Sūtra 3.17

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 3.17:

शब्दार्थप्रत्ययानाम् इतरेतराध्यासात् संकरस् तत्प्रविभागसंयमात् सर्वभूतरुतज्ञानम् ॥ ३.१७ ॥

śabdārthapratyayānām itaretarādhyāsāt saṃkaras tatpravibhāgasaṃyamāt sarvabhūtarutajñānam || 3.17 ||

śabda—the word. artha—the meaning, the object. pratyaya—the idea of all these. itaretara—of each with the other, adhyāsāt—because of the coinciding. saṃkaraḥ—becoming one, appearing as one. tat—their, pravibhāga—distinctions, saṃyamāt—by Saṃyama over, sarva—all. bhūta—of living being, ruta—of the sounds, jñānam—knowledge.

17. The word, the object and the idea appear as one, because each coincides with the other; by Saṃyama over their distinctions comes the knowledge of the sounds of all-living-beings.—123.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Now the power of speech functions in the manifestation of literal sounds only. The auditory power is the substratum for the changes of sound alone. A word, however, is taken in by the will-to-know (buddhi, understanding) all at once, having taken up a unified appearance just as the last literal sound ceases. Literal sounds, from the impossibility of being expressed simultaneously, have not the nature of giving support to each other. They appear and disappear showing no connection with the particular word, nor bringing it into consciousness It is, therefore, said that each of them is not the word (itself).

The letter; however, is singly a constituent of the word; it has the potentiality of supplying a name for all objects; it is, as it were, of universal application, inasmuch as it appears in combination with every conjoined letter, it takes different places in different combinations, sometimes being placed before and sometimes after another letter. Thus there are many literal sounds, which being placed in different orders, help in denoting, by convention, certain different sounds according to the difference in the order of their positions. For example, the literal sound of g, au, and h, possessed as they are of the potentiality of giving names to all objects, denote in this particular order (gauḥ) the particular object which is possessed of udders, &c. (a cow).

A word is that single manifestation of consciousness, which appears just as the succession of literal sounds limited to a particular conventional meaning ceases; it is a conventional sign for the thing signified.

Thus a single word is perceived as a single manifestation of consciousness; it is brought into existence by a single effort; it has no parts and no order; it is not a whole of separate and distinct literal sounds. It is a phenomenon of the will-to-be (buddhi); it is brought into consciousness by the operation of the notion of the last literal sound; it is understood by the mind of the world, as having come into existence by conjunction of letters) on account of the eternal habit brought about by its ever having been with the help of literal sounds, separately named, uttered and heard, that the power of speech has functioned for the purpose of transferring the complete verbal thought signs from one mind to another. (And this being so), the ordinary mind distinguishes a word from another by conventional meaning, saying that such and such a succession of so many letters, so ending, denotes such and such an object.

Convention, however, is a manifestation of memory showing the mutual correlation of word and meaning, in the shape of coincidence. ‘This object is the same as this word, and this word is the same as this object’—such is the convention showing the one correlated to the other.

Thus do word, meaning and idea run into each other on account of mutual correlation of coincidence. Take, for example, the word cow the object cow and the idea cow. Whoever knows their distinction knows all.

And in all words lies the power of a sentence. If you say “A tree,” the word ‘is’ is understood, inasmuch as the object signified by a word never fails of existence.

Similarly no action is possible without its means. Thus on pronouncing the word ‘cooks,’ all the appliances necessary for the act of cooking are meant to be understood. It is only for the purpose of specialization that the object, the subject and the instrument such as Caitra, fire and rice are expressly mentioned.

Then is also seen the combination of words in sentences for expressing meanings by the entire sentences. ‘The Vedic student reads the hymns, lives, bears life.’ In a sentence like this the words and the meanings of words are both expressed in consciousness. Hence should words be etymologically divided as expressing actions or nominal cases. Otherwise how would it be possible to construe a word, a noun or a verb, when one cannot be known from the other on account of external similarity. For example, take the words Bhavati, Aśvaḥ, Ajapāyāḥ.

The words, the meaning and the idea of the sentence are distinct from each other. Thus svetate prāsādaḥ (The mansion shines white) means an action. The words svetaḥ prāsādaḥ (A white mansion), signify a noun.

Both forms of speech denote both a noun and an affirmation of an action and also the meaning and the idea thereof. How? By the correlation, ‘this is that.’ The notion puts on but one appearance, the same as the conventional sign. As to the white object, it is the support for both the word and the idea. It changes its state, but goes neither with the word nor with the idea. Such is a word and such an idea; none goes with the other. Another is a word, another its meaning and another the idea. By performing Saṃyama in this way on their mutual distinction, a Yogī obtains knowledge of the sounds of all living beings.—123.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

This is another subject for Saṃyama, here discussed:—‘The word, the object and the idea appear as one, because each coincides with the other; by Saṃyama on their distinctions comes knowledge of the sounds of all living beings?

Here with the object of explaining the sound (verbal) which denotes a meaning, the commentator first mentions the province of the operation of the power of speech (VĀK). Now the power of speech, Vāk, manifests literal sounds in eight places. As it is said:—‘There are eight seats of literal sounds, the chest, the throat, and the head, and also the root of the tongue, the teeth, the nose, the lips and the palate.’

This VĀK, the power of speech, is purposed to operate in literal sounds only, such as they have come into existence by the recognition of the world. It does not operate to express the sign as such of a thing signified. This is the meaning.

He ascertains the sphere of the operation of the power of hearing The auditory power, again, operates to change itself into the particular form of a literal sound, which is a distinct modification of the manifested inarticulate sound striking against the organs of speech. Its operation is limited to that much; it does not as such signify the thing signified. This is the meaning.

He distinguishes the verbal sign signifying an object as such, from literal sounds as they have come into existence by the recognition of the world:—‘A word, however, (that is to say, the sign signifying a thing) is taken by the understanding all at once, having assumed a unified appearance, jnst as the last literal sound disappears.’ Each of the literal sounds is first taken in according as the sounds are familiar to the world; and after they have been taken into the mind, they are brought together into a single manifestation of consciousness, and thus as a sign signifying an object it is taken in by the understanding all at once. The single verbal sound ‘cow’ is a word, and is taken in as such by the understanding. Although each of the preceding sounds of component letters tends to bring into the field of consciousness the sound of the whole verbal sign, yet until the last literal sound is added to the sound-image that is being formed, the whole is not made distinct and clear. When the last literal cognition has, however, come into operation, the entire sound-image constituting the word becomes clear. For this reason it is said that ‘a word is taken in by the understanding all at once, having assumed a unified appearance, just as the last literal sound ceases.’

‘Literal sounds from the impossibility, &c.’ This is said in reply to him who does no recognize on account of the distinctions obtaining among the different classes of letters, that words are taken in as entire single concepts all at once, but establishes on the contrary that the letters themselves singly have the power of signifying the object.

It may be in one of two ways that the literal sounds may generate the mental impression of the signified object as each is being pronounced as a part of a complete word. They may carry the capacity of signifying the object, each of them, either as pegs which give support to a basket hung therefrom; (Thus whenever the peg goes, the basket would go too) or, they may give support to the meaning as several stones placed together and made into a platform give support to a stool.

The first theory does not hold. The pronouncement of one letter only does not carry the object to the mind, for if it did, the uttering of the other letters would be quite useless. When a work has been completed, the employment of an effort for its achievement, such as is not calculated to give the completed work any extra quality, would take the effort out of the category of the means of achievement.

If this does not hold, the other remains. It is certainly possible in this case, as was not possible in the case of many pegs placed separately, that stones placed together to make a single platform should hold a stool, because in this case the capacity of giving support to the stool is being employed at one and the same time. Letters, however, cannot all be pronounced simultaneously, and for this reason they cannot carry the meaning to the mind even when brought together, because each of them does not take after the other, and the pronouncement of the one does not suggest the other. They do not attach to the form of one word only as if they were of its very nature. They, therefore, do not suggest the word, as each is being pronounced and passing into latency. Each maintains itself in separate and independent existence like a rod of steel. It is, therefore, said that each of them is not of the nature of a word.

Inasmuch as this defect would not arise, if the letters forming parts of a word constituted as such the word itself, he says ‘Each letter, however, singly is a necessary constituent of a word: it has the potentiality of supplying a name for all objects.’ All the potentialities of making all names are present in it. Thus the letter, G, is found to exist in the words GAU, GAṆA, GAURA, NĀGA, etc., which signify different objects (a cow and others respectively). It has, therefore, the potency of supplying names for each and all of these objects. Similarly is the letter, O, found in the words, SOMA, ŚOCI, etc., which means God and other things, and that too has, therefore, the capacity of naming all these objects. Similarly should it be understood everywhere else. Each of these letters G, etc., appears in combination with, i.e., in contact with other conjoined letters, such as, O, etc. On account of there being such contact, it becomes, as it were, of universal application, i.e., each of these letters becomes, at it were many, and does not remain, as it is, one only. It does not of course, actually become many. Therefore the words, as it were,’ have been added. The letter, of course, remains the same.

The letter, G, placed before and the letter, O, placed thereafter distinguish the consequent sonorous impression from the words GAṆA, etc. Similarly doos the letter,

O, placed alter G, distinguish it from the words ŚOCI, etc. A specific sonorous impression is thus established in the mind as the succession of literal sounds appearing in the word ceases. This specific. mental impression is the single image of the word, GAU, as manifested in the mind (sphoṭa). It is this sonorous image that denotes the specific quality of the species COW.

This is the meaning. It is impossible that the notion of an object be caused by literal sounds on account of there being a fixed order of their succession in a word: because they do not come into existence simultaneously. Nor is it proper to hold that notwithstanding the order of the succession of literal sounds in a word being fixed they come together to manifest the notion of an object by the operation of their residual potencies, in the same way as there is absence of antecedence and postcedence in the purificatory potencies brought about by oblations of combustibles, etc.; or in the same way as the heavenly state of existence is brought about. This is so, because option is inadmissible.

Knowledge of an object is not, therefore, caused by literal sounds. It is necessary that there should be perception of a single word as the means of calling it forth.

This, however, is not the case with a word. A word is expressed by sounds which differ from each other in the effort which is put forth in pronouncing them (prayatna). These constituent sounds which go to form this and that Word, each differing from the other, are similar to each other in having their place of formation in the mouth and the effort requisite for their pronouncement, always the same. For this reason they make up a word similar to the others in some respect, although dissimilar in reality. The similarities here and there differ from each other by the difference Caused by the relative positions of the letters. It is by this complacement that words appear as possessing different parts and composite natures, although in reality they are single and without parts. This happens in the same way as a face possessing a constant tinge of colour and fixed features and dimensions show more reflections than one, each possessed of different colour, dimensions and features, when placed differently with respect to a mirror, a dagger and a jewel. The difference is not real.

A verbal sign is single and partless. The letters are taken to be its parts by virtue of the difference of the contiguity of similar letters in different words. The difference of words being thus due to the conception of there being constituted by letters conceived as such a single and partless sonorous image (sphoṭa). Having no distinctions in itself, it is kept up in the mind, as it were, distinct and possessed of parts. It is for this reason that the specific sonorous image of the word Gau is not determined by its part G, because therein it is similar to the sonorous images of such other words as GAURA, etc. It, however, determines the whole verbal image when qualified by the literal sound U. Similarly the letter O is not competent to determine the single whole, the sonorous image of the word GAU, on account of its similarity therein with the words ŚOCI, etc. It, however, does so, being qualified by the literal sound G. Although they do not co-exist, yet one can be qualified by the other by means of residual potencies coming to co exist. And the two residual potencies have not different spheres of action, because two percepts of two different parts and the potencies born therefrom, have one word as the sphere of their operation. By the perception of the parts alone, the whole word is not manifested; but it is manifested as the succession of literal sounds ceases: and it should be added that the consciousness of the cessation of this succession manifests by virtue of the residual potencies of the perceptions of the different parts. It is a matter of observation that the past unmanifested impressions strengthen the present manifested impression by means of the successive storage of their residual potencies. Thus the notion of the existence of a tree at a distance is at first dim, but by and by becomes distinct. It is not, however, possible that this may be the method of the literal sounds bringing about the perception of the object. Because the rule of dimness and clearness applies only to perceptive cognitions; and it is not by perceptions that literal sounds bring about the consciousness of an object. It cannot, of course, be that each of the constituent literal sounds of a word should produce an indistinct image of the object which becomes distinct only in the end. If the image is raised by the letters it must be quite distinct. Or, it may be said that it is never born at all. It can never be said that it remains indistinct and dim (asphuṭa). The dissimilarity is that in the case of the sonorous image the distinctness and indistinctness are fancied after the perceptibility is established. Thus when the notion of the cessation of literal sounds takes its place in the mind through the auditory sense, along with the residual potencies left therein by the perception of each literal sound in succession, the literal sounds come together into the manifested sonorous image of a single word. This manifestation is brought about by a specific output of energy. The speciality of this energy depends upon the fixity of a particular order of the succession of literal sounds. When, therefore, the order of the succession changes, the specific energy which is competent to bring about the particular verbal manifestation no longer exists, and the particular manifestation is not brought about. Literal sounds are thus limited to the expression of a particular meaning by their dependence upon the order of their succession. They, therefore, show the conventional limitation as it appears in the world, to be the sphere of the operation of a word having more parts than one. So many as two, three, four, five or six literal sounds possessing the power of naming all objects denote the particular object which is possessed of udders, &c., when they appear as G, AU and the aspirate H.

Well, then, is it the letters alone which by virtue of distinct orders of succession denote an object? Is not a word independent of its constituent letters? For this reason he says:—‘Thus a single word, &c.’

‘The succession of literal sounds’ is the succession brought about by literal sound.

‘The succession of literal sounds limited to a particular object ceases’:—Such are the letters of a word at the time when the successive pronouncement of the literal sounds is over.

‘Manifestation of consciousness’ means the shining out of the Will-to-know (the buddhi) in the shape of a particular image.

‘Limited to a particular conventional meaning’:—The literal sounds limited to a particular conventional meaning are, as has been said, the sounds of G, AU and H, in accordance with the conceptions of superficial observers. The meaning is that G, &c., are also taken to be the signifiers of an object, being as they are the parts of a word and thus its necessary constituents. In reality, however, it is a single mental phenomenon which, as a word, signifies an object. He renders the same plainer:—‘Thus a single word is a single manifestation of consciousness, &c. All this related to it is understood by the mind of the world, &c.’

But why a single manifestation of consciousness? For this reason he say:—‘It is the object of a single effort of consciousness.’ A cow: This single word is the object of a single phenomenon of consciousness; it is, therefore, spoken of as a single manifestation.

He mentions the cause of its manifestation:—‘It is brought into existence by a single effort.’ The effort which manifests the word RASA is different from the effort which manifests the word SĀRA. And it is single, inasmuch as it is possessed of the quality of the individuality of the word RASA from the beginning, is differentiated by the fruit thereof, and has a determinate order of the antecedent and postcedent (literal sounds thereof). The different parts of the word which are understood to be existing as such by differences in similarity and order of contiguity, do not exist as such in reality, and a word is, therefore, said to be without parts. For this reason it has no order, because there is no existence in it of parts which may exist either before or. after each other.

The question arises, that literal sounds appearing in order before and after one another in a word and being therefore its parts, how is it said under the circumstances that a word has no order and no parts? For this reason he says:—‘It is not a whole made of separate and distinct literal sounds.’ Literal sounds are not parts of a word; but by means of differences in similarity and order of contiguity, the word puts on of itself different forms and appears as it is in reality. The faces appearing in a jewel, a dagger, a mirror, &c., are not parts of the real face. ‘It is a manifestation of the Will-to-know (buddhi). This means that the collective appearance at the cessation of a succession is known by the buddhi, is found in the buddhi. The operation of the notion of the last literal sound means the residual potency of the cognition of that sound. This residual potency when it is thrown in with the residual potencies of the cognitions of the previous literal sounds, brings the whole word into consciousness, that is, renders it to the object of cognition. And it is shown below that the residual potencies left in the mind by the cognitions of sounds, coincide in space with the sphere of the word they make up.

Well; but if a word has no parts, no order and no constituent literal sounds, why does it never appear as such? A white crystal may appear to be red when besmeared with molten shellac; but it is not that it will not appear pure white even when the colour has been removed. Literal sounds are, therefore, parts of a word. For this reason he says:—‘It is understood by the mind of the world, &c.’ The eternal functioning of the power of speech has gone on through the articulation into words of different literal sounds. This has been carried on with the help of literal sounds, separately named, uttered and heard by the hearers for the purpose of transferring them from one to other minds. Eternal habit is secured by the operation.

‘On account of eternal habit’ means that the mind which has preceived thus, is possessed of the habit thus acquired; the habit, that is to say, of understanding the whole word as coloured by separate literal sounds. ‘As having come into existence’ (siddhavat) means ‘as it were, having a real and independent existence.’

By ‘conjunction of letters’ he means the speech of the older people which has always been so achieved. ‘Thus is the word known.’ The meaning is this. There is a certain application (upādhi) which may either be applied to anything or separated from it. Take for example lac or something similar. If it is separated from the crystal it shines out in its white purity. This is proper. As to the notion of a word, however, it is never produced except by a particular sound which is brought about by a particular effort. Further a word is always marred by similarity, and its notion is generated in the mind only as being made up of literal sounds. How then is it possible that a word may also be spoken or known as pure and independent of literal sounds? As they say:—‘Sounds being similar in their nature becomes causes of wrong impressions. The cause of wrong impression takes them in as such; in the sight of those who know the word, it is fixed with reference to its means of production. This certain confusion in the world is but the contradiction of knowledge? Because the body of a word shows itself as always made up of articulated sounds; the world being superficial observers, believe that the literal sounds themselves are words; and they think that the literal sound only appearing in different combinations give different meanings. He says this:—‘Distinguished by conventional meaning, etc? The meaning is that for the benefit of the ordinary mind to whom the real word is unknown as such, a word is divided into literal sounds by an act of the mind which is called convention. He describes the division into article sounds:—‘Of so many letters,’ neither more nor less.

‘Such and such a succession’ means one having a particular order of uninterrupted succession. ‘Succession so ending,’ is that which is taken in by a single act of the understanding. He illustrates such and such an object:—‘Such as the generic quality of a cow, &c.’

‘Well; but if convention means that a particular word is to denote a particular object, then there is no confusion between word and meaning. For this reason he says:—‘Convention, however, &c.’

‘A manifestation of memory’:—The existence of this conventional relation is due to the function of memory. The convention which determines the meaning is not only this, that such and such a meaning has been given to such and such a sound; it is also that such and such a sound is remembered as correlated to such and such a meaning. This is the meaning,

‘Whoever knows their distinction performs Saṃyama thereon and thereby knows all,’ that is, understands the sounds of all living beings. The genitive case used, ‘their distinction’ is used only with reference to convention in which the forms are not distinct.

A word has thus been established to be a single partless and jointless output of sound in which the literal sounds are only fancied to be articulations. Now he establishes that a sentence also is a single complete notion in the mind and that the words are simply fancied to be parts thereof. So he says:—‘And in all words lives the power of a sentence.’ This is the explanation. A word is used to convey information to another. It is only what they are intended to convey that is conveyed to the other. The same is intended to be conveyed by them which is the field of any action, &c., with reference to them. It is not the object alone that is signified by them, but the entire meaning of a sentence. All words are meant to complete the meaning of a complete sentence. Hence the same is their meaning. For this reason, where even a single word is used, even there the meaning is understood to be what it would be, if it were used together with another word. The whole meaning is not conveyed by one word alone. Why? Because that such alone has not the power to convey the whole meaning. Therefore in such places it is the sentence alone that conveys the meaning not the separate words. Because however the words are parts of a sentence, they too have the power of denoting the meaning of a sentence, in the same way as literal sounds have the power of conveying the meaning of a word on account of appearing as articulations thereof. For this reason just as every literal sound is possessed of the power of forming all means, so every word also is as such possessed of the power of forming all sentences and thus denoting the meaning intended to be conveyed by all sentences. This is what is meant by saying, ‘And in all words lives the power of a sentence.’ When some one says, ‘A tree,’ it is understood, that a tree exists. The word, ‘tree,’ together with the word, ‘is,’ understood, give the meaning of a sentence, and hence the word, tree, exists as part of a sentence.

But then how is it that the word, ‘is,’ is understood? For this reason he says:—‘The object signified by a word never fails of existence.’ In the world, words are the means of ascertaining the existence of objects; and a word, always joining the object signified to the word ‘is,’ everywhere gives the meaning of a sentence. This is the meaning of an object never failing of existence. It is for this reason the practice of those who know the usage of words, that wherever there is no other verb, the word ‘is’ and ‘becomes’ are to be considered understood, and arc to be supplied.

Having described the nominal bases as never failing of a particular action he now shows that a particular-action never fails of a noun:—Thus on pronouncing the word ‘Cooks’ the appropriate agents of the action signified are always understood. And the word excludes other inappropriate agents. Jt is thus that the meaning of a sentence is differentiated.

Similarly are words found existing in a sentence although they are not required there: and for this reason all the more is it that words possess the power of giving the meaning of a sentence. For this reason he says:—‘Then is also seen the combination of words in a sentence.’ Not even thus the words ‘Vedic student,’ &c., used independently would convey such a meaning if they were not understood as conjoined to the words ‘is,’ &c. Thus the meaning is that this too has been fancied to be a part of a sentence.

Let that be. But if the words themselves have the power of conveying the meaning of a sentence, there is no use of making sentences. The meaning intended to be conveyed by a sentence is conveyed by the words themselves. For this reason he says:—‘In a sentence like this, &c.’ It has been said that the meaning intended to be conveyed by a word is not conveyed by a word alone, until it is conjoined to another word understood. Hence are words separated from a sentence and fancied as separate from them; and hence also are words separated from the meaning of a sentence, and are distinguished as either verbs or nominal bases. Thus are words to be etymologically explained by introducing the divisions of cases.

But then why should so much trouble be taken to explain them? For this reason he says:—‘Otherwise how, etc.’

In the sentence GHAṬO BHAVATI, BHAVATĪ BHIKṢĀM DEHI, BHAVATĪ TIṢṬHATI, the nouns and verbs appear to be similar in external shape. The word BHAVATI in the first sentence is a verb and means ‘exists. In the other two sentences it is a noun and might be translated as ‘Your ladyship.’

Similarly in the sentences, Āśvastvam and Aśvas Yśti, the former Āśvas is a verb and means ‘be appeased.’ The second Āśvas is a noun and means a horse.

Similarly in the sentences, Ajāpayaḥ Piva and Marayajapaya Śat-rūn. In the former sentence it means the milk of a she-goat, and in the second it moans ‘kill.’

Thus names and verbs being similar in external appearance, they would not be known as nouns and verbs if they were not to be separated from the sentence. How could they otherwise be explained as either verbs or nominal bases? Hence words should be separated from a sentence and explained. It is not that, merely by thus explaining words after having taken them out of the sentence, they would really become different in nature.

Having thus ascertained the nature of words, he now begins the discussion of the absence of real confusion (saṅkara) among word, meaning and idea, upon which confusion has been fastened by convention:—‘These are the word, the meaning and the idea among which obtains a distinction.’

Thus, Śvetate Prāsādaḥ, (white shines the mansion) means an action. It is very plain here that the action of looking white which has to be established, comes first, and then arises the consciousness of the purpose of the action having been established.

The word ‘Śveta’ is a separate thing. Even where the word and meaning have their forms established, there exists a difference between word and meaning. He says this ‘Śvetaḥ Prāsādaḥ iti’ (the place is white). The word here has the meaning of a noun. The absence of the case-ending is because the word is intended to express its own meaning. He divides the meaning:—‘These are words denoting both a noun and an action. The meaning of both those words is both of the nature of a noun and an action.’ He divides the idea:—‘And also the meaning and the idea thereof.’ It is the word ‘CA’ in the original which gives the meaning of the words, ‘the meaning of the idea thereof.’ The relation shown here is with another object which is signified.

The question is that if word, meaning and notion are known as single on account of confusion (saṅkara, coming together) whence does the distinction come? He puts the question, with this object:—‘How?’ He gives the answer:—‘By the correlation, this is that, &c.’

The meaning is that the cause of the notion of unity is the qualification of the Convention; it is not real, however. The use of words ‘In the conventional sign’ in the locative case shows that convention, is the cause thereof. He shows the reality:—‘And the white object, &c.’ The ‘states’ are newness and oldness. ‘Goes with’ means becomes confused.

By performing Saṃyama in this way with reference to the distinctions of word, meaning and idea, the sounds of all animals, insects, &c., become distinctly intelligible to the Yogī. The Saṃyama performed with respect to the speech of man is equally performed with respect to their sounds also, inasmuch as both are of the same class. The Yogī knows their different sounds, their different meanings and their notions. Thus is it proved.—17.