṣṭā), senses (indriya) and object (artha). Three points have been mentioned here. First the body is the locus of action. How is the body a locus of action? Vātsyāyana explains: “Action is the effect on the part of one led by the desire of attainment or avoidance for acquiring the means of attaining or avoiding the objects sought or shunned. Where this effort resides is the body.” The term ‘action’ does not mean any kind of movement. In that case the definition will be wrongly applicable to even a jar. Almost all the substances can be characterised by movement. So the simple meaning of the term cannot be accepted here. It is through the body that a person tries to obtain a desirable object and to avoid an undesirable object. When one finds a desirable object one has an internal exertion which is followed by external physical action. The same thing happens in the case of an undesirable object also. This particular kind of action is present only in the body and not in any thing else, like the jar etc. If such an action is taken as the defining character of the body there will be no difficulty. It may be objected that this definition will not be applicable to the body of a person who is in deep meditation and is sitting motionless. In answer it is pointed out that at that particular moment his body may not be characterised by such action but still it is capable of having such action. When the man is not in meditation but performing the ordinary actions his body can have that particular form of action. Because it has the capability it can be considered a body. When we say, for example, that this person is a cook, it does not mean that he is cooking at that particular moment. He does not always cook. Sometimes he does something other than cooking, still he is called a cook because he is able to cook if he wishes to do so.^[2]

The second definition is that the body is an abode of the senses. If we take this statement in its simple sense the meaning will be that the body is conjoined with the sense or the senses are located through some particular relation in the body. But this is not the real implication here. Vātsyāyana explains that to the existence of which the senses owe their existence and which being destroyed the senses also perish is the substratum of the sense and that is the body. Depending on it the senses can act upon their respective objects, both desirable and undesirable. In short the senses are vitally dependent upon the body, without body they cannot function or even exist. Being located in the body they receive the respective objects.

Thirdly, the body is said to be an abode of artha. It is to be noted that artha is one of the twelve prameyas admitted by Gautama.^[3] According to Gautama it means the five qualities of the five material elements, namely, smell, taste, colour, touch, and sound. Actually these are the qualities each of which is apprehended by one of the five external senses. But in the present context this technical meaning has not been accepted. Here the word stands for pleasure and pain which are produced by the experience of the thing like smell etc. Vātsyāyana says that it is in the body that a person apprehends pleasure and pain resulting from sense -object contact.

Thus, in the first chapter Gautama has defined the body in simple terms, later in the third chapter he takes up the critical examination of body just after concluding the discussion on the nature of the self.^[4] Vātsyāyana thinks that this order of discussion is quite logical. The body is the substratum of the experiences of pleasure and pain by the self and they are due to the actions of the self itself. Thus with the discussion of the body the discussion of the self become complete.

We have already noted that there cannot be a critical examination without a doubt. Vātsyāyana says that a doubt regarding the material element of which the human body is composed arises because different views in this regard are found.^[5] Some say it is made of earth only, some of earth and water, some of earth, water and fire, some of earth, water, fire and air. And finally, some, of all the five material elements. Hence there is the doubt: is the human body made of only one element as the olfactory sense is made of earth alone or is it made of different elements?

Gautama accepts the view that the human body is made of earth alone. The reason given by him is that only the specie quality of earth, namely, smell, is found in the body and not the quality of the other four is found in it.^[6] Smell is the specific quality of earth. Hence whatever is found characterised by the quality of smell is to be viewed as made of earth. The human body has the quality of smell. Therefore it must be made of earth. Vātsyāyana adds that though the human body is made of earth, this does not exclude the possibility of earth being conjoined with the other four elements in the making of the human body. For example, a jar is made of earth only, but it is produced when earth is mixed up with other elements like water etc. The same is true of the body.

After stating his own conclusion Gautama refers to the views of others. Thus, for example, some say that it is true that the specific quality of earth or smell is found in the body. But it is also true that the specific quality of water or viscosity and the specific quality of fire or hot touch are also found there.^[7] Thus logically these three elements should be considered as the material of the body. Others claim that not only these three qualities but also inhalation and exhalation are observed in the body. These are the results of the presence of air. Therefore, air should also be included in the materials producing the body.^[8] Finally it is argued by some that since smell, liquid excretion, digestion, breathing etc and also opening are found in the body it should be accepted as composed of all the five elements.^[9]

In three sūtras Gautama records three different views, but he does not actually refute them. Vātsyāyana says that Gautama has not cared for the refutation of these objections, because the grounds on which they are based are doubtful. The presence of the specie qualities of the different material elements in human body may be explained as due to different causes. First it may be that all the elements actually constitute the body and hence the qualities of all are there. Secondly, earth alone is the material of the human body, but the other four elements join with earth in producing the body, though they are not the actual constituents. This also may be the cause explaining the presence of qualities other then smell. Of these two possibilities Vātsyāyana accepts the first and rejects the other, because it is not logical. If it is assumed that the body is made of various elements it will become devoid of the qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch. The general rule regarding the production of qualities in an effect is that it comes from the specific quality of the material cause, a piece of cloth made of red yarns becomes red. A quality which is not present in the cause cannot produce the same in the effect. Thus if earth and water are both considered to be the material for the body it cannot have smell, because smell is not a quality of water. Similarly, the three earth, water and fire together cannot be so because in that case the body cannot have smell and taste both of which are absent from fire. In fact, different elements with different qualities cannot be accepted as the material for the composition of a single substance, because in that case it will become impossible to specify its exact nature. It is logical to admit that a particular substance is made of only one particular element, but other elements can externally provide help in producing it.^[10]

In the last sūtra of the present section Gautama states that there is also scriptural statement indicating that the human body is made of earth alone.^[11] There is one statement which says that in the end the body goes to the earth. This is a reference to the product returning back to the primary element. There is also a reference to the product as emerging from the material cause. In the cases of the jar etc. it is observed that an effect is produced by homogeneous material cause. Hence it is illogical to assume that heterogeneous elements can produce an effect.

Gautama has further discussed the production of body in another section of the third chapter from a different standpoint.^[12] Vātsyāyana explains the relevance of this discussion. In the preceding section the nature of mind has been discussed. But the mind can function only in a body with the senses and not any where outside the body. The body is also the basis for all cognitions, enjoyment of objects etc. on the part of a knower. In fact, all the activities of a person proceed only on the basis of the body. But there is a doubt regarding this body. Some say that adṛṣṭa has a role in the production of body, but others say that it is not so, its creation is due to only a combination of material elements.^[13] Gautama admits the former position saying that the body is produced due to connection with the results of actions previously performed. The body is the locus to which the self becomes attached, through which the self apprehends the object of senses and thus make dharma and adharma productive. These two alone with the material elements create a new body when the previous body is destroyed. In this new body the activities take place in the same way as in the previous body. All this can be justified only on the admission that the body is created from material elements depending upon adṛṣṭa. Vātsyāyana gives a further ground. It is observed that objects like the chariot etc. which fulfil different purposes are produced from material elements only when they are acted upon by the effort (a quality) belonging to some person. From this instance it is to be inferred that the body which also can fulfil different purposes should come into being out of elements which are dependent upon a special quality of the person concerned. This quality is adṛṣṭa.

To the above the opponent may object that there are actually many composite objects, such as, sand, a piece of rock, minerals in the mountain etc. which fulfil different purpose but are not produced as depending upon adṛṣṭa.^[14] The body also may be so. In answer it is pointed out that the opponent does not actually give any argument. The instances themselves are to be logically established. Just as it is claimed that the production of the body is independent of adṛṣṭa so also it is simply said that there are objects which are produced without the help of adṛṣṭa. If the opponent could cite a logical ground which proves that there are objects independent of adṛṣṭa then only he can argue that the body is similar. But the absence of adṛṣṭa is not proved in any case. So in all the cases the doubt remains whether they may be dependent upon adṛṣṭa also.^[15]

Moreover, the instances of sand etc. are not actually proper. There is clear distinction between the production of a body and the production of sand etc. In the first case, the cause is the seed, i.e. the mixture of semen and female blood, but in the case of latter there is no such seed.^[16] Thus it is to be assumed that the specific form of adṛṣṭa of the particular person which is the cause of its inhabitancy in the mother’s womb and also the two specific forms of adṛṣṭa of the parents which are the causes of their obtaining a son exert influence upon the production of the body. Therefore it cannot be argued that the body also should be produced in the same manner as sand etc.

The case of the body is also different because its production depends upon the food and drink taken by the mother. For the production of body the seed alone is not enough. It increases and gradually grows into the form of a body when the food and drink taken by mother is digested. This transformation of the food is not found in the case of food lying in the earthen pot. For this reason it is admitted that adṛṣṭa also is a cause of the body.^[17]

Gautama gives another argument. The union of the husband with the wife is not found to lead to conception in each and every case. The possibility of absence of conception in spite of union can be justified only on the admission that adṛṣṭa also is a cause. Thus when the particular adṛṣṭa for body is present, there is conception. But if it is not there, there is also no conception. If only the material elements are admitted to be the cause such absence in some cases cannot be explained.^[18]

Again, Gautama says that the body is really a specific combination of different kinds of elements -the veins through which blood and the essential liquids of the body flow, all the liquids ending with semen, the nerves, the sinews, the bones, the muscles, and many such other things. Thus the composition of the body is highly complicated. It cannot be produced simply by the element of earth etc. without depending upon adṛṣṭa.

It is also found that a particular self experiences pleasure and pain produced only in the particular body with which it is connected. If there is no specific cause for this in the form of a particular adṛṣṭa the selves will have no difference and become similar to one another. Thus, each of the bodies which are equally made of earth etc. and are exactly similar may belong to any self. There is also no property in the earth etc. justifying a rule that a particular self will be related to a particular body. The loci of all the selves for apprehending pleasure or pain will be identical. But actually it is not found to be so. The specific rule can be explained on the admission that the particular self constructs a particular body for its experiences of pleasure or pain.^[19]

Continuing the Nyāya argument, Vātsyāyana says that difference in the nature of one’s self and the body is indeed observed. One is born high or low and has a body beautiful or ugly, afflicted with diseases or free from disease, with limbs intact or impaired and so on. There are also very minute differences which cannot be counted. Such differences are possible only due to the difference of adṛṣṭa located in each individual self. The commentator also argues that liberation or an absolute cessation of the self’s connection with the body is not possible unless adṛṣṭa is admitted to be cause of the body. To this, the followers of Sāṃkhya may object, according to their basic doctrine, that a body is produced so long as the distinction between prakṛti and puruṣa is not known due to ignorance, when one finally knows the distinction between the two there is no question of any further production of a body and one attains liberation. So it is not necessary to admit adṛṣṭa as a cause. In answer Vātsyāyana says that the absence of the knowledge of distinction, which is said to be the cause of the body, is present even in liberation because in that state there is total absence of knowledge due to the absence of the body. Thus there will be an absurd position, that the body is produced even in liberation.^[20]

According to another view, adṛṣṭa is admitted as a cause of the body. But it is accepted not as a quality of the self, but as a quality of the atoms and the mind. This view also is rejected. In this view adṛṣṭa can never be destroyed. A quality is generally destroyed when its substratum is destroyed. But both the atoms and the mind are eternal. So their qualities also should be eternal. The other way in which this quality can be destroyed is the enjoyment of its results. But the opponent cannot defend his position even then. The results of action are enjoyed only by the self and not by the atoms or the mind. It cannot be accepted that the adṛṣṭa of one is destroyed through the enjoyment of its results by someone else. Moreover if the conjunction of the mind with the body be due to adṛṣṭa located in the mind the conjunction can never the destroyed, because the opponent cannot cite any cause for the mind’s movement out of the body at the time of death. If, on the other hand, adṛṣṭa is admitted to be a quality of the self, it can be explained by saying that when some particular adṛṣṭa is destroyed through the enjoyment of its result, the mind is made to move out of the body by some other adṛṣṭa which has started producing its result. It is further argued that the body would then become eternal because death cannot be explained. Death results when, due to the general destruction of adṛṣṭa through enjoyment, the body falls and is reborn due to some other adṛṣṭa. If the production of body be due to only the material elements there can be no death due to the gradual destruction of a quality. Death also is not accidental. A person dies under some specific conditions. Someone dies in the mother’s womb, someone at a young age, someone in the old age and so on.^[21]

However, the opponent may point out that the destruction of adṛṣṭa may be explained as in the case of black colour of an atom.^[22] The black colour of an earth atom is not produced, it is eternal, but it is destroyed by a conjunction with fire. Similarly adṛṣṭa located as a quality in the atoms and the mind is eternal, but it is destroyed by right knowledge. So no further body is produced after liberation. In answer, it is said that this instance of atomic black colour is not justified due to various reasons. No proof that such colour is uncaused has been given. There is no perception or inference which establishes that black colour of an atom is uncaused. Therefore it cannot be a proper instance. After giving the simple meaning of Gautama’s sūtra, Vātsyāyana brings out its implication in different ways. The opponent’s view based on this instance will result in the absurdity that a self will have to enjoy the fruits of action which it has not actually performed. If such a position is accepted there will be contradiction with perception, inference and verbal testimony. That there are different kinds of pleasure and pain is known by all the living beings through perception. If there is no specific cause in the form of adṛṣṭa as present in a particular self this difference cannot be explained. Thus there will be a contradiction with observed fact. Secondly, only a person whose self is characterised by an internal effort for pleasure or pain experiences them. Only a conscious person who becomes aware that pleasure is to be produced by some particular means and desiring to attain the pleasure tries to get the means for it can have the sensation of pleasure. But sometimes pleasure and pain are produced in different conscious persons even without such an internal effort. It is then that this sudden pleasure or pain is due to the presence of some other quality in the self. This other quality is adṛṣṭa and it is thus proved by inference. The opponent’s position is contradicted by this inference. Thirdly, in the scriptures there are prescriptions regarding the performance or avoidance different acts. If there is neither virtue nor vice no body will perform the good acts and refrain from the bad ones. Thus it has to be admitted that there are virtue and vice and the experiences of pleasure and pain of a person are due to adṛṣṭa. If anybody denies it his view will be contradicted by the scripture.^[23]

In the list of prameya the third position is occupied by sense (indriya). As we shall later see there is some controversy among philosophers about the number and nature of the senses. In the first chapter of his work Gautama only gives the names of five senses, which are generally known as organs of knowledge as opposed to organs of action. Gautama says that the senses are the olfactory, the gustatory, the visual, the cutaneous and the auditory and they originate from material elements.^[24]

While introducing the sūtra, Vātsyāyana remarks that the external senses are means of enjoyment. But enjoyment means the experience of pleasure or pain. The immediate means of such experiences is the mind and not an external sense. So how does Vātsyāyana make this remark? Vācaspati answers that the external senses also are indirectly the means of enjoyment. The mind cannot go to an external object directly. It can do so only through a particular external sense.

Each of the senses perceives a particular quality only. There is a fixed rule in this regard. Thus the olfactory can only perceive smell (gandha), the gustatory can perceive only taste (rasa), the visual can only perceive colour (rūpa), the cutaneous can only perceive touch (sparśa). It is further pointed out that this sense is located in the skin. The term tvak meaning skin also is used to mean the cutaneous sense in a secondary sense. The auditory is the receptor of sound (śabda). Vātsyāyana claims that from the etymological analysis of the names it is clear that the senses are by nature restricted to their respective objects.^[25]

The remark that the senses originate from material elements has a special significance. This indicates that Gautama’s view is different from the Sāṃkhya view.^[26] In the Sāṃkhya view all the senses originate from ahaṃkāra alone, which in its turn is an evolute of buddhi. But Gautama admits that the five senses originate from five different elements. Thus the olfactory is produced from earth, the gustatory from water, the visual from fire, the cutaneous from air and the auditory is of the nature of ākaśa. Vātsyāyana briefly refutes the Sāṃkhya view. It cannot be denied that a particular sense is restricted to a particular object. Even the Sāṃkhya cannot deny this rule. But, if all the sense are accepted to be produced from the same element, such a rule cannot be maintained. They should all be of the same nature and all qualities should be received by all. On the other hand, if it is accepted that different senses are produced from different elements, the rule can be easily explained. Thus, the olfactory will be of the nature of earth. Earth is a substance which is characterised by the quality of smell. Therefore the olfactory sense also should have the same quality. That is why it is capable of receiving the quality of smell only. Similarly the gustatory is of the nature of water, having the quality of taste. It also has taste and therefore it can receive the same quality. The visual, cutaneous and auditory senses also share respectively the qualities of colour, touch, and sound. Therefore they receive only those qualities.

After this introductory remark Gautama takes up the critical examination of the senses in the third chapter.^[27] This section is designed to show that the senses are made of matter. This is actually a dispute with the Sāṃkhya. In the first chapter Gautama has very briefly indicated the difference of the Nyāya position. In the third chapter a discussion in detail is made.

In the Sāṃkhya view the senses are ultimately products of avyakta. Actually, from avyakta comes out buddhi, from buddhi comes out ahaṃkāra and from ahaṃkāra comes out the senses. But as we have already seen in the Nyāya view the senses are products of material elements.

A critical examination is not possible without a doubt. The doubt justifying a critical examination of the senses has been illustrated by Gautama by the visual sense. One may argue that the visual sense is made of matter because it is identical with the eyeball. When the eyeball is not damaged there is visual sensation, while there is no such sensation when it is damaged. On the other hand some one may argue that the visual sense cannot be equated to the eyeball, because the senses perceive their objects only after getting in contact with them. If an object is placed in very close proximity to the eyeball there is no perception. But it is there when the object is situated at a distance from the eyeball. This can be explained only on the admission that the senses are not made of matter but evolve out of ahaṃkāra. So they are all -pervasive, i.e. remain in contact with all objects. We have thus two opposite alternatives, namely, senses are material and senses are non -material. So there is a doubt.^[28]

Opening the discussion Gautama first states the argument for the Sāṃkhya position. The visual sense perceives all sorts of objects with varying magnitude and size. On the one hand it perceives the big and the bigger things, while on the other the small and the smaller things. But if it is assumed that the sense is made of matter, it will have to be accepted that it has a definite magnitude and shape. In that case it will not be possible for it to perceive any thing bigger in magnitude. The fact that this sense perceives objects of both enormous and minute magnitudes shows that it cannot be made of matter.^[29]

An objection may be raised against the above. It is argued that a big or small thing may be perceived by the visual sense even if it is material and not all -pervasive. The perception of a big or small thing results from a specific contact between the rays of the eye and object, just as in the case of the rays of a lamp and an object revealed by it. The size of the lamp or the length of its rays has nothing to do with the perception of a thing big or small. Both the big and the small are revealed by rays of the lamp. Whatever comes in contact with them is revealed. Similar is the case with the visual sense. The rays come in contact with things of different sizes and they are perceived. The essential factor is the contact. The size or shape of things does not matter. It may be asked, how is it known that a contact between the rays and the objects has been produced? It can be known by inference. If there is no obstruction between the eye and the object there is visual perception. But if it is there, e.g. if a curtain is hanging between the eye and the thing, there is no visual knowledge. In short, it is not necessary to accept the Sāṃkhya view.^[30]

This objection is answered easily by denying the existence of visual sense. The rays of a lamp are to be accepted, because they are perceived by the eyes. If really there were visual rays they also would have been perceived. It cannot be said that visual rays are not perceptible. A thing becomes perceptible if it fulfils three conditions. First, it must have intermediate magnitude. Secondly, it must be made of many parts. Thirdly it must have colour. Visual rays satisfy all these conditions. So like the rays of a lamp they also should be perceived. But the fact is that they are not so. There is no question of inferring them from any ground.^[31]

As against this it is pointed out that in the case of an object inferentially proved the absence of perception cannot establish its nonexistence. Some things are perceptible by nature and some things are imperceptible by nature. In the case of the former nonexistence can be proved by the absence of perception. In the case of latter absence of perception does not prove nonexistence. Their existence is proved by inference. In case a thing can be proved neither by perception or any other source of knowledge it can be said that it does not exist. But the visual rays are proved by inference.^[32]

Gautama further points out that the perceptibility of a thing may depend on many conditions. The general conditions may be satisfied, still there may be no perception, because different things have different properties.^[33] Vātsyāyana gives two examples. First, in autumn and winter, a substance made of water, in spite of having an intermediate magnitude and being composed of many parts is not known by perception when its parts are mixed up with some other substance, but its quality, namely, cold touch is perceived. Secondly in summer and spring a substance made of fire and having latent colour remains unperceived alone with its colour, but the other quality, namely, warm touch is perceived. Moreover, different things have different nature. For example, the rays of both a lamp and eye are of the nature of fire but the former rays have manifest colour but no such touch. So they are visible, but they are not hot to touch. The latter rays have colour and touch both of which are not manifested, so they are neither visible nor feel warm. Therefore, it cannot be claimed that visual rays do not exist simply because one does not perceive them.^[34]

Clarifying his position further Gautama gives an example which shows that some thing made of the element of fire should not be necessarily visible. He says that the absence of perception in the case of visual rays is like the absence of perception of the light of a meteor at midday. All the conditions of visibility are present in the case of the light of a meteor but at midday it is not visible, because then the light of the sun is very bright and all other lights are subdued by it.^[35] In other words, it is not visible because there is some special circumstance. Similar is the case with visual rays. They are not perceived because both their colour and touch are latent.

In Indian philosophy one of the questions raised in the context of perception is whether the senses act after reaching or coming in contact with reaching with the object. Baudhas and Jainas argue that the visual sense gives perceptual knowledge without being related with the object. But Nyāya holds the opposite view. Gautama takes up this question in the third chapter. The opponents argue with an example. In is found that even if an object is obstructed by a piece of glass, mica or crystal the object is visually known. This shows that perception by the eye is possible without a contact with the object. When the object is placed on the other side of the glass, naturally the rays of the eyes cannot be conjoined with the object because there is an obstruction. In answer Gautama says that in case even an object obstructed by a wall should be perceived. The opponent thinks that there may by perception even when there is obstruction. So a thing should be perceived every where. But it is not actually so. Therefore it has to be admitted that when there is no obstruction and the visual rays can come in contact with the object, there is perception. Of course, the opponent may raise the question, how then there is perception when there is obstruction by a piece of glass? Gautama answers that in the case of glass etc there is actually no obstruction because the rays of the eyes can go through them and get in contact. Generally one material thing is obstructed by another material thing. But this does not mean that there is no exception. Things are different in nature. There are things which though material do not cause obstruction. For example, when a frying pan is put on the oven things in the pan are cooked. The fire passes through the pan and reaches the things. In the case of glass crystal etc also the same thing happens. No question can be raised against the nature of an object. One cannot ask: why does a wall obstruct, but glass does not? Facts are to be explained according to the nature of the things.^[36]

In a separate section Gautama has also discussed and refuted a peculiar view on the number of sense.^[37] According to this view there is only one sense, namely, the sense of touch and nothing else. It has been remarked that most probably it was an old Sāṃkhya view. Gautama first states why there may be a doubt regarding the number of senses. The five senses are located in different parts of the body. Generally things which occupy different places are found to be different. On the other hand, it is also found that a single thing can occupy different places. The human body or the tree is one whole but they are present in their different component parts. Thus there may be a doubt, is there only one sense or are their many senses?^[38] The opponent says that the sense of touch only should be admitted. This sense pervades all the locations of the sense. There is no part which is not pervaded by it. Thus whenever any cognition is produced there must be a contact between the mind and this sense. No cognition can be produced without a contact between the mind and the sense. Thus it is better to admit that the single sense of touch produces cognition of all the qualities like smell etc and it is not necessary to admit any other sense.^[39]

Vātsyāyana first gives his own answer to this. This view cannot be accepted, because in that case it would have to be admitted that even a blind person may cognise colour. A blind man has no visual sense, but his tactual sense is there. So he should be able to perceive even colour with it because it is the only sense admitted by the opponent. Similarly a deaf should also perceive sound.^[40] The opponent may explain that the above situation does not arise. Though it is admitted that the tactual is the only sense, it is further admitted that only that particular part of the tactual which is present in the eyes can perceive colour. In the case of a blind man the part of the tactual sense located in the eyes is destroyed. So he cannot perceive colour. But he can perceive other qualities, because the tactual sense covering the location of other senses has not been damaged. Vātsyāyana says that this explanation actually goes against the view of the opponent itself. He is forced to admit that the same part does not perceive all the qualities, different parts perceive different qualities. This means that different things perceive different qualities. Therefore it becomes proved that there are many senses.^[41]

Gautama himself says in reply to the above objection that if there were only one sense many cognitions relating to the different qualities would have been produced at the same time. It is a fact that all the qualities are not perceived at the same time. The cognitions of the different qualities occur at different moments. Cognitions occur when the self is related to the mind, the mind to the sense and the sense with the object. Assuming that there is only one sense, one would have to admit that the mind has got connected with a sense which again has connection with all the objects of senses. So all the cognitions would be produced, because the causes are all there.^[42]

A further argument is given. It cannot be admitted that the sense of touch is the only sense because there will be contradiction. In the opponent’s view it will have to be accepted that the sense of touch can perceive an object even with -out coming in connection with it. But this is not really possible. The sense of touch can perceive such objects only which are in contact with it. To avoid this difficulty the opponent may that some part of the sense (the part perceiving touch) acts as the receptor when there is connection with the object, while some part of the same (the part perceiving colour) acts as the receptor even without any connection with the object. But this argument will lead to two difficulties. First there will be no difference to the perception of colour whether obstructed or not. As there is no need for contact all colours whether obstructed or not obstructed should be equally perceived. Secondly it is a fact that colour, though not obstructed, is not perceived when it is at a distance. It is perceived only when it is both near and unobstructed. But if there is no need of a connection between the sense and colour for its perception this fact will remain unexplained.^[43]

Another argument for admitting different is rather simple. The objects of senses are five namely, colour, taste, smell, touch and sound. They are all different in nature. Therefore the things which cognise or reveal them also should be different.^[44] To this the opponent may say that the objects of senses are not five, they are numerous. For example, smell, touch and sound are of different varieties. The answer to this is also simple. Touch may be cold, hot, or temperate. But as a quality it is one and the same coldness or hotness does not change it into a different quality. There may be many instances of each quality like colour etc, but as classes they are only five.^[45] Even then the opponent may contend that in the same way it may be proved that there is only one sense. One can argue that though colours etc are different, all the things are one and the same because of being an object of a sense. If there is only a single class, then let there be one single sense cognising all.^[46] Gautama answers the objection. He says that the senses are only five because the cognition, the locations, the process of getting connected, the size and the material cause are only five. Thus there are positive grounds to establish that the senses are five and not one.^[47]

According to Sāṃkhya ahaṃkāra alone is the material cause of all the senses. But according to Nyāya different senses are produced from different elements. Concluding his discussion on the senses Gautama gives an argument to show that the Sāṃkhya view is not logical. Each sense produces the awareness of a special quality of only one of the elements and they should be considered as made of those particular elements only. Thus of all the specific qualities like colour etc, only smell is cognised by the olfactory sense. Smell is the specie quality of earth. Therefore this sense is made of earth. By following the same rule it can be decided that each of the others senses also is made of a particular elements like water etc.^[48]

We have all ready noted that Gautama has mentioned twelve things in his list of the objects of knowledge. In this list the fourth one is artha or the object of the sense. In the first chapter Gautama only gives the names of such five objects.^[49] According to him, artha specifically means five qualities, smell, taste, colour, touch and sound which are apprehended by the five external senses. These qualities belong to five elements. There is a difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of the sūtra. According to Vātsyāyana’s explanation artha means only the qualities. But Uddyotkara takes it in a broader sense which includes not only the there perceptible elements, namely, earth, water and fire but also qualities that are perceptible. Any thing perceptible is an object of the sense. He says that this explanation does not go against the view of Gautama because he has used the word artha to mean any perceptible object like the jar etc (3.1.1). Some scholar does not accept this view. When Gautama critically examines artha he discusses the nature of the five qualities only. That which is earlier generally stated is taken up later for further discussion. This the rule is followed by Gautama. When Gautama includes artha in the list a of prameya his intention is to take it in a technical sense. In a different context he may use the word in a general sense.^[50]

In the first āhnika of the third chapter Gautama critically examines artha. At the outset, he mentions the location of the different qualities in different elements. The earth has smell, taste, colour and touch. Water has the qualities of taste, colour and touch. Fire has the qualities of colour and touch. Air has the quality of touch only. Ākāśa has only one quality, sound.^[51]

Next Gautama notes an objection against his view of the location of qualities. The opponent says that the sense made of earth apprehends in earth smell alone and not taste, colour or touch. The gustatory sense which is made of water apprehends in water taste alone and neither colour nor touch. The visual sense which is made of fire apprehends in fire colour alone and not touch. Therefore the distribution of qualities as given by Gautama is not acceptable.^[52]

So according to the opponent each material element has only one quality. Smell alone is the quality of earth, taste alone is the quality of water, colour alone is the quality of fire and touch alone is the quality of air. This easily explains why a single quality is apprehended by a particular sense in a particular element. Of course it may be pointed out that earth, for example, is actually perceived as having qualities other than smell also. One perceives water or taste in earth and this cannot be denied even by the opponent. So earth should be admitted as having many qualities. To this, it is answered that such perception of many qualities is due to the mixture of one element with another element. Actually each element has one particular quality only. But when a number of elements get mixed one may apprehend many qualities in that mixed substance. For example, a flower is a substance made of earth. It has only the quality of smell but a particular touch or a particular taste also may be perceived in it. This happens only because some particles of water or air are also mixed with the flower. This mixture may not by perceptible but it can be inferred. Even Gautama should admit such mixture. Because sometime one perceives good or bad smell in air. But smell is not a quality a air. So it is to be admitted that some element of earth have got mixed up with air.^[53]

Gautama defends his position by providing a number of arguments. It is a fact accepted by all that a substance of earth or water is perceived by the visual sense. But it is also a fact that a substance having colour is perceived by the visual sense. A substance without colour is never so perceived. Thus it cannot be denied that earth or water also has the quality of colour. Moreover it will not be logical to assume that a particular element is always, invariably mixed up with another element so that many qualities are perceived. A mixture may happen sometime, but not always. Sometime an element may also remain without being mixed up. Even in that state it is perceived by the visual sense. So it has to be accepted that the quality of colour belongs to it as such. Besides if the opponent’s view is accepted, then, air also should become perceptible sometime. Air which has the quality of touch only may sometime be mixed up with fire which has the quality of colour only. In such a case one should perceive colour in air also. A thing with colour is known by the visual sense. Hence, air also should be visually known. In short the position of the opponent is not accepted. As to the objection that the olfactory sense cognises smell only in earth and not any other quality, Gautama answers that this is because of the existence of a particular quality in a particular sense. The olfactory sense is made of earth. So the quality of smell attains excellence of that particular quality and perceives it only. Similar is the case with the other senses. It has nothing to do with the presence or absence of qualities other than smell in earth.^[54]

It has been objected that the olfactory sense can receive smell only. So the element of earth should have only the quality of smell but neither colour nor taste. Similarly the gustatory sense which is made of water can only receive taste. So water should have the quality of taste only and neither colour nor touch. Gautama answers these objections. He says that in a particular sense there is an excellence of a particular quality only. A sense can perceive only such a quality having excellence. E.g. there is excellence of smell in the olfactory sense and hence it can receive smell only. It has nothing to do with the presence or absence of any particular qualities in earth. The case of other senses also should be similarly explained.^[55]

The quality of smell belongs to earth. Whatever is made of earth has this quality. So the olfactory sense also should have smell. But how is it that the smell of that sense is not perceived? In answer Gautama says that when the sense perceives smell in other substances the smell present in itself becomes a cooperating factor, but in the perception of its own smell there can be no cooperating factor. So the smell of the sense itself is not perceived. Moreover, an object cannot act upon itself. The visual sense can reveal other objects but not its own self. Against this it may be pointed out that there is an exception. According to Nyāya the auditory sense is of the nature of ākāśa. Sound is the quality of ākāśa and is produced in it only. In fact, that particular sound which is produced in the auditory sense is perceived by itself. Gautama admits that it is actually so. The case of the perception of sound is really an exception, but this is not illogical. Different things are different in nature. Every thing has some special properties of its own. So sometimes the general rule may not be applicable.^[56]

The fifth object of knowledge is called buddhi. In the first chapter Gautama does not give a proper definition of buddhi but tries to indicate its nature by mentioning two synonyms.^[57] It has the same meaning as awareness or knowledge or cognitions. Actually the term buddhi is also used by Sāṃkhya. But there the sense is quite different. The Sāṃkhya is the earliest system of Indian philosophy. Many of its views have been refuted by Gautama and Vātsyāyana. Though the primary purpose of the sūtra in the first chapter on buddhi is to give a definition, Gautama also finds an opportunity to reject the Sāṃkhya view. According to it, buddhi means the first evolutes of prakṛti, upalabdhi means the unreal connection of puruṣha with jñāna and jñāna is a modification of buddhi. But Gautama makes it clear that in the Nyāya view these terms do not have different meanings, they all mean the same thing, namely, knowledge.^[58]

In the third chapter Gautama takes up the critical examination of buddhi. But first it has to be shown that there may be a doubt regarding its nature. Gautama himself explains how a doubt may occur. Buddhi has similarity with both ākāśa and karman. These two things are without the quality of touch. Buddhi also is so. But karman is noneternal and ākāśa is eternal. So a doubt arises. If buddhi is like karman it should be non-eternal and if it is like ākāśa it will be eternal.^[59]

The opponent says that it is eternal, because an object is re-cognised. According to Nyāya knowledge is a property of the self. But according to Sāṃkhya it is a quality of buddhi, which is the internal sense. It cannot be a quality of the self. It is produced and it is destroyed. So sometimes the self will be characterised by the quality and sometimes it will be without this quality. In other words the self will then become non-eternal and subject to transformation like any ordinary thing, but such a position is not acceptable. The self is eternal and a substance without any kind of transformation. Hence knowledge must belong to buddhi. In that case buddhi should be eternal, because then it must be the agent of recognition but such an agent must be a permanent thing because it should be present earlier when the first knowledge was produced and again it should also be present when later the recognition takes place. Gautama refutes this position in a simple manner. He says that the argument is a case of the fallacy of the unproved. That is, it is not proved that knowledge is a quality of buddhi. In fact knowledge is a quality of the self. The agent of recognition is none other than the self. So it cannot be argued on the evidence of recognition that, buddhi is eternal.^[60]

According to Sāṃkhya, vṛtti is a kind of modification of the internal sense and the modification is identical with it, just as water and its wave are not actually different. Refuting this view Gautama says that the modification and the internal sense are said to be identical, which means that as long as the internal sense is there, the modifications also are there. But these modifications are also the cognitions. Therefore in the Sāṃkhya view all cognitions will be present at the same time. But this is not the actual position.^[61] The follower of Sāṃkhya may say that the internal sense remains unchanged. But the modification or cognition appears and disappears in it. The modifications are not always present. Therefore the above objection is not possible. To this Gautama says that if the internal sense remains but the modifications are destroyed then it will follow that they are not identical. If the destruction of one does not mean the destruction of another it is to be concluded that the two are different. If it is still argued that they are not different then it will have to be admitted that when modification disappears the internal sense also disappears.^[62]

According to Nyāya a number of cognitions cannot the produced at the same moment. They are produced in different moments one after the other. Incidentally, he points out the reason why it is so. One of the causes of cognition is a conjunction between the internal sense and the external sense. But the mind is atomic in nature. It cannot come in contact with more then one sense at a time. Therefore at a particular moment only one particular cognition can be produced. How is it concluded that the mind is very minute? Gautama gives the reason. It is found that when a person is absorbed, he does not cognise an object even if his sense is in conjunction. For example, when a person listens to a song very attentively he has no cognition of even his friend standing before his eyes. Here there is a contact with the object, still there is no cognition. This is because the mind is not in contact with the visual sense; it is in contact with the auditory sense. So it is clear that the mind is very small and cannot be connected with many senses at the sometime. It may be argued that sometime we feel that cognitions through different senses are occurring at the same moment. For example, a person is watching a show. He is having cognitions with the visual and other senses. Gautama says that the cognitions may appear to be produced at the same time but they are not actually so. The mind can move very quickly and so it runs from one sense to another very quickly. There is almost no gap between the cognitions. It appears that they are being produced at the same moment.^[63]

In another section of the third chapter^[64] Gautama discusses the special Nyāya view that knowledge is momentary. Knowledge is destroyed immediately after production. In later Nyāya knowledge said to be momentary in the sense that in the first moment it is produced, in the second moment it is present and in the very third moment it is destroyed. Gautama says that knowledge is similar in nature with action. An action does not last long. An action is produced, next there is disjunction, next there is destruction of previous conjunction then there is conjunction, with new space and the action is destroyed. This shows that an action cannot continue for a long time. Similarly every moment different cognitions are being produced. One cognition destroys another cognition. So cognition cannot be lasting.^[65]

There may be an objection. If knowledge is said to be momentary the awareness of an object will be indistinct. The function of knowledge is to reveal the nature of an object. But if it does not last long it cannot clearly reveal all the properties of the object. Thus the object will not be distinctly revealed. For example, light reveals an object. But if the is light momentary as in the case of lightning, the object is not properly manifested. This is because the lightning flashes for a very short time. Knowledge also will be like it.^[66] Gautama answers with the example of a lamp that the position of the opponent is untenable. In a lamp every moment newer and newer flames are produced. Some of them are short and some of them are long. The flames are also produced at different moments. Actually the lamp is nothing but a series of momentary flames. But the fact is that each of the flames is distinctly perceived. Here the knowledge is momentary and the object also is momentary. But there is distinct awareness in spite of the momentariness of both. Therefore the objection of the opponent does not stand.^[67]

The mind is the sixth prameya. It is the internal sense which is necessary for the perception of qualities like pleasure, pain etc. which cannot be perceived by any external sense. Like the other senses it also is imperceptible. In the first chapter of his work Gautama gives one ground for the inference of the mind.^[68] The argument is as follows. Different senses may come in contact with different objects at the same moment. But a number of perceptual cognitions do not arise at a single moment. From this fact it is inferred that over and above the contact with the sense there must be some additional cause, a contact with which is necessary for the production of knowledge. This additional cause must be also part less so that the possibility of its different parts coming in contact with different senses at the same moment is excluded. This part less or atomic additional cause is the mind. Thus though there may be contact of different senses with different objects, there is produced cognition only through that particular sense which is in contact with the mind. Sometimes we may have the impression of having many cognitions through many senses at a time, but it is only wrong one due to the quick movement of the mind.

Vātsyāyana explains that though Gautama has mentioned only one ground, there are still many facts which cannot be explained unless the mind is admitted. He gives a long list.^[69] The first is knowledge in the form of recollection (smṛti). Recollection is a kind of knowledge. It must be produced by a sense as an instrument. But in the case of recollection the object of knowledge is not present there and may even be destroyed. It is not possible to know such an object by any external sense. But we have the knowledge of such an object. So the mind is admitted as the internal sense.

The second in the list is inference (anumāna).^[70] In the case of inference also a direct relation between a sense and the object known is not possible. Not only present things but also past ones are known by inference. A person first perceives the mark, then he remembers that the mark has an invariable relation with a particular thing. On the basis of this knowledge he infers the presence of an object which is not being perceived. Thus in the production of the inferential knowledge an important role of something other then the external sense has to be admitted. That additional cause is the mind.

Vātsyāyana says that the mind has to be admitted to explain the case of knowledge acquired through word (āgama). In the Nyāya view verbal testimony also is a source of knowledge. When a person hears a sentence he understands a connected meaning of the different meanings expressed by the different words. It is clear that in that process there is practically no role of the external senses. The knowledge must be acquired through some special instrument which is the mind.

The next in the list is doubt (saṃśaya).^[71] Doubt is a special from of knowledge involving more than one alternative. For example, when a person’s visual sense comes in contact with some thing at a distance he perceives in it the similar properties of a man and a tree. But he cannot decide whether it is a man or a tree. So, he has a knowledge in the form, is it a tree or a man? It is clear that in the process of such knowledge something other than the external sense has a vital role. In other words it is the operation of the mind which makes such knowledge possible.

There is also a special kind of extra -ordinary knowledge which is proved by our experience. Some time a person has an intuitive perception which reveals something beyond normal range of perception. For example, a little girl may say without any apparent basis that her brother will come tomorrow and actually he comes on that day. This kind of valid knowledge is called pratibhā. Unless the mind as an internal sense is accepted there can be no explanation for this kind of apprehension. In such a case the whole thing occurs because of the operation of the mind only.

Next is mentioned the well-known case of dream experiences. In the state of dream we perceive so many things. But there any role of the external sense is out of the question. The whole thing is constructed by the mind. If no such thing as the mind is admitted there will be no explanation for such illusory cognitions.

In the first sūtra, Gautama gives a list of categories the right knowledge of which leads to liberation. In the list there is a category called tarka or hypothetical argument.^[72] It is not a kind of pramāṇa but it helps a pramāṇa so that it can produce right and definite knowledge. For example, even after observing in many instances that smoke is pervaded by fire one may have doubt about the invariability of the relation. One may be in doubt -in all cases one has observed that the two are present together, but still can there be a case where smoke is present but fire is not? This doubt is removed by a tarka. If it is assumed that there may be smoke without fire one will have to accept that there may be an effect without a cause for smoke is the effect and fire is the cause. But it is never possible that an effect is present without a cause. So smoke cannot be present without fire. It is clear from this process that there must be an instrument in the form of the mind.

Lastly Vātsyāyana refers to the perception of the qualities is like knowledge, desire etc. In fact later this argument only is accepted as a proof for the existence of the mind. A person has an awareness in the form, I am happy or I am sorry. The object of knowledge here is pleasure pain etc. But they are not external objects like the jar etc. But the perception of an object is not possible without an instrument. As such the mind is to be admitted as the instrument of cognition of pleasure.

In the section on the critical examination of mind^[73] Gautama first take up the question whether there should be only one mind or many minds in a single body. There are five external senses. Cognitions are produced through them. The senses are restricted to specific objects. Every sense cannot produce the cognition of every kind of object. For all kinds of perceptual cognition a contact between mind and a particular sense is necessary. So there arise two possibilities. First there is only one mind in the body. When a cognition is produced through a particular sense the mind gets conjoined with it. Again in the case of another sense, the same thing happens. Secondly it may be admitted that there are many minds in the same body. When a cognition occurs though a particular sense only a particular mind is conjoined with it. In other words there are five external senses. And there are also five minds working for each of them. It appears, according to some, five cognitions through five senses can be produced at the same time. If only one mind is admitted, such a position cannot be explained. It can be easily explained if there are present five different minds. Thus there may be a doubt regarding the exact number of mind in a body.

In the first sūtra Gautama clearly states his conclusion that the mind is only one.^[74] The ground for this conclusion is that cognitions are not produced at the same moment. We have already seen that the Nyāya holds a rather distinct view that many cognitions are not produced at the same time. Every cognition occurs only in a particular moment. If this conclusion is to be accepted, one has also to accept that there is one mind in a body. If there be many minds, they can all come in contact with all the senses at the same time and all cognitions may be produced. But if the mind is one it cannot get in contact with all the senses at the same time. So the contacts will occur one after another and cognitions also will be produced accordingly.

An objection may be raised.^[75] It is found that in the same body of a person different actions are produced at the same time. If there be only one mind it will not be possible. Vātsyāyana has given an example. The same preceptor reads, works, holds a vessel, looks at the path, hears sounds coming from the animals, being afraid tries to determine the position of the ferocious animals and recollects the destination. All these actions are found to be occurring at the same time and not one after the other. No action on the part of an intelligent person is possible without the operation of the mind. In the case of every decision a person takes the mind plays a vital role. But if the mind be one it cannot be involved with so many actions in a single moment. If many minds are admitted, it may be explained that there is a special mind for each of the actions.

Gautama answers this objection with an example.^[76] His main point is that actions are not actually produced at the same moment but they appear to be so because they occur in quick succession. In a moving fire-brand (alātacakra), the succession of movements though present is not apprehended due to rapidity. Because of this non-apprehension of succession it is apprehended as a connected whole and ultimately the fire brand is wrongly as ascertained to be round as a wheel. In the same way due to the quick production and destruction of the cognitions as well as the actions, succession, though present, is not apprehended. That is why it is wrongly ascertained that the actions take place at the same moment.

The opponent may object that only an example has been given. No argument to prove that the actions occur at different moments has been given. So the conclusion is not justified. In fact, there are two possibilities. First, it may be that the actions appear to be occurring at the same time because there is succession but it is not apprehended. Secondly, it may be that the actions appear to be so because of the fact that there is no succession. In answer to this Vātsyāyana says^[77] that it has already been proved that cognitions cannot occur at the same moment and they are produced only in succession. The same ground also proves that the actions are produced in succession. So, it is not necessary to give further argument here.

Vātsyāyana further argues that Gautama’s position is also justified by actual practice of persons.^[78] It is observed that the cognitions of a person, when he thinks over various objects seen and heard of are produced in succession. On the basis of this instance it is to be inferred that in other cases also cognitions do not occur at the same time. Thus, when a person comprehends the meaning of a sentence, succession in the cognition of letters, words, and the sentence and also the cognitions of their meanings is not perceived due to the quick appearance and disappearance. The different letters composing the words in the sentence are uttered first. Then, each is heard one after another. The letters received by hearing are then determined, singly or together as forming words. Next, one determines them to be the components of the sentence. After their determination as words, their meanings are obtained through recollection and then noting the different words in the proper order one determines the whole sentence. Finally, one notes the different meanings as connected with one another and comprehends the meaning of the whole sentence. Here everything occurs gradually. But as the whole thing takes place very quickly it appears that everything occurs at the same time. It is not proved without doubt in any instance that many cognitions arise at the same moment. So it is not logical to claim that there are many minds in the same body.

Lastly Gautama points out that the mind is atomic in nature.^[79] It is not possible for it to come in contact with many senses at the same time. Therefore also cognitions must occur at different moments.

It has been said again and again that cognitions are not produced at the same time, because the mind does not come in contact with all the senses. Even then it may be objected that many recollections may be produced at the same time. A recollection is not produced through a sense. No contact between a sense and mind is necessary. The causes of recollection are impression (saṃskāra) and self -mind contact. Both self and mind are eternal. Their contact also must be eternal. The impressions also are lasting and they all are present in the self. So all the recollection should be produced at the same time.

To answer the above, some say that the impressions are located in different parts of the self. A recollection is produced when the mind is conjoined with that particular part of the self in which a particular impression is located. The mind is atomic and cannot be conjoined with all the parts of the self at the same time. So the recollections also are not produced accordingly.^[80]

But Gautama does not accept this answer. He says that the self is all -pervading. It has many parts, some of them may be located inside the body but many of them are outside the body also. If it is said that impressions are located in different parts of the self, then, it will have to be admitted that some impressions are located in the parts of the self which are outside the body. But then recollection cannot be produced from such impressions because the mind cannot come out side the body and get conjoined with the parts of the self outside the body. So long as a person has life the mind remains within the body and never goes outside.^[81]

An argument also is given to show that Gautama’s position is logical. A person intending to recollect an object may concentrate his mind and recollect the object after a long time. But it is found that while he recollects his body holds on. An internal effort which is produced by a contact between the self and the mind is of two kinds. One cause to hold on (dhāraka) and one is what incites to action (preraka).The cause of the former is a contact of the mind with the self as connected with a body. If it is admitted that while recollecting an object the mind goes out of the body, gets conjoined with some other part of the self, the mind will have contact with the self as having no connection with a body. Therefore due to the absence of the cause, the first kind of internal effort will not be produced and the body of the person who recollects will fall to the ground. This absurd position can be avoided only if it is admitted that so long as a person is living his mind does not leave the body.^[82] As against this it may be objected that the mind can move very quickly. When a recollection occurs it goes out of the body very quickly and also comes back to the body very quickly. There is almost no gap between its going out and coming in. So the body does not fall.^[83] But it is pointed out that this claims is not logical, because there is no specific rule regarding the amount of time taken by the act of recollection. Some object is recollected in a moment and some after a long time. When an object is recollected after a long time one intending to recollect concentrates the mind and there follows a series of different pieces of recollection. Thus after the specific mark of an object is rightly recalled the mark becomes a cause of the recollection of that object. In such a case the mind must remain outside the body for a long time and it will be impossible for the body to hold on.^[84]