Comparison as a pramāṇa

Udayana next takes up the case of comparison (upamāna). Strictly speaking, in the Nyāya view comparison has nothing to do with proving the existence of a thing. It is very much limited in scope. It can only establish that in some particular cases a relation between a particular word and a particular thing is there. In other words, comparison which is based on the knowledge of similarity only shows that this particular things is denoted by this particular term. So for proving the existence or nonexistence of God comparison has no relevance. But there is a lot of controversy regarding the nature of comparison. The Vaiśeṣika which is closely allied to the Nyāya does not admit it as a separate source of knowledge. It is argued that it can well be included in inference. The Mīmāṃsaka admits it as a separate source. But his view is totally different from that of the Nyaya. The Nyāya Vaiśeṣika admits seven categories (padārtha). Similarity is not admitted as a category. But the Mīmāṃsaka says that similarity is a separate category and it cannot be cognized by any other source of knowledge than comparison. Comparison is to be admitted as a separate source of knowledge to justify the cognition of similarity.^[1]

Udayana says that similarity is not a separate category because it can be included in any of the seven categories already admitted. Similarity means some common properties which are present in two different things. Thus similarity may be different in different cases. For example, one may say that one thing is similar to another because of blue colure. In that case similarity will be in included in the category of quality. But if one says that two persons are similar because both of them are walking, similarity will mean the category of action. So it cannot be claimed that for the cognition of similarity comparison should be admitted. Moreover, if such a claim is made, one may also claim that there should be also a separate pramāṇa for the cognition of dissimilarity. It may be pointed out that dissimilarity is cognized by presumption (arthāpatti) and it is not necessary to admit a separate pramāṇa. To this Udayana answer that the same may be applied to similarity also. Let similarity be cognized by presumption.^[2]

We have already noted that in the case of comparison the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika hold different views. According to the latter, the function of comparison can be carried out by inference. A person knows that a gavaya is similar to a cow. So he infers that this animal must be the gavaya. But Udayana says that the specific function of comparison is to establish relation between a particular word and a particular thing i.e. to ascertain that this particular object is denoted by this particular word. This special relation between the thing denoted and the word denoting it cannot be established by any other pramāṇa, like perception etc.^[3]

Similarity cannot be the cause for the application of the term gavaya, because in that case it will have to be admitted that if a person does not have an awareness of the cow he will not be able to use the term gavaya. But actually a person may know a gavaya and apply the term even without having knowledge of a cow. Actually the ground for the application of the term gavaya is the universal of gavayatva. But it is not yet known to the person. Thus even if one listens to the statement that a gavaya is similar to a cow, he will not be able to use the term.^[4]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 3.8.

[2]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 3.9.

[3]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 3.10.

[4]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 3.11.