Sūtra 2.13

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 2.13:

सति मूले तद्विपाको जात्यायुर्भोगाः ॥ २.१३ ॥

sati mūle tadvipāko jātyāyurbhogāḥ || 2.13 ||

13. The root existing, the deserts are kind, age, and experience.

The Rajamartanda commentary by King Bhoja:

[English translation of the 11th century commentary by Bhoja called the Rājamārtaṇḍa]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Now he describes the varieties and distinctions of the residua of works with their fruits.

[Read Sūtra 2.13]

The “root” (mūla) is the afflictions aforesaid. As long as the afflictions are not removed, the deserts (vipāka), fruition of works, good and evil, follow in the form of kind, age, and experience. “Kind” (jāti) means being a man or some other being. “Age” (āyus) is always remaining in the same body. “Experience” (bhoga) means sense objects, the senses, and consciousness of pleasure and pain, according as it is accepted in the passive, instrumental, or abstract sense.

The purport of this is this: That as the residua of works reposited in the thinking principle from time without a beginning, attain maturity, so they, according to their measure, lead to fruition in the form of kind, age, and experience. The afflictions existing with their roots uncut, the residua of works become the originators of deserts. Even as unhusked Śāli paddy, like unroasted seeds, are able to germinate, but husked grains, like roasted seeds, cannot, so the residua of works, unparted from the afflictions, become the germinators of deserts; though such is not the case when the afflictions are removed, or the residua are reduced to the condition of roasted seeds.

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[The first difficult word in the aphorism is jāti. Its meaning is obvious enough, but I call it difficult because I can find no satisfactory equivalent for it in the English language. It is formed of the root √jan ‘to be born,’ and means that which is born; but in philosophy it is used to imply species in a very comprehensive sense. It means caste, i.e., distinction of family; or species, that is one distinct from another, as several species in a genus or order; or broader distinctions than what is implied by species; as also the broadest distinctions which naturalists indicate by the term kingdom. The examples given show that the word jāti equally applies to the change of caste, as in a Kṣatriya becoming a Brāhman; or to that of species, as in a man becoming a demigod; or to that of a kingdom as in a woman becoming a creeper: I know of no such comprehensive term in the English language. Dr. Ballantyne uses rank, but I doubt if the change of a woman into a creeper or a stone, the change could be idiomatically described as one of “rank.” Colebrooke uses “birth” but the change may take place without a regular birth. For the sake of English idiom the best course would be to use different equivalents under different circumstances, but that would upset the line of argument of the author. Genesis appears to bear close approximation to jāti, and kind is its Anglo-Saxon counterpart. In using “kind” as the equivalent, I use what appears less liable to objection than others, but it is by no means a good one.

The second word āyus has been so explained by the commentator as to imply longevity, but the word means simply “age” or “duration of life,” which may be long or short according to circumstances:—a meritorious work leading to prolongation of existence in a particular body, whereas a vicious one tending to shorten the span of life.

The third word is bhoga, which Dr. Ballantyne renders into “enjoyment;” but inasmuch as here it means the endurance of pain as well as the delectation of pleasure, I prefer “experience,” which covers both.

The purport of the aphorism is that the fruition of works leads according to circumstances to change of body into a higher or lower grade, to the prolongation or reduction in the span of life, and to the experience of pleasure or pain.

The Pātañjala Bhāṣya, thus explains the time of fruition: “The deserts are of three sorts, kind, age and experience. In regard to them the questions are discussed, 1st, Is one work the cause of one birth, or is it the cause of many births? 2nd, Are many works the causes of many births or of one birth?

One work is not the cause of one birth. Why so? Because there would be no regularity in the fruition of the remainder of innumerable works accumulated from time without a beginning along with a recent work. The objection would also be there would be no inducement for people (to perform many works). Therefore it is wrong.

Nor is one work the cause of many births. Why? Because if out of many works each work was to be the cause of many births, there would be want of time for the fruition of all the remaining deserts. Therefore it, too, is wrong. Nor can many works be the cause of many births. Why? Because it is not possible for many births to happen simultaneously, and consequently it must be said to happen successively, and then the objection before urged (about want of time) would apply. It follows then that the diverse stock of residua of virtuous and vicious actions performed from birth to death remains in a dominant or a dominated form, and on a death taking place it becomes the cause of a birth, being itself liable to destruction on another stock becoming dominant.”]

The above described kind, &c. being the fruits of works, the author, in order to show that they produce fruition according to the works which are their cause, says: