Conclusion 1

[This is part of Bhoja’s commentary following the final Sūtra 4.33]

Nor is it only in our philosophy that the knower of the field [of action] in its isolated condition is recognised to exist in this form of intelligence; on reflection it will be seen that in other systems of philosophy also it remains in the same form. Now, in the worldly condition soul appears as full of agency, experiencership, and inquisitiveness; if this one soul, the knower of the field, be not admitted to be so, then in the absence of all antecedent and postcedent enquiry in momentary consciousness, (i.e., believing consciousness to be existent only for the time being, which cannot look into the past or the future,) there would be no constant relation between soul and the fruits of works, and the objection would arise of the destruction of that which has been done, and the coming into existence of that which has not been done, (i.e., no desert would follow works done, and desert would result from undone work). Acknowledge him to be the experiencer (of deserts) by whom an act enjoined by the Śāstras is performed, and there will be an inclination on the part of all to perform works for the acceptance or avoidance of good or evil. Since all actions characterised by the desire of avoidance or acceptance are subject to enquiry; since there would be an impossibility for enquiry in the case of mutually distinct moments; (i.e., the moment when one action is done being distinct from that in which another action is performed); and since in the absence of enquiry there would arise an impossibility for any kind of action to take place, it is established that that which is the agent, experiencer, and enquirer is the soul. In the condition of liberation, there being an absence of all actions characterised by the idea of the acceptable and the acceptor, sentience alone remains behind. That sentience is apparent only as sentience, and not by knowing itself, since the nature of sentience is to perceive objects, and not to perceive itself. Further, when an object is perceived by the thinking power, the idea is “this” (ayam), and when the identity of that power is to be implied, the idea is “I” (aham). Two such mutually discordant actions, characterised as the profluent and the refluent are, cannot be achieved simultaneously, and since the two actions cannot be performed at the same time, soul remains as sentience only. Hence it is reasonable (to believe) that in the liberated condition, when the qualities are defunct, soul remains solely as sentience. In the mundane condition agency, percipiency, inquisitiveness arise in regard to that soul. Besides, there is a relation between Prakṛti and soul, which is that of experience and experiencer; it is natural, and exists from time without a beginning. It is due to the prevalence of want of right notion. And that being the case, in the presence of the two powers for the advancement of the object of soul, (cf. IV, XXII), all modifications in the form of Mahat and others take place. And since the power of the soul as the supreme agent, and of casting its quality of sentience on the thinking principle, and that of experiencing the result of the conjunction of that reflection, proceed from conjunction (with Mahat), and since the consciousness of agency and experiencership of the intellect proceeds from the influence of sentience on the intellect, and consequently of the conduct of all enquirable actions, what use is there in other unprofitable agglomeration of fallacies?

Notes:

[Bhoja does not say that the theory he combats is due to the Buddhists, but the dogma of momentary consciousness was prevalent among the Mādhyamīkas, and hence I infer that he means the Buddhists. The theory is, that all things are momentary, and their cognition is also momentary, produced by the concatenation of complements of unconscious causes, without a permanent intellectual back-ground, (cf. Cowell and Cough’s Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha, p. 15), It is refuted by the allegation, that such consciousness could not be made subject to moral responsibility. The consciousness that would perform an action now, would have no relation to the one that had acted before, or to that which would act in the future, and the responsibility of the one could not be transferred to another. There could be no such idea as ego, for the ego of one cognition would not be the ego of another, and yet as ego is the basis of cognition and consciousness, no theory can be valid which repudiates that. There could be under such circumstance no incentive to, nor necessity for, moral action. A permanent individual consciousness is unavoidable, and that is found in the thinking principle enlivened by a reflection of soul.]