Text 16

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 16:

द्रव्यादीनाम् त्रयाणामपि सत्तासम्बन्धः सामान्यविशेषवत्त्वं स्वसमयार्थशब्दाभिधेयत्वं धर्माधर्मकर्तृत्वं च ॥ १६ ॥

kāryatvānityatve kāraṇavatāmeva || 16 ||

Text (16):—The. character of being an effect and that of being non-eternal, belong only to those (Substances, Qualities and Actions) that have causes.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Those things that have a productive cause,—such for instance as Substance and the rest—have the common character of being an effect and being non-eternal.

Some people have defined ‘being an effect’ as inherence in the cause or inherence in ‘Being’ prior to non-existence. But none to these is correct; as of none of these would apply to ‘Destruction’ which is as good an effect as anything else. Hence we must define the character of effect as consisting in the fact of its having its existence (manifestation or appearance) dependent upon the action of a cause: as this is the definition that is found to apply to all effects.

‘Non-eternality’ has been defined by some as existence qualified by previous non-existence and subsequent destruction. Rut this is not correct; for the simple reason that ‘non-eternality’ is never known in this form; in ordinary parlance what people understand by ‘non-eternal’ is destructible; and they do not understand it as qualified by any sort of existence.

Others again define it as liability to production and destruction. But there is not much in this definition either, as Prāgdb-hāva (Previous non-existence, which is non-eternal) is never produced.

For these reasons we must accept non-eternality to consist of the destruction of the particular form, of the thing; as has been declared elsewhere—“Non-eternality is said to be the action of destruction in general.” Though there is no destruction at the time that the thing is actually existing, yet (there could be nothing objectionable in having destruction as its qualification, as) we do admit of destruction as the qualification of a thing, when its possibility is proved by other means of knowledge than direct perception (even though it may be not actually perceptible at the time). And as a matter of fact we do find one and the same man cognising the jar (an entity) as non-eternal; similarly also, such notions as—‘the destructible body,' ‘the un-permanent objects’—are very common. [ In all these cases the object itself is what is directly perceived, the qualification being always recognised by other means of knowledge.)