Sūtra 4.33

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 4.33:

क्षणप्रतियोगी परिणामापरान्तनिर्ग्राह्यः क्रमः ॥ ४.३३ ॥

kṣaṇapratiyogī pariṇāmāparāntanirgrāhyaḥ kramaḥ || 4.33 ||

kṣaṇa—of moments, pratiyogī—the uninterrupted sequence, pariṇāma—of evolutionary change. aparānta—on the cessation, nigrāhyaḥ—to be cognised as distinct, kramaḥ—succession.

33. Succession is the uninterrupted-sequence of moments, cognised as distinct on the cessation of evolutionary change.—193.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Well, but what is this succession? ‘Succession is the uninterrupted flow of moments; it is taken in by last end, the cessation of changes. A cloth which has not undergone the succession of moments, does not give up its newness and become old all at once in the end.

Further, succession is found in the permanent also. This permanence is two-fold, the Eternal in Perfection; and the Eternal in Evolution. Of these, the perfect eternity belongs to the Puruṣa. The evolutionary eternity belongs to the qualities. The Permanent or Eternal is that in which the substance is not destroyed by changing appearances. Both are permanent because their substance is never destroyed.

Now with regard to the appearances of the qualities, the Will-to-be and others, succession has an end which is cognized by the cessation of the changes. In the eternal qualities however, whose appearances these are, it has no end. In the case of the Permanent ones, the existence of the released Puruṣas who are established in their own natures, is also known by succession. In their case too, therefore, it has no end. It is however conceived there, with reference to the necessary conception of the act of being attached to the word.

But then is there or is there not an end to the succession of evolutionary changes of the universe, which is ever present in the qualities, by motion or by cessation of motion? This cannot be answered as such. How?

There is a question to which only a one-sided answer may be given:—‘All that is born must die and having been dead be born again.’ Well, but if the question is put in this form—

Is it that all that is born must die, and having been dead be born again?

The answer that can be given to this is not a single one but must be divided in two.

He in whom the light of knowledge has appeared, and whose desires have been destroyed, that wise man is not born; the rest are born. Similarly the question is, Is mankind good or not? The answer is again to be divided in two. The humankind is better in comparison with the animals, but is inferior in comparison with gods and seers (Ṛṣis).

As to the question, Has the universe an end or has it not? Why this question cannot be answered as such? For the wise there is cessation of the successions of the universe. Not for the others. There is defect in formulating any other theory. Hence the question must necessarily be divided into two.—193.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

Puts a question in the context about the succession of changes (krama):—‘Well but what is this succession?’ The answer is:—‘Succession is the uninterrupted sequence of moments cognized as distinct on the cessation of evolutionary change.’

That to which is mutually related the moment relating backward and forward to the moment of the succession of changes is so called. The meaning is that succession is that which is the support of a group of moments. There can of course be no succession ascertained without the existence of that of which it is the succession. Nor can there be a succession of one moment only. The inference by residue therefore points only to the dependence thereof upon a group of moments. Says this:—‘Succession is the uninterrupted flow, &c.’ Mentions authority for the existence of the succession of changes:—It is taken in by the last end, the cessation of changes.

Even in new cloth preserved with care, oldness becomes visible after a long time. This is the last end of change, otherwise called its cessation. It is for this very reason that a succession of change exists. And before that too is inferred the smallness, the greater smallness and the greatest smallness as well as the grossness, the greater smallness and the greatest smallness of oldness in regular sequence of one after the other.

Shows the same by the canon of difference:—‘A cloth which has not undergone, &c.’ That which has not been subjected to the succession of moments, is spoken of as not having undergone that.

Well, but this succession cannot be posited of the Pradhāna, because that is eternal. For this reason says:—‘Succession is seen in those that are permanent. By using the plural number shows that succession pervades all permanent objects.’

Now shows the modes of permanence and then establishes how succession pervades the eternal:—‘Permanence is two-fold, &c.’

Well, the constantly eternal may be eternal, because it never gives up its nature such as it is. As to the changing substances, they are constantly giving up their appearances; how can they be called permanent? For this reason says:—‘The Permanent or Eternal is that, &c.’ Characteristic, secondary quality and condition possess the qualities of appearance and disappearance; the characterized however remains the same in substance.

Well, are all successions known by the cessation of changes? Says, No Now with regard to the appearances of the qualities, the Will-to-be, etc? Because the succession of the characteristics ends on account of their being destructible. Not so however the succession of the Pradhāna ends.

Well, the Pradhāna might be said to be possessed of the succession of changes, because of the change of its characteristics. But the Puruṣa never changes. How then can there be a change of succession in the case of the unchanging Puruṣa? For this reason says:—‘In those that are constantly permanent, &c.’

There in the case of those that are bound, they have the notion of non-separation from the mind; there is therefore a fastening of the change on them on account of the changes of the mind. In the case of those however that have been released, the existence of an unreal change has been fancied by ignorance with reference to the action of the word to be. Because the word precedes, fancy comes thereafter and puts on the appearance of the action of the word to be.

It has been said that the succession of changes does not find an end in the qualities. Not suffering that assertion puts the question, ‘Is there an end to succession, &c.’?

Cessation of motion means the Great Latency, the Mahāpralaya. Motion signifies creation. This is the meaning.

If there were no end of the change of the universe (saṃsāra) on account of eternity, how then should it be in the Great Latency, that all the Puruṣas should all at once have an end of the succession of changes in their case, and again should the same succession of changes come into being all at once at the beginning of a manifestation? For this reason it would follow that one Puruṣa alone being released, the universe of evolution would cease to exist for all, and thus all the Puruṣas would become released. In this way would come the end of the succession of the changes of the Pradhāna, and the Pradhāna also would thus come to be impermanent.

Further it is not allowed that the manifestation of existence which did not exist before is possible, and this assertion cannot therefore be taken to prove its infinity. When this becomes the case, it can no longer be said that the Pradhāna is beginningless. All the teachings of the Śāstras thus come to be futile. This is the meaning.

Gives the answer:—It cannot be answered; the question does not deserve to be answered. With the object of showing that this question cannot be answered, shows a question which admits of a one-sided answer. ‘There is a question, &c.’ The answer to the question, Will all those that are born die? is Yes. This is true. Now speaks of a question which admits of an answer after being divided into two:—Are all those that are born bound to die and dying be born again? The answer that can be given to this is only possible after a division.

In order to make the matter clear, mentions another question which admits of an answer only after being divided:—‘Similarly the question, &c.’ This question does not admit of a one-sided answer. It is impossible to say that the evolution of the wise and unwise is in general indefinite or finite. There can be no community between them.

This is similar to the Impossibility of ascertaining the goodness or otherwise of every living being all at once. The same is the case with the death of one who is just born. This can, however, be ascertained after a division. Says this:—The wise man is not born, &c. This is the meaning.

The inference is that there being emancipation of all in the case of the freedom of one only from succession, the world must come to end. Ánd this depends upon the emancipation proved to exist by the authority of the Śāstras. Thus here is the authority of the means of knowledge known as verbal authority, which establishes the emancipation understood. How can it be that the same Śāstras should, by a certain teaching of theirs, stultify another authority of the Śāstras establishing the eternity of the modifications of the Pradhāna? Therefore, the inference which militates against the authority of the Āgama cannot be considered an authority. It is of course in the Veda, the Smṛti and the Purāṇas that the succession of creation after creation is without beginning and without end. Farther it is not possible that all the souls should cease to be born and die all at once. Even in the case of learned men who have been practising and working for more lives than one to achieve discriminative knowledge, this knowledge does not become well established. How is it then possible that in the case of all living beings, whether they belong to the class of the moving or the unmoving creatures, it should manifest all at once by some chance?

Further it is not proper that the effects should manifest at one and the same time although the causes are not in existence at one and the same time. In the case of the manifestation of discriminative knowledge by succession, innumerable souls may be released by succession, but the destruction of the universe will not follow, because creatures are infinite and innumerable. Thus all is plain.—33.