Sūtra 4.16

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 4.16:

न चैकचित्ततन्त्रं वस्तु तदप्रमाणकं तदा किं स्यात् ॥ ४.१६ ॥

na caikacittatantraṃ vastu tadapramāṇakaṃ tadā kiṃ syāt || 4.16 ||

na—not. ca—and. eka-citta—on one mind. tantram—dependent. ced—if. vastu—an object, tat—by that, pramāṇakam—to be cognized by that. tadā—then. kim—what (only to denote the question). syāt—would it exist.

16. And if an object dependent upon one mind were not cognized by that, would it then exist?—176.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

If an object, were dependent upon the mind, then in case the mind were restrained, or attending to some other object, the object would not be touched thereby, nor would it come into objective relationship with any other mind. It would not be cognized, i.e., its nature would not be taken in, by any mind. Will it cease to exist at the time? Or, coming into relationship again with the mind, whence would it come back to life?

Further the parts of an object which are not in contact with the mind, would not exist. Thus there would be no back, and how could then there be the front itself? For this reason, the object is self-dependent, and common to all the Puruṣas. Minds also are self-dependent. They come into relationship with the Puruṣas. By their relationship is secured perception, which is enjoyment (bhoga).—176.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

Or, there may not be this disappearance of a portion; let the object be co-existent with the idea. On this also says:—‘And if an object dependent upon one mind were not cognized by that, would it then exist? If the mind which cognizes a jar, does not at any time turn towards it on account of attention being directed towards a cloth, or if an object having been the object of discrimination the mind thereby becomes restrained, then the idea of the jar and the knowledge of discrimination would not be in existence the time, and the jar and the knowledge being dependent for their existence upon the co-existence of the idea thereof in the mind, would no doubt cease to exist. Says this:—‘One mind, &c.’

‘Would it then exist?:’—Means it would not exist.

Further coming into relationship with the mind, how would the jar or the discrimination be born again. Effects have constant causes and lead to them invariably by both the canons of agreement and difference. Effects cannot be born from causes other than their own appropriate causes. In the absence of the cause there would be no occasion for their existence. For, is it proper that an object being the cause of the knowledge thereof, it should also be the cause of itself? If this were so, then the sweets which one might be expecting to get, and the sweets which one might be really using, would be equally placed with reference to taste, strength and digestion. It has therefore been well said:—‘If it come into relationship with the mind, &c.’

Further the front portion of any object is always pervaded by the middle and posterior parts, i.e., it cannot exist without the simultaneous existence of the middle and posterior parts. If the existence of an object depended upon being perceived, then the middle and posterior parts would not exist, and thus on account of the cessation of pervasion the front part also would cease to exist. The object itself would not thus be in existence, how then would it be in existence along with the idea itself? Says this:—‘The portions thereof which are in contact, &c.’ Not in contact means not known. Concludes:—‘For this reason, &c.’ The rest is easy.—16.