Defence of admission of Adṛṣṭa

After this long debate the Cārvāka may be forced to accept the cause-effect relation. Still they may argue that this relation should be restricted to ordinary causes and effects only. For example, it may be accepted that a pot is produced from a lump of clay or a piece of cloth is produced from a ball of yarns. Similarly ordinary things may come into being due to ordinary causes. But Nyāya says that there are extraordinary effects, e.g. heaven etc. and there are extraordinary causes, e.g. the unseen (adṛṣṭa). Cārvākas object to this kind of causal relation between two extraordinary things, As it is wellknown, Cārvākas accept only perception as a source of knowledge. If a thing is not perceived it does not exist. Inference has no validity. So it cannot be said that a thing which is not perceived can be proved by inference. Nobody claims that heaven or the unseen can be perceived. It is not necessary to admit them. But Nyāya has to prove the existence of the unseen, because as we have already noted, in the Nyāya view one of the arguments for admitting God is that the unseen produces its results only under the guidance of God.

Udayana takes up this task in one of the verses of the first stavaka.^[1] It is found that learned and intelligent persons engage themselves in the performance of sacrifices prescribed by the scripture which produce effects in the other world. They are not ordinary people who are foolish and without wisdom. Still they exert themselves for performing sacrifices which involve a lot of hardship and suffering. Such engagement proves that the sacrifices must produce some effects, they are not useless exercises. A foolish person may do something which serves no purpose. But learned people are not so. They can judge whether an action is fruitful or fruitless. If they find that an action is capable of producing some effect only then they try to perform it. They have reverence for the scripture and they do not hesitate to proceed for an action prescribed by the scripture. So it follows that such action is not fruitless.^[2]

Further, it cannot be argued that even if it is accepted that such actions produce some effects they are only of the nature of suffering. The idea is that there is no such thing as heaven which is the abode of all happiness and pleasure. What is actually observed is that people who perform these actions only meet with various kinds of hardship, inconvenience and troubles. Udayana says that the opponent’s contention is really absurd. By nature people try to get what is pleasant and to avoid what is unpleasant. There are different kinds of objects in the world. Some produces pleasure and some produces suffering. But people only strive to attain the former and not the latter. Even ordinary people run after happiness and perform only such actions as may produce it. How can then the learned persons engage themselves in actions which only cause pain? So it is to be accepted that the effect must be something pleasant like heaven etc.^[3]

Even then the opponent may persist by saying that the effects of sacrifices are there, but they are not anything extraordinary. Actually these actions are performed for the purpose of getting some form of ordinary happiness. For example, a person may perform a sacrifice only because he hankers after fame. If he performs a difficult sacrifice successfully people will admire him very much and his fame will spread far and wide. Or, a person may be prompted by the opportunity to get a large amount of money. A wealthy person who cannot perform a sacrifice himself, but greatly desires that it should be performed may request a learned person to perform a sacrifice and agree to pay him money for his labour. All these are ordinary results which can be enjoyed in this world. The Cārvāka says if the Nyāya speaks of such results they are ready to accept them. But there can be no admission of heaven etc. To this Udayana replies that even if it is assumed that one performs a sacrifice for fame or financial gain it cannot be an invariable rule. It cannot be said that whenever a person performs such an action he performs it for such purposes. It can be shown that there are people who do so neither for fame nor for money but only out of reverence for the scripture. So the argument of the opponent is fallacious.^[4]

The opponent may still argue that they have no objection in accepting that the performance of a sacrifice produces a result in the form of heaven. But Nyāya says that this result is not directly related to the sacrifice. A sacrifice is performed, the unseen is produced and then ultimately, one gets to the heaven. Between the performance of the sacrifice and the result there is the unseen in the middle. What is the necessity of admitting this thing in the middle? There is no proof, which can establish the existence of the unseen. It is better to admit that the causal relation is direct. The performance of the sacrifice itself directly leads to the result. Thus if there is no unseen it will not be necessary to admit God as the supervisor.^[5] In answer, Udayana says that an action does not last very long, it is destroyed in a very short time. If some special property produced by it is not admitted it will not be possible to accept the action as the cause. The idea is as follows. It has been prescribed by the scripture that if one wishes to attain heaven, one should perform the Jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice. It follows that the sacrifice is the cause for the attainment of heaven. But it may be objected that such a causal relation is not possible. A cause is defined to be an immediate antecedent to the effect. But it is observed that heaven is not attained immediately after the performance of the sacrifice. In fact, many years may intervene between the two.

Thus if the sacrifice is not an immediate antecedent, how can it be considered a cause? It is for the purpose of removing this difficulty that something produced in the middle has to be admitted and this is nothing but the unseen. A sacrifice being an action by nature cannot last for a long time. But the unseen produced by it can last for a long time, as long as the result is not produced. It is destroyed immediately after the production of the result. Thus actually it can be an immediate antecedent to the effect. So its cause, namely, the action also may be related to the result through the mediation of the unseen. Such indirect causal relation is admitted in other cases also. For example, a previous apprehension is said to be the cause of recollection. But a recollection may be produced long after the apprehension has been produced and destroyed. So it is admitted that an apprehension does not directly produce a recollection. It does so through the mediation of an impression (saṃskāra). An apprehension immediately produces an impression which remains for a long time in the self and when the other necessary conditions are present it produces the recollection.^[6]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.8.

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.9.

[6]:

Ibid.