Sūtra 7.2.1 (Number: Proof of Unity)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 7.2.1:

रुपरसगन्धस्पर्शव्यतिरेकादर्थान्तरमेकत्वम् ॥ ७.२.१ ॥

ruparasagandhasparśavyatirekādarthāntaramekatvam || 7.2.1 ||

rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa-vyatirekāt—because of difference from Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch; arthāntaraṃ—a different object; ekatvaṃ—unity.

1. Because of its difference from Colour, Taste, Smell, and Touch, Unity is a different object.

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

In the second chapter there are five section; (a) the section on the examination of attributes existing in one, and in more than one, object; (b) the section on the examination of attributes existing only in more than one object; (c) the section, in passing, on the examination of the relation of sound and significance (i.e., of words and their meaning); (d) the section of the examination of attributes existing in one object and having for their non-combinative cause conjunction with universal substances void of particular or distinguishing attributes; and, (c) the section on the examination of combination. Now, the perceptibility of Number, etc., also is dependent upon combination in the same object with magnitude. Accordingly, with a view to examine number, and also separateness, immediately after the determination of measure of extension, in violation of the order of enumeration, the author says:

[Read sūtra 7.2.1 above]

‘Rūpa-rasa-gandha-sparśa’ is indicatory of all attributes other than the pentad beginning with number, (i.e., number, measure or extension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction). ‘Vyatirekat’ = because of difference or divergence. The meaning, therefore, is this: “One water-pot”—Such particular intuition can be produced by some particularity. And that particularity is not colour, etc., for the intuition is produced by difference from, or without, them. Nor is it the being a water-pot, etc., that is the condition or occasion (of the intuition), for such intuition is produced in respect of a piece of cloth also. Nor is unity a Genus, like Existence, for its denotation is neither less nor more than that of Existence. Nor, again, is it a Genus confined to substance only, for it is neither less nor more extensive than Substance-ness. Nor does the difference or mutual distinction (of Unity and Substance-ness) arise from difference of intuition, even though they are neither less nor more extensive than each other; for if difference of intuition were caused by itself, existence also would be differentiated; if, on the other hand, it were to be caused by difference of subject-matter, then, difference of subject-matter, as has been stated, is not possible, since, otherwise, there would be difference of the characteristic of being a small water-pot and of being a large water-pot. Nor is the view, held by Bhūśaṇa [Bhūṣaṇa?], that unity is non-difference from (or identity with; itself, a reasonable one. Were self-identity of the water-pot its Unity, then there would be no intuition of Unity in the case of a cloth, etc., Bhūśaṇa’s other view, namely, that difference from itself constitutes Duality, etc., is also not valid; for variety of uses of difference from itself or self-distinction, as being common to three, four, and so on, is not possible or capable of proof. This is the import.—1.