Cārvāka view (Body is self) refuted

After concluding the refutation of the Sāṃkhya view Udayana goes on to discuss the Cārvāka view.^[1] Whether this view is really relevant or not is not clear, but Udayana somehow manages to bring in the topic for discussion. The general practice followed by Indian philosophers is that they not only present logically their own views but also strengthen their position by refuting the views of others. The views of the opponents are generally directly related, but sometimes it also happens that they take the opportunity to refute a view which may be indirectly related. In this connection we should also note another point. Although no work or text of the Cārvāka is available and only some of its main views are briefly available in the texts of the rival systems, there is no doubt that this heterodox system was given much importance, because all the major works of the different systems refer to Cārvāka views and strongly refute them. Udayana also follows this general trend.

The reference to a particular view of the Cārvāka here is justified by commentators in the following manner. Cārvāka says that they have no objection in admitting that adṛṣṭa is the property of a conscious element. But like the Nyāya and others it is not necessary to admit that there is a distinct entity called the self which alone is conscious. It is argued that the body itself may be considered as conscious. There is no self over and above the body. The body is a mixture of material elements which have undergone a specific transformation. Any kind of combination of the elements does not constitute the body. That is why consciousness is not found in any object composed of the different elements. When the material elements combine in a special way and produce a body it is endowed with consciousness. The fact that the body is identical with the so called self is proved by direct awareness. It is generally admitted that the self is denoted by the term `I”. But we have such awareness as `I am fair”, or “I am fat” etc. which shows that the term “I” stands for the body. But this view directly goes against the Nyāya position. Nyāya admits that the self is definitely different from body, senses and their combination. So Udayana has to refute this position also.

At the first instance Udayana says that there is a general rule that a thing known by one cannot be remembered by another. It is never possible that one person sees a thing, but later another person remembers it. The agent of the acts of seeing and remembering must be one and the same. But if the body is admitted to be conscious this rule cannot be justified. The body changes from time to time. The body of the childhood is different from the body of the youth, which again is different from the one at old age. In short, at different ages there are different bodies. This fact is proved by perception and there is no doubt. If it be true, then it will not be possible for a person to remember in old age what he has experienced in childhood. This is because the body which had the experience in childhood and was the agent is no longer present. The body which is now present is a different one and he does not have the previous experience. So it should not remember anything. There is thus a difference between the agent of perception and remembrance.^[2]

The Cārvāka may contend that at different stages the body may be different, but impressions may be carried from one body to another. The body of childhood experiences objects, impressions are produced by them and they reside in that body. But when later this body is gradually destroyed and a new body is produced, the impressions of the old body travel into the new body. Thus though the new body does not have the experiences, it can remember things because of the presence of the impressions in itself. An illustration may be given. When fragrant musk is put into a piece of cloth it acquires that fragrance. It again that piece of cloth comes in contact with another piece of cloth the latter also becomes fragrant. If means that the fragrance has moved from one substance to another. Similarly there may be transfer of impressions from one body to another. Discarding this argument Udayana says that fragrance and an impression are totally different things. So in the case of the latter transfer is not possible. Actually in the case of must there is no transfer of fragrance. The minute particles of musk are conjoined with the minute portion of the first piece of cloth. When it comes in contact with the second piece of cloth some minute particles get conjoined from the first to the second. There is only a contact between two substances.^[3]

The Cārvāka position will lead to another absurdity also. If transfer of impressions is admitted it will have to be admitted also that the impressions of the mother are carried over to the child also. Thus it would be possible for the child to remember what has not been experienced by it, but by its mother. But that goes against fact. Udayana points out that the Cārvāka does not admit the doctrine of momentariness. If it is admitted that the body is a permanent thing there can be no explanation for the fact of remembrance. In that case, the limbs like the hand etc. are to be considered as the parts constituting the body. If the hand is cut off there should not be any recollection of the things experienced by the hand. But the fact is that even when a particular limb is destroyed, things perceived by it are remembered. It shows that the agent who perceives and remembers must be something different from the body.^[4]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.15.

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid.