Taittiriya Upanishad Bhashya Vartika
by R. Balasubramanian | 151,292 words | ISBN-10: 8185208115 | ISBN-13: 9788185208114
The English translation of Sureshvara’s Taittiriya Vartika, which is a commentary on Shankara’s Bhashya on the Taittiriya Upanishad. Taittiriya Vartika contains a further explanation of the words of Shankara-Acharya, the famous commentator who wrote many texts belonging to Advaita-Vedanta. Sureshvaracharya was his direct disciple and lived in the 9...
Verse 2.577
Sanskrit text and transliteration:
विद्याऽविद्यात्मकं ब्रह्म मतं चेन्न विरोधतः ।
पृथक्च दृश्यमानत्वादात्मनो घटरूपवत् ॥ ५७७ ॥
vidyā'vidyātmakaṃ brahma mataṃ cenna virodhataḥ |
pṛthakca dṛśyamānatvādātmano ghaṭarūpavat || 577 ||
English translation of verse 2.577:
If it be said that Brahman is of the nature of both knowledge and ignorance, it is not so, because they are opposed to each other, and also because they are cognized as different from the Self, in the same way as the colour of a pot (is cognized as different from the percipient).
Notes:
The critic now argues in a different way. If fear is caused by avidyā, and if it is removed through vidyā, why should it not be said, asks the critic, that ignorance and knowledge are both inherent in the Self? This argument is now taken up for consideration with a view to show that neither knowledge nor ignorance is in the Self.
If it is said that both knowledge and ignorance inhere in the Self, is it in the sense that both of them constitute the nature of the Self? Or, is it in the sense that they are attributes of the Self? The first alternative is untenable. Vidyā and avidyā are mutually exclusive, and so it is wrong to say that both of them constitute the nature of the Self. There is yet another reason to show why this view is untenable. Very often we speak of "my knowledge” and "my ignorance”. These locutions clearly indicate that we know them as different from the Self. Just as the colour of a pot, which is perceived, is different from, and therefore cannot constitute the nature of, the percipient, so also knowledge and ignorance which are perceived directly are different from, and therefore cannot constitute the nature of, the Self.