Summary of Arguments

Starting the discussion Udayana first shows in brief how he will go into the discussion.^[1] First, he says that if an effect does not depend upon something else, namely, the cause, it cannot be contingent (kādācitka). To this, it may be asked: Is the cause also contingent? If it is not so, then, the cause would become eternal and the effect also would be eternal. But in reality it is not found to be so. If the cause also is contingent, it also should have a further cause. This further one again must be contingent and have a cause. In this way there will be the problem of infinite regress. To this, the answer is that actually the series of effects and causes goes on continuously without ending and in such case infinite regress is not a fault.^[2]

It may be argued, let one and the single Brahman be the cause of everything in the world. There is no necessity for admitting different causes for different effects. Or, it may be argued that let prakṛti which is of the nature of different buddhis be the cause of the things of the world. Thus the objection that a single thing cannot produce many things having different nature cannot be raised. The first view is held by Vedāntins and the second by the followers of Sāṅkhya. Both are not acceptable to Nyāya. Udayana refutes the views by pointing out that if any one of them is accepted there cannot be any logical explanation for the variety of nature in the things of the world. The difference in the nature of effects are due to differences in the nature of the causes. If the cause be only one or of the same nature, the effects also must be of the same nature. But this is not actually observed. Different things have different nature. So different causes are to be admitted.^[3]

Even then, an opponent may argue, let us admit the causal relation. But we should admit such a relation in respect of ordinary things only. In the case of ordinary things we find that they are present or produced when certain other things are present beforehand. For example, a piece of cloth is produced by a bundle of yarns or a jar comes into being only when a lump of clay is present. But Nyāya admits not only ordinary things as causes. It is said that when one performs a sacrifice some unseen result is produced and ultimately it becomes the cause of heaven. The opponent claims that it is not necessary. It would be better to admit that the sacrifice itself is the cause and there is nothing extraordinary. To, this Udayana says that people in general engage themselves in the sacrifices so that they can enjoy fruits of action in the other world. This practice is adopted by the learned and honest persons. So it cannot be doubted that heaven etc. are produced by the performance of sacrifice. But when a person attains heaven the sacrifice is not present there. How can it then produce the result? So it has to be admitted that some unseen result is produced by the sacrifice. It remains for a long time and finally produces heaven even when the sacrifice is absent.^[4]

Again, there may be a question. Let us admit that some unseen result is produced by an action. But where does it reside? Does it reside in the self of the person who performs the sacrifice, or in the object of enjoyment? Actually the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya give different answers to this question. The Nyāya accepts the first view and the Mīmāṃsā the second. So Udayana gives the argument for the Nyāya view. He says that if the unseen result is admitted to be present in an object of enjoyment, everybody should commonly enjoy it. But the fact is that enjoyment of pleasure or pain is always restricted to a particular individual self only. When one enjoys pleasure another does not enjoy the same. The unseen result is the cause of enjoyment and hence it should be present only in the self of the person concerned.

Actually, Udayana gives here an idea of the points on which he is going to make a detailed discussion by presenting the views of the opponent and establishing the Nyāya position by negating them. In fact, this is a summary of the first stavaka.^[5]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Nyāyakusumāñjali 1.4.

[2]:

Ibid.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid.

[5]:

Ibid.