Text 80

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 80:

तत्र रूपं चक्षुर्ग्राह्यम् । पृथिव्युदकज्वलनवृत्ति । द्रव्याद्युपलम्भकं नयनसहकारि शुक्लाद्यनेकप्रकारं सलिलादिपरमाणुषु नित्यं पार्थिवपरमाणुष्वग्निसम्योगविरोधि सर्वकार्यद्रव्येषु कारणगुणपूर्वकमाश्रयविनाशादेव विनश्यतीति ॥ ८० ॥

tatra rūpaṃ cakṣurgrāhyam | pṛthivyudakajvalanavṛtti | dravyādyupalambhakaṃ nayanasahakāri śuklādyanekaprakāraṃ salilādiparamāṇuṣu nityaṃ pārthivaparamāṇuṣvagnisamyogavirodhi sarvakāryadravyeṣu kāraṇaguṇapūrvakamāśrayavināśādeva vinaśyatīti || 80 ||

Text (79):—Of these, Colour is perceptible by the Eye.—(VIII-ii-6, IV-i-8).

It exists in Earth, Water and Light (Fire); it brings about the seeing of objects, and serves as an aid to the Eye.—(II-i-13, IV-i-6).

It is of various kinds, ‘White’ and the rest.

It is eternal in the atoms of Water &c.—(VII-i-3, VII-i-4).

In the atoms of Earth, it is opposed to contact with fire.

In all material products, it is preceded (brought about) by a like quality in the Cause; and it is destroyed by the destruction of its. substratum.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author proceeds to describe Colour first, as it is Colour that is the direct cause of the manifestation or appearance of all things.

Among Qualities, Colour is perceived by the Eye alone, and not by any other sense-organ.

Objection: “In as much as the generality ‘rūpatva’ also is perceived by the Eye, how could perceptibility by the Eye be regarded as the distinguishing quality of Colour?”

Reply: All that we mean is that the said perceptibility serves to distinguish Colour from all other qualities; as the word ‘tatra,’ ‘of these’, distinctly refers only to the Categories under consideration (i.e. Qualities, and ‘rupatva’ is not a quality). As for generalities (like ‘rūpatva’), Colour is distinguished from these (which have no generalities) by the fact of its having a generality.

Colour subsists only in Earth, Water and Light (Fire). It makes perceptible the substance wherein it subsists, also the Qualities, Action and Generalities pertaining to that substance. The colour of an object aids the Eye in the perception of that object.

Colour is eternal in the atoms of Water and Light. In the atoms of earth it is destroyed by the contact of fire, as we shall show later on.

The colour of all products is preceded (brought about) by the colour of the object which is the material cause of those products. The destruction of the Colour of the product is due to the destruction of the object in which it subsists.

Objection: “We cannot admit that the destruction of Colour follows upon the destruction of the object wherein it subsists; because as a matter of fact we find that the destruction of the substance and its Colour is simultaneous.”

Reply: It is not so; because there is (at that time) no cause for the destruction of Colour. In the case of the substance, the jar for instance, we find that when it is struck by a club, there is produced a certain action among its constituent particles, and this action brings about the destruction of the conjunction or cohesion of the particles forming the object; and then follows the destruction of the object formed by that cohesion, from the destruction of its cause (in the shape of this cohesion). For the destruction of the Colour of that substance, however, we find no cause at that time. If the destruction of the Colour were to follow upon that of the cohesion of the particles of the object, which cohesion is not the cause of that Colour,—then, there would be a destruction of the Colours of the earthenware fragments also. Hence we consider it right to hold that it is the substance that is destroyed first, and after this destruction there follows the destruction of the Colour subsisting in that substance; and the interval between the two destructions is so small that people are led to regard them as simultaneous.

Some people regard the Colour and the Substance wherein it subsists to be identical, and hence they hold the cause of the destruction of Colour to be the same as that of the destruction of the Substance. To these persons the following questions should be put:—Does the colour of the atom produce another Colour or not? When producing it, does it produce it within the Colour itself, or in its substratum, the atom? If it does not produce it, or if it produces it within itself, or in the atom only,—then no Colour could be produced in the Diad: and hence the whole world proceeding from that Diad, would also be colourless.

If on the other hand, the atom produces the Colour in the Diad, then in as much as nothing that has not itself been brought into existence could be the substratum of that produced Colour, this latter could be produced only after its substratum, the Diad, bad been produced; as no effect could ever be produced without a substratum. Under the circumstances, how could these be any identity between the two,—the two appearing one after the other? Then again, you hold that it is only while the jar is existing that its Colour is destroyed by the contact of fire, and that it is while the jar exists that the Colour is produced in it (by the contact of fire). And there can be no identity between two things, when the production of the one does not mean the production of the other, and the cessation of the one does not mean the cessation of another. Nor is it necessary that if the two were different there would be a chance of their being perceived apart from each other (which is not found to be the case). Because Colour is always found to subsist in a substance. And as for this, it is the nature of things, and hence there is no good urging any serious objections against it.