Sūtra 1.11

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 1.11:

अनुभूतविषयासंप्रमोषः स्मृतिः ॥ १.११ ॥

anubhūtaviṣayāsaṃpramoṣaḥ smṛtiḥ || 1.11 ||

anubhūta—the objective mental, perceived, viṣaya—impressions, subjects. asaṃpramoṣaḥ—not stealing away along, not slipping away. smṛtiḥ—memory.

11. Memory is the not stealing away along with objective mental impressions (retained) (i.e., the reproducing of not more than what has been impressed upon the mind).

The Sankhya-pravachana commentary of Vyasa

[English translation of the 7th century commentary by Vyāsa called the Sāṅkhya-pravacana, Vyāsabhāṣya or Yogabhāṣya]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Does the mind remember the act of knowing or the object? The notion coloured by the object of knowledge shows out both the object and the act of knowledge, and thus begins the formation of the habit of the same kind. The habit manifests its own cause, and thus generates a memory, having the same form and consisting of both the object and the act of knowledge. When the manifestation of the act of knowledge is the first of the two, the modification is the intellect (buddhi). When the appearance of the object of knowledge is the first, it is Memory.

This memory is two-foìd: When the phenomenon to be remembered has become the very nature of the mind, and when it has not so become. In dream it is the former; at the time of waking the latter.

All these memories are born in sequence of the impressions of Real Cognition, Unreal Cognition, Imagination, Sleep and Memory. Further, all these modifications are of the nature of pleasure, pain and illusion. Pleasure, pain and illusion will be described among the afflictions. ‘Attachment is the sticking to pleasure as such in sequence.’—7.2. ‘Aversion is the sticking to pain as such in sequence.’—8.2. Illusion, however, is Nescience. All these modifications are to be checked. It is when these have been checked that there comes either the Cognitive or the ultra-cognitive trance.

The Gloss of Vachaspati Mishra

[English translation of the 9th century Tattvavaiśāradī by Vācaspatimiśra]

“Memory is the not stealing away along with mental impressions.” Memory is the not stealing away along with an object which has come into the mind by real cognition, &c. It is only the object of knowledge which comes into consciousness by mental habit alone and which shines forth into the mind in consequence of the cognition of the cause of the habit, that is one’s own. The taking of an object, however, over and above that is theft, on account of its similarity with the act. The word ‘pramoṣa’ is derived from the root ‘√muṣ,’ to steal.

This is the meaning; Right cognition and others all cause the knowledge of an object unknown, either in the ordinary or in some particular way. Memory, however, does not pass over the limitation of the former knowledge. It is that former knowledge or something less than that which is its object, never something more. This is the distinction of memory from other modifications. The question, ‘Does it remember the notion or the object?’ starts this discussion.

It would appear that the habit generated by an act of knowledge puts into the mind the object of knowledge only, because the impression in the mind is caused by the coming in of the object of knowledge: and no mental impression can come into existence of itself. If the mental impressions itself were reproduced, it would be the mental impression alone (and not the object of knowledge).

For this reason the author comes to the final conclusion that it is a remembrance of both. Because the mental impression (the act of knowledge) takes its origin from the object of knowledge, the former is coloured by the latter. In reality, however, it manifests, i.e., illuminates the form, that is the appearance of both the object and the act of knowledge.

That which brings anything into manifestation, is its cause (vyañjaka, manifester). Its manifestation is the form thereof. Hence the meaning of the original is, ‘possessing the form of its cause.’

The question arises, what is the difference between the memory and the intellect (buddhi), if they have the same form as far as their genesis is concerned?

For this reason, the author says “When the form of the act of knowledge is the first of the two, &c.”

An act of knowledge consists in the taking in of an object; and it is not possible that there should be the taking in of an object which has already been taken in, i.e., known. Hence by this is described the knowing of the yet unknown, which is intellection. It is described to be such as the form or appearance of knowledge is the first, i.e., the most important factor therein. And although there is no difference in nature, the preponderance of the quality is established.

Memory is described to be that in which the form of the object of knowledge is the first or foremost appearance. By the form of the object of knowledge being the first in appearance, it is meant that the object of knowledge has already been subjected to the operation of the other mental modifications. It is said the field of memory comprises the mental impressions which have already been subjected to the operation of other mental modifications. And this is what is “not stealing along with mental impressions.”

But this stealing exists in memory too. It shows in dream past phenomena impressed upon the mind at different times and places, such as the names, &c., as connected with, other times and places which have not passed into the mind as such. For this reason, he says, ‘It is two-fold.’

‘That which has become of the very nature of mind,’ means raised into being by mental potency, imagined. This is that in which the object of memory has already been made part of the mind.

The other is that which has not become of the nature of the mind, which is not raised out of mental potencies, is not imagined and is therefore real.

This is not memory, it is on the contrary unreal cognition, fitting in as it does with the definition thereof. It is called memory because it only looks like it, just as what looks like real cognition is called real cognition.

But then why is memory mentioned last of all?

The reason is given:—‘All these memories, &c.’ ‘Impression in sequence’ means taking in. Memory is a modification preceded by this taking in. That is to say, the genesis of memory is therefrom.

The question arises that an intelligent man will only check the modifications which cause misery to the Puruṣa, and such are the afflictions, not the modifications as such. What then is the object of their suppression? For this reason, he says:—All these, &c. This is easy.