Text 45: The Mind (Manas)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 45:

मनस्त्वयोगान्मनः | सत्यप्यात्मेन्द्रियार्थसान्निध्ये ज्ञानसुखादीनामभूत्वोत्पत्तिदर्शनात् करणान्तरमनुमीयते | श्रोत्राद्यव्यापारे स्मृत्युत्पत्तिदर्शनात् बाह्येन्द्रियैरगृहीतसुखादिग्राह्यान्तरभावाच्चान्तःकरणम् | तस्य गुणाः संख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागपरत्वापरत्वसंस्काराः | प्रयत्नज्ञानायौगपद्यवचनात् प्रतिशरीरमेकत्वं सिद्धम् | पृथक्त्वमप्यत एव | तदभाववचनादणुपरिमाणम् | अपसर्पणोपसर्पणवचनात् सम्योगविभागौ | मूर्तत्वात् परत्वापरत्वे संस्कारश्च | अस्पर्शवत्त्वाद्द्रव्यानारम्भकत्वम् | क्रियावत्त्वान्मूर्तत्वम् | साधारणविग्रहवत्त्वप्रसङ्गादज्ञत्वम् | करणभावात् परार्थम् | गुणवत्त्वाद्द्रव्यम् | प्रयत्नादृष्टपरिग्रहवशादाशुसञ्चारि चेति | इति प्रशस्तपादभाष्ये द्रव्यपदार्थः ॥ ४५ ॥

manastvayogānmanaḥ | satyapyātmendriyārthasānnidhye jñānasukhādīnāmabhūtvotpattidarśanāt karaṇāntaramanumīyate | śrotrādyavyāpāre smṛtyutpattidarśanāt bāhyendriyairagṛhītasukhādigrāhyāntarabhāvāccāntaḥkaraṇam | tasya guṇāḥ saṃkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvasaṃskārāḥ | prayatnajñānāyaugapadyavacanāt pratiśarīramekatvaṃ siddham | pṛthaktvamapyata eva | tadabhāvavacanādaṇuparimāṇam | apasarpaṇopasarpaṇavacanāt samyogavibhāgau | mūrtatvāt paratvāparatve saṃskāraśca | asparśavattvāddravyānārambhakatvam | kriyāvattvānmūrtatvam | sādhāraṇavigrahavattvaprasaṅgādajñatvam | karaṇabhāvāt parārtham | guṇavattvāddravyam | prayatnādṛṣṭaparigrahavaśādāśusañcāri ceti | iti praśastapādabhāṣye dravyapadārthaḥ || 45 ||

Text (45).—The Mind is so called, because of its belonging to the class ‘mind.’—(III-ii-1).

Even when there is a proximity of the object to the soul and the sense-organ, we find that Cognition, Pleasure do not appear, and from this we infer the necessity of an instrumentality other than the aforesaid proximity. Then again, we find that due remembrance appears even when there is no functioning of the organs of Hearing &c.; and that the objects of this means or instrument are pleasure &c. which are not cognisable by the external sense-organs: and from these two facts we infer the fact of that instrument being internal.—(III-ii-3. VII-i-23. V-ii-17).

The qualities of the mind are—Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority and Faculty.

The Sūtra asserts the nonsimultaneity of efort and knowledge; and this proves that there is one mind to each body. From this follows Separateness. The Sūtra speaking of the ‘absence’ in the mind, of that (Largeness) indicates its atomic dimension. The mention of moving to and moving away indicates the presence in it of Conjunction and Disjunction. Its corporeal or material character indicates Priority and Posteriority, as also Faculty.—(VII-ii-21).

The mention of the absence of Tangibility indicates its being unproductive of substances.

Having action it must be corporeal or material. It must he regarded as unconscious; as otherwise the whole body would be the common ground (of all experiences or sensations). Being an instrument it must be subservient to the purpose of something else.—(III-ii-22.)

Having qualities it must be regarded as a Substance. And it must move quickly, in as much as it includes within itself all effort and the unseen forces (of the soul’s) actions.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Having dealt with the Self or Soul, the most important of the Substances, the author next proceeds to describe the Mind: Manastvayogāt &c. This is to be explained as before. The generality ‘Mind’ is inferred from the diversity among individual minds. All individuals of similar properties and actions we find inclusible in a certain single Commonality or Class,—as in the case of such things as the jar and the like; and Minds are individuals having similar properties and actions; hence they are inclusible in a single Class.

Until the existence of the Mind has been proved, any description of its properties would be improper; hence the author puts forward proofs for its existence. ‘Satyapi &c.’. The Soul is at one and the same time, in contact with all the senseorgans; the sense-organs too have contacts with objects in proximity to themselves; and yet we find that while we cognise one of the various objects in contact with the various sense-organs, we have no cognition or pleasure &c., with regard to others; hence it follows that for such cognition &c., there is some means or instrumental cause other than the contact of the object, the sense-organs, and the soul;—the proximity of which other cause brings about the Cognition &c., which do not appear otherwise. The argument may be put forward thus: The contacts of the objects, the sense-organ and the Soul depend upon some other cause, in the bringing about of the due effect,—because even when the former contacts exist, the necessary effect does not appear,—as in the case of the threads &c. And this instrumentality upon which they depend is that of the Mind.

Objection: “What is your proof for holding that at the time that one thing is perceived, there is a contact, with the sense-organs, of another thing which is not perceived?”

Reply: Our proof is the distinctly perceived proximity (to the object) of the body wherein the organ inheres. That is to say, at the time that the Colour of an object is perceived, its smell also is in contact with the organ of smell,—because of its being in proximity to the body containing that organ,—like the smell that is perceived.

The author puts forward another argument—Śrotrādyavyāpāre that is to say, Remembrance is brought about by means of the sense-organs,—because it is a cognition,—like the cognition of smell; but it cannot be regarded as brought about by the organs of hearing and the like,—because we find it appearing in the deaf and blind also, in whose case there could be no operation of the organs of hearing or of vision; consequently the organ by means of which it is brought about cannot but be the Mind.

The author now proceeds to show that the inference of a distinct organ is not based upon the above argument alone; it is to be inferred also from the existence of such perceptible things as pleasure and the like, which are wholly different in character from Colour and other such perceptible things, and which cannot be perceived by means of the external organs of sense. This is what is meant by the sentence Vāhyendriyaiḥ. &c. The sense of this is as fallows: The perception of pleasure &c., must be regarded as brought about by sense-organs,—because it is direct perception,—like the perception of colour. And the sense-organ by which they are perceived cannot but be the Mind; as the organs of Vision &c. are not found to have any operation in these cases.

Objection: “Being, born of no senses apart from themselves, Pleasure &c., could not be regarded as having the nature of Cognition; and the Cognition of pleasure could not be apprehended by any other means (in the shape of the Mind).”

Reply: If Pleasure and Pain were both of the nature of cognition pure and simple, then there would be no difference between them. And if they were distinct from each other, then both could not have the nature of pure cognition. Though the form of ‘experience’, or ‘feeling’ is common to both of them, yet the 'forms of Pleasure and Pain are altogether distinct from each other. Nor can these two be regarded as produced by a means non-different from cognition; as cognition is produced from the form of the object perceived; and it is from this cognition, as helped by tendencies, that Pleasure and Paiu are produced. If it were not so, then there could never be any feeling of Indifference. Nor has it been established that cognition is self-cognisable; specially as we have no instances of one and the same thing (cognition e.g.) being both the objective and the instrument.

The case of the self-luminous lamp might be brought forward as an instance. But the lamp too, is cognised by the man, is made cognisable by the Eye; and Cognition only constitutes its action; and this itself could not be the Instrument, as well as the action, the agent as well as the objective.

Objection: “As, for the upholders of the Self (the Vedānti,) the Self, in its own cognition, is the agent as well as the objective at one and the same time,—so too could the various characters of the Instrument. &c. belong to cognitions also.”

Reply: Not so; because the diverse characters are not incompatible in the case of the Self; as the objectivity of the Self consists in its being the object of the action of cognition; and as in this action the Self is independent (of all other things), it has the character of the agent also; and certainly there is no incompatibility between objectivity and independence. On the other hand, the character of Instrument and that of Action are not compatible; in as much as the instrument is an accomplished thing while an action is something yet to be accomplished; specially as there could be no identity between the effect and the cause. Between the characters of the Agent and the Instrument also there can be no compatibility, as the character of the agent consists in not being urged or used by some thing else, while that of instrument consists in being employed by others,—and thus one is positive while the other negative; and as such the two are wholly incompatible with each other; and hence they could never coexist in any substratum.

Objection: “What we mean by the ‘self-cognisability’ of a cognition is, not that it has no means or instruments,—but that when it is produced, it is self-cognisable by its very nature.”

Reply: What is it that is illumined in the case of cognitions? Is it the object cognised, or the cognition itself? If the former, then, the cognisance would be that of the object, and not that of the cognition ‘itself;’ and hence there would be an uncognisability of the cognition. If the illumination consisted in the cognition itself, then the cognition itself would be the object as well as the action of illumination; and thus there would be an identification of the action and the instrument. Nor is there any instance to show that the appearance or production of the cognition constitutes its own operation with regard to itself.

In support of the self-cognisability of cognitions, the opponent has brought forward the following argument: “A thing that depends for its illumination or appearance upon something else, always appears or becomes illumined on the appearance of this latter; just as the jar which depends for its appearance upon the lamp, and as Colour &c., depend for their manifestation upon Cognition.”

But if the cognition itself constitutes the illumination or appearance of the object,—then the assertion that Colour &c., Lave their appearance dependent upon cognition would be asiddha (not established), and also Anaikānta, doubtful, in view of the Sense-organs (on which the manifestation of Colour &c., is found to depend). If it be held that the manifestation of the object is brought about by cognitions, and not that the cognitions them selves constitute the manifestation of objects,—then, there could be no coroborrative instance in support of this view; as what the lamp does is only to bring about the cognition of the object; and not a manifestation of it.

This also meets the declaration that “one who has no direct perception is never known to see an object." As the seeing of an object does not consist in the directness of the cognition; it consists only in the production of an Idea. And hence even though the cognition may not be cognised, yet as soon as it would be produced, the object would become duly cognised.

Question: “How could the production of one thing constitute the cognition of another?”

Answer: What can we do, when such is the actual nature of the things themselves? But this would not mean that the production of one thing would bring about the cognition of all things. Because the cognition of any thing is restricted by its auxiliary causes; because what is produced is the cognisance which has the character of the cognition of certain definite objects, and which is cognisable by definite persons.

Others (the Prabhākaras) propose the following explanation: The object having become manifested by its relationship with cognition,—the cognition having the nature of light, becomes self-luminous, like the lamp; and the soul also, being the substratum of the cognition becomes manifested, like the wick of the lamp light; and thus in all cases there is a threefold cognition (of the object, of the cognition and of the soul.)

But this is not correct; because as a matter of fact, we find that in the cognition, ‘this is a jar,’ there does not enter any idea of the cogniser or the cognition. In a case where the ideas of these do enter,—e.g. in the cognition ‘I know the jar’—there too we find that when the cognition has been produced, we have a direct mental cognition of the object as qualified by the cognition and the cogniser; and the ideas of the cogniser and the cognition do not enter into any visual cognition; as if they did, then these two also would be visible by the Eye.

Having proved the existence of the Mind, the author next proceeds to describe its qualities:—Tasya guṇāh. &c. That is to say the presence of the eight qualities of Number &c., constitutes a differentiating peculiarity of the Mind.

The author points out the existence of Number in the Mind. Prayatna &c., There arising a question as to whether there is one mind with each body, or there are many minds in each body, we declare that there is only one mind with each body, “because of the non-simultaneity of efforts and cognitions,” as put forward by the author of the Sūtra. If there were many minds, there would be a multiplicity of the contacts of the self and the mind; add as such we would find the same man having many cognitions and putting forth many efforts at one and the same time. As a matter of fact however we find these appearing only gradually, one after the other; and while the man is engaged in one cognition of one thing, he has no cognition of any other thing; and when he has ceased to cognise the former object, then he has a due cognition of the latter. Similarly efforts too are found to appear gradually, one after the other; as when a man is putting forth his effort in one direction, he does not put forth any in another direction; and when the former action has been finished, then he does put forth his efforts towards another action. For these reasons the Mind must be regarded as one only. And the mind being one only, there is only one contact of it at a time; and hence it follows that at one time, there is a single cognition, and a single effort.

In certain cases we have a notion of more than one cognition appearing at one and the same time; but that is due to the fact of the cognitions following each other very quickly (and hence having the intervals between themselves not perceptible); just as in the case of the whirling of a fire-brand, we have the idea of a circle of fire, though in reality it is a single flaming point revolving so swiftly as to give rise to that notion. And in such cases too there is no actual simultaneity; specially as from perceiving a gradual succession of effects of the instrument in one case, we infer the fact of other effects also of the same Instrument (Mind) to have the same capability (of appearing in a gradual succession).

Objection: “In that case, how would you explain this cognition ‘the trees are in flower,’ where we find a simultaneous cognition of two objects, the tree and the flowers? How too would you explain the simultaneous actions of moving and supporting one’s own body?”

Reply: In the case of the cognition in question, we have a single cognition comprising a number of objects; and this we do not deny; when however the cognitions are distinct (of the flower and the tree) then we have no cognition in the form put forward; as every one of the cognitions is restricted to a single object.

In the same manner, the moving and supporting of one’s body also are accomplished by a single Effort; just as we have a single cognition with regard to many objects,—so also would its causes, Desire and Effort, apply to more than one action; and hence there is nothing that cannot be explained in due accordance with our theory.

From this follows its Separateness—that is to say, the quality of Separateness follows from the presence of Number in the Mind.

Tadabhāvavacanāt &c. That is to say, the Sūtra declares the Ākāśa and the Self to be all-pervading and very large, and then adds ‘on account of the absence of these characters in the Mind, it is atomic in its nature. And hence it is proved that the Mind is atomic in its dimension; specially as an eternal substance, which is not all—pervading, could not but be atomic, (all intervening dimensions belonging to transient things) The absence of the all-pervading character in the Mind is inferred from the nonsimultaneity of Cognitions; as if the Mind were all-pervading, then it would be in contact with all the sense-organs, at one and the same time; and hence there would be simultaneous cognitions of Colour and Taste &c.,—everything that might happen to be in contact with the sense organs.

Objection: “How is it that in a case where many objects, each of which is cognisable by a single sense-organ, are in contact with the eye as controlled by the mind,—we have no simultaneous cognition of all these objects? for certainly in this case there is a simultaneous contact of the Self, the Sense-organ and the Object. It might be argued that from the very fact of there being no such simultaneity we would assume an incapability in the contact of the Mind and the Self to bring about more than one cognition, at one and the same time. But then, the same explanation might be given of the' nonsimultaneity of cognitions, even in the case of the Mind being regarded as all-pervading. In view of this, you must put forward some other reasons for denying the all-pervading character of the Mind.”

We put forward the following reasons: The Mind and the Self both being all-pervading, there would be no contact between the two (as the contact of two all-pervading things would produce a dimension that would be twice-all-pervading which would be an absurdity); and hence there would be no production of such properties of the Self as cognition, pleasure &c.; as these have the contact of the Self and the Mind for their immaterial cause; and this would be absent. If the contact of the Self and the Object were to be the immaterial cause of the production of these qualities, then the, cognition would appear in the locality where the Object exists; as all qualities existing in space are found to be produced in such a way as not to be separate from their immaterial cause. If the contact of the Self and the Sense-organ were the required immaterial cause, then there would be no pro Auction of the cognition of sound; as the Self (which is all-pervading) could have no contact with the organ of hearing, which is of the nature of Ākāśa (which again is all-pervading). As a matter of fact we find that neither the cognitions appear outside the body, nor is there a non-production of the cognitions of sound; and hence we cannot accept either the contact of the Self and the Object, or that of the Self and the Sense-organs, to be the immaterial cause (of Cognitions, and Pleasure &c.); and so we cannot but accept the contact of the Self and the mind to be that immaterial cause; and as this would not be possible if the Mind were all-pervading, there would be no appearance of Cognition etc., if the Mind were so. As a matter of fact however, we do find Cognitions and Pleasure &c. appearing; and this fact precludes all possibility of the Mind being all-pervading.

Apasarpaṇa &c. That is to say, the Sūtra ‘Apasarpaṇa &c.’ distinctly indicates the fact of the Mind moving away from one (the dead) body and into another body (that the soul takes), through the agency of the unseen potency of the soul’s actions; and those motions indicate the presence in the Mind, of the qualities of Conjunction and Disjunction.

Mūrtatvāt &c. That is to say, the absence of all-pervading character in the Mind proves its corporeality (or materiality); and from this it follows that like the jar, the Mind has Priority, Posteriority and Speed.

Asparśavattvāt &c.—The absence of touch in the Mind is proved from the fact of its being, like the Self, something different from the Body, and yet being productive of the cognitions of all things. And from this it also follows that like the Self, the Mind is not productive of any other homogeneous substances.

Kriyavattvāt &c.—Though the materiality of the Mind has been already proved by showing that it is atomic, yet the author has added this in order to make it still clearer.

Sādhāraṇavigraha &c.—If the Mind were the cogniser, then, the Body would become a common ground of experiences (of all kinds of sensation; or of the Mind and the Self the two being two Distinct cognisers.) As a matter of fact however we do not find this to be the case, in as much as the activity or inactivity of the body is found to follow the purposes of a single agent (or the motive of a single sensation.) Hence the Mind cannot be regarded as conscious. Though the fact of the Mind being conscious has already been denied, yet the author has put it forward again, as opportunity presented itself for its reiteration.

The unconsciousness of the Mind having been proved, the author adds: Karaṇabhāvāt &c.—That is to say, it is the means of bringing about the experiences of something other than itself.

Being endowed with qualities the Mind is a substance, like the Earth &c. And on account of its containing within itself efforts and unseen forces (of actions), the Mind must be regarded as quick in motion. That is to say, being taken up by efforts, that precede living, and also by attachment and aversion, we must admit that the mind quickly moves from one place to another; and seeing that it contains the unseen potencies (of actions) we must regard it as quickly moving from one body to another, at death.

May this Ocean of Substances be duly studied,—the Ocean which is the receptacle of pearls in the shape of pure and various reasonings, and which is full of clear conclusions in the place of corals.