Taittiriya Upanishad

by A. Mahadeva Sastri | 1903 | 206,351 words | ISBN-10: 8185208115

The Taittiriya Upanishad is one of the older, "primary" Upanishads, part of the Yajur Veda. It says that the highest goal is to know the Brahman, for that is truth. It is divided into three sections, 1) the Siksha Valli, 2) the Brahmananda Valli and 3) the Bhrigu Valli. 1) The Siksha Valli deals with the discipline of Shiksha (which is ...

Chapter VIII - On the Defensive

Defence of the Vedic Doctrine.

In the Vedānta-sūtras (in the Pāda i of the Adhyāya II) all objections raised against the doctrine of Brahman,—which has been made out in the First Adhyāya as the one taught by all Upaniṣads in one voice,—on the ground that it is opposed to the srmitis or teachings of some individual sages and to the logic of experience, have been answered in thirteen disquisitions (adhikaraṇas), all of which together form a defence of the foregoing exposition of the Vedic doctrine. The first disquisition has been digested as follows:

 

The Veda versus the Sāṅhya system.
(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 1 - 2).

(The opponent):—The Vedic doctrine of Brahman should make room for the Sāṅkhya teaching; for, as the Sāṅkhya teaching would otherwise have no scope at all, it must prevail as against the other. Of course the Sāṅkhya doctrine has been promulgated for the express purpose of teaching the nature of things as they are; it has nothing whatever to do with Dharma, i e., with the teaching of what one has to do; and therefore, if the teaching of the Sāṅkhya system be set aside even in that matter, then it would have no scope at all. If, on the other hand, the teaching of the Veda, which treats of Dharma as well as Brahman, be set aside so far as it concerns one of them, namely, Brahman, even then it will have ample scope, so far as it treats of Dharma. Accordingly, it is but proper that the Vedic doctrine of Brahman should give in to the Sāṅkhya teaching, inasmuch as otherwise the latter would have no scope at all; whereas (as shewn above) the Vedic teaching can afford to make room for the other.

(The Vedāntin):—As against the foregoing, we hold as follows: It is not right that the Vedic teaching should be made to give in to the Sāṅkhya doctrine; for, the latter has been falsified by the institutes of Manu and the like which speak of Brahman as the Cause of the universe. The institutes of Manu and the like are indeed more authoritative, inasmuch as they are based on the Vedic texts now extant, while Kapila’s doctrine has no such basis. Certainly, we know of no Vedic text whatever supporting the doctrine that Pradhāna is the Cause; and it has been already shewn that all extant Vedic texts point to Brahman as the Cause of the universe. Hence the impropriety of making the Vedic doctrine give in to the Sāṅkhya teaching.

 

The Veda versus the Yoga system.
(Vedānta-sūtras II i. 3)

(The opponent):—The Yoga doctrine is the science taught by Patañjali. The eight-stepped yoga therein taught is taught in the extant Vedic texts also. In the Śvetāśvata-ra-Upaniṣad, for instance, yoga is taught at great length. Further, yoga is a means to knowledge; for, in the words “with the sharp and subtle mind He is beheld”[1] the śruti declares that the one-pointedness of mind which can be accomplished by yoga is a means to the immediate realisation of Brahman. Hence the authority of the science of Yoga. And this science teaches that Pradhāna alone is the Cause of the universe. Therefore ihe Veda should make room for the Yoga doctrine.

(The Vedāntin):—Indeed the Yoga doctrine is an authority so far as it is concerned with its main aim, which is to teach the eight-stepped yoga; but it is no authority as regards the non-Vedic theory of Pradhāna, which lies away from the main aim of its teaching.—To explain: Having started with the words “Now commences the teaching of yoga,” the science then defines yoga in the words “yoga is the restraint of the modifications of the thinking principle”, and expounds yoga at great length in the sequel; so that the main aim of the science is yoga. The science does not, on the other hand, start with Pradhāna and the rest as the main subject of its teaching. When in the second section which is devoted to an exposition of yama, niyarna, and other steps on the path of yoga, the author explains the evil, the cause of evil, its abandoning, and the means of abandoning it, he makes a casual mention of Pradhāna, etc., as taught in the Sāṅkhya. Pradhāna does not therefore form the main subject of its teaching. Hence no necessity for the Veda giving in to the Yoga doctrine.

 

The Veda versus the Sāṅkhya reasoning.
(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 4 — 11).

(The opponent):—It should give in to the empirical reasoning such as the following: The insentient universe cannot have been born of Brahman who is intelligent; for the one is of quite a different nature from the other. What is quite opposed to another cannot be born of that other; as for example, the buffalo is not born of the cow.

(The Vedāntin):—The dictum that the cause and the effect are of the same nature fails in the case of scorpions and hair. We know that the scorpion, a sentient organism, is born of cow-dung which is insentient, and that an insentient thing such as hair is born of the human organism which is sentient. Therefore no dry reasoning independent of the Veda can take a final stand in any matter. Accordingly one of the teachers has said:

“A thing inferred with ever so great a care by logicians however expert is quite otherwise explained by other and greater experts.”[2]

Therefore, the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the strength of the specious argument based upon the distinction between Brahman and the universe.

 

The Veda versus empirical reasoning generally.
(Vedānta-sūtra II. i. 12).

(The opponent):—Granted that the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the strength of the Sāṅkhya and Yoga systems and their logic. There are, however, other systems, those of Kaṇāda, Buddha and so on; and the Vedic doctrine will have to give way to their teachings and their logic. Kaṇāda, a Maharshi, a great sage, has taught that the atoms (paramāṇus) are the cause of the universe, and supports this theory by the following argument: All things produced are produced out of smaller parts; a cloth, for instance, is produced out of threads; and all molecules are things produced; therefore they must have been produced out of things which are smaller in magnitude. And Buddha, again, who is an incarnation of Viṣṇu, teaches that the universe has come out of abhāva or non-existence and supports that view by logic: Every existing thing is preceded by its non-existence; the dream-world, for instance, is preceded by suṣupti or dreamless sleep. Wherefore, the Vedic doctrine should give in to the mighty systems of Kaṇāda and the like.

(The Vedāntin):—As against the foregoing we argue as follows: When even the Sāṅkhya and Yoga doctrines, treating of Prakṛti, Puruṣa and other things, and which are incidentally here and there cited by the authors of the Purā-ṇas,—by the crest-jewels of Vedic teachers,—have been set aside as weak and unwarranted so far as their teaching as to the Cause of the universe is concerned, much more readily should we set aside as weak and unwarranted the theories of Kaṇāda and the like which are ignored by all wise teachers. Certainly, nowhere in the Purāṇas,—the Pādrna, the Brāhma and the like,—is the theory of atoms and molecules cited even incidentally. On the contrary, in the words “One should not honor, even by a word of mouth, the sceptical rationalists and hypocritical devotees,”[3] such systems are altogether condemned. As to the generalisation that all produced things are produced out of smaller parts, it does not apply to illusion (vivarta); for, we see mighty trees on a distant mountain-top giving rise to the illusory idea of the very minute tip of the grass-blade. Even as to the inference that the universe has come out of non-being, the example of the dream-world cited above does not warrant the general proposition that every produced thing is preceded by its non-existence; for suṣupti is only an avasthā or condition of the Self (Ātman), and since the existence of the Self during suṣupti has thus to be admitted, it follows that the dream-world is preceded by something existing. Wherefore the Vedic doctrine should not give way to the systems of Kaṇāda, Buddha and the like.

 

The Vedānta versus sensuous perception.
(Vedānta-sūtra II. i. 13)

(The opponent):—The non-duality which has been made out by a connected interpretation of Vedic texts is proved false by pratyakṣa etc.,—by sensuous perception, empirical inference, etc.,—which reveal a distinction between the perceiver and the things perceived.

(The Vedāntin):—No. For, in the case of the ocean we perceive both duality and non-duality: in the form of waves it is dual; and as a body of water it is non-dual. Only, these opposites, duality and non-duality, cannot coexist in that thing which does not altogether admit of even a distinction of aspects and is absolutely one. Wherefore, when it is possible to distinguish two aspects—non-dual as Brahman, and dual as differentiated into the perceiver and the objects of perception,—the Vedic doctrine cannot be set aside on the ground of opposition to our perception of duality.

 

Non-duality in duality—how far real.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. i. 14 - 20)

(Question):—Is this non-duality in duality absolutely real or only apparently so?

(Prima facie view):—It is absolutely real; for it never proves false in the case of Brahman any more than in the case of the ocean.

(Conclusion):—“Here there is no duality whatever:”[4] in these words the śruti denies all duality. By reasoning, too, we come to the same conclusion. For, duality and nonduality, which are mutually destructive, cannot coexist in one and the same thing, just as the one moon cannot be two. As to the conclusion arrived at in the preceding article that duality and non-duality in the One Thing are due to difference in Its aspects, even this is not right; for, the non-dual Reality does noLadmit of different aspects. In the ocean or the like, however, both duality and non duality are admitted because of a difference in its aspects, which is a fact of experience; and it is a well-established principle that no fact of experience can be dismissed as unreasonable. It cannot be said that, in the present case also, two different aspects, as Brahman and as the universe, are facts of experience; for, Brahman is knowable only through śās-tras (scriptures). Wherefore non-duality in duality in the case of Brahman is opposed to both śruti and reasoning and has only a relative (vyāvahārika) reality, i.e., it is real only from the stand-point of the unenlightened.—It may be asked, then, what is the Absolute reality? We reply: Non-duality is alone real: apart from the cause, there is no effect; and therefore the cause alone is real. And accordingly the śruti teaches that the cause alone is real, and illustrates the truth by clay and the like.

“By one clod of clay, for instance, my dear, all that is made of clay is known. A product of speech is the changing form, a name; what we call clay is alone real: so, my dear, is the one spoken of.”[5]

This passage may be explained as follows: A big clod of clay is the cause, and pots and dishes, etc., are its changing forms. The Tārkikas (logicians) maintain that pots and dishes, etc., are things quite distinct from clay. To shew that pots, etc., are not independent realities, the śruti speaks of them as vikāras or changing forms; which means that pots, etc., are only different forms of the one thing, clay, and that they are not independent realities any more than childhood, youth, and dotage are independent of Deva-datta. So that even while it manifests itself in the form of pots, etc., clay alone is the independent reality. Therefore, when clay is known, the whole real essence of pots, etc., is known. Unreal as these are, they are not worth knowing. Though these changing forms manifest themselves through the eye, yet, when properly scrutinised, they are found to have no being whatever of their own apart from clay. They exist only in names,—dish, pots, etc.,—which are but a creation of speech. Thus these changing forms have no real being of their own and yet present themselves to consciousness: that is to say, they are false appearance3(mithyā) and are therefore unreal; whereas clay has a being of its own even apart from its changing forms and is therefore real. It is in accordance with this illustration that we should understand the Vedic teaching regarding Brahman, and it is quite clear that in that teaching Brahman corresponds to clay, and the universe to pots, etc. Wherefore, the universe being one with Brahman, the truth is that Brahman is non-dual. Those persons, however, who have not thus investigated the matter learn on the one hand from the teaching of the Veda that Brahman is nondual, while again they are convinced of duality by sensuous perception and empirical inference. As thus the twofold knowledge arises only at first sight, i. e., in the absence of a thorough investigation, we may conclude that the non-duality in duality presented to the mind in the case of Brahman and the universe, as in the case of the ocean and its waves, is but relatively true (vyāvahārika), and that it is considered real only in the absence of investigation.

 

Īśvara untainted by good and evil.
(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 21 - 23)

(The opponent):—In the case of jīvas merged in the saṃsā-ra, the Parameśvara or Supreme Lord does good to them by way of endowing them with non-attachment (vairāgya). He has also created evil in the form of sin(adharma)leading to hell (naraka); and while doing so, He, as the Omniscient, knows His identity with the jīvas. This is to say that He does both good and evil to Himself, which is incongruous; for, no sensible person in the world neglects his own good or does evil to himself. The Vedic doctrine, therefore, is open to the objection that it makes the Lord neglect His own good.

(The Vedāntin):—As against the foregoing we hold as follows:—Īśvara is omniscient, and therefore knows that the jīva’s saṃsāra is unreal and that He is untainted in Himself. Hence no room for the objection that the Lord is affected by good and evil.

 

Duality evolved from non-duality.
(Vedānta-sūtras, II. i. 24 - 25.)

(Theopponent):—“One alone without a second”:[6] from these words we learn that Brahman is devoid of all duality;

i. e., we learn that He is not in Himself made up of distinct parts and that there exists nothing else belonging to the same class as Brahman or to a different class. On the contrary, the things to be created, such as ākāśa, the air, etc., are various. When there is no variety in the cause, there cannot certainly be any variety in the effect; otherwise, from one thing, such as milk, might be evolved things of different kinds, such as curd, oil and so on. Moreover, the śruti describes the evolution of ākāśa and other things in a certain order; and we are at a loss to know what there is to determine the particular order of evolution. Therefore, the evolution of the universe in all its variety and in a particular order cannot take place from Brahman who is one and secondless.

(The Vedāntin):—In point of fact, Brahman is, no doubt, non-dual; but the śruti, reason, and experience tell us that Brahman is associated with avidyā. The śruti says: “Māyā verily is Prakriti(cause), man should know; and Īśvara the possessor of Māyā.” Māyā is the same as avidyā, since both alike are characterised by indefinability. It should not be supposed that this admission of Māyā lands us in duality; for, nothing is veal except Brahman. Thus, though one, Brahman can produce the universe in all its variety with the help of avidyā. Neither should it be supposed that there exists nothing to determine the particular order in the evolution of things; for, avidyā may possess potentialities which bring about the evolution of things in a particular order. Therefore, the evolution of things in the universe in all their variety and in a particular order can take place from Brahman, the secondless.

 

The theory of transformation maintained.
(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 26 - 29.)

(The opponent):—In the sixth article (adhikaraṇa)[7] it has been shewn that cause and effect are one; so that, the Vaiśeṣika’s theory of the production of an effect distinct from the cause is not acceptable to the Brahmavādin. He is therefore obliged to accept the theory of transformation (pariṇama), as in the case of milk and curd. Then he may be asked this question: Is it wholly or in part that Brahman transforms Himself into the universe? In the former case, Brahman would be non-eternal; in the latter, Brahman would be made up of parts. Wherefore the theory of transformation cannot be maintained.

(The Vedāntin):—Brahman’s transformation of Himself into the universe is effected by the potentialities of Māyā, as the śruti says, “The Lord appears multiform through māyās (false ideas)”[8] It is not a reality. Therefore the Brahma-vāda cannot be caught between the two horns of the dilemma,—transformation as a whole or transformation in part. Thus, the theory of transformation is not difficult for the Brahmavādin to maintain.

 

Though incorporeal, Brahman possesses Māyā.
(Vedānta-sūtras. II. i. 30 — 31)

(The opponent):—In the world we find all jugglers, who display magical powers, possessed of a body. Brahman being without a body, how can He have the power of Māyā?

(The Vedāntin):—Though the house-builders and other architects stand in need of earth, timber, grass and other external objects quite distinct from themselves, yet, a juggler can construct houses and the like without resorting to any external things. Similarly, though the worldly juggler stands in need of a body, still, without a body, Brahman may possess Māyā. Perhaps it may be urged that we have the authority of sensuous perception for maintaining that a juggler can produce houses, etc., without any external aids. If so, then, even as regards Brahman, we may rely on the authority of the śruti which says that “the Maheśvara is the possessor of Māyā,”[9] and maintain that He is without a body and yet possesses Māyā.

 

Evolution as an act of sport.
(Vedānta-sūtras II. i. 32 — 33)

(The opponent):—“Bliss is Brahman:”[10] in these words the śruti declares that the Parameśvara, the Supreme Lord, is ever-contented. If we admit that such a being cherishes a desire for creation, it will detract from His ever-contentedness. If, on the other hand, we deny any such desire, then it is tantamount to saying that, as creating the universe without an intelligent purpose in view, the Īśvara behaves like a lunatic.

(The Vedāntin):—Princes and others, who are quite intelligent, engage in hunting and other kinds of activity only as a matter of sport, with no specific end in view. And inspiration and expiration are facts of everybody’s experience. There are innumerable instances of purposeless activities displayed by children. Like these, Īśvara, though ever-contented, may create the whole universe without any specific end in view and yet be not a lunatic.

 

Īśvara acquitted of partiality and cruelty.
(Vedānta-sūtras. II. i. 34 — 36)

(The opponent):—Īśvara creates most happy beings such as Devas, as also most unhappy beings such as cattle and other lower animals, and also men who are midway between the two. Thus bestowing happiness and misery of different degrees upon different classes of souls, how can Īśvara be other than partial? Or, bringing about the destruction of Devas, lower animals, men and other creatures in the whole universe,—an act which is extremely reprehensible even to the meanest being,—how can He be other than merciless? Thus, the Īśvara of the Vedānta is open to the charge of partiality and mercilessness.

(The Vedāntin):—In the first place Īśvara cannot be charged with partiality, inasmuch as the different creatures are born in the highest class or in the middle class or in the lowest class of beings just according to their respective karmas. It cannot, however, be urged that this detracts from the independence of Īśvara; for, as the Antaryāmin, the Inner Regulator and Controller dwelling in all beings, He rules all karma.

Here one may say: If, to avoid the charge of partiality against Īśvara, you say that karma is the cause of difference, and again if, to secure Īśvara’s independence, you make Him the Regulator of karma’s operations, in the end you make Īśvara Himself the cause of difference in the lots of different creatures.

In reply we say that this is not a fault at all. The act of regulating consists in the mere preventing of the potentialities of the different things in nature from getting into confusion. These potentialities form the very body or essence of Māyā; and Īśvara is not their creator. Since the respective karmas of the different beings are, by virtue of their inherent potentialities, the cause of the differences, Īśvara who is the mere regulator of their operations cannot be charged with partiality.

Like suṣupti or dreamless sleep, the destruction of the universe, is not a source of pain; on the contrary, it removes all pain; so that Īśvara only shews His mercy by this act.

(Objection):—Though Īśvara is not open to the charge of partiality when, in the minor evolutions, He creates the universe in accordance with the preceding karma, still He is open to the charge as regards His first creation, since there existed no karma preceding that creation.

(Answer):—No. The series of creations is beginningless, as the scriptures say, “no end, no beginning.”[11]

 

The Attributeless as the material cause.
(Vedānta-sūtra II. i. 37)

(The opponent)That is said to be the prakṛti or material cause which changes itself into the effect. In our experience we find that all material causes such as clay are possessed of attributes. Then, how can the attributeless Brahman be the material cause of the universe?

(The Vedāntin):—It is true that etymologically the term ‘prakṛti’ means that which undergoes change. But this change may take place in two ways: either by way of actual transformation as in the case of milk, etc., or by being mistaken for something else, as a rope is mistaken for a serpent. Now, though the attributeless Brahman cannot undergo actual transformation, He may be mistaken for something else. We do find that one jāti or species, which is attributeless, is mistaken for another: on seeing, for instance, a dirty brāhmaṇa, people mistake him for a śūdra. Therefore, though attributeless, Brahman can be the prakṛti or material cause of the universe.



 

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Kaṭha. Up. 3-12.

[2]:

Śloka-Vārtika.

[3]:

Viṣṇupuraṇa, 3–18–101.

[4]:

Kaṭha. Up. 4-11.

[5]:

Chhā. 6–1–4.

[6]:

Chhā. 6–2–1.

[7]:

Vide ante pp. 346–349.

[8]:

Bṛ. Up. 2–5–19.

[9]:

Śvetā. 4–10.

[10]:

Tai. Up. 3–6–1.

[11]:

Bhg. Gītā. 15–3.

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