4. The impact of Buddhist Logic on the Nyāya Theory of Perception

The impact of the Buddhist onslaught was such that the thinker, Vācaspati Miśra, had to change the original definition of perception in order to defend the Nyāya position. He declares in Nyāyavārtika-tātparyatīkā: Yad eva indriyajasya jñānasya gocara tat pratyakṣam, na tu indriya-saṃbaddham^[1], that is, whatever comes within the range of the knowledge produced by the sense is the object of perception, and not merely that which comes in contact with the sense. It means that there may be an object of perception which is not in contact with the sense, and yet it may have been comprehended by a perception produced by the sense. Vācaspati Miśra, himself says in the same context that even if the relation of an object with its past state is not grasped by the sense, yet that relationship is comprehended in the perceptual knowledge produced by the sense with the aid of memory or impressions. It appears that the Buddhist objection is met here only by giving up the original Nyāya-Vaiśesika position, i.e., that alone which is in contact with the sense is perceived, and by adopting a new theory that whatever comes within the range of knowledge produced by the sense is the object of perception.^[2]

Here we notice that a new factor is in the process of being introduced in the Nyāya-Vaiśesika epistemology. When perceptual knowledge is produced by sense objectcontact, it smuggles in something which is not in contact with the sense. For example: when we see from a distance that a plate of shāhi biriyani is being cooked, we also virtually smell its fragrance and sometimes even have a virtual taste of it. How does it do so? The answer is that it is comprehended with the aid of memory or impressions. There are two alternatives that either (i) memory of the past experience or (ii) simply the impressions (saṃskāra) of that experience without awakening memory (smṛti) render aid to the sense, and the sense thus aided produces a perceptual knowledge which, in addition to cognizing the object in its present state, cognizes it as related to a past state as well.^[3] The main emphasis laid by the Nyāya-Vaiśesika school, is that the perceptual knowledge of the object as related to both the states, present and past, is one unitary knowledge. As held by the Buddhist, it is not composed of two parts, Viz., (i) sense-perception of the present state, and (ii) memory of the past. But if we hold that memory (and not saṃskāra) renders aid to the sense, it will mean that there is, in the first place, the memory of the relation of the object with a past state, and that secondly, the memory helps the sense, but itself disappears; it does not itself become part of the perceptive knowledge. For, otherwise the perceptual cognition would not be a unitary cognition. It is thereof held that the sense, aided by the memory, produces a unitary perceptive knowledge which comprehended an object as related to its present as well as to its past state. Even then the fact the perceptual knowledge is preceded by memory suggests a sort of alien element in the unitary perception. The later Nyāya-Vaiśesika writers, therefore, gave up this alternative; and adopted the second alternative that the sense was helped by the impression (saṃskāra) and not by memory (smṛti). The question of impressions helping the sense is usually taken up in connection with the perceptual knowledge, called recognition (pratyabhijñā), which is held, by the NyāyaVaiśesika writers, to be a special kind of perception, and differentiated from ordinary determinate perception.

It is tenaciously held by the later Nyāya-Vaiśesika that recognition is not composed of two kinds of knowledge, viz., sense-perception grasping the present state of an object, and memory referring to its past state; but it is one unitary knowledge in which the past state is also apprehended by sense perception. According to the later writers, apprehension of the past state by sense-perception is due to the aid of impressions. It is held that the sense, unaided by impressions, grasps an object only in its present state, but when aided by impressions, it has the power to comprehend the past state also. The function of an impression (saṃskāra), as originally conceived, is that of bringing about remembrance. Praśastapāda, of course, mentions recognition (pratyabhijñā) as well as memory, both being produced by impression. He says that the quality of the soul called impression (bhāvanā, i.e., saṃskāra) is the cause of remembrance and recognition of the objects seen, heard, or experienced before. It appears that Praśastapāda conceives recognition as a special kind of remembrance which occurs along with some kinds of perception. He does not seem to have conceived that recognition is a unitary perceptive knowledge in which impressions are capable of presenting a past state in a sense perception. This theory seems to have developed only in the ninth or the tenth century.^[4]

Jayanta and Śridhara^[5] both hold that the past state of an object is revealed in a senseperception when the sense is aided by impressions. They do not accept the other alternative that the sense is aided by remembrance. In fact, Śridhara differentiates between an object called forth by memory (smṛtyopanita), which, according to him, is of the nature of thought, and the object called forth by an impression (saṃskāropanita)^[6] which is of the nature of sense-perception. Śridhara says with reference to the cognition of a word that at the time of cognition of the last letter, the previous letters, although destroyed, are brought forth by memory, and they become the efficient cause of the comprehension of the meaning. If the efficient causality of a past object is possible, the inherent causality of some (past) objects may also be possible; the inherent causality of some (past) objects may also be possible. But an object can be an inherent cause only if it were actually existent. The existence of a past object at the present time, contradictory as it may appear, is brought about through the power of impression. An impression is held to be the cause of a sense-perception also, as it is that of remembrance.

The Buddhist objects that the sense always grasps a present object, that impression has always reference to a past object, and vice versa, the sense can never grasp a past object and that impression can never refer to a present object. Śridhara replies that although sense and impression, working separately, are incapable of grasping past and present objects respectively, yet, when working in concert, they produce an effect in the form of recognition. The later Nyāya-Vaiśeşika writers, however, hold that apprehension of a past state occurs only in the case of recognition which is only a special kind of determinate perception, but not in every determinate perception. Both the points that a determinate perception has reference to a past state and to other objects of the same class, appeared in the later period of Nyāya literature in the form of transcendental relations called jñāna-lakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa respectively.^[7] These two forms of transcendental relations were ultimately crystallized by later Nyāya-Vaiśeşika writers in response to a prolonged controversy over the following two questions posed by the Buddhists: (i) how can the past state of an object, or for the matter of fact, how can the fragrance of sandal wood, which is not in contact with the sense, be cognized by sense perception? and (ii) how can the concomitance between the inferential mark and the thing to be inferred be established by observation of their association in a large number of cases? But the introduction of extraordinary transcendental elements in explaining ordinary epistemological phenomena certainly robs the Nyāya theory of the rigor common-sense realism should have. The Buddhists logicians succeed in forcing the Naiyāyikas to lose some of the glories of their theory.

Both the Nyāya and Buddhist agree that an ontological system must be epistemologically grounded in the sense that what is epistemologically prior should be the starting-point at ontological enquiry, but the difference lies in what they consider to be epistemologically prior, how they define perceptual knowledge. The Buddhist argues that the phenomenal (the appearance at particular, colour, shape, taste, smell, touch, and so on) by its nature comprises the entire content of our immediate perceptual experience, and hence it is epistemologically prior, while physical objects or propertied things are far removed from “raw” experience. The Nyāya claims, on the other hand, that physical things or propertied things are more directly accessible to our perceptual awareness.

It is observed that according to Nyāya there are two stages in a perceptual cognition: there is the conceptual stage, in which we are aware of the object as being a certain way; but this is always preceded by a non-conceptual stage in which we are aware of the constituents of a perceptual judgment individually, without being aware of them as forming a relational complex. On the Nyāya account all the elements of this judgment are out there in the world. None is constructed by the mind. But the mind must first be aware of them by themselves before it can be aware of the relational complex they make up.^[8] Buddhist logicians do agree with Nyāya that perceptual cognition involves two stages, the non-conceptual and the conceptual. They also agree that perceptual judgments involve attributing some general nature to an object. They do not accept universals, though, so they have to deny that perceptual judgments reflect what exists outside the mind. Only non-conceptual perception can do that. My conceptual cognition of Dhenu as a cow involves attributing cowness to the real particular out there. But while the world contains real particulars, it does not contain universals like cowness. So if perception puts us in touch with the world, then the conceptual stage of perceptual cognition is not perception. We may call it a “perceptual judgment”, for it is always preceded by what is properly called “perception”. But it is a judgment, something involving concepts, and that makes it a kind of inference.

Seeing Dhenu as a cow feels like something we just do when we see Dhenu. This is what Nyāya is getting at when it says we see universal like cowness. But if there are no universals out there where Dhenu is, there must be some process of mental construction involved in our seeing her as a cow -a process that we are not ordinarily conscious of. Diṅnāga started with the idea that this mental process involves associating what we actually see -the unique particular Dhenu -with a word, in this case “cow”. His real insight comes when he says that knowing what word to call something involves an inference. To know that what I see is called a cow, I need to know to infer that there’s a fire on the hill: that anything that’s like this hill in having smoke also has fire, while nothing that lacks fire has smoke. So if seeing Dhenu as a cow is a matter of associating what I see with the word “cow”, then seeing Dhenu as a cow must involve a kind of inference. We are not aware of performing this inference because we do it so quickly and automatically. It’s something we learned to do when we learned to talk, and ever since then we”ve been doing it constantly. So it’s not surprising that we are unaware of doing it, just as we are no longer aware of all we are doing when we stand upright and walk.

According to Buddhist logicians, two things happen in rapid succession when you are on the hill and see the fire there. First you have a non-conceptual cognition in which you are visually aware of that unique particular located on the hill. This is what is properly called “perception”. You then very quickly perform a kind of unconscious inference whereby you judge that what you see is the kind of thing that is called a “fire”. This result in the conceptual cognition that may be expressed as “This is a fire”. We can call this cognition a “perceptual judgment”.^[9] But it is important to remember that for Diṅnāga and his school it is not perception, for it is about fire-in-general, which is not really out there. This does not make your cognition erroneous. Now that you are aware of the fire as a fire, you can use your knowledge about fire-in-general. One of the things you know about fire is that it can warm you when you are cold. Since you are cold and want to warm up, your perceptual cognition of the fire helps you satisfy your desire. We said above that a means of knowledge must be able to lead successful practice. Even though your judgment is about a mental construction, not something in the world, it still leads to successful practice. So it counts as a means of knowledge. It just turns out that it’s an inference.

Perception is also a means of knowledge. But because it is non-conceptual, Buddhist logicians claim that it does not give rise directly to successful practice.^[10] You can only know that the particular you see will warm your hands after you have conceptualized it as fire. And that involves inference. So why is perception a means of knowledge? Because it leads you to construct fire-in-general, and that construction leads to successful practice. Both perception and inference (including perceptual judgment) are means of knowledge because both bring about veridical cognitions. A veridical cognition is one that is not falsified by bringing about unsuccessful practice. Suppose I wrongly took the smoke on the hill as a sign of an impending volcanic eruption. I might try to save my life by running away. But this would be pointless, since no volcanic eruption threatens my life. This is a case of a faulty inference. Its faultiness lies in its leading to unsuccessful practice. Perceptions don”t give rise actions; they only lead to perceptual judgments. So a perception cannot be directly falsified by an action. It can only be falsified through its leading to unsuccessful practice. This unique feature of the Buddhist logicians” analysis of a perceptual cognition is innovative as well as practical.

After a brief survey of the entire proceedings it may now conclude some differences between Nyāya and Buddhists’ theory of perception:

For Buddhist, the term pramāṇa stands for both the source of knowledge and its outcome which is known as pramā or pramāṇaphala. Buddhists do not make any distinction between pramāṇa and pramāṇaphala whereas, for Nyāya, pramāṇa is different from pramāṇaphala. According to Nyāya, pramāṇa is a kind of cause or process which makes us reach to pramā is different from the pramā because pramā is a resulted knowledge. For Nyāya, the resulted knowledge (pramāṇaphala) is pramā or pramā is the resulted knowledge and pramāṇa is the cause of valid knowledge.

The next difference comes with regard to the number of means of knowledge (pramāṇa). Buddhist accepts two means of knowledge: perception and inference while Naiyāyikas accept four means of knowledge: Perception, inference, verbal testimony and comparison. Buddhist reduces comparison and verbal testimony into inference.

Thirdly, these two schools differ in holding the view of prameya and pramāṇa. For Naiyāyikas, prameya and pramāṇa are not unreal. They are real categories (padārtha). On the other hand, For Diṅnāga, prameya and pramāṇa are of ideated in character. According to him, the factors prameya and pramāṇa are inherent in knowledge itself.

Further, for Buddhist, an object has specific means of knowledge. In other words, a particular object is perceived by a particular pramāṇa. There are two types of objects: sva-lakṣaṇa and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa. sva-lakṣaṇa is apprehended by perception and sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is apprehended by inference. This position of Buddhist is known as pramāṇa-vyavasthā. On the other hand, for Naiyāyikas the same thing can be apprehended by different means of knowledge. This position of Nyāya is known as pramāṇa-samplava.^[11]

For Buddhist, perception is free from verbal designation (Kalpanā). It is purely nirvikalpa. On the other hand, Nyāya involves sense-object contact in their definition of perception. It also accepts two stages of perception: indeterminate and determinate. Indeterminate is the raw sensation and determinate is perception with the attributes of an object like naming etc. But for Buddhist, perception is purely indeterminate. They do not accept savikalpa as a stage of perception. They take it under the realm of inference.

For Nyāya, both sensation and conception are included in perception. According to them, after the raw sensation of a thing by the senses, one takes this raw sensation under various concepts like naming, shaping etc. And then one can say he or she perceived a thing. Nyāya holds the position of realism. On the other hand, for Buddhist, sensation is free from conception. One does not need any knowledge about the thing in order to perceive it, the perception starts from the object and reaches at knowledge.

Lastly, for Realist the universal and the particular can be perceived in perception. On the other hand, for Buddhist, particular or sva-lakṣaṇa is perceived by perception and universal or sāmānya-lakṣaṇa is perceived by inference. The school of Nyāya, states that universal can be perceived. The knowledge of universal is inherent in sense-object contact. According to Jayanta, the universal is perceived in non-contradicted senseexperience like particular. According to him, it is not the case that indeterminate perception only apprehends the particulars and determinate perception only apprehends the universals. For them, indeterminate perception and determinate perception have same objects. The main difference between these two is indeterminate is not definite. But, with respect to the nature of perceptual knowledge and the object, there is ultimately no difference between the two.^[12]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

D.N. Shastri, op.cit., p.452.

[2]:

Ibid., pp. 452-454.

[3]:

Ibid.

[4]:

Ibid., p. 460.

[5]:

J.N. Sinha, op.cit., p.58.

[6]:

D.N. Shastri., op.cit., p.461

[7]:

Ibid., p.464.

[8]:

C.D. Sharma, op.cit., pp.194-195.

[9]:

G. B. J. Dreyfus, op.cit., p.352.

[10]:

S. Mookerjee, op.cit., p.343.

[11]:

L. D. Chhatre, op. cit , p.3.

[12]:

R. R. Dravid, The Problem of Universals in Indian philosophy, p. 94.