Brahma-Sūtra 1.1.19

English of translation of Brahmasutra 1.1.19 by Roma Bose:

“And on account of desire (through which simply the Lord is able to realize his purposes), there is no dependence (of the Lord) on (what is an object of) inference (viz. pradhāna).”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

If the individual soul be admitted to be the cause, it must depend on a material cause, viz. on pradhāna which is an (object of) “inference”, just as a potter has to depend on clay and the rest in creating pots and the like. But the Highest Person, non-material, consisting of bliss and omnipotent, has to depend on nothing. Why? “On account of desire”, i.e. on account of intention, as declared by the scriptural text:—‘He desired: “May I be many”’ (Taittirīya-upaniṣad 2.6).^[1] Hence that which consists of bliss is different from that (viz. the individual soul).

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

To the objection, viz. Pradhāna may very well be denoted by the term ‘consisting of bliss’, as it contains the quality of sattva which is the cause of bliss, and as it corresponds to the effect^[2],—we reply:—

The term ‘consisting of bliss’ contains no “reference” to “inference”, i.e. to that which is inferred, viz. pradhāna. Why? “On account of desire”, i.e. because the text, which refers to that which consists of bliss, viz. ‘He desired: “May I be many’” (Taittirīya-upaniṣad 2.6), mentions one who desires. The sense is that desire means volition, and that is not possible on the part of the non-sentient pradhāna, but is possible on the part of the omniscient Lord of all. Although pradhāna has already been set aside by the aphorism ‘Because (the creator) sees, not, non-scriptural’ (Brahma-sūtra 1.1.5), it is once more set aside here with a view to confirming the ‘universality of knowing’^[3] and hence there is no fault of repetition.

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the sūtra:)—if the individual soul be denoted by the term ‘consisting of bliss’, the topic of the present discussion, it must be the cause of the world as well; and in that case, just as potters have to depend on clay and the rest for creating pots, etc. so the individual soul too must depend on pradhāna, which is a synonym for ‘inference’.^[4] But if the omnipotent Brahman be the cause of the world, no such fault arises,—this is the sense.

Śaṅkara and Bhāskara:

This is sūtra 18 in their commentaries. Reading same, interpretation different, viz. ‘And on account of desiring, there is no reference to (what is an object of) inference (viz. pradhāna) (in the term “ānanda-maya”)’. That is, Scripture predicates willing on the part of the ānanda-maya, and willing is possible on the part of a conscious being alone.^[5]

Comparative views of Śrīkaṇṭha:

Reading same, interpretation different—viz. ‘And, (even) on account of desire, (i.e. in spite of the fact that Hiraṇyagarbha is said to have desired to create the world,) (his being the creator) is not dependent on reasoning (i.e. does not stand to reason,) (because it is the Lord Himself who created the world in the character of Hiraṇyagarbha)’.^[6]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Ś, R, Bh, Quoted by Baladeva.

[2]:

That is, pradhāna, the non-sentient cause, is similar to the effect, the non-sentient world. Vide Vedānta-kaustubha 1.1.5.

 

[3]:

Vide Brahma-sūtra 1.1.11, where it has been said that Brahman is universally known from all texts to be the cause of the world.

[4]:

That is, pradhāna has been called ‘inference’ (anumāna) in the sūtra, because it is an object of inference.

[5]:

Brahma-sūtras (Śaṅkara’s commentary) 1.1.18, p. 222; Brahma-sūtras (Bhāskara’s Commentary) 1.1.18, p. 26. Note that this is adopted as an alternative explanation of the sūtra by Śrīnivāsa, but not by Nimbārka. See above.

[6]:

Brahma-sūtras (Śrīkaṇṭha’s commentary) 1.1.19 (pp. 240-241, Part 3).