Sūtra 1.2

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Sūtra 1.2:

योगश्चित्तवृत्तिनिरोधः ॥ १.२ ॥

yogaścittavṛttinirodhaḥ || 1.2 ||

2. Yoga is the suppression of the functions of the thinking principle.

The Rajamartanda commentary by King Bhoja:

[English translation of the 11th century commentary by Bhoja called the Rājamārtaṇḍa]

[Sanskrit text for commentary available]

Now what is this Yoga? To this the author replies:—

[Read Sūtra 1.2]

“Thinking principle” (citta) is of the form of goodness without a taint. “Functions” (vṛtti) are modifications of the relation between each other of them. “Yoga” or meditation is described to be the “suppression” (nirodha), or dissolution in their primary causes, through the direction inward on the suppression of the tendency outward, of the functions in question. This suppression is a cross-grained ascent of the “functions” of the thinking principle. Being common to all the conditions of the thinking principle, it is an attribute of all beings, and therefore it becomes at times evident in some one condition or other. The conditions, or the different states of the thinking principle, are—restless activity, mischievous ignorance, voluptuousness, concentration, and suppression. Thereof the condition of activity (kṣipta) is induced by an access of the quality of foulness (rajas). Propelled by that quality it tends outwards, approaching or receding from imaginary or real pleasurable or painful objects. It is common to demons, sons of Diti, Titans, sons of Danu, &c. Addiction to evil actions without distinguishing between what should be done and what not (mūḍha) proceeds from an excess of darkness (tamas). It is common to demons (Rākṣasas), ghosts (Piśācas), &c. Voluptuousness (vikṣipta) is the feeling of avoiding the causes of pain, and engaging in (those sensuous objects of) sound and the like which promote enjoyment. It proceeds from an excess of the quality of goodness (sattva), and is observable in the Devas. It amounts to this, that the thinking principle by foulness becomes restlessly active; by darkness mischievous, or desirous of injuring others; and by goodness full of happiness. These three conditions of the thinking principle are not fit for the condition of devout contemplation. The two conditions of concentration and suppression, having an excess of the quality of goodness and following the others, are reckoned fit for that purpose.

The object of arranging the qualities of goodness &c, in a disorderly way is this: notwithstanding the two qualities of foulness and darkness being very detestable, the quality of foulness is first described, because unless activity is made intelligible, no suppression of it can possibly be grasped. Hence the reversed order. The object of placing the quality of goodness last is this: that by its excess, the two (subsequent) conditions become fit for Yoga. Of those two conditions, viz., concentration and suppression, that in which the thinking principle is in a state of (exclusive) application to one point is called Yoga. What is the result of this? (It is this): by Yoga or concentration to one point the external functions cease, and on that cessation there is a complete dissolution of all functions with their residua. In both these conditions, Yoga meditation is practicable.

Notes and Extracts

[Notes and comparative extracts from other commentaries on the Yogasūtra]

[The most important word in the aphorism is citta which has been rendered into “thinking principle” by Dr. Ballantyne. In ordinary Sanskrit it is a synonym of the word manas “mind,” and Dr. Ballantyne has used that word as a synonym in different places, and in the sense in which that word is used in philosophy—i.e., “that which perceives, feels, thinks and wills,” (Taylor, Elements of Thought,) “or that which, when it acts, knows what it is going to do; something stored with ideas of its intended works, agreeably to which ideas those works are fashioned,” (Harris, Hermes, p. 227)—he is right. In the Sāṅkhya aphorisms of Kapila, its counterpart manas has been used in the same sense (Mahadākhyamādyam kāryam tanmanaḥ, I.71). But inasmuch as the philosophical writers of this country make a marked distinction between mind as above described, and as an internal organ of knowledge, the sensorium, it is desirable that the distinction should be marked by the use of a different word. In the Sāṅkhya aphorisms the word citta does not occur, nor is it to be met with in the Nyāya. The Vedāntists use it sparingly, taking it to be a modification or another name of Buddhi (Vedānta-sāra). Its equivalent in the Sāṅkhya is Adhyavasāya, which is synonymous with Buddhi. (Adhyavasāyo ìuddhiḥ, II, 13). It is called Mahat “the great one,” because “it is the first and most important of the products of nature, presiding over and pervading the whole.” (Mahattvam svetara-sakalakārya-vyāpakatvan-mahaiśvaryācca.) It is mati “understanding,” because every thing is understood by it, (manyati anayā); khyāti “familiar knowledge;” jñāña, and prajñā. That Patañjali implies the object of these words by citta is evident from the fact of his making it the first product of nature and anterior to egotism, as the Sāṅkhya does, and by saying that the suppression of its functions results in the completion of Yoga. (Vṛtti-nirodhāt tatsiddhiḥ, III, 81). Thus Vācaspati Miśra—citta-śābdenāntaḥkaraṇam buddhimupalakṣayati. According to the order of creation prakṛtri comes first, thence citta, thence egotism, thence mind, and thence the subtile organs &c., and this both according to the Sāṅkhya and the Yoga systems. The thinking principle is thus the same with intellect, and mind in the highest sense.

The next word is vṛtti. I follow Colebrooke and Wilson by rendering it into “functions.” The functions are produced by modifications of the original principle produced by unequal exertions of the three qualities of goodness, foulness and darkness. In so far they are allotropic conditions of the same principle, and so, as Vijñāna Bhikṣu expresses it, the world is merely a modification of form, of which prakṛti is the materiality. (pariṇāmarūpam jagadupādānakatvantu-prakṛtitvam.) Pariṇāma or change is the term usually employed as its equivalent, and Bhoja explains it by saying “they are modifications of the relation between each other of the functions.” Vijñāna Bhikṣu calls it transformation of Prakṛti, (prakṛtivirūpam). Under these circumstances Dr. Ballantyne's use of the term “modification” affords the closest rendering; but Dr. Wilson prefers functions as more idiomatic and expressive.

The last word is nirodha, which means stoppage, or hindering, and suppression implies the same.

The definition of Yoga as given in the text and the commentary suggests the idea that the suppression of thought must be complete before Yoga can be accomplished, but such is not the object, for in the lower stages of meditation such is not the case, and yet it is Yoga. The Pātañjala-bhāṣya points this out by saying that since the word sarva “all” has not been used before vṛtti “functions,” the form of Yoga in which there is a distinct recognition is also Yoga. (Sarvaśabdāgrahanāt saṃprajñātopi Yogaḥ). It is remarkable that Bhoja should have overlooked so important a qualification.]

Now the author of the Sūtras, wishing to describe the words citta-vṛtti-nirodhaḥ, describes first [in two aphorisms] the word citta.