Nature of Abhāva

It has already been mentioned that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, abhāva or no-existence is real category. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa maintains that non-existence is also capable of producing knowledge.^[1] It is not devoid of all capabilities. It is the object of knowledge in the form of ‘it is not’ (nāsti). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas also hold that abhāva is not without any essence. It is determined by its pratiyogī (counter-correlate). In case of negation, there is an object whose non-existence is experienced and there is a locus and which this non-existence is based. The object of non-existence is called its pratiyogī and the locus is called anuyogī. For example, in case of ‘there is no jar on the ground’, the jar is the pratiyogī and the ground is the anuyogī. Negation is always determined by its pratiyogī. That means its knowledge depends on the knowledge of its counter-correlate. If we do not know a jar, we cannot also know its non-existence. That is why Śivāditya says that negation is that whose knowledge depends on the knowledge of its pratiyogī.^[2] Jayanta Bhaṭṭa also says that there are two kinds of reals, viz., sat and asat.^[3] Sat is that which is known as existent and asat is that which is known as non-existent. Vācaspati Miśra maintains that abhāva is known as ‘does not exist’ (nasti).^[4]

Viśvanātha defines abhāva in his Muktāvalī thus: non-existence is that which is possessed of the mutual non-existence in respect of the six categories beginning with substance.^[5] But this definition is defective, because here the nonexistence is defined as possessing mutual non-existence. But without explaining mutual non-existence it is not possible to define non-existence. Again mutual nonexistence being a variety of non-existence, it depends on the knowledge of nonexistence. Thus, this definition involves the defect of anyonyāśraya (mutual dependence).

The definition given by Viśvanātha ultimately leads to the conclusion that non-existence is different from existence. This is expressed by Mahadeva thus: negation is that which is different from existence.^[6] But this definition is also not free from defects. The Advaita Vedāntins like Citsukha, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī etc. have criticized this definition vehemently. To defend this definition Ramarudra says that the differences of the six categories belong to negation by the relation of paryāpti. This means that in case of negation the difference of six categories collectively belong to it. The difference of six categories collectively does not belong to any one of these six categories.^[7]

Mādhavācārya in his Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha has forwarded another definition of abhāva. In his view, non-existence is that which does not possess samavāya and at the same time which is different from samavāya (asamavāyitve styasamavāyaḥ).^[8] Dravya, guṇa, karma, sāmānya, and viśeṣa are related by samavāya, so they are samavāyi. Samavāya is not different from samavāya itself. In this way this definition also implies that abhāva is different from dravya etc.

The Naiyāyikas themselves have pointed out some defects in the definition of abhāva in the form of ‘different from bhāva’. They point that a person who has no knowledge of the six positive categories experiences negation. Hence, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi has offered a better definition of negation. He defines negation as a relation. Thus negation is the svarūpa relation which is found both in positive and negative objects which determines the cognitions in the form ‘it is not here’, ‘it is not that’ etc.^[9] Hence, abhāva is also defined that which is the object of knowledge generated by the words like Man etc.^[10]

In this way an exact definition of abhāva could not be given by the NyāyaVaiśeṣikas. Bhattacharyya points out,

“According to the Vaiśeṣikas it is different to maintain the ontological status of negation. If it depends upon positive being for its very existence then it becomes only an article of faith to believe in their assertion that it has metaphysical existence.”^[11]

Hence, Śivāditya’s definition ‘negation is that which depends on the knowledge of its pratiyogi’ is more appropriate as it has shifted the dependent nature of negation from the side of existence to the side of awareness. This definition is also accepted by Gangeśopādhyāya.^[12]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

abhāvo’pi jñānajanasamartha iṣyate. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 53

[2]:

pratiyogījñānādhinajñāno’bhāvaḥ. Saptapadārthī, p. 51

[3]:

sadasatī tattvam. Nyāyamañjarī, p. 51

[4]:

abhāvapadārtho nāstīti pratītiviṣayo bhavati. Nyāyavārtikatātparyatikā, p.

[5]:

dravyādisatkānyonyābhāvavattvam. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 53

[6]:

Vide, Muktāvalīsaṃgraha on Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 80

[7]:

Negation, p. 12

[8]:

Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha, p. 249

[9]:

Vide, Ghosh, Sri Dipak, Bhāṣāpariccheda-samīkṣā, p. 58

[10]:

cf. Nyāyadarśanavimarṣa, p. 77

[11]:

Bhattacharyya, Janaki Ballabha, Negation, p. 14

[12]:

Vide, Ibid.