Text 56

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 56:

बुद्धिसुखदुःखेच्छाद्वेषप्रयत्नास्त्वन्तःकरणग्राह्याः ॥ ५६ ॥

buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnāstvantaḥkaraṇagrāhyāḥ || 56 ||

Text (56):—Intellect, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Aversion, Effort are perceptible by the Internal Organ.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Intellect &c., are cognised by the Mind alone. Some people bold that Intellect is an object of Inferential Knowledge and is not perceived by the Mind. But this is not right; as there would be no distinguishing mark—middle term—by which Intellect could be inferred. ‘All objects’ could not serve as that term; as in that case the premiss would be too wide. Nor could ‘cognised object’ serve as the term required. Because cognisedness consists in relationship with cognition; and this fact of being an objective of cognition is never found to be perceived until the cognition is known; as the perception of the relationship depends upon a knowledge of the members hearing that relationship. Hence how could an object qualifying or determining that (cognition) serve as the ‘mark’ or ‘middle term’? Specially as, like the cognition, the qualification of the cognition also, aids in bringing about the inferential cognition, only when it is itself known.

Objection: “After the cognition has been produced, there is produced iu the object a peculiar condition known as ‘cognisedness,’ just as the action of cooking produces, in the Rice, the condition of cookedness. And this cognisedness being a property of the object is known along with the object itself.”

Reply: There is not much in this theory; as such is not found to be the case in ordinary experience. That is to say, in the case of the Rice, we distinctly perceive its cookedness in its being changed from Taṇḍula (uncooked rice) to Odana (cooked rice); but in the case of the object in question we do not perceive any such cognisedness. As for the character of its having a directly perceptible form, and also its capability of being acquired or rejected,—these also consist in its relationship to cognition; and they are not distinct properties of some other properties (of that object). Then again, just as when the object is cognised, there is produced cognisedness in it, so in the same manner when this cognisedness is known, there would be a cognisedness produced in that cognisedness also; and so on we would go on ad infinitum. If cognisedness be regarded as self-luminous (in order to avoid this regressus ad infinitum)— then, we ask, why should you object to this self-luminosity (self cognisability) in the cognition itself?

“Though as a matter of fact, the object has an existence extending over all three periods of time, past, present and future, yet when it is cognised it is cognised as belonging to the present. And the condition of the object determined by the present time is what constitutes its cognisedness; and this being an effect of the cognition, serves as the ‘mark’ for an Influence of Cognition.”

But there is not much to recommend in this theory either. Because what the ‘condition of the object determined by the present time’ means is its condition qualified by that time; and this belongs to the object by its very nature; and by cognition, this condition is not produced, but only known.

One who holds that cognition is inferable from the knowledge that we have of objects, should be met by the following arguments: Does the ‘knowledge of objects’ inhere in the self, or in the object? It could not be regarded as inhering in the object, as it has been shewn that consciousness cannot belong to objects.

If it be regarded as inhering in the self, then what cognition is there besides this, which would be inferred from that knowledge?

It might be argued that what would be inferred from this ‘knowledge’ would be its cause, in the shape of the action of the cogniser. But we ask—Is this 'cause’ eternal, or transitory? If it be transitory, then we should have to find a cause for that also. It might be put forward that the cause of this would be the contact of the Mind and the cogniser, which aids in the contact of the Sense-organ with the object. But in that case we might have all this cantact as the cause of the ‘knowledge;’ and what would be the use of having an intermediate cause in the form of the ‘cogniser’s action’? If on the other hand, it be held, that, “‘the said action’ is eternal, and that the appearance of the knowledge of objects only at certain times (and not always) is due to the fact of the accessory causes, (in the shape of sense-contact &c), being operative only at certain times,”—then, the production of ‘knowledge’ being found to be duly brought about by means of these incidental agencies (of sense-contact &c), the postulating of that ‘action’ would be absolutely useless; specially as the cognition of the object, as also all subsequent usage based thereupon, could be accomplished by means of the said ‘knowledge’ itself.

Objection: “How could the cognition produced by the object, the sense-organ &c., be regarded as inhering in the Self alone, if the Self did not consist in natural consciousness coeval with itself? Specially as if the Self were unconscious, then its causal efficiency with regard to the cognition Not in any way differing from that of sense-contact &c., the cognition might be regarded as inhering in the Sense-organ &c.”

Reply: It is not so; because the required restriction would be the result of the peculiar nature of the things concerned. As for instance, even though the threads are not the cloth, yet on account of the restriction of the class ‘Thread,’ the cloth inheres i[??] them, and not in the shuttle (and other implements of Weaving); and so, in the same manner, though the Self consists in pure consciousness, yet on account of the restrictions accompanying the class ‘Self,’ it would be in this that the cognition would inhere.

This also meets the theory held by some that the cognition of itself constitutes the selfs ‘consciousness.’ As if it were so, then there would be a correct cognition of the Self even during the ordinary state of man. It might be argued that during the ordinary state the consciousness is hidden by Ignorance; but we ask—Is there Ignorance in Brahma also? How too, could that which is self-luminous and eternal could be spoken of as hidden? Then again when it would be hidden, then there would be no cognition of any thing else; because of the scriptural text—‘all this shines by the light of that (consciousness).’ If on the other hand, any other cognition does appear, then there would be universal liberation; as the appearance of Vidyā, Knowledge, would destroy all Avidyā, Ignorance. If it be held that Ignorance does not disappear, then, the light of knowledge not being the cause of the destruction of Ignorance, no liberation would be possible. Nor could we even think of the partial manifestation of that which is without parts.