Padarthadharmasamgraha and Nyayakandali

by Ganganatha Jha | 1915 | 250,428 words

The English translation of the Padarthadharmasamgraha of Prashastapada including the commentary called the Nyayakandali of Shridhara. Although the Padartha-dharma-sangraha is officially a commentary (bhashya) on the Vaisheshika-Sutra by Kanada, it is presented as an independent work on Vaisesika philosophy: It reorders and combines the original Sut...

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 37:

अप्त्वाभिसम्बन्धादापः । रूपरसस्पर्शद्रवत्वस्नेहसङ्ख्यापरिमाणपृथक्त्वसम्योगविभागपरत्वापरत्वगुरुत्वसंस्कारवत्यः । पूर्ववदेषां सिद्धिः । शुक्लमधुरशीता एव रूपरसस्पर्शाः । स्नेहोऽम्भस्येव सांसिद्धिकं च द्रवत्वम् । ताश्च पूर्ववद्द्विविधाः । नित्यानित्यभावात् । तासां तु कार्यं त्रिविधम् । शरीरेन्द्रियविषयसंज्ञकम् । तत्र शरीरमयोनिजमेव वरुणलोके पार्थिवावयवोपष्टम्भाच्चोपभोगसमर्थम् । इन्द्रियं सर्वप्राणिनां रसव्यंजकं विजात्यनभिभूतैर्जलावयवैरारब्धं रसनम् । विषयस्तु सरित्समुद्रहिमकरकादिः ॥ ३६ ॥

aptvābhisambandhādāpaḥ | rūparasasparśadravatvasnehasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasamyogavibhāgaparatvāparatvagurutvasaṃskāravatyaḥ | pūrvavadeṣāṃ siddhiḥ | śuklamadhuraśītā eva rūparasasparśāḥ | sneho'mbhasyeva sāṃsiddhikaṃ ca dravatvam | tāśca pūrvavaddvividhāḥ | nityānityabhāvāt | tāsāṃ tu kāryaṃ trividham | śarīrendriyaviṣayasaṃjñakam | tatra śarīramayonijameva varuṇaloke pārthivāvayavopaṣṭambhāccopabhogasamartham | indriyaṃ sarvaprāṇināṃ rasavyaṃjakaṃ vijātyanabhibhūtairjalāvayavairārabdhaṃ rasanam | viṣayastu saritsamudrahimakarakādiḥ || 37 ||

Text (37):—Water is that which is comprised in the class ‘water’. It has the following qualities: Colour, Taste. Touch, Fluidity, Viscidity, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Distance, Proximity, Gravity and Faculty. These also are indicated by the sūtra in the same way as the qualities of Earth.

The colour of water is white; its taste is sweet; its touch is cool. Viscidity belongs to the water alone; as also does natural Fluidity.—(II-i-2; IV-i-11; II-ii-5; V-i-17; V-ii-3 to 6; V-ii-8, 11.)

Like Earth, Water also is of two kinds—eternal and noneternal. Its products are threefold, in the shape of the Body, the Sense-organ and the Object. The Body (of water) is one that is not born of the womb; and is known to exist only in the regions of Varuṇa. These aqueous bodies however are made capable of experiencing pleasure, pain &c., by the admixture of Earth-molecules. The aqueous sense-organ is the organ of Taste, which serves to make Taste perceptible by all living beings, and is made up of aqueous atoms only, without any part of the molecules of other substances. The aqueous Object exists in the shape of Rivers, Oceans, the Moon, Hails and the like.—(IV-i-1 to 5; IV-ii-1, 6 to 11; VII-i-20, 21; VIII-ii-6; V-ii-8; IV-ii-1.)

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

The author now proceeds to define Water. Here also the purpose of the definition lies in the fulfilment of the purposes to be served by the word, or in the differentiation of the thing defined from all other things, like and unlike.

The following objection might here be urged:

“A person could explain a thing for another person by means of a definition, only when be himself knows the distinguishing features of the thing; as one who does not know a thing himself could not explain it to another. The difference of one object from, another however lies in their mutual negation; and this negation could be cognised only when both members of the “negation have been cognised; otherwise we could have no “such negation as ‘the cow is not a horse’, where the character of one thing (the horse) is denied of another thing (the cow). Now then, we ask—Is this mutual negation cognised by a mixed cognition of both these things, or by a cognition of each of these as distinct? In the former case, we could have no such notion as ‘this is not that;’ and in the latter case, the said notion of negation would involve a mutual interdependence; as the cognition of negation would be due to the cognition of each as distinct from the other, and the cognition of each as distinct from the other would be due to a perception of their mutual negation as negation is the same as distinction.”

To the above we make the following reply:—As a matter of fact, there is a mutual negation between two things that are distinct from each other, and distinction is not the same as mutual negation; as the distinction of a thing consists in its own specific form; and certainly a cognition of this latter does not depend upon the perception of any other thing,—proceeding, as it does, from direct sense-contact; and this specific form of each object is cognised as distinct by itself. For instance, when a man is in search of the cow, he does not proceed to take the horse if he happens to see it; nor does he recall to bis mind (necessarily) the word ‘cow’; consequently there would be nothing incompatible in the cognition of the mutual negation between the cow and the horse, as brought about by a due recognition of the distinctive features of the cow and the horse, each independently by itself. Nor could it be urged that in that case, we may totally deny mutual negation, and admit only of the difference in the distinctive features of each thing. Because we do have a distinct cognition of mutual negation, in the negative form, (while the cognition of the distinctive features of each thing is always in the positive form).

It is not aqueousness alone that constitutes the distinctive feature of Water, and the author proceeds to show that it is distinguished by the presence of fourteen qualities accompanied by fluidity. The compound ‘rūparasa’, etc. must be first explained as a Dvandva, and then the Possessive affix added. The mention of these in the sūtra is to be shown in the same way as in the case of the qualities of Earth. We have the Sūtra—“Rūparasasparśavatya āpaḥ, dravāḥ, snigdhaśca.” As for number etc. belonging to Water, this is to be found in the same sūtra that has been shown to apply to the case of Earth.

In as much as on the occasion of pointing out the distinctive features of each substance, it would not be proper to mention colour &c. in these general terms,—these being common to the earth &c. also,—the author points out the particular forma of these qualities that belong specifically to Water. The colour of Water is white, its taste is sweet, and its touch is cool. As for the appearance of other colours in water, it must be regarded as due to the colour of the receptacle of the water: because when the water is thrown upwards, it is always perceived to be of a distinctly white colour.

Objection: “Water cannot be regarded to have the sweet taste, as it is never found to be sweet in the same way as sugar &c. are.”

Reply: Not so; Water is found to have a taste quite different from any of the other five tastes—the Acrid, Astringent, Bitter, Saltish and Acid; and as for the sweetness not being perceived as in sugar &c. that must be regarded as being due to the absence of any excessive degree of sweetness.

By the declaration—“Viscidity belongs to Water alone”—is meant that unqualified Viscidity is found in Water only. It might be argued that Viscidity is found in earthy substances also, such as in milk, oil and butter. But as a matter of fact we find that no Viscidity is present in such purely earthy substances as stones, bricks, dry fuel &c; and hence the Viscidity that is found in a few Earthy Substances like oil, butter &c. must be regarded as belonging to the Water with which the earth particles are mixed up; just as is the case of the natural fluidity that we meet with in milk and oil. The fact of Viscidity being a quality of Water is proved by the one being always found with, and never without, the other. It is for this reason that we find a certain degree of smoothness in the trees and shrubs growing in the vicinity of human habitations, and dryness and roughness in those growing in the forest,—this being due to the fact of the former having their roots always watered with the water thrown about by the people, while the latter have no such supply of water.

Natural Fluidity also belongs to Water alone; that is to say, it is not Viscidity alone, but natural Fluidity also, that belongs specifically to Water only. As for milk and oil, their Fluidity must be regarded as due to the proximity of their substrate (i.e. the water in which they are contained); because under certain circumstances they, are found in the solid form.

Like the Earth, Water also exists in a twofold form the eternal and the non-eternal; that in the shape of atoms being eternal, and that in the shape of the various products being noneternal.

The products are of three kinds. The explanation of this is as in the case of Earth-products; that is to say, as in the case of Earth we have products in the shape of the Body, the Organ and the Object, so we have in the case of Water also.

The aqueous body is never born of the womb—of earthy bodies some are born of the womb and some are not so born; while the aqueous body is always such as is never born of the womb.

Question: “An earthy body we find in the case of man,—this being regarded as earthly because endowed with the quality of smell; where do we find the Aqueous body?”

Answer: In the regions of Varuna. The existence of this body is to be believed in on the strength of scriptural texts pointing to the existence of such bodies.

Question: “In as much as Water has the character of a single substance, the Aqueous body would always be in the form of the Bubble &c.; and as much how could such a body be capable of bringing about the ordinary experiences.?”

Answer: The aqueous body is capable of bringing about experiences, by reason of its containing particles of earth also. In the production of the aqueous body the particles of Earth serve as the instrumental causes; and the natural fluidity of water having been controlled by these earth-particles, there is brought into existence a peculiar body, not in the shape of mere watery bubbles &c.

Some people define the Body as something that is made up of the five elementary substances (lit. having these for its material cause). But if it were so, then, firstly the body could not have any odour; because such odour could only be produced by the odour in one of its material causes, which is not possible. Secondly the body would have a variegated colour and touch; in as much as its five constituent causes would have distinct colours and touches; and as a matter of fact we do not find this to be the case; hence the Body can not be rightly regarded as made up of the five elementary substances. For similar reasons it can not be regarded as made up of Earth and Water; nor could it be held to be made up of Earth, Water and Air; and if it were made up of Earth, Air and Ākāśa, then it would be wholly devoid of colour, taste and odour (as the Ākāśa is devoid of these); if it were made up of Fire, Water and Ākāśa, then it would be without Odour and Taste; and so forth. Thirdly, if the body had the five elementary substances for its material cause, then it could not be one only; as a diversity of causes must bring about diversity in the effect. Therefore we must admit that the human body is made up of earth,—because it has odour—like the Earth in the atomic state. As for the presence of the properties of Water and other substances that we meet with in the Earth, they must be regarded as belonging to the Water &c. mixed up with the Body.

The Sense-organ is that which renders Taste perceptible to all living beings. That is to say, that sense-organ which makes Taste perceptible for all living beings is one that is made up of Water-molecules. In order to account for the fact of that organ alone, and no other aqueous object, making Taste perceptible, the author adds: The water molecules of which the sense-organ is made up is not affected (or accompanied) by any heterogenous molecules, such as those of the Earth and other substances. That is to say, these latter do not in any way weaken the effeciency of the aqueous molecules making up the organ in question. This is the reason why this organ is wholly distinct in character from all other substances; and thus having its production of a character distinct from everything else, it is this organ alone that brings about a perception of Taste, which can not be done by any thing else; as nothing else is produced in the same way as the organ under consideration. All this is [ass??ed][assured?] on the ground of our actual experience, which shows that taste is perceived by the organ of Taste, and by nothing else.

The existence of the organ of Taste is proved by the perception that we have of Taste; as every action must be brought about by some instrumental cause. And the fact of this organ being aqueous in its nature is inferred from the fact of its bringing about the perception of Taste only, from among colour and the rest,—like the saliva which is evaporised in the mouth.

The aqueous objects are—the Rivers, the Oceans, Snow, Hail and other such things,—which are enjoyed, and as such become the means of the accomplishment of the experience of the agent.

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