The concept of Jñātatā

The Mīmāṃsaka may object that there is no difficulty in the case of a continuous cognition, because a cognition produces a certain property called jñātatā in the object of knowledge. Thus, each of the cognition in a continuous cognition produces in the object newer and newer properties and every moment the object becomes changed and every cognition actually reveals a new object. If this position is not admitted there cannot be a specific rule between a particular cognition and a particular object. Cognitions are different. For example, the cognition of a jar is different from that of a cloth. This restriction can be explained only if it is admitted that the particular cognition produces a particular property in the object.

Udayana says that this is not logical. That a particular cognition is related only to a particular object is determined by nature. In the production of a cognition the object also is one of the causes. The cognition of jar reveals only a jar and not a cloth because it is produced by a jar and not a cloth. Even if it is admitted that a cognition produces a particular property in the object, the question may be asked, how is it that a particular cognition produces a property in a particular object only and not in any other? It will have to be admitted that this is due to nature only. It is the very nature of the cognition of a jar that it produces a property only in the jar. Moreover, even an object which is not actually present at the particular moment the cognition is produced may be revealed by a cognition. The question of producing a property does not arise because there is no object.^[1]

The opponent may still argue that a cognition is actually a kind of action. An action always produces some property in the object. If an action does not produce any property in a thing it cannot be called an object of that action. For example, rice is an object of the act of cooking. Thus by the act of cooking the rice becomes soft and white. Therefore a cognition also should produce some property in its object. This is also rejected by Udayna. What is really meant by an action? If it is said to be the meaning of a root (dhātu), the rule will break down in the case of the sentence, for example, “one makes a contact with the sky by an arrow.” In this case, no property is produced in the sky. Secondly, an action may be said to be a function of the instrument. In that case the rule will break down in the case of the perception of a jar through a sense-object contact. In the perception of a jar, the jar is the object and the contact is the instrument. This instrument produces the perception of the jar, but no property in the jar itself. Thirdly, it may be said that an action means a kind of movement. But a cognition is not any kind of moment and it cannot be called an action. So the question of producing a property by a cognition does not arise.^[2]

It may still be contended by the opponent that the production of a property in an object by a cognition is proved by direct experience. For example, after the cognition of the jar has been produced, one has a particular awareness “the jar is known”. But so long as such a cognition is not produced the jar remains simply a jar. In the second case the jar is characterized by the property of jar-ness only, but in the first case it is so by the properties of jar-ness and known-ness. This latter property is produced by the cognition. In case it is not admitted the difference of properties cannot be explained. The fact is a matter of general experience. This position also is not tenable. In all the cases of a qualified cognition a relation between the qualifier and the thing qualified becomes known. Sometimes this relation is conjunction etc. and sometimes the relation of svarūpa. The relation between an object and its cognition is svarūpa. No further production of a property in the object has to be admitted. Moreover, if the opponent’s position is accepted, one will have to admit many other such properties. For example, one may have awareness in the form “The jar is desired” or “The jar is produced.” Thus one will have to admit properties like desired-ness', producedness etc. In fact, cognitions have no external form and hence one cognition is distinguished from another cognition by the particular object which produces it. In common practice also distinction is made by the particular action itself and there is no question of admitting any particular property by the action.^[3]

The Mīmāṃsaka may finally say that let us forget this discussion about the nature of valid knowledge. Let us accept whatever definition is found to be logical. But in no case can the knowledge of God be considered as valid, because it is not produced by a pramāṇa. The knowledge of God is eternal. It is not produced and it also does not produce a valid knowledge. So God’s knowledge can neither be called pramā nor pramāṇa. In short, God has no validity and his words also are not valid. There will be no validity of the Veda. Udayana concludes the discussion by saying that a valid knowledge means which reveals an object as it actually is. For example, when one perceives water in a tank the knowledge is valid, because water is present there. But when one perceives water in a mirage the knowledge is invalid, because water is not found there. God is eternally related to valid knowledge. God is never unrelated to such knowledge. He is the eternal abode of valid knowledge. Whether God’s knowledge is produced or causes some other knowledge is not relevant. So God’s words are valid and there is no objection.^[4]

As usual Udayana adds lastly a verse which expresses not only his great devotion to God, but also, in an indirect way, the subject-matter of the fourth stavaka.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 4.2.

[2]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 4.3.

[3]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 4.3-4.

[4]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 4.5.