Prameyas in the Nyaya-sutra of Gautama

by Sri Panu Podder | 2014 | 41,257 words

This essay studies the theory of Prameya as discussed in the Nyaya-sutra of Gautama and commentaries. The Nyayasutras belong to a separate branch of Indian Philosophy (darshana) and can be dated to at least the 6th century B.C. They primarily deal with logic and knowledge such as the topics of Pramana (instruments of valid Knowledge) and Prameya (o...

Chapter 1 - Introduction (Prameyas in Indian philosophy)

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In the Indian tradition four human ends are recognised, namely, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. For the fulfilment of each of them there are also different branches of learning (śāstra). Philosophy or darśana is the special branch of learning explaining the nature of liberation and the means for attaining it. As it is well known, there are different systems they hold divergent views on the various issues. Each system has its own viewpoint regarding the nature of reality and other allied problems. Even then, it we take a very general view, we find that all the systems are rather unanimous in a few respects. For example, liberation (mokṣa) generally means an absolute cessation of suffering. The term absolute is important and it signifies that in liberation suffering is necessarily destroyed and there is no re-production of suffering. Life is full of pain and misery. Every human being is afflicted with different kinds of sorrows every moment of his existence. Liberation means final destruction of all sufferings forever. Philosophy helps one to reach this state.

But, it may be asked, there are many ordinary means by which one can free oneself from sufferings and why should one study philosophy for this purpose? In answer, it is pointed out that an ordinary remedy may remove suffering for the time being, but there is no guarantee that the suffering will necessarily be removed and will not recur. A sick person may get well by taking medicines. But it is a fact that a person may not be cured even by taking a lot of medicine. Moreover, he may suffer from the same disease again in future. But the study of philosophy ensures that the suffering will definitely be removed and there will be no recurrence. The different systems of philosophy may differ on a lot of subjects, but so far as the nature of liberation is concerned they share the same view.^[1]

We may note here another basic point also on which almost all the systems agree. Except the Cārvāka, all the other systems of philosophy, both orthodox and unorthodox, admit rebirth or transmigration of self. All the systems admit that the self (ātman) is an entity distinct from the body. The self is born again and again, and dies again and again. However, the self is admitted to be eternal and birth and death are to be understood in a secondary sense. Thus, for self, birth means association with a new body and death means dissociation from the old body. As long as one is not liberated the cycle of births and deaths goes on endlessly. This is known as bondage or worldly existence (saṃsāra).^[2] Such existence is full of suffering and one can finally destroy suffering only when one is able to stop this cycle. If there is no association with or dissociation from bodies the self remains in its pure state. Then no suffering can be produced at all.

Naturally, it may be asked, why should the self be in bondage? How is it that the self passes through a series of births and deaths? The answer to this question also is the same in all the systems. False knowledge is the root cause of bondage. Since a person does not have right knowledge and is ignorant of the true nature of things, he suffers from worldly existence. Though there is general agreement on this point there is however differences of opinion about the nature of the false knowledge or the right knowledge which respectively causes bondage and freedom. Even then, it may be said generally that false knowledge is removed by right knowledge, just as darkness is dispelled by light. As to the nature of reality also, the systems differ widely among themselves. For example, according to Sāṃkhya, there are two basic realities, namely, puruṣa and prakṛti. The two are quite opposite in nature. The former is consciousness itself and is not subject to any transformation. But the latter is non-sentient and constantly subject to transformation. This external world is an evolution of the latter.^[3] But the common people are not aware of this fundamental distinction between the two and they wrongly consider the two as identical. So long as this false knowledge of identity persists one is in bondage. But when one acquires right knowledge, the knowledge correctly discriminating between the two, one becomes liberated. This is no doubt especially the position of Sāṃkhya. Other systems naturally do not subscribe to such a view. They conceive reality in their own ways and admit totally different categories. Accordingly, the exact nature of right knowledge also becomes different.

From the above discussion it is clear that in the context of liberation the most important factor is the acquisition of right knowledge. All the systems again are agreed on the point that it can be done only through pramāṇa or instrument of valid cognition. Some cognitions are valid, e.g. the cognition of water in the river. But some cognitions are valid, e.g. the cognition of water in a mirage. The instrument of a cognition which is valid is called pramāṇa and the one of a cognition which is invalid is called pramāṇābhāsa.^[4] A valid cognition reveals the nature of a thing correctly, but an invalid cognition cannot do so. The different systems admit different numbers of pramāṇas and also there are great differences of opinion about the nature of each. But it is generally admitted that pramāṇa only can produce right knowledge.

Thus just as pramāṇa is the instrument of right cognition so also prameya is the object of right cognition. A cognition must have a specific object. A cognition can never be without a specific object of its own. It may thus be said in a way that the main subject-matter of philosophy consists in the determination of the nature of the two.

The fact that these two are the main concerns of philosophy is hinted at by Gautama. In the first sūtra of his work, Gautama briefly states his main point, namely, final good can be attained through the right knowledge of sixteen categories, namely, instrument of valid cognition (pramāṇa), object of valid cognition (prameya), doubt (saṃśaya) etc. While explaining this sūtra Vātsyāyana notes an objection of the opponent. It is objected that the separate mention of the first two categories, i.e. pramāṇa and prameya, is justified. But it is not necessary to mention separately the other fourteen categories (i.e. from saṃśaya to nigrahasthāna), because they all can be included in the first two. In answer Vātsyāyana says that, even then, the separate mention of doubt etc. is necessary because they constitute the unique subject matter of Nyāya or logic. From this remark of Vātsyāyana it may be concluded that if considered logically all categories may be divided only into two, pramāṇa and prameya. Moreover, in the fourth chapter of his work Gautama has refuted some views each of which declare that there is only a specific number of objects in the world. There also we find an indication that such a view was upheld by some.^[5] Of these two again, prameya seems to be of greater importance, because it is the false knowledge concerning the prameyas only which binds one to worldly existence. One can attain liberation only when one can remove this false knowledge. Pramāṇa is the means for getting right knowledge. In this context we can briefly note what Gautama says in the second Sūtra of his work. Gautama says that in the series of suffering (duḥkha), birth (janma), activity (pravṛtti), evil (doṣa) and false knowledge (mithyājñāna), when each previous one is removed as a consequence of the removal of the one following it liberation (apavarga) is attained. That is, the removal of false knowledge leads to the removal of evil, that of evil to that of activity, that of activity to birth and finally that of birth to that of suffering and this is nothing but liberation. In this series each previous one is the effect and the following one is the cause, e.g. false knowledge is the cause of evil, evil of activity and so on. According to the general rule that the absence of cause is followed by the absence of effect, we get that the removal of the following one results in the removal of the previous one. Although false knowledge has been mentioned in the sūtra in a general way, we have to take only that particular form of false knowledge which is the cause of worldly existence. This is because to attain liberation one has to remove the connection with such existence. Thus if the particular form of false knowledge is not removed the purpose will not be served. For example, false knowledge of a rope can be removed only by the right knowledge of a rope and not by the right knowledge of anything else.

While explaining this sūtra Vātsyāyana begins with the remark that there exist many forms of false knowledge regarding the prameyas, starting with ātman and ending in apavarga.^[6] He also gives many instances of such knowledge with reference to the various prameyas. For example, according to Gautama the first prameya is the self. The self is proved as an entity as distinct from the body etc. But common people suffer from such false knowledge as the self does not exist, or identify the self with what is not self, such as the body or the sense organ.

Of the various prameyas self is the most important. Therefore it has been mentioned first and also false cognitions relating to it. But there may be different kinds of false cognitions related to others also. Thus, according to Gautama. suffering (duḥkha) is one of the objects of knowledge. But common people fail to recognise suffering as suffering. In fact, they do the very opposite, they consider suffering as pleasure (sukha). There are so many things which are not permanent and they are to be shunned. But people take them for permanent and try to acquire them. Such opposite notions are observed in the case of many things. An object which can not really protect one is wrongly supposed to be a means for protection. An object is really a source of fear but it is taken as a cause for removing fear. People often consider a prohibited thing as desirable. Activity also is included in the category of prameya. It generally means some special form of action. But here it is used in the sense of the fruits of actions. Regarding this, one has the false notion that there is nothing called action or fruits of actions. In the Indian tradition, all the systems except the Cārvāka admit karman or fruits of karman. The law of karman is a very important doctrine of Indian philosophy admitted by both the orthodox and unorthodox systems. If one performs a good action, virtue (dharma) is produced and if one performs a bad action vice is produced.

For the enjoyment of virtue and vice one has to pass through worldly existence. But because of ignorance people generally think that there is no such law. The prameya called evil is of three kinds attachment (rāga), aversion (dveṣa) and ignorance (moha).^[7] These three also compel one to remain in saṃsāra, but people think that evil is not a cause of saṃsāra. Re-birth (pretyabhāva) is a prameya according to Gautama. So long as one does not attain liberation one has to pass through the cycle of births and deaths continuously. But regarding this re-birth one wrongly feels that actually there is no entity which can be said to be being born or dying again and again. There is nothing which is born or dies. It is to be noted that the self is eternal. Therefore the self cannot be subject to birth or death in a general sense or directly. Actually, the self is said to be so depending upon the production or destruction of the body. For the self birth means association with a new body and death means dissociation from the existing body. But people wrongly believe that there is no definite cause for re-birth and thus it is not possible to specify when the cycle of rebirths will come to an end and one will be able to reach liberation. Liberation is considered the highest goal of human existence. It is the most desirable state, because it means permanent freedom from all sufferings. But ignorant people are afraid of liberation. In the state of liberation, just as there is no suffering so also there is no pleasure either. People think that in such a state one can not have any kind of pleasures and there being no material body, even cognition or consciousness will be totally absent. One will be transformed into a piece of stone. Every one seeks pleasure. No one is ever led to activity unless one may have something pleasant. Therefore why should any intelligent person go for liberation?

Vātsyāyana has also explained how false knowledge leads to worldly existence. He says that because of the different kinds of false knowledge there occur attachment to the favourable (anukūla) and aversion for the unfavourable (pratikūla). Under the influence of these two are produced evils like falsehood, malice, deception and greed etc. Driven by the evils and through the agency of the body one commits injury, theft and prohibited copulation. Through words one is led to lying, rudeness, fault-finding and incoherence. Through mind one is led to doing harm to others, desiring to grab at others possessions and heterodoxy. Such activities are undesirable and they result in vices. But there are also activities which are desirable. Thus through the agency of the body one performs charity, rescues others and renders service to others. Through words one practises truth, benevolence, becomes attractive to every body and regularly recites the Veda. Through the mind one practises mercy, detachment and reverence. All these result in virtue. According to the nature of the activities or their results, namely, virtue and vice one respectively gets a good or bad birth. When false knowledge is dispelled by true knowledge, the evils are removed. Because of the removal of the evils activity fails to take place. Since there is no activity, the births come to an end. With the cessation of births suffering disappears. With the disappearance of suffering is attained the final good or liberation.

In this connection we may briefly make some remarks after noting the implication of the first two sūtras of Gautama. In the first one, Gautama mentions the names of sixteen categories and says that the right knowledge of them leads to the final good. Now, it may be asked, is the right knowledge of all the sixteen categories equally necessary, or the knowledge of some is more important than that of the others? Should we consider some of the categories more important and some less important? While explaining the sūtra, Vātsyāyana comments at the very outset that in the first term we have an instance of dvandva compound in which the meanings of all the component words are equally prominent.^[8] In other words, in such a case, one cannot say that the meaning of one word is more important than the meaning of another word. According to this rule, in the first sūtra of Gautama also each member should be treated with same importance. Thus, for the final good it would be necessary to ascertain the nature of all the sixteen categories. If such a position is accepted, it follows further that ordinary people have false knowledge about the nature of all the categories and it is be removed. But at the very starting of the second sūtra Vātsyāyana states that ordinary people have different kinds of false notions regarding the twelve prameyas starting with ātman and ending with apavarga. This clearly shows that he is selecting exclusively the second category in the first sūtra. He has also given examples of false knowledge regarding the prameyas only. The removal of such false knowledge only leads to final good. As if the other fifteen categories are of minor importance. Thus there appears to be a sort of contradiction between the statements of Vātsyāyana under the first and the second sūtras.

Some scholars have tried to avoid this contradiction.^[9] They say that the cause of bondage for every human being is his false knowledge about the nature of his own self. Therefore, he will be able to attain liberation only when this false knowledge is removed by the right knowledge of his own self. The objects of knowledge in the case of the false cognition and the right cognition must be the same. Otherwise one cannot oppose the other. The right knowledge of one thing cannot remove the false knowledge of another thing. That the right knowledge of ātman is actually the cause of liberation is established on the authority of the Upaniṣads. It has been again and again said in the different Upaniṣads that one must realise the nature of the self and then one will become free. The Nyāya is an orthodox system and it accepts the authority of the Veda. Vātsyāyana also has followed that tradition and accepted the position that the self is the most important one not only among the categories but also the objects of knowledge. It does not mean that the other categories have no utility. The most important thing is to realise the true nature of the self, but the right knowledge of the other categories essentially helps. Their knowledge may be secondary but is indispensable. For example, right knowledge can be acquired only through pramāṇa and it is necessary to understand its nature.

In this context we may note another point. In the first sūtra we find the term niḥśreyasa (final good), but in the second sūtra we find the term apavarga (liberation). But the question is, are the two terms synonymous? Generally the first term stands for any kind of ‘good’, beneficial thing etc. Liberation is also a kind of ‘good’, but any ‘good’ is not liberation, it is the highest ‘good’. In fact, ‘good’ may be of two kinds–ordinary and extra -ordinary. For example, when a person suffering from disease gets rid of it by taking medicine one attains ordinary good. Similar cases of benefits come under this category. But liberation alone is extraordinary ‘good’. So it may be asked, has Gautama referred to both these kinds of good by the word niḥśreyasa? Vācaspati has said that this word stands for any kind of good and the right knowledge of pramāṇa etc. is the means for getting any kind of good, yet in the first sūtra Gautama uses the word in the sense of liberation only, because in his work he has elaborately discussed the nature of ātman and given much importance to it. If it was his intention that ordinary good is to be accepted, then he would have spoken of the right knowledge of also all the other categories.

We have already shown that in a system of philosophy the category called prameya is of great importance. There may be difference of opinion about the real implication of Gautama’s sūtra but it is accepted by all that the right knowledge of prameya leads to liberation. According to derivation, the term prameya means an object which is proved by pramāṇa. In this sense all the existing objects in the world should be called prameya. Even the ordinary objects like a jar, a piece of cloth etc. should become prameyas. But Gautama has not taken the term in its ordinary sense, he has taken it in a technical sense to mean only twelve specific objects of knowledge. Explaining the reason for this Vātsyāyana says that Gautama has taken as prameya only such objects false notion about which is the cause of bondage and the right knowledge of which leads to liberation. There may be many more prameyas, but they are not relevant in the context of liberation and hence they have not been taken into consideration. In this connection Vātsyāyana has actually referred to the six categories admitted in the Vaiśesika system by name.^[10] All these six have again many varieties and therefore the actual number of prameyas is infinite. Thus, in Gautama’s view prameya means only such objects as are directly responsible for the attainment of liberation. He does not intend to deny the fact that there are so many other objects of knowledge also.

In the ninth sūtra of the first āhnika of the first chapter, Gautama has given a list of twelve prameyas. They are: self (ātman), body (śarīra), sense (indrīya), object of sense (artha), knowledge (buddhi), mind (manas), activity (pravṛtti), evil (doṣa), rebirth (pretyabhāva), result (phala), suffering (duḥkha) and liberation (apavarga). Gautama himself has discussed the nature of them in different chapters. But while explaining the ninth sūtra Vātsyāyana has very briefly noted the nature of each in his own way.

The first position in this list is occupied by the self. In later time the self has been divided into two types: The supreme self (paramātman) and the individual self (jīvātman).^[11] The former in the Nyāya view stands for God (īśvara). Nyāya admits multiplicity of selves. Like Advaita Vadānta it does not believe that there is one and only one self. Each body is occupied by a particular self and all the selves are different from one another. These are known as individual selves. In the list of prameyas by ātman we have to take these selves. Of course, whether Gautama really admitted God or not is a matter of debate.^[12] He also nowhere mentions any thing called paramātman.

Of all the prameyas the self is the most important one and there is no doubt about this conclusion. Although it has been said that the Nyāya is not merely a study of the self because it deals with many other unique things,^[13] such as doubt etc, still it is actually found that in many of the sections in the different chapters attempts have been made to determine the nature of the self in detail from various viewpoints. In one of the following chapters we shall try to have an idea of all that. For the present, we shall try to note the implication of Vātsyāyana’s brief remarks on the twelve prameyas.^[14]

In a single statement Vātsyāyana says that the self is the knower (draṣṭṛ) of every thing, the enjoyer (bhoktṛ) of every thing, omniscient (sarvajña) and the knower of all (sarvānubhāvin). Vācaspati explains that here by the word ‘all’ the commentator takes all types of pleasure and pain and their causes. In the Nyāya view, the individual selves are all different. Each self experiences only those pleasures and pains which are located in it-self. One self cannot experience the pleasures or pains located in another self. Just as each self is aware of its own pleasure and pain so also it recognises the particular causes of them. This is what is meant when it is said that the self is the knower of all or omniscient, because it is not really possible for one self to know the pleasure or pain present in so many other individual selves. The idea is that so long as a self does not attain liberation and remains attached to worldly existence, it becomes conjoined with a specific body. It performs good or bad actions and as results, experiences pleasures and pains. Pleasure and pain are effects and hence they must have specific causes. The self knows all these, experiences them and enjoys them. The body, sense etc. are unconscious and they cannot know any thing. Each sense is restricted to a particular object, but the self is not so, it can know all types of objects.

About the body Vātsyāyana is very brief using only a single to term to describe it. He says that the body is the medium (āyatana) through which the self experiences pleasures and pains. In the Nyāya view the self belongs to the category of substance and pleasure and pain to that of quality. The self experiences pleasure or pain actually means that these qualities are produced in the self. But they can be produced only when the self is associated with a body. If there is no such association, no quality can be produced in the self. That is why in the Nyāya view there can be no pleasure also in the self in the state of liberation. But the experiences of pleasure and pain are not possible only with the help of self and the body. It is also necessary to have some instrument or means which produces them. Such instruments are called in (indriya), the third in the list of prameya. They have their own specific objects and when they are connected with them they produce pleasure of pain according to the actual nature of the object. The fourth prameya is artha. This term has a number of meanings, but here it technically means such things as are enjoyed through the instrumentality of the senses. In the ancient Sāṃkhya system buddhi is used to mean the internal sense, but in Nyāya it is used to mean cognition in general. But in the presents context it will not be proper to take the word in such a meaning. Therefore Vātsyāyana says that here buddhi means direct awareness of pleasure and pain.

We shall later discuss the nature of mind elaborately. Vātsyāyana says that manas is the internal sense. That the five external senses, such as the visual etc. are admittedly Nyāya is beyond doubt. The mind also is accepted to be a sense. But the famous Buddhist philosopher Diṅnāga has objected that in Gautama’s view mind cannot be considered as a sense. This is because in the list of senses Gautama does not mention manas.^[15] On the other hand, in the list of prameyas indriya, and manas are mentioned separately.^[16] It may by argued that manas has been accepted as a sense in other systems. And Gautama has no-where refuted this view. Therefore, it follows that Gautama accepts that manas is a sense.To this the Buddhist points out that in that case it becomes unnecessary to mention the five external senses also, because they are accepted by all the systems. While explaining the definition of perception given by Gautama, Vātsyāyana has refuted the Buddhist. He says that manas is definitely a sense, but it has been mentioned separately because it is quite different in nature from the external ones. Internal qualities like pleasure, pain etc. can only be cognised through manas each of the external senses can cognise only a particular kind of object only. But manas is involved in the cognition of all kinds of objects. Moreover, all the other senses are made of matter, but manas is not so.^[17]

The seventh and eight prameyas are activity and evil and they are responsible for the production of the body, objects of senses, cognition, pleasure or pain so long as liberation is not attained. The self as residing in a body engages itself in different kinds of actions. These actions many be good or bad and accordingly may produce pleasure or pain. According to the fruits of actions, namely, virtue and vice, the self becomes associated with a particular kind of body. The nature of the body a self would acquire is determined by the nature of the actions performed. The root cause of activity again is attachment and aversion. Living beings are led to different activities under the influence of these two until right knowledge is acquired. It is said that a self in bondage is connected with a body. But it can not be definitely determined at which particular point of time the self has become associated with the particular body. A body is something perishable. The same body cannot last forever. Earlier the present body was absent. Later also this body will not be there. In other words, in different time the self remains associated not with one single body but different bodies. This process of discarding old bodies and taking up new bodies continues till liberation and this is known as rebirth.

Result means the awareness of pleasure and pains along with their causes of production, such as, the body, sense etc. About suffering Vātsyāyana has not made any comment here. Suffering is a very well known object proved by the awareness of each and every living being. In fact, there is not a single living being who is unable to identify what is suffering. By nature every body wants to avoid suffering and constantly searches for the means which can remove suffering. The last and one of the most important prameyas is liberation. It means the absolute cessation of suffering. Absolute means that suffering is destroyed definitely and does not recur ever in future.

From a particular viewpoint Vācaspati has divided the twelve prameyas into two groups. The first consists of only two prameyas namely, ātman and apavarga which are called upādeya or absolutely desirable. The other ten prameyas are included in the second group which is called heya or to be absolutely shunned. In other words, one should try by all means to understand the nature of self and attain liberation. On the other hand, one should try to get rid of the other ten. That liberation is the most desirable is obvious, because every living being wants to get freedom from suffering. The self is the dearest thing to all.

Nobody ever desires that the self should be destroyed. But Vācaspati has drawn attention to one fact. So long as the self remains confined to worldly existence it becomes the residence of specific qualities like pleasure, pain etc. The self as endowed with such qualities is not the most desirable. In the state of liberation no specific quality is produced in the self. At that time the self remains in a pure state with out being qualified by any quality. Only the self in such a pure state is the most desirable, because the highest good is nothing but the removal of suffering.

It is to be noted that in the list of prameyas given by Gautama there is no mention of pleasure or sukha. Just as suffering is a well known fact for every living being so also pleasure is a thing proved by general awareness. Just as a person strives to avoid suffering so also he makes every effort to acquire pleasure. Thus it would have been proper for Gautama to mention pleasure also along with suffering. Apprehending such an objection Vātsyāyana says that the mention of suffering only does not mean that the existence of pleasure is denied. It cannot be claimed that Gautama does not accept a prameya called sukha. The existence of pleasure is established on the basis of general awareness and there is no reason why Gautama should reject the obvious. A thing which is an object of uncontradicted awareness cannot be denied. In fact, in many cases the existence of an entity is proved by such awareness. Then, why dose not Gautama mention sukha? Vātsyāyana points out that this exclusion of sukha has a special purpose. The primary objective of Gautama is to motivate one for the attainment of liberation. In that case the role of suffering is much more important. When one becomes attached to pleasure one hardly thinks of liberation. But if it can be shown that even if pleasure is possible, it is not ultimately desirable, then one would be easily led to activity for liberation. The fact is that there is no pure pleasure, pleasure which is not invariably mixed up with suffering. In ultimate analysis it can be shown that the so called pleasures are but causes of suffering only. Thus to attain liberation one has to give up both pleasure and pain equally. One should contemplate every thing as suffering only. Here it is prescribed for meditation this birth along with pleasures and its means is only suffering, because it is permeated by suffering, is in separable from suffering and is connected with various torments. By deeply meditating on this one acquires indifference. An indifferent person becomes non-attached and the non-attached is liberated.^[18]

In the connection we may make some brief is remarks about the position of God in the Nyāya system. We have seen that God is not mentioned in the list of sixteen essential categories and also in the list of prameyas where its inclusion would have been proper. In some of the systems of Indian philosophy God is given a very prominent position. It is sometimes even claimed that even after acquiring right knowledge one may not attain liberation without the mercy of God. But no such idea about God is found in the Nyāyasūtra In fact, it is not clear if Gautama has actually admitted God or not. There is a small section in the first āhnika of the fourth chapter consisting of only three sūtras where some references to God are found. But the implications of these cryptic sūtras are not clear.^[19] Even the commentators are divided in their opinion about what actually Gautama tries to establish in this section. In the whole process of attaining liberation God has been given no role.

However, when we come to the commentators we find a different picture. Vātsyāyana specifically refers to God and makes comments about God’s is nature.^[20] If God is admitted, the first question that may be raised is in which category should God be included? Vātsyāyana starts with answering this question. God is a distinct from of self (ātman). The fact is rather obvious, because God must be a conscious being and only the self can be considered as conscious. No other entity can become conscious and hence there is no other alternative than identifying God with the self. But God is no ordinary self. An individual self cannot be considered as God. Hence Vātsyāyana adds that God is differentiated from the ordinary selves by certain specific qualities. Thus, God is different by the possession of virtue, eternal true knowledge, concentration of mind and accomplishments as well as by the absence of vice, false knowledge and carelessness. The results of God’s virtue and carefulness are the eight kinds of superhuman powers. But the virtue of God is produced, according to his deliberation and not according to any action as in the case of ordinary persons.^[21]

Moreover God is just like a trusted friend to all the living being. A father is affectionate to his own children without any self-interest. Similarly God also acts as father to all the living beings of the world. God cannot be included in any class other than the class of self. The self is proved by inference taking the quality of knowledge as the mark. For proving God’s existence also there is no other logical ground. It is established by statements of the scripture that God is omniscient and nothing remains unknown to God. Vātsyāyana does not accept the view that God is indeterminate and without any quality. God is of the nature of self and hence, qualities which belong to a self must be present in God also. However, as God is an extraordinary and unique kind of self, naturally there should also be a lot of differences in the qualities of God and an ordinary self.^[22]

Vātsyāyana does not offer clearly any proof for the existence of God. It appears that the same inference proving an ordinary self having as its ground the quality of knowledge can also establish the existence of God. But later commentators like Uddyotakara, Vācaspati and Udayana deal very elaborately with the proofs for the existence of God, In fact Udayana wrote an independent work called Nyāyakusumāñjnli for the sole purpose of discussing God in all the different aspects by refuting also the objections raised against the admission of God by the philosophers of the other schools.

The most important argument for admitting God, according to Nyāya, is the one based on causality.^[23] It is generally observed that all composite objects are produced by an intelligent agent. A jar is produced by the efforts of the Potter, a cloth is produced by the efforts of the weaver and so on. This world is also an effect. Therefore it also must have an agent. But no ordinary self can be admitted as such an agent. An agent must have direct knowledge of the materials with the help of which he produces the effect. The materials which are necessary for the creation of the world include many things, such as atoms etc. which cannot be perceived by any ordinary self. If one has to be the creator of the world one has to be omniscient. Thus a different kind of self has to be admitted and it is nothing other than God. This inferential argument has been much discussed both by Nyāya philosophers and their opponents according to their own viewpoints.

Another well known argument is the one based on adṛṣṭa. According to the law of krman which is accepted by almost all the systems of Indian philosophy everybody has to experience the fruits of his own actions good or bad, namely virtue and vice. But adṛṣṭa is an unintelligent principle and cannot act itself without the guidance of some wise person. There must be someone who is capable of dispensing the fruits of actions to the living beings properly and justly. No ordinary self has the power to handle these fruits of action. Therefore God is to be admitted like a monarch rewarding or punishing his subjects according to the nature of actions.

The Nyāya system accepts the validity of the Veda.^[24] It is argued that if God is not admitted the validity of the Veda can not be established. The Veda is of the nature of a collection of verbal statements. The validity of a statement depends upon the validity of the speaker. Statements as such cannot be said to be valid or invalid. If the speaker rightly knows the objects and reports rightly then the statement becomes valid.^[25] But if the speaker makes a mistake, does not know the true nature of an object, his statement becomes invalid. In other words, a statement is valid if the speaker directly knows the objects and correctly speaks about them. Thus the statements of the Veda also must have a reliable speaker, otherwise they would not be valid. In the Veda there are described many things which cannot be known by any ordinary person. So some extraordinary speaker because of whose validity the validity of the Veda would follow has to be admitted and that is God.

There is no doubt that at least in later Nyāya God has been given great prominence. But it has not been specifically stated if God has any significant role to play in the attainment of liberation. It appears that according to Nyāya right knowledge automatically leads to liberation and God has nothing to do with it, God can neither help it nor prevent it.