Chapter 7 - The Kapila Sāṃkhya Philosophy

[Full title: The Kapila Sāṃkhya Philorophy or the Consideration of the Mutable and the Immutable (kapila-sāṃkhya-śāstra or kṣārakṣara-vicāra)]

prakṛtiṃ puruṣaṃ caiva viddhy anādi ubhāv api |
  — Gītā (13.20).

"Know that both the prakṛti (Matter) and the puruṣa (Spirit) are eternal".

I have stated in the last chapter, that simultaneously with the consideration of the Body and the Lord or Superintendent of the Body–the kṣetra and the kṣetrajña one must also consider the visible world and the fundamental principle in it–the 'kṣara' (mutable) and the 'akṣara' (immutable)–and then go on to the determination of the nature of the Ātman. There are three systems of thought which scientifically consider the mutable and the immutable world. The first of these is the Nyāya school and the second one is the Kapila Sāṃkhya school. But the Vedānta philosophy has expounded the form of the Brahman in a third way altogether, after proving that the propositions laid down by both of those systems of thought are incomplete. Therefore, before considering the arguments advanced in the Vedānta philosophy, it is necessary for us to see what the ideas of the Nyāya school and of the Sāṃkhya school are. In the Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyaṇācārya, the same method has been adopted, and the opinions of the Nyāya school and of the Sāṃkhya school have been refuted in the second chapter. Although the whole of this subject-matter cannot be given here, yet, I have in this and the next chapter given as much information about it as is necessary for understanding the mystic import of the Bhagavadgītā. The propositions laid down by the Sāṃkhya school are of greater importance than those laid down by the Nyāya school. Because, as Bādarāyaṇācārya has said (Vedānta-Sūtras 2.1.12 and 2.2.17), though no respectable and leading Vedānta philosopher has accepted as correct the Nyāya doctrines laid down by the followers of Kaṇāda, yet, as many of the propositions of the Kapila Sāṃkhya-śāstra are to be found in the Smṛti writings of Manu and others and also in the Gītā, my readers must first become acquainted with them. Nevertheless, it must be stated right in the beginning that though many ideas of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are to be found in the Vedānta philosophy, yet the readers must not forget that the ultimate doctrines laid down by the Sāṃkhya school and the Vedānta school are extremely different from each other. There has also been raised an important question, namely, whether the Vedāntists or the Sāṃkhya philosophers are the originators of those ideas which are common to the Vedānta and the Sāṃkhya philosophy. But it is not possible to go so deep into that subject-matter in this book. Possibly, the Upaniṣads (Vedānta) and the Sāṃkhya philosophy grew up side by side like two children, and the doctrines found in. the Upaniṣads, which are similar to the Sāṃkhya doctrines, may have been independently arrived at by the writers of the Upaniṣads; or on the other hand, the writers of the Upaniṣads may have borrowed some of these doctrines from the Sāṃkhya philosophy; or thirdly, Kapilācārya may have improved upon the doctrines laid down by the ancient Upaniṣads according to his own opinions, and formulated the Sāṃkhya philosophy. All these three positions are possible. But taking into account the fact that though the Upaniṣads. and the Sāṃkhya philosophy are both ancient, the Upaniṣads are the more ancient (Śrauta) of the two, the last supposition seems to be the most credible of the three. Whatever may be the truth, when one has once become acquainted with the doctrines laid down by the Nyāya and the Sāṃkhya schools of philosophy, it becomes easier to grasp the principles of Vedānta, especially of the Vedānta in the Gītā. Therefore, let us first consider what the opinions of these two Smārta śāstras about the formation of the universe are.

Some persons have a wrong idea that the only object of Nyāya (i.e., Logic) is to decide what conclusions can subsequently be- drawn by inference from some desired or given data and which of these inferences are correct, and which wrong, and why.

Proving by means of inference etc. is a part of Logic. But that is not the most important part; classifying or enumerating the various things in the world, that is to say, the subject- matter of proof (apart from the question of proving them), finding out what are the fundamental classes or things under which all the substances in the world can be classified, as a result of the gradual evolution of things in the lower orders into things in the higher orders, finding out what their nature and qualities are, and how other things came into existence out of these things, and how all these things can be proved, and all such other questions are included in Logic. Nay, one may go further and say that this science has come into existence only for this purpose, and not merely for considering the question of inference. It is in this way that the Nyāya-sūtras of Kaṇāda are begun and worked out. The followers of Kaṇāda are known as Kaṇādas. In their opinion the root cause of the world is Atoms.

The definition of atoms given by Kaṇāda and the one given by Western natural scientists is the fame. When after dividing and sub-dividing things you come to the stage when division is no more possible, you have reached the atom or 'paramāṇu' (parama + aṇu), that is, the ultimate entity. As these atoms coalesce, they acquire new qualities as a result of the union, and new things are created. There are also atoms of the Mind and of the Body, and when these unite, life results. The atoms of the earth, water, fire and air are fundamentally different from each other. The fundamental atoms of the earth, have four qualities, namely, form, taste, smell, and touch; those of water have three such qualities, those of fire, two, and those of air, only one. In this way the entire cosmos is from the very beginning filled with permanent and subtle atoms. There is no other root cause of the world except the atoms. The commencement (ārambha) of the mutual coalition or union of the original and permanent atoms results in all the perceptible things in the world coming into existence. This theory propounded by the Nyāya school regarding the creation of the perceptible universe is technically known as 'ārambha-vāda' (Theory of Commencement), and some followers of that school never go beyond this. There is a story about one of them, that when those who were around him at the moment of his death, asked him to take the name of God, he uttered the words: "pīlavaḥ! pīlavaḥ! pīlavaḥ!"–"atoms! atoms! Atoms!". Nevertheless, other followers of the Nyāya school believe that Īśvara is responsible for bringing about the fusion or union of atoms and they in that way complete the chain of the creation of the universe; and these are known as theistic Logicians. In the second subdivision of the second chapter of the Vedānta Sūtras (2.2.11–17), this Atomic theory, and immediately thereafter, also the theory that the Īśvara is merely the immediate cause (2.2.37–39) has been refuted.

Reading what is stated above regarding this Atomic theory, those of my readers who have studied English will at once think of the Atomic theory advanced by the modem chemist Dalton. But in the Western countries, the Atomic theory of Dalton has now been put into shade by the' Evolution theory of the well-known biologist Darwin. In the same way, in India in ancient times, the Sāṃkhya philosophy has put into the background the theories of Kaṇāda. Not only can the Kaṇāda school not explain satisfactorily how Activity was first imparted to atoms, but their theories cannot also- explain how the rising gradation of living things like trees, animals, and men came into existence, nor also how that which was lifeless became living, and several other things. This explanation was given in the 19th Century in the Western countries by Lamarque and Darwin, and in our country in ancient times by Kapila. The summary of the opinions of both these- schools is that the Cosmos or universe came to be created by the bursting forth of the constituents of one original substance; and on this account, the Atomic theory lost ground in India in ancient times, and now in the Western countries. Similarly, modern physicists have now also proved that the atom is not indivisible. It was not possible in ancient times to prove the Atomic theory or the Evolution theory by analysing and examining various material objects in the world by means of physics and other natural sciences. Experimenting again and again on the various objects in the world, or determining their qualities by analysing them in various ways, or making a comparison between the organs of the bodies of numerous present and former living things in the living world, and such other present day devices of the natural sciences were not available to Kaṇāda or to Kapila. They have deduced their propositions from whatever material was before their eyes at the time. Still it is a matter of great surprise that the philosophical propositions laid down by the Sāṃkhya philosophers as to how the growth or formation of the universe must have come about are not much different from the scientific propositions laid down by modern natural scientists. As the knowledge of biology has grown, the material proof of these opinions can now be given more logically, and by the growth of know- ledge of the natural sciences, human beings have undoubtedly benefited to a considerable extent from the Material point of view. But in order to impress on the minds of my readers that the modern natural scientists cannot tell us much more than Kapila as to how diverse perceptible created things came into existence out of one imperceptible prakṛti (Matter), I have in various places later on referred shortly to the propositions laid down by Haeckel for comparison side by side with the propositions of the Kapila Sāṃkhya school. These propositions were not for the first time promulgated by Haeckel, and he has himself clearly admitted in his works that he was expounding his propositions on the authority of the works of Darwin, Spencer, and other previous natural scientists. Yet Haeckel has for the first time described succinctly and in an easily intelligible way all these various propositions, after properly co-ordinating them, in his book known as The Riddle of the Universe; and I have therefore, for the sake of convenience, taken Haeckel as the protagonist of all these natural scientists, and referred principally to his opinions in this and the next Chapter. I need not say that this reference is only brief, because it is not possible to consider those propositions in this book in greater detail, and those who want further information about them must refer to the original works of Spencer, Darwin, Haeckel and other scholars.

Before considering the Kapila Sāṃkhya philosophy, it must be mentioned that the word 'Sāṃkhya' is used in two different meanings. The first meaning is the Sāṃkhya philosophy expounded by Kapilācārya, and that meaning has been adopted in this Chapter and in one place in the Bhagavad- Gītā (Bhagavadgītā 18.13). But besides this specific meaning, it is usual to include philosophy of every kind in the general name 'Sāṃkhya', and it also includes the Vedānta philosophy In the phrase 'Sāṃkhya-niṣṭhā' or 'Sāṃkhya-yoga' this ordinary meaning of the word ' Sāṃkhya ' is intended; and wherever the scients who follow this niṣṭhā (doctrine) have been referred to as 'Sāṃkhya' in the Bhagavadgītā later on (Bhagavadgītā 2.39; 3.3; 4.5; and 13.34), not only the followers of the Kapila Sāṃkhya school, but also the Vedāntists who have abandoned all Actions by ātmānātma-vicāra (by considering what does and what does not pertain to the Self); and who are.lost in the contemplation of the Brahman, are intended. As the word ' Sāṃkhya ' comes from the root 'Saṃ-khyā' (calculation), its primary meaning is 'one who counts'; and etymologists say that, as the fundamental elements according to the Kapila philosophy are just twenty-five, the followers of that philosophy originally got the specific name of 'Sāṃkhya' (in the sense of " counters "), and later on the word 'Sāṃkhya' acquired the comprehensive meaning of philosophy of every kind. I, therefore, think that after the practice of referring to

Kapila ascetics as 'Sāṃkhya' had first come into vogue, Vedānta ascetics also later on came to be known by that name. Whatever may be the case, in order that confusion should not arise as a result of this double meaning of the word 'Sāṃkhya', I have used the elongated heading of 'Kapila Sāṃkhya-Śāstra' for this chapter. There are sūtras (Aphorisms) in the Kapila Sāṃkhya-Śāstra just as in the Kaṇāda Nyāya philosophy. But as neither Gaudapāda nor Śrī Śaṃkarācārya, who wrote the Śārīra-bhāṣya, have taken these sūtras as authorities in their works, many scholars are of opinion that they could not be ancient. The Sāṃkhya-Kārikā written by Īśvarakṛṣṇa is considered to be older than them. Gaudapāda, the chief preceptor of Śaṃkarācārya, has written a bhāṣya (Commentary) on that work and even in the Śāṃkarabhāṣya itself, extracts have been taken from these Kārikās, and the translation of that work into the Chinese language made before 570 A. D. is now available.^[1] Īśvarakṛṣṇa has stated at the end of these Kārikās, that he has in his work given a summary in seventy couplets in the āryā metre of a previous extensive- book of sixty chapters called Ṣaṣṭi-Tantra (omitting some chapters). The work Ṣaṣṭi-Tantra is now not available, and I have, therefore, considered the fundamental propositions of the Kapila Sāṃkhya-Śāstra on the authority of these Kārikās. In the Mahābhārata, the Sāṃkhya doctrines have been mentioned in many chapters. But as in that work, the Vedānta doctrines have been always mixed up with the Sāṃkhya doctrines, it becomes necessary to consider other treatises in order to decide what the pure Sāṃkhya philosophy was; and for that purpose, no work older than the Sāṃkhya-Kārikās is at present available. The pre-eminent worth of Kapila becomes clear from the following words of the Blessed Lord in the Gītā: "siddhānāṃ Kapilo muniḥ" (Bhagavadgītā 10.26), that is, "from among the Siddhas, I am the Kapila muni". Nevertheless, it is not known where and when Kapila Ṛṣi lived. There is a statement in the Śāntiparva of the Mahābhārata that Sanatkumāra, Sanaka, Sanandana, Sanatsujāta, Sana, Sanātana and Kapila were the seven Mind-born sons of Brahmadeva, and that they were born with Knowledge (340.67); and in another place (Śān. 218), we find the Sāṃkhya philosophy explained to Janaka by Āsuri, the disciple of Kapila, and Pañcaśikha, the disciple of Āsuri. Again in the Śānti-parva (301.108, 109) Bhīṣma also says, that the science which was once propounded by Sāṃkhya about the formation of the universe is everywhere to be found " in the Purāṇas, in history and in books on political economy and other places". Nay, it may even be said that: "jñānaṃ ca lake yad ihāsti kiṃcit Sāṃkhyāgataṃ tac ca mahan mahātman", that is, "all the knowledge in this, world originates in the Sāṃkhya philosophy" (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 301. 109). When one considers in what way the Evolution theory is being everywhere taxed into commission by the Western writers, one should not be surprised if every one of our writers has to some extent or other drawn upon our ancient Sāṃkhya philosophy, which is a match for the Evolution theory. Stupendous ideas like the theory of gravity of the earth, or the utkrānti-tattva^[2] (Evolution theory) in the science of the creation, or the theory of the unity of Brahman and the Ātman, come into the mind of some superman once in a way in thousands of years. Therefore, the practice of expounding one's own arguments, on the authority of any universal doctrine or comprehensive theory accepted at the time, is seen followed in books in all countries.

This introduction has become necessary because the study of the Kapila Sāṃkhya philosophy is now out of date. Let us now consider what the principal propositions of the Kapila Sāṃkhya philosophy are. The first proposition of the–Sāṃkhya philosophy is that nothing new comes into existence in this world; because, only śunya (nothing) and nothing else can be produced by śunya (that is, which did not exist before). Therefore, it must always be taken for granted that all the qualities which are to be seen in the created products (kārya) must be found at least in a subtle form in the kāraṇa from which the products were created (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 9). According to the opinions of Buddhists and of Kaṇāda, one thing is destroyed and out of it another thing comes into existence; for instance, the seed is destroyed, and from that the sprout comes into existence, the sprout is destroyed, and from that the tree comes into existence, and so on. But the Sāṃkhya and the Vedānta philosophers do not accept this proposition. They maintain that those elements which existed in the seed of the tree are not destroyed, but they have absorbed other elements into themselves from the earth and from the air, and thereby the new form or state of a sprout is taken up by the seed (Śāṃkarabhāṣya 2.1.18). Similarly, even if wood is burnt, it is only transformed into smoke, ashes etc., and not that the elements in the wood are totally destroyed and a new thing in the form of smoke comes into existence. It is stated in the Chāndogyopaniṣad that: "katham asataḥ saj jāyeta?", i.e., "how can something which exists come out of something which never existed?" (Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.2.2). The fundamental, Cause of the universe is sometimes referred to as 'asat' in the Upaniṣads (Chāndogyopaniṣad 3.19.1; Taittirīya Upaniṣad 2.7.1). But Vedānta philosophy has laid down that that word is not to be interpreted as meaning 'a-bhāva' (non-existing) but as indicating only the non-existence of such a perceptible state as can be denoted by name or form (Vedānta-Sūtras 2.1.16, 17). Curds can be made only out of milk, not from water; oil comes out of 'til' (sesamum), not out of sand; from these and other actual experiences, one must draw the same conclusion; because, if one accepts the position that those qualities which do not exist in the kāraṇa (cause) can arise independently in the kārya (product), one cannot explain why it should not be possible to produce curds from water. In short, that which is now in existence cannot have come into existence out of something which originally did not exist. Therefore, the Sāṃkhya philosophers have laid down the proposition, that whatever product you may take, its present concomitants and qualities must in some form or other have been in existence in its original cause. This proposition is known as 'satkārya-vāda' (theory of something being produced out of something which existed). Even modern natural scientists have laid down the proposition that the gross elements and the potential energy in all things are permanent, and whatever changes of form anything may go through, yet in the end the sum total of all material concomitants and of all potential energy in the world is always the same. For instance, even if we see a lamp burning and the oil disappearing, yet the atoms of oil are not totally destroyed, but continue to exist in the form of soot, smoke, or other subtle components; and, if all these subtle components are taken together and weighed, their weight will be the same as the total weight of the oil and of all those other matters from the air which were mixed with it when it was burning; and it has now been proved that the same rule applies to potential energy. But although these two propositions of modern physics and of the Sāṃkhya philosophy may be apparently similar, yet it must not be forgotten that the proposition of the Sāṃkhya philosophy has reference only to the fact of one thing being created out of another thing, that is to say, it refers specifically to the theory of Causes and Effects, whereas the proposition of modern physics is much more comprehensive. The very important difference between these two propositions which has now been proved by actual experiments and mathematics, is that no quality in any product can arise out of any quality which was not in the cause, and what is more, that the material elements and the potential energy in the causes are in no way destroyed by reason of their having been transformed into products, and that the sum total of the weights of the material elements and the potential energy of any product in its various states is always the same, and is neither increased nor decreased. Looking at the matter from this point of view, it will be seen that the propositions which have been given at the commencement of the second chapter Of the Bhagavadgītā. (Bhagavadgītā 2.16), such as: "nāsato vidyate bhāvaḥ". I e., "that which is not, will never come into existence" etc., have greater similarity with the proposition of modern physics, than with the mere satkāryavāda which deals with causes and products, though they apparently look like satkāryavāda. The purport of the above quotation from the Chāndogyopaniṣad is also the same. In short, the doctrine of satkāryavāda is acceptable to the Vedānta philosophy. Nevertheless, according to the Monistic (advaita) Vedānta philosophy, this proposition does not apply to anything beyond the qualified (saguṇa) universe, and how the qualified universe appears to have come into existence out of the qualityless (nirguṇa) must be explained in some other way. This theory of the Vedānta will be fully dealt with later on in the chapter on Metaphysics (adhyātma). As in this place we have to consider only how far the Sāṃkhya philosophers have gone, we will take for granted the doctrine of satkāryavāda and see how the Sāṃkhya philosophers have made use of it in dealing with the question of the Mutable and the Immutable.

When once this satkāryavāda is taken as proved, then, according to the Sāṃkhya science, the theory that the visible universe came into existence out of śunya, there having been, nothing whatsoever in existence before, naturally falls to the ground. Because, śunya means non-existing, and that which exists can never come into existence out of that which does not exist. Therefore, it becomes absolutely clear that the universe must have come into existence out of some substance or other, and that all those constituents (guṇas) which we now; see in the universe must have also been in this original substance. Now, if you look at the universe, many objects in it, such as trees, animals, men, stones, gold, silver, diamonds, water, air etc., are perceptible to our organs, and their forms and qualities are all different. The Sāṃkhya doctrine is that this diversity or difference is neither permanent, nor fundamental and that the fundamental substance in all things, or Matter, is only one. Modern chemists had analysed various objects and had originally arrived at 62 fundamental elements. But as the Western natural scientists have now proved that these 62 elements are not eternal and that there must have been someone fundamental substance from which the sun the moon, the earth, the stars, and the rest of the universe was created, it is not necessary to further labour this proposition. This original or fundamental substance at the root of all the things in the universe is known in Sāṃkhya philosophy as 'PRAKṚTI'. Prakṛti means 'fundamental' and all things which subsequently arise out, of prakṛti are called ' vikṛti ' or the vikāras (transformations) of the fundamental substance.

But though there is only one fundamental substance in all things, if this substance had also only one constituent quality, then according to the satkāryavāda, other qualities could not have arisen out of this one quality; whereas, looking at the stones, earth, water, gold, and various other things in the world, we find that they have numerous qualities. Therefore, the Sāṃkhya philosophers have first carefully considered the constituents of all the various things and divided these constituents into three classes, namely, the sattva, the rajas and the tamas, (the placid, the active and the ignorant). Because, whatever object may be taken, it naturally has two states, namely, its pure, unadulterated, or perfect state and the opposite of it, its imperfect state; and it is seen that its tendency is to move from its imperfect state to its perfect state. Out of these three states, the state of perfection is called by the Sāṃkhya philosophers the sāttvikī state, the imperfect state is called the tāmasī state, and the state of progression is called the rājasī state; and according to them the three qualities, sattva, rajas and tamas, are to be found from the very beginning in Matter (prakṛti), which is the fundamental substance of all things. Nay, it may even be said, that these three constituents together make up Matter. In as much the strength of each of these qualities is the same in the beginning, Matter is originally equable. This equability existed in the beginning of the world and will come again when the world comes to an end. In this equability, there is no activity and everything is at rest; but, later on, when these three constituents begin to vary in intensity, various things spring out of Matter as a result of the progressive constituent, and the creation begins. Here the question arises as to how the difference arises in the intensity of the three constituents, sattva, rajas and tamas, which were originally equal in intensity. To this the reply of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is, that that is the inherent characteristic of Matter (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 61). Though Matter is gross, yet it carries out all this activity of its own accord. Out of these three constituents, knowledge or intelligence is the sign of the sattva, and the rajas constituent, has an inspirational tendency, that is to say, it inspires a, person to do some good or evil act. These three constituents can never exist by themselves independently. In everything, there is a mixture of all the three constituents; and in as much as the mutual ratio of the three constituents in this mixture always varies, the fundamental Matter, though originally one, assumes the various forms of gold, earth, iron, water, sky, the human body etc. as a result of this diversity in constituents. As the intensity or proportion of the sattva constituent is higher than that of the rajas and tamas constituents in the object which we consider as sāttvika, all that happens is that these constituents being kept in abeyance are not noticed by us. But strictly speaking, it must be understood that the three constituents sattva, rajas and tamas are to be found even in those objects which are sāttvika by nature. There does not exist a single object which is purely sāttvika, or purely rājasa or purely tāmasa. In each object, there is an internal warfare going on between the three constituents, and we describe a particular object as sāttvika, rājasa, or tāmasa according to that one of these three constituents which becomes predominant. (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 13; Śriman Mahābhārata Aśva-Anugītā-36 and Śān. 305). For instance, when in one's own body the sattva constituent assumes preponderance over the rajas and tamas constituents, Knowledge comes into being in our body and we begin to realise the truth about things and our mind becomes peaceful. It is not that in this mental condition, the rajas and the tamas constituents cease to exist in the body; but as they are repressed, they do not produce any effect. (Bhagavadgītā 14.10). If instead of the sattva constituent, the rajas constituent assumes preponderance, then avarice arises in the human heart, and the man is filled with ambition and he is- inspired to do various actions. In the same way, when the tamas constituent assumes preponderance over both the sattva and the rajas constituents, faults like sleep, idleness, confused memory etc. arise in the body. In short, the diversity which exists among the various objects in the world, such as gold, iron, mercury etc. is the result of the mutual warfare or diversity in intensity of the three constituents, sattva, rajas and tamas. The consideration as to how this diversity arises when there is only one fundamental Matter is known as 'vijñāna'; and this includes all the natural sciences. For example, chemistry, the science of electricity, physics etc. are all diverse kinds of jñāna, that is, they are vijñāna.

This fundamental Matter, which is in an equable state, is 'AVYAKTA ', that is, not perceptible to the organs; and all the various objects which come into existence as a result of the mutual internal warfare of its sattva, rajas and tamas constituents, and become perceptible to the organs, that is to say, all which we see or hear or taste or smell, or touch, goes under the name of 'vyakta' according to the Sāṃkhya philosophy. 'VYAKTA' means all the objects which are definitely perceptible to the organs, whether they become perceptible on account of their form, or colour, or smell, or any other quality. Perceptible objects are numerous, and out of them, trees, stones etc. are GROSS (sthūla); whereas others like the Mind, Reason, Ether etc., though perceptible to the organs, are SUBTLE (sūkṣma). The word sūkṣma does not here have its ordinary meaning of 'small'; because, though ether is sūkṣma, it has enveloped the entire universe. Therefore, sūkṣma is to be taken to mean the opposite of 'sthūla', or even thinner than air. The words 'gross' or 'subtle' give one an idea about the conformation of the body of a particular thing; and the words 'vyakta' (perceptible) and 'avyakta '(imperceptible) show whether or not a particular thing can be perceived by us in reality. Therefore, although two different things may both be subtle, yet one of them may be perceptible and the other imperceptible. For instance, though the air is subtle, yet as it is perceptible to the sense of touch, it is considered to be vyakta; and prakṛti (Matter), the fundamental substance of all things, being much more subtle than air itself, is not perceptible by any of the organs and is, therefore, avyakta. Here a question arises, namely: if prakṛti is not perceptible to any organ, then, what evidence is there that it exists? To this the reply of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is, that by considering the various objects, it is proved by inference by the law of 'satkāryavāda' that the root of all of them, though not actually perceptible to the organs, must nevertheless be in existence in a subtle form (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 8); and the. Vedānta philosophers have accepted the same line of argument for proving the existence of the Brahman. (See the

Śāṃkarabhāṣya on Kaṭhopaniṣad 6.12, 13). When you once in this way acknowledge prakṛti to be extremely subtle and imperceptible, the atomic theory of the Nyāya school naturally falls to the ground. Because, even if atoms are considered imperceptible and innumerable, yet, in as much as each atom is, according to the Nyāya theory, an independent entity or part, the question as to what matter any two atoms are composed of still remains. Therefore, the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya philosophy is, that in prakṛti there are no different parts in the shape of atoms, that it is consistent and homogeneous or unbroken in any part, and that it perpetually pervades everything in a form which is avyakta (that is, not perceptible to the organs) and inorganic.

In describing the Parabrahman, Śrī Samartha Rāmadāsa Svāmī says in the Dāsabodha (Dāsabodha 20.2.3.):–

"In whichever direction you see, it is endless; there "is no end or limit anywhere; there is one independent "homogeneous substance; there is nothing else".

The same description applies to the prakṛti of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. Matter, made up of three constituents, is imperceptible, self-created, and homogeneous, and it eternally saturates everything on all sides. The Ether, the air, and other different things came into existence afterwards; and although they may be subtle, yet they are perceptible; and 'prakṛti ' which is the fundament or origin of all these is imperceptible, though it is homogeneous and all-pervading. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between the Parabrahman of Vedānta philosophy and the prakṛti of Sāṃkhya philosophy; because, whereas the Parabrahman is Vitalising and unqualified, prakṛti is inactive (gross) and is qualified, since it possesses the sattva, rajas and tamas qualities. But this subject-matter will be more fully considered later on. For the moment, we have only to consider what the doctrines of the Sāṃkhya philosophy are. When the words sūkṣma, sthūla, vyakta, and avyakta have been defined as above, one comes to the inevitable conclusion that in the beginning of the universe, every object is in the form of subtle and imperceptible prakṛti and that it after- wards becomes vyakta (perceptible to the organs), whether it is subtle or gross; and that at the time of pralaya (total destruction of the universe), when this its perceptible form is destroyed, it again becomes merged into imperceptible Matter and becomes imperceptible. And the same opinion has been expressed in the Gītā (Bhagavadgītā 2.28 and 8.18). In the Sāṃkhya philosophy, this imperceptible Matter is also known as 'akṣara (Immutable) and all things which are formed out of it are known as 'kṣara' (Mutable). 'kṣara' is not to be understood as meaning something which is totally destroyed, but only the destruction of the perceptible form is here meant, 'prakṛti ' has also other names, such as, 'pradhāna' (fundamental), 'guṇakṣobhiṇī ' (stirrer up of the constituents), 'bahudhānaka' (many-seeded), and 'prasava-dharmiṇī ' (generative). It is 'pradhāna (fundamental), because, it is the fundamental root of all objects in the universe; it is 'guṇakṣobhiṇī' (stirrer up of constituents), because, it of its own accord breaks up the equable state of its three constituents (guṇas); it is 'bahudhānaka' (many-seeded), because, it contains the germs of differentiation between various objects in the shape of the three constituents; and it is "prasava-dharmiṇī " (generative), because, all things are born or come into existence out of it. That is why these different names are given to Matter. This prakṛti is known in Vedānta philosophy as 'Māyā' (Illusion) or an illusory appearance.

When all things in the world are classified under the two divisions of 'Perceptible' and 'Imperceptible' or 'Mutable' and 'Immutable', the next question which arises is into what categories the Ātman, the Mind, Intelligence, Individuation, and the organs, which have been mentioned in the last chapter on the kṣetra-kṣetrajña-vicāra, are to be put according to Sāṃkhya philosophy. The kṣetra and the organs being gross, they will of course be included in the category of the Perceptible. But how is one to dispose of the Mind, Individuation, Intelligence, and especially of the Ātman? The modern eminent European biologist Haeckel says in his books that the Mind, Intelligence, Individuation and the Ātman are all faculties of the body. We see that when the brain in a man's head is deranged, he loses memory and even becomes mad. Similarly, even if any part of the brain is deadened on account of a blow on the head, the mental faculty of that, part is seen to come to an end. In short, mental faculties are only faculties of gross Matter and they can never be separated from gross Matter. Therefore, the mental faculties and the Ātman must be classified along with the brain in the category of the Perceptible. When you have made this classification,, the imperceptible and gross Matter is ultimately the only thing which remains to be disposed of, because all perceptible- objects have sprung out of this fundamental imperceptible- There is no other creator or generator of the world except prakṛti. When the Energy of the fundamental Matter (prakṛti) gradually increases, it acquires the form of caitanya (consciousness) or of the Ātman. This fundamental prakṛti is governed by fixed laws or rules like the satkāryavāda, and in accordance with those laws, the entire universe, as also man, is acting like a prisoner. Not only is the Ātman not something different from Matter, but it is neither imperishable nor independent; then, where is the room for salvation? The idea which a person has that he will do a particular thing- according to his own will is a total illusion; he must go where prakṛti (Matter or Nature) drags him.

In short, as the late Mr. Shankar Moro Ranade has stated in the 'Dhrupad' (stanza) at the commencement of the drama Kalahapurī–

"The world is a vast prison, all created beings are "prisoners, the inherent qualities of Matter are "shackles which nobody can break".

Haeckel's opinion is that this is the way in which the existence of the living and the non-living world goes on. And because according to him the universe originates from a single, gross, and imperceptible prakṛti, he has named his doctrine advaita' (non-dualism)^[3]. But in as much as this advaita doctrine is based on something which is gross, and as it incorporates everything within gross Matter, I have named it 'jaḍādvaita' (Gross Non-dualism) or Non-dualism based on the Natural sciences.

But the Sāṃkhya philosophy does not accept this Gross Nondualism. They accept the position that the Mind, Reason and Individuation are qualities of Gross Matter which consists of the five primordial elements and consequently it is stated in the Sāṃkhya philosophy that Reason, Individuation, and other qualities gradually spring out of the fundamental imperceptible Matter. But according to the Sāṃkhyas, it is impossible that consciousness (caitanya) should spring out of gross Matter; not only that, but the words "I know a particular thing" cannot come to be used unless the one who knows, understands, or sees Matter, is different from Matter, in the same way as no one can sit on his own shoulders; and looking at the affairs of the world, it is the experience of everyone that whatever he knows or sees is different from himself. The Sāṃkhya philosophers have, therefore, come to the conclusion that the one who knows (jñātā) and that which is to be known (jñeya), the one who sees and that which is to be seen, or the one who sees prakṛti and Gross prakriti must be two fundamentally different things (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 17). The one which has been described in the last chapter as the kṣetrajña, or the Ātman, is the one which sees, knows or enjoys, and it is known in the Sāṃkhya philosophy as PURUṢA (Spirit), or ' jña ' (jñātā). As this Knower is different from Matter, it follows that the Knower is inherently quality- less, that is, beyond the three constituents of prakṛti, namely, sattva, rajas and tamas; that the Knower does not go through any change of form and does nothing else except seeing and knowing, and that all the activity which is going on in the world is only the activity of prakṛti. In short, the doctrine of the Sāṃkhya philosophers is that if MATTER (prakṛti) is acetana (lifeless), SPIRIT (puruṣa) is sacetana (vitalised); if Matter is responsible for all activity, Spirit is apathetic and non-active; if Matter has three constituents, Spirit is unconstituted; if Matter is blind, Spirit is seeing; and that these two different elements in this world are eternal, independent, and self-created. And it is with reference to this doctrine that the Bhagavadgītā first says: "prakṛtim puruṣaṃ caiva viddhy anādi ubhāv api", that is, "prakṛti and puruṣa are both without a beginning and are eternal" (Bhagavadgītā 13.19), and then goes on to say: "kāryakāraṇa kartṛtve hetuḥ prakṛtir ucyate", i.e., the activities of the body and of the organs are carried on by prakṛti: and that, "puruṣaḥ sukhaduḥkhānāṃ bhoktṛtve hetur ucyate", i.e., "the puruṣa is responsible for our experience of pain and happiness". But although the doctrine, that prakṛti and puruṣa (Matter and Spirit) are both eternal, is acceptable to the Gītā, yet it must be borne in mind that the Gītā does not look upon these two elements as independent and self-created, as is done by Sāṃkhya philosophers.

Because, in the Gītā itself the Blessed Lord has referred to Matter as his Illusion (Bhagavadgītā 7.14; 14.3); and as regards the Spirit, he has said:–"mamaivāṃśo jīvaloke" (Bhagavadgītā 15.7), i.e., "It is a part of me". Therefore, the Gītā has gone further than the Sāṃkhya philosophy. But we. will keep aside this aspect for the time being, and consider further what pure Sāṃkhya philosophy says.

According to Sāṃkhya philosophy, all the objects in the world are divided into three classes:–the avyakta (the fundamental Matter or nature), the vyakta (the forms taken by it), and the puruṣa (jña), the Spirit or the Knower. But in as much as the form of perceptible objects out of these is destroyed at the time of pralaya (total destruction), imperceptible Matter (prakṛti) and Spirit (puruṣa) are the only two elements which remain in the end; and in as much as it is a proposition of the Sāṃkhya philosophers, that these two fundamental principles are eternal and self-created, they are called 'dvaiti' (those who accept TWO principles). They do not accept any other fundamental principle besides Matter and Spirit, such as Īśvara, Time, inherent Nature or anything else.^[4] Because, in as much as according to that philosophy the qualified Īśvara, Time, or inherent Nature are all perceptible, they are included in the perceptible objects which arise out of imperceptible Matter; and if you look upon the Īśvara as qualityless, then having, regard to the law of satkāryavāda, Matter with its three constituents cannot spring out of a qualityless fundamental element. Therefore, they have definitely laid down that there is no third fundamental element in addition to prakṛti and puruṣa as a cause of the universe; and having in this way defined only two fundamental elements, they have according to their own opinion worked out how the entire universe was created out of these two fundamental elements. They say that though the qualityless puruṣa (Spirit) is unable to do anything itself, yet, in the same way as the cow gives milk for its calf, or iron acquires the quality of attraction by the proximity of a magnet, so also immediately on the puruṣa coming into union with prakṛti, prakṛti which was originally imperceptible begins to place before the puruṣa the subtle, and the gross perceptible diffusion of its own constituents (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 57). Although the puruṣa may be sacetana (vitalised) and a jñātā, (knower), yet, in as much as it is kevala (isolated), that is, qualityless, it has not got the necessary perquisites for performing actions itself; and although prakṛti can perform actions, yet, in as much as it is gross and acetana (lifeless), it cannot understand what to do and what not to do. Therefore, just as when there is a partnership between a blind man and ft lame man, the lame man sits on the shoulders of the blind man, and both of them begin to follow tits road, so also when lifeless Matter becomes united with the vitalised Spirit, all the activities in the world come in m existence (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 31): and just as in a drama an actress ones takes one part and' after some time again another part and performs her dance for the entertainment of the audience, so also prakṛti for the benefit of the puruṣa (for 'puruṣārtha'), and though the puruṣa gives nothing in return, takes up numerous parts in the drama by changing the mutual ratio of the sattva, rajas, and tamas constituents, and continually performs its dance before the puruṣa (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 59). But so long as the Spirit, being entranced by this dance of Matter or by false pride (Bhagavadgītā 3.37) unjustifiably arrogates to itself this activity of Matter, and enmeshes itself in the strands of pain and happiness, it will never attain salvation. But on that day, when the Spirit realises that Matter with its three constituents is different and that it, the Spirit, is something different, the Spirit may well be said to be released, (Bhagavadgītā 13.29, 30; 14.20). Because, strictly speaking, the Spirit is fundamentally neither a doer nor is it bound. It is independent and by its very nature isolated, that is, it is non-active.

Whatever happens is being done hy Matter. Nay, in as much as the Mind and even Reason are manifestations of Matter, whatever knowledge is acquired by Reason is the result of the activity of Matter. This knowledge is three-fold, namely sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa (Gi.18.20–22). Out of these, when Reason acquires the sāttvika kind of knowledge, the Spirit realises that it is different from Matter. The sattva, rajas and tamas constituents are the constituents of Matter, not of the Spirit. The Spirit is qualityless and prakṛti with its three constituents, is its mirror (Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 204.8). When this mirror becomes clear, that is to say, when the Reason, which is a manifestation of Matter, become sāttvika, then the Spirit sees in this clear mirror its own clear identity, namely, that is different from Matter, and Dame Matter, becoming shamefaced, stops her dance before the Spirit. When this state is acquired, the Spirit is released from all bonds and attains its inherent isolation. Isolation (kaivalya) means the state of being kevala (isolated), that is being single and not being joint with Matter. It is this natural state of the Spirit which is called mokṣa (release) or salvation by the Sāṃkhya philosophers. But some philosophers have raised the subtle question whether in this state, it is the Spirit which abandons Matter or Matter which abandons the Spirit. This question is of the same type as the question whether the wife is too tall for the husband or the husband too short for the wife, and same may think it is equally useless. Because when two things are divorced from each other, there is no point in considering who has left whom, as we see that both leave each other. But, if one gives this question of the Sāṃkhya philosophers deep consideration, it will be seen not to be improper from their point of view. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, the Spirit being qualityless, non-active, and apathetic, the performance of the actions of giving up or sticking to cannot technically speaking be ascribed to the Spirit (Bhagavadgītā 13.21, 32). Therefore, the Sāṃkhyas have come to the conclusion that it is Matter, (which has got the quality of activity), which much be said to leave the Spirit. It is prakṛti which obtains its own Release from the Spirit (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 62 and Bhagavadgītā 13.34). In short, Release if not an independent state which results to the Spirit from some outside agency, nor it is a state which is different from its fundamental and inherent state; just as the outer skin of a stick of grass is different from the internal stock, or as the fish in water is different from the water, so are the Matter and Spirit relationed towards each other. Ordinary persons, being steeped in ignorance as a result of the constituents of Matter, do not realise this distinction and remain tied up within the periphery of family affairs. But he who has released this distinction may well be said to be released. It is stated in the Mahābhārata that such a person is called a 'knower' or 'buddha' (wise) or 'kṛtakṛtya', i.e., "one who has done whatever ought to have been done." (See, Śriman Mahābhārata Śān. 194.58; 248.11 and 306.308). And the meaning of the word 'buddhimān' (intelligent) in the sentence "etad buddhvā buddhimān syāt", i.e., "by understanding this a man becomes 'buddhimān' or 'buddha', that is, becomes a knower" (Gi. 15.20), is the same. The true form of Release even according to the science of the Atman (adhyātma) is also the same (Śāṃkarabhāṣya 1.1.4). But the advaita (Monistic) Vedānta philosophers give a different explanation about it: instead of saying that the Spirit is inherently isolated, they say that in as much as the Atman is fundamentally of the form of the Parabrahman (Supreme Spirit), Mokṣa is the realisation by the Atman of its fundamental form, namely of the Parabrahman. This difference between the Sāṃkhya philosophers and the Vedanta philosophy will be made clear in the next chapter.

Although the advaita (Monistic) Vedanta Philosophy fully accepts the Sāṃkhya theory that the spirit is qualityless, apathetic, and inactive, yet the other doctrine of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, namely there are fundamentally innumerable independent Spirits which see the dance of one and the same Matter is not acceptable to Vedāntists (Gi. 8.4; 13.20–22); Ma. Bhā. Śān. 351; and Ve. Sū. Śāṃ. Bhā. 2.1.1). According to the Vedanta philosophy, living beings appear different as a result of difference of environment; but as a matter of fact, everything is Brahman. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophers, in as much as the life and death, and the family of every man is different, and in as much as one comes across this difference in the world that one man is happy and another man is unhappy, every Atman or puruṣa must be originally different from another, and their number is innumerable (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 18). Matter and Spirit are the two different fundament principles of the entire universe. The Sāṃkhya philosophers interprete the word Spirit as meaning a collection of innumerable Spirits. They say that the world goes on a result of the union between these innumerable Spirits and Matter with its three constituents. When each Spirit becomes united with Matter, it places before the Spirit the diffusion of its constituents, and the Spirit goes on enjoying it. After this has gone on for a long time, when in the case of a particular Spirit, the activity of prakṛti takes the sāttvika (placid) form, that Spirit alone (not all Spirits) acquires true knowledge and the activity of Matter comes to an end so far as it is concerned. It reaches its fundamental isolated state. But even if it attains salvation, the worldly life of the other Spirits continues. Some people are likely to think that when a Spirit reaches the state of isolation, it must at once escapes from meshes of Matter.

But, according to the Sāṃkhya philosophers such is not the case. The body and the organs which are the manifestations of Matter do not leave it till the body dies. The reason given be the Sāṃkhya philosophers for this is: "in the same way as the wheel of the potter goes on revolving for same time as a result of previous motion, even after the pot on it has been finished and taken away from it, so also even that man who has attained the state of isolation continues to exist for some time" (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 67). But the man who has attained that the isolated state is not in any way obstructed, nor does he experience either pain or pleasure or happiness, on account of his body. This body, which is a manifestation of gross or lifeless Matter, is in itself gross or lifeless, man looks upon both pain and pleasure or happiness as same. If it is said that the Spirit will be affected by pain or pleasure then, as it has realised that it is different from the activity of Matter, and that the entire activity is of Matter and not of its own, it remains apathetic, howmuchsoever active Matter may continue, that man who has not acquired this knowledge by transcending the three constituents of Matter, does not escape the cycle of birth and death; then he may take birth in the sphere of gods, as a result of the preponderance of the sattva constituent or in the sphere of humans, as a result of the preponderance of the rajas constituent, or in the sphere of animals, as a result of the preponderance of the tamas constituent (Sāṃkhya Kārikā 44, 54). These results, in the shape of the cycle of birth and death, befall a man as a result of the preponderance or minimisation of the sattva, rajas and tamas constituents in the Matter which envelopes him, that is, in his Reason. It is stated even in the Gītā (Bhagavadgītā 14.18), that:–"ūrdhvaṃ gacchanti sattvasthāḥ", that is, "persons in whom the sāttvika constituent predominates go to heaven", and tāmasa parsons go to perdition. But these resulting states in the shape of heaven etc., are non-permanent. For that Spirit which wishes to become released from the cycle of birth and death, or according to the terminology of the Sāṃkhya philosophy, which has to maintain its difference or isolation from Matter, there is no other way except transcending the "three constituents and becoming virakta (desireless). Kapilācārya had acquired this asceticism and Knowledge from his very birth. But it is not possible that every man can be in this state from the moment of his birth. Therefore, everyone must by means of the discrimination of fundamental principles realise the difference between Matter and Spirit and try to purify his Reason. When by such efforts, the Reason becomes sāttvika, there arise in that Reason itself the qualities of Realisation (jñāna), Asceticism (vairagya), and Power (aiśvarya), and the man ultimately reaches isolation. The word 'aiśvarya' (power) is used here in the sense of the Yogic power of acquiring whatever may be desired. According to the Sāṃkhya philosophy, Righteousness (dharma) is included in the sāttvika constituent; but Kapilācārya has ultimately made the distinction, that by mere dharma one acquires only heaven, whereas Knowledge and Asceticism give Release or Isolation, and effect a total annihilation of the unhappiness of a man. That man who, as a result of the preponderance of the sāttvika constituent in his bodily organs and in his Reason, has realised that he is distinct from Matter with its three constituents, is called triguṇātīta (one who has transcended the sattva rajas and tamas constituents) by the Sāṃkhyas. In this state of a triguṇātīta, neither the sattva, nor the rajas, nor the tamas constituent continues to exist; therefore, considering the matter minutely, one has to admit that this state is different from either the sāttvikī, or rājasī, or tāmasī states of mind; and following this line of argument the Bhāgavata religion, after dividing Devotion (bhakti) into ignorant, progressive, or placid, has described the disinterested and non-differentiating devotion of the man who has transcended the three constituents as nirguṇa, that is, unaffected-by-quality (Śrīmad Bhāgavatpurāṇa 3. 29. 7–14). But it is not proper to extend the principle of division beyond the three divisions of placid, progressive, and ignorant. Therefore, the Sāṃkhya philosophers include the triguṇātīta state of transcending the three constituents in the placid (sāttvika) state on the basis that it results from the highest expansion of the placid constituent; and the same position has also been accepted in the Gītā. For instance, the non-differentiating knowledge that everything is one and the same is, according to the Gītā, placid knowledge (Bhagavadgītā 18.20); and where the description of the sāttvikī state of mind is given in the fourteenth chapter of the Gītā, the description of the state of transcending the three constituents is given later on at the end of the same chapter. But it must be borne in mind that in as much as the Gītā does not accept the duality of Matter and Spirit, the words 'prakṛti', 'puruṣa', 'triguṇātīta', which are technical terms of Sāṃkhya philosophy are always used in a slightly different meaning in the Gītā; or in short, the Gītā permanently keeps the rider of the monistic (advaita) Para- brahman on the Dualism (dvaita) of the Sāṃkhya philosophy. For instance, the difference between Matter and Spirit according to the Sāṃkhya philosophy has been described in the 13th chapter of the Gītā (Bhagavadgītā 13.19–34). But there the words 'prakṛti' and 'puruṣa' are synonymous with the words 'kṣetra' and 'kṣetrajña'. Similarly, the description in the 14th chapter of the state of transcending the three constituents (Bhagavadgītā 14.22–27) is of the siddha or released man who, having escaped the meshes of Māyā (Illusion) with its three constituents, has realised the Paramātman (Supreme Spirit) which is beyond both Matter and Spirit, and not of a Sāṃkhya philosopher, who looks upon Matter and Spirit as two distinct principles and who looks upon the isolation of the Spirit as the state of transcending the three constituents of Matter. This difference has been made perfectly clear by me in the subsequent chapter on adhyātma (philosophy of the Highest Self). But as the Blessed Lord has, while supporting the adhyātma or Vedānta philosophy in the Gītā, in many places made use of the Sāṃkhya terminology and arguments, one is likely to get the wrong idea, while raiding the Gītā, that it accepts as correct the pure Sāṃkhya philosophy. Therefore, I have repeated here this difference between the Sāṃkhya philosophy and the propositions similar to it in the Gītā. Śaṃkarācārya has stated in the Vedānta Sūtra-bhāṣya, that he is prepared to accept all the propositions of the Sāṃkhya philosophy but not to give up the advaita theory of the Upaniṣads that there is only one fundamental principle in the world, namely, the Parabrahman (Supreme Spirit), which is beyond both Matter and Spirit and from which the entire creation, including Matter and Spirit, has sprang (Śāṃkarabhāṣya 2.1.3); and the same line of argument applies to the arguments in the Gītā.

–-:o:–-

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Much information is now available about Īśvarakṛṣṇa from Buddhistic works. The preceptor of the Buddhistic scholar Vasubandhu was a contemporary opponent of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and the history of this Vasubandhu written by Paramārtha (449 to 569 A. D.) in the Chinese language has now been published. Dr. Takakasu has, on the strength of this, come to the conclusion that Īśvarakṛṣṇa must have lived about 450 A. D. (See Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1905. p. 33 to 53). But according to Dr. Vincent Smith, Vasubandhu himself must be placed some- where in the 4th century (about 280–369 A. D.), because a translation of his works has been made in 404 A. D. into the Chinese language. When the date of Vasubandhu is in this way pushed back, the date of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is also pushed back to the same extent, that is to say, by about 200 years; and must be taken at about 240 A. D. (See Vincent Smith's Early History of India, 3rd Edition, p. 328.).

[2]:

I have used the word 'utkrānti-tattva' here as meaning 'the Evolution theory' because it is used in that sense now-a-days. But 'utkrānti' means 'death' in Sanskrit. Therefore, in my opinion it would be more proper to use the expressions 'guṇavikāsa' (the expansion of the constituents), 'guṇotkarṣa' (the diffusion or growth of the constituents), 'guṇapariṇāma' (the development of the constituents) used in the Sāṃkhya philosophy for denoting the 'Evolution theory' instead of the term 'utkrānti-tattva'.

[3]:

Haeckel's original word is 'Monism', and he has written an independent work on it.

[4]:

Īśvarakṛṣṇa was a total atheist (nirīśvaravādī). He has stated in the last three summarising āryā couplets of his Sāṃkhya-Kārikā, that there were 70 āryās (couplets) in the Sāṃkhya-Kārikā on the principal subjectmatter. Bat in the edition which has been printed in Bombay by Tukārām Tātyā, which contains the translations of Colebrooke and Wilson, there are only 69 āryās on the principal subject. Therefore, Mr. Wilson was necessarily faced with the question which this 70th couplet was; but that couplet not having been available to him, bis difficulty has remained unsolved. In my opinion, this couplet must be after the present 61st couplet. Because, the commentary of Gaudapāda on the 61st couplet is not on one couplet, but on two couplets.

And if the symbolical phrases in this commentary are taken and a verse is written, it will run as follows:

kāraṇam īśvaram eke bruvate kālaṃ pure svabhāvaṃ va |
prajāḥ kathaṃ nirguṇato vyaktaḥ kālaḥ svabhāvaś ca ||

And this verse fits in with the anterior and posterior context. I think that someone has subsequently omitted this āryā, as it supports atheism. But as this ultra-critical man who has omitted the original couplet, forgot to delete the commentary on the verse which was omitted, we can now reconstruct that verse. For this, we must be grateful to this officious man. It would appear from the first hymn of the sixth chapter of the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad, that in ancient times, people used to look upon Inherent Nature and Time as the fundamental causes of the world and the Vedāntists used to go further and to look upon the 'Īśvara' as such cause.

That hymn is as follows:–

svabhāvam eke kavayo vadanti kālaṃ tathānye parimuhyamānāḥ |
devasyaiṣā mahimā tu loke yenedaṃ bhrāmyate brahmacakram ||

And in order to show that not even one of these three were accepted by the Sāṃkhya philosophers as a fundamental Cause, Īśvarakṛṣṇa put the couplet mentioned above after the 61st. couplet.