Sūtra 2.24

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 2.24:

तस्य हेतुर् अविद्या ॥ २.२४ ॥

tasya hetur avidyā || 2.24 ||

tasya—its. hetuḥ—effective cause, avidyā—nescience.

24. Nescience is its effective cause.—75.

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

The effective cause, however, of the conjunction of the individual consciousness with its own Will-to-be is Nescience, which means the potency of the habit of unreal cognition. The Will-to-know, possessed as it is of the aroma of the habits of unreal cognition, does not culminate into the knowledge of the self, which is the end of its work, and thus having still a duty to perform, comes back. When, however, it reaches the culmination of its work, which is the attainment of the knowledge of the Puruṣa, its work is achieved, ignorance is gone, the cause of bondage no longer remains, and it does no longer come back.

Someone ridicules this position by the story of the impotent husband. A foolish wife thus addressed her husband “My dear, my sister has got children. Wherefore have I none?” He said to her:—“I shall beget children unto thee when I am dead.” Similarly, this knowledge while in existence, does not cause the mind to cease from action; what hope is there that it will cause cessation when suppressed? Says on this subject a teacher very nearly perfect:—“Is not Mokṣa (freedom) the cessation of the Will-to-be itself and nothing else? The Will-to-be ceases to act when the cause of ignorance no longer remains. The Ignorance which is the cause of bondage is removed by knowledge. Mokṣa (perfect freedom) then is only the cessation of the mind from its work. Wherefore then this mental confusion out of place?”—75.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

In order to establish the fourth alternative he introduces the aphorism:—‘The effective cause, however, of the conjunction, &c.’ ‘Individual consciousness’:—The word Pratyak-cetana in the text means consciousness which cognizes by reflex action, and as the conjunction which makes it possible is not common to all the Puruṣas, and is the conjunction of one Puruṣa with his own independent Will-to-be, variety of experience is effected. (Hence the translation Individual Consciousness).

He reads the aphorism:—‘Nescience is its effective cause.’ But Nescience is Unreal Cognition. It is duo to the conjunction of consciousness with the individualized Will-to-be just as other experiences and emancipation are due to it. If the Will-to-be is not conjoined to consciousness, there can be no existence for unreal cognition. How is it then that Nescience is the cause of any kind of cognition? For this reason he says:—‘Which means the residual potency of Unreal cognition.’ The Nescience of other creations drawn in with the mind in which it manifested, live in the Pradhāna in the shape of potential energy. The Pradhāna, possessed as it is of the aroma of this potential energy, evolves out of itself, the Will-to be of a particular Puruṣa, just as it was before. Similarly in the regular order of each creation preceding another. The order of creation being eternal no defect arises in the theory. It is for this reason that the Puruṣa is not free at the time of each creation. For this reason he says:—‘The Will-to-be possessed as it is, &c.’

When, however, the knowledge of the Puruṣa reaches its end, then the cause of bondage in the shape of the residua of unreal cognition no longer exists, and it does not come back. For this reason he says:—‘When, however, it reaches its culmination, &c.’

Here some nihilists ridicule this state of absolute independence (kaivalya) by reflating the story of the impotent husband. The author tells the story of the impotent husband:—“A foolish wife, &c.” “Wherefore” in the translation stands for “with what object” in the original. Object here stands for reason. The object of an act is the reason of the action.

The author shows the similarity with the story of the impotent:—‘Similarly, &c.’ This existing knowledge of the distinction between consciousness and the ‘qualities’ does not cause mental cessation; what reason is there that higher desirelessness, the light of knowledge alone will make the mind to disappear after having restrained it along with its residual potency? The effect of something exists only so long as the cause itself exists. It does not remain in existence when the cause ceases to exist. He refutes this by quoting the reasoning of a teacher who agrees on this point:—‘Says on this subject a teacher, &c.’

A teacher, very nearly perfect though not altogether, is called Ācāryadeśa, As to a perfect teacher Vāyu has described his qualities thus:—‘One is called an Ācārya because he understands the meaning of the teaching (śāstra) well, establishes one in right conduct also, and also himself keeps the right line of action.’

Mokṣa (absolute freedom) is only the cessation of the Will-to-be after it has achieved experience and the discrimination of the distinction between the Puruṣa and Objective Existence. It is not that the Will-to-be itself ceases to exist. This ceasing of the Will-to-know from its work of causing experience and emancipation, although the Will-to-know itself lives on, follows immediately upon its establishment in the state of the Cloud of Virtue (dharma-megha) which is the culmination of discriminative knowledge. He illuminates the same:—‘The Will-to-know ceases to act when ignorance, which is the cause of bondage, is removed by knowledge. The removal of knowledge (the cessation of the act of knowing) is brought about by higher desirelessness. The meaning is that perfect freedom (mokṣa) exists even though the Will-to-know itself lives on.’ Having described the opinion of the teacher, he now gives his own:—‘Mokṣa then is only the cessation of the mind from its work.’

But it has been said that when the act of knowing ceases the mind itself very soon ceases to exist. How is it then this brought about by knowledge? For this reason he says:—‘Wherefore then this mental confusion quite out of place?’ The construction is as follows:—We may be taunted thus if we believe that knowledge is the direct cause of the cessation of the mind. We, however, lay down that discriminative knowledge becomes useful in establishing the Puruṣa in its own nature, when having reached the highest point, by the successive appearances of the higher and higher stages of the inhibitive trance, it comes to co-exist with the state of mental cessation. How then have we laid ourselves out for a taunt?—24.