Real meaning of Injunction

It has been argued that effort as a property of the agent cannot be accepted as the meaning of injunction, because an effort may be expressed even by a verbal form which does not use liṅ. As against this the opponent may argue that let the knowledge of effort be accepted as the cause of engagement in an activity and it is not necessary to accept any other verbal form as expressing effort. For example, in the sentence “The chariot is moving” the verbal form expresses only an action. Effort is a quality of the conscious. It cannot belong to the unconscious chariot. Therefore, the meaning of the verbal form is simply an action which is conducive to movement. Thus effort may be accepted as the meaning of injunction. Udayana says that this position is untenable. We have, for example, the two sentences -“The jar has been done (produced) and “The sprout has not been done”.

From such sentences it is clear that some person like a potter is the agent and not any other kāraka. It is to be accepted that the meaning of the root kṛ is nothing but effort. It may be objected that if effort is the meaning of only such a root, how can it be accepted also as the general meaning of a verbal form? In answer, Udayana says that with reference to the result which will be produced later, the effort which is present beforehand and is the means is called effort and it is nothing different from bhāvanā. In short, a verbal form cannot express as meaning something which is present in the agent.^[1]

Udayana also examines whether injunction can be regarded as the property of an action. An action here means the result like heaven etc. If it is said that the knowledge of heaven being the result is the knowledge of the meaning of injunction, there will be the objection of being engaged even in an action which does not lead to heaven. If however by action is meant apūrva and its effecthood is accepted as the meaning of injunction, Udayana points out that in that case apūrva will not be able to retain its essential character, namely, being what is not present before the idea is that if apūrva is to be regarded as the meaning it will have to be admitted that it is understood or present beforehand. If it is not understood already, before one understands the connected meaning of the sentence as a whole, it cannot lead one to any action. So apūrva must be present beforehand and then it cannot be called apūrva. The opponent may say that in the first stage apūrva is simply known as an action and not specifically as an apūrva. The verbal knowledge is acquired in this stage. Later it is specifically known as apūrva. Udayana says that this argument also is not acceptable. In the case of an action which is compulsorily prohibited there is no desire for a result and also no apūrva is produced. It cannot also be claimed that action means the sacrifice etc. and the property of accomplishing it by an effort as belonging to it will be the meaning of an injunction, because the performance of sacrifice etc. is not possible unless there is beforehand the knowledge that it will be conducive to something desirable or the knowledge that it will not produce anything which is undesirable.^[2]

Udayana also considers the Bhāṭṭa view in this context. According to it, the instrument of śābdabodha is the word. The property of word is bhāvanā. The knowledge of bhāvanā is what leads a man to an action. The idea is that a person may be led to an action in two ways. Sometimes a person engages himself due to his own desire. But sometimes he is engaged in an action being motivated by something else. In the case of the first, the cause of engagement is the knowledge that this action is a means for producing the desirable. In the case of the second, the cause of engagement is the prompting of some other person. This prompting is a kind of action belonging to somebody who induces the person to a particular action. Such prompting is thus generally possible for some conscious being only. It actually amounts to the desire of the person who induces somebody to an action. But this is not possible, in the Mīmāṃsā view, in the case of Vedic statements, because the Veda has no contention with any person. So it is admitted that this prompting belongs to the Vedic word or sentence itself. It is technically known as bhāvanā. Rejecting this view Udayana briefly says that there is no logical ground for admitting bhāvanā. Moreover, even when a person has the knowledge of bhāvnā from the word abhidhā, it is found that there is no activity. The opponent may say that if we critically examine what should be the correct meaning of liṅ, we find that no other meaning except bhāvanā is possible. So we have to accept this position. Udayana replies that in a similar way objections may be raised even against the view that bhāvanā is the meaning of liṅ. So this view is untenable.^[3]

Next, Udayana takes up the question whether the property of the sacrifice etc. which are the instruments, namely, being the means for the desirable, can be accepted as the meaning of an injunction. A sacrifice leads to a desirable end, e.g. heaven. The sacrifice is the instrument with the help of which one gets such a result. Thus a sacrifice becomes a means for the desirable. The property of being a means for the desirable which is located in a sacrifice should be the meaning of an injunction. Udayana says that this is also not acceptable. Actually, the meaning of an injunction is the inferential ground for being a means for the desirable. If it is said that being a means for the desirable is the meaning of an injunction it will amount to saying that the same thing is the inferential ground for itself, which is not logical. Again in the case of arthavāda it is found that an injunction is inferred after the knowledge of being a means for desirable has already been produced. Moreover, in the case of liṅ used in the second and the first persons there is no reference to the fact of being a means for the desirable. Lastly, this meaning does not logically apply to a statement which indicates a prohibition that something is not to be considered as a means for the desirable, e.g. the statement that one should not eat kalañja.^[4] After an examination of the different views regarding the meaning of an injunction Udayana gives his own opinion by saying that the meaning of an injunction is represented by the intention of the speaker of the sentence. Sometimes a speaker utters a sentence with the purpose of engaging a person in a particular action. Again, sometimes a speaker utters a sentence with the purpose of preventing him from engaging in a particular action. The intention of the speaker is the meaning of injunction in every case. This is the only logical position. An objection may be raised here. A person does not engage himself in an action unless he has the knowledge that the actions is desirable. Or, a person is not prevented from engaging in an action unless he has the knowledge that it will lead to something undesirable. Whatever may be the intention of the speaker person does not act without such a form of definite knowledge. So it cannot be accepted that only the intention of the speaker is the meaning of an injunction. In answer to this, Udayana says that there is no difficulty, because the intention of the speaker leads a person to the knowledge that it is a means for the desirable or the knowledge that it is a means for the undesirable. This is a case of inference. When a person listens to a statement of a reliable person inducing him to an action, the person concerned infers that this is a good action which will produce something desirable for him and that is why the reliable person has the intention that he should perform it. Similar is the case with a statement preventing a person from engaging himself to an action. The person concerned infers that this action will produce something undesirable for me, because the reliable person is prohibiting me to perform it. Thus there will be no difficulty.^[5]

As we have already noted, in the first verse of the fifth stavaka Udayana has mentioned at least eight grounds for the inference of God. He has interpreted each of the grounds in two ways. Giving the alternative explanation of the sixth ground at the end of the fifth stavaka, he says that the whole of the Veda speaks of nothing but God, the great lord. There are so many statements in the Veda which clearly speak about God. So the existence of God cannot be doubted or disproved. The great powers of God have been directly presented through numerous statements of the Veda. In fact, we can say that, in a word, the essence of all the Vedic statements is constituted by God alone. The Mīmāṃsakas may of course object to such a conclusion. According to them, action is the most important thing and the significance of each and every Vedic statement is related to actions. If a statement of the Veda does not relate to some action it is as good as useless or meaningless. This relation with an action may be direct or indirect, but no statement can be without a relation to an action. In short, the whole of the Veda conveys only different kinds of actions like sacrifices etc. An action is something sādhya, i.e. something to be accomplished.^[6] Thus the Veda speaks of only what is to be accomplished. It may be pointed out that in the Veda we also find mentioned many things, such as, heaven etc; the altar etc. and the fire etc.–which are all accomplished (siddha) things. The Mīmāṃsakas answer that it is true, but such things are not mentioned independently, but only as connected with some kind of action. They are described only as in-separable parts or components of a particular action like a sacrifice etc. God is an accomplished thing. It cannot be the meaning of the Veda. In answer to this, Udayana says that even if we accept the Mīmāṃsaka view, it does not disprove the existence of God. The accomplished things like the altar etc. are ultimately connected to some action no doubt, but this does not mean that at the first instance they do not present independently their meanings. When a word is uttered its primary meaning must first be understood. If the meaning of a word is not at all understood, how can it be related to something else? Thus it is to be admitted that first the things like the altar etc. are conveyed independently by their respective names. Later they are related to an action. So God may be an accomplished thing and may be related to an action later. But it cannot be denied that the statements speaking about God primarily speak of God as something existing. Thus the existence of God is not in any way disproved.^[7] An alternative explanation of the seventh ground for God is also given. In the Veda there are many statements, some of which praise things and some of which denounce things. Such statements are possible only for a person who has direct experience of the things praised or denounced. For example, when a person says that the taste of a green mango is bad and sour whereas the taste of a ripe mango is good and sweet, it follows that the person has actually tasted both kinds of mangoes. Similarly, the Vedic statements describing the goodness or the badness of a thing indicate that there must be a person who has direct experience of things. But many of the things described in Vedic statements are extraordinary the nature of which cannot be ascertained by an ordinary person. So God has to be admitted as the extraordinary person who knows the nature of even the extraordinary things.^[8]

The eighth ground also has been interpreted very briefly in a different way. In the Veda there are many verbal forms which are in the first person singular number, such as, syām, a bhuvam, bhaviṣyāmi etc. The singular number expressed by such forms must be related to the speaker of the statements. In the case of the Veda this number cannot be related to anybody other than God. This explanation is given by taking the word saṃkhyā in the sense of number. But the word may also be taken in the sense of special designation. In the case of the Veda many such special designations, e.g.

Kāṭhaka, Kālāpaka etc., are found. It cannot be said that these special designations are only due to the people studying the Veda, because such persons are innumerable. It is not that now only persons are studying the Veda. The Veda had been studied previously again and again in different times by numerous persons. So it is only to be concluded that at the beginning of creation merciful God assumed the particular kinds of bodies and spoke the different branches and the names have been given accordingly.^[9]

Finally, Udayana praises God, prays for His mercy and also claims that those who has no faith in God are really the most despicable human beings, we must have pity upon them.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.8.

[2]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.11.

[3]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.12.

[4]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.13.

[5]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.14.

[6]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.15.

[7]:

Ibid.

[8]:

Ibid.

[9]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 5.16.