Substance (8): Ātmā (Self)

The concept of self (ātmā) is one of the main conceptions upheld by the six Indian orthodox philosophers. Self as a distinct substance is accepted by all. However, there is difference among them about the nature of the self. The heterodox philosophers like the Cārvākas and the Bauddhas do not accept the existence of a permanent self. However, the Indians believe in the existence of self. Cārvākas do not accept any eternal self. In their view, the self is the living body with consciousness and it has no separate existence. This is called materialistic view. Bauddhas accept the self as a stream of thought. The Advaita Vedānta states that the self is one which has no change and self-shining consciousness. According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta, the self is not pure consciousness but conscious.^[1] The Saṃkhya-Yoga system accepts the countless puruṣas as the self. In the Bhāṭṭa system the self is recognized as the substratum of consciousness and it is object of mānasapratyakṣa (mental perception). The Prābhākaras also accept innumerable selves in different bodies. According to some Vaiṣṇava philosophers, the self is different in different bodies and its size is atomic (aṇuparimāṇa).^[2]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas accept the reality of an eternal self which is not material. Radhakrishnan mentions that “According to the Nyāya, the universe has certain elements which are not corporeal. These are our cognitions, desires, aversions, volitions and feelings of pleasure and pain. All these modes of consciousness are transitory and so are not themselves to be identified with substances. They are viewed as qualities of the substance called the soul.”^[3]

Gautama includes ātmā in the list of prameyas, rather it is the first prameya. He describes ātmā as that which causes desire, aversion, volition, pleasure, pain and intelligence in his view. These qualities are the signs or marks of the self.^[4] Thus according to Gautama the self is not perceptible; it is inferred by these signs. Kaṇāda also agrees with Gautama and says that ātmā is not perceptible but inferred.

Kaṇāda lists eight inferential signs or liṅgas in order to proof the existence of the ātmā. These are prāṇāpāna-nimeṣonmeṣa jīvana-manogati-indriyāntaravikārasukhaduḥkha-icchādveṣa prayatna.^[5] Praśastapāda describes some of the liṅgas enumerated in the Nyāyasūtra as the qualities of the self. He says buddhi (knowledge), sukha (happiness), duḥkha (pain), icchā (desire), dveṣa (aversion), prayatna (volition), dharma (merit), adharma (demerit), saṃskāra (tendency), saṃkhyā (number), parimāṇa (magnitude), pṛthaktva (distinctness), saṃyoga (conjunction) and vibhāga (disjunction).^[6] From these it is cleared that Praśastapāda has included both the special qualities and the common qualities here. But a substance is not inferred by its common qualities but by its special qualities. Buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dveṣa, prayatna are the special qualities of the self which are stated as liṅgas of ātmā by Gautama. Kaṇāda has also regarded sukha etc. as the liṅgas of the self. Though, he has included some other liṅgas like prāṇāpāna etc. It is to be noted here that the first three liṅgas in the Vaiśeṣikasūtra referred to the principle of life and the fourth, the principle of psychological and spiritual function. Praśastapāda also points out that the self cannot be percept because of its subtleness. But it can be inferred being the agent of the instruments of knowledge (karaṇa).^[7]

Praśastapāda further says that:

“A controlling agent which has efforts is inferred for every individual from the activity and cessation of activity of the body, which is capable of acquiring suitable objects and avoiding unsuitable ones, and (it is inferred) also from breathing etc., just as we infer a charioteer from the motion of the chariot. How? It is because we have experiences of variegated movements of vital air contained in the body (we can infer a controlling agent) just like (the inference of) a blower from bellows”.^[8]

The later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophers follow Gautama, Kaṇāda, Praśastapāda and others.

Though Gautama and Kaṇāda do not accept the perceptibility of the self, Uddyotakara opines that the self is perceived as the object of the notion of ‘I’.^[9]

According to Viśvanātha although the self is undoubtedly an object of such perception as ‘I know’ and ‘I am happy’, yet to one who has doubts about it, cannot be brought home from the very first that the self which is the object of the above perceptions, is distinct from the body etc.^[10] Hence another proof is required so he says that the self is the inspirer of sense-organs. Because sense-organ being is an instrument of knowledge requires as an agent for producing the result.^[11] He also argues that body itself cannot be the agent. Because the consciousness (caitanya) cannot be a characteristic of the body as it is not found in dead bodies.^[12] Here it is to be remembered that according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas inspirer (adhiṣṭhātā) means that which indirectly imparts consciousness to the organs of the body.^[13] It may be argued that the eyes and other organs themselves may well be both agents and instruments of knowledge, for there is nothing to show that these two are contradictory. To these Viśvanātha replies that in that case there will be no recollection of things already experienced through the eyes, when the later are gone because then there would be no perceiver, for it is impossible for one person to recollect what another person has seen.^[14] Similar is the case with the mind. For if the minds are regarded as itself conscious then there will be no perception of knowledge etc. mind being of atomic size.^[15]

Viśvanātha also states that the self is the shelter of merit and demerit and possessor of special qualities. The special qualities of the self are: the existence of the self is inferred from its voluntary movements (pravṛtti). He explains it through an example that the motion of a chariot is depended upon the charioteer, likely, the existence of the self is depended upon actions of voluntary movement. It is known through the mind only and it is substratum of egoism. It is all pervading and causes the quality of knowledge etc.^[16]

Annaṃbhaṭṭa gives a very simple definition of ātmā. In his view, ātmā is the substratum in which knowledge inheres.^[17] This definition is quite suitable to point out that the ātmā is a substance and it is different from other substances. The word adhikaraṇa also indicates that the knowledge abides in the self through the relation of inherence (samavāya).^[18] Otherwise this definition will be over-pervasive to space and time.^[19]

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas regard time and space as the receptacles of all things by temporal (kālika) and spatial (daiśīka) relation respectively. Hence to avoid this over-pervasion ātmā is said to be the receptacle of knowledge through the relation of inherence (samavāya).

Ātmā is of two kinds: human self (jīvātmā) and supreme self (paramātmā). Supreme self is one; it is omniscient God and devoid of pleasure and pain.^[20] Annaṃbhaṭṭa has raised a question in the Dīpikā regarding the proof of the existence of the self. He argues that the perception cannot be the proof for the existence of the self. Perception is of two types-external and internal. External perception is generated by external senses. God being a colourless substance cannot be perceived by external sense-organs. Nor can God be perceived internally or mentally as He is far remodel from pleasure and pain felt by the self.^[21] God cannot also be inferred as there is no liṅgas or mark for such and inference. Annaṃbhaṭṭa maintains that these arguments are not valid as there is inference as proof for the existence of God. The inferential statements supplied by Annaṃbhaṭṭa runs thus. aṅkurādikaṃ sakartṛkaṃ kāryatvādghaṭavat. It means that every effect must have an agent; the universe is an effect like a pot; It must have an agent. This agent is called God. Annaṃbhaṭṭa also defines an agent as one who causes and immediate knowledge of the material cause, a will to act and an effort. Material cause here means inherent cause (samavāya kāraṇa).^[22]

It is remarked by Athalye and Bodas that:

“The three attributes jñāna, icchā, kṛti are closely related to one another as cause and effect. There cannot be an effort (kṛti) unless there is a will and a will to produce can only arise when there is previously direct cognition of the material cause on which the will is to operate. Aparīkṣajñāna is required because mere knowledge of an absent (parīkṣā) material cause such as earth in a pot or cotton on the tree, will not suffice. The material must be at hand and under that agent’s control as the time of creation”.^[23]

It thus follows that God causes the direct knowledge of all the paramānus of all the substances. Hence God is omniscient.

The human self is different according to different bodies. It is all pervading and eternal.^[24] To activate the sense organs there must be an agent (self)like there is needed an agent to use every instrument. For example, an axe in cutting.^[25]

According to Annaṃbhaṭṭa the definition of human self is that it is the substratum of happiness etc.^[26] In this context he raises a question from the view point of the opponents thus: the statements ‘I am a man’, ‘I am a brāhman’, etc. indicate that the body is the self. He refuses this view by saying that if the body is regarded as the self, then when its hand, foot etc. are destroyed, the self will also be destroyed. The sense-organs also cannot be regarded as the self because in that case there will be no recognition between one who sees and feels a thing, the senses there are different, i.e., the I and the skin etc. Hence the human self is different from the body and indriyas.^[27]

Annaṃbhaṭṭa also discusses about the size of the self in his Dīpikā. There are three views prevalent in Indian philosophical surcles. Some philosophers uphold the view that the self is atomic in size.^[28] The Jaina says that the self is of medium size that is the size of the body.^[29] The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas on the other hand says that the self is all-pervasive. Annaṃbhaṭṭa refuse the first view of the atomic size of the self on the ground that the self then will not be able to feel pleasure or pain through the each whole-body. It is also not possible to accept the self as of medium size because in that case the self would be non-eternal and in that case there will be happened kṛtanāśa (destruction of what is down) akṛtābhyāgama (enjoyment of what is not down). Thus at the end the self must be regarded as all-pervasive.^[30]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

cf. Chatterji, S.C. and Datta, D.M., An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, pp. 203-204

[2]:

Kuppuswami, S., A Primer of Indian Logic, pp.80-81

[3]:

Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 128

[4]:

icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñanāni ātmano liṅgam iti. Nyāyasūtra, 1.1.10

[5]:

prāṇā’pāna-nimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatindriyāntaravikāraḥ sukhaduḥkhaicchā-dveṣaprayatnāścātmanoliṅgāni. Vaiśeṣikasūtra, 3.2.4

[6]:

vuddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmas-aṃskārasaṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ. Vaiśeṣikadarśanam with Praśastapādabhāṣya,, p. 54

[7]:

tasya saukṣmyāt apratyakṣatve’pi karaṇaiḥ śabdādyupalabdhyanumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate. Ibid., pp.47-48

[8]:

śarīrasamavāyinībhyaṃ ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyāṃ pravṛttinivṛttibhyāṃ rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vigrahasyādhiṣṭhāta’numīyate prāṇādibhiśceti. Ibid., p.51; Translation by Kyokano, ‘On the liṅgas of Ātman’, From Vasubandhu to Caitanya, ed. Johannes Bronkhorst Karin Preisendany, p.12

[9]:

Nyāyavārtika, 3.1.1

[10]:

ahaṃ jāne ahaṃ sukhī ityādi pratyakṣaviṣayatvamastyeva tathapi vipratipannaṃ prati prathamata eva śarīrādibhinnastatpratītigocara iti pratipādayituṃ na śakyata. cf. Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 210

[11]:

ātmendiyadyadhiṣṭhātā karaṇaṃ hi sakartṛkam/ Bhāṣāpariccheda, p.65

[12]:

śarīrasya na caitanyaṃ mṛteṣu vyabhicārataḥ/ Ibid., p.66

[13]:

indriyāṇāṃ śarīrasya ca paramparayā caitanyasampādakaḥ Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī, p. 210

[14]:

tathātvaṃ cedindriyāṇāmupaghāte kathaṃ smṛtiḥ/ Bhāṣāpariccheda, p.66

[15]:

mano’pi na tathā jñānādyanadhyakṣaṃ tadā bhavet. Ibid., p.68

[16]:

dharmādharmāśrayo’dhyakṣo viśeṣaguṇayogatah/
pravṛttyādyanumeyo’yaṃ rathagatyeva sārathiḥ//
ahaṃkārasyāśrayo’yaṃ manomātrasya gocaraḥ/
vibhurvuddhyādiguṇavān vuddhistu dvividhā mata // Bhāṣāpariccheda, pp. 78-79

[17]:

jñānādhikaraṇamātmā. Tarkasaṃgraha., p.12

[18]:

Dīpikā on Ibid

[19]:

Vide, Tarkasaṃgraha., p.134

[20]:

Tarkasaṃgraha., p.12

[21]:

na tāvatpratyakṣaṃ taddhi vāhyamāntaraṃ vā. nādya arūpidravyatvāt. Dīpikā on Ibid

[22]:

Ibid

[23]:

Tarkasaṃgraha., p.129

[24]:

jīvātmā pratiśarīraṃ bhinno vibhurnityaśca. Tarkasaṃgraha., p.12

[25]:

Ibid., p.134

[26]:

sukhādyāśrayatvaṃ jivalakṣanam. Dīpikā on Ibid., p.13

[27]:

Ibid.

[28]:

Chatterjee, S.C. and Datta, D.M., An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p.205

[29]:

Ibid., p. 75

[30]:

Dīpikā on Tarkasaṃgraha., p.13