2.3. Perception according to Uddyotakara

[Full title: 2. The Prācina-Naiyāyika Theory of Perception—Perception according to Uddyotakara]

Uddyotakara a commentator of Vātsyāyanabhāṣya talks about literary meaning of perception which is connected to the senses.^[1] Uddyotakara elaborates the phrase Indriyārthasannikarṣotpannam jñānam pratyakṣaṃ. According to him perception is that knowledge which is produced by the sense-object contact. He interprets Vātsyāyana’s view on perception along with this he offers other explanations too. Firstly, the contact of sense-object is the unique feature of each individual perception. In every individual perception, which is produced by the sense-object contact, what makes it different from other perception is dependent on the sense organ or the object apprehends. Each individual perception is called either after the sense-organ, or after the object. For instance: the perception of colour is called visual perception or colour perception; and after the contact of mind-sense no perception is ever called; for instance the perception of colour, is never called mental perception. Secondly, the contact of mind sense is the common thing in all types of perception, which are otherwise different. To put it another way the mind sense contact does not differ in all types of perception; it remains the same in all kinds of perception. Thirdly, the contact of mind with senses is not stated as the unique feature of perception, because in perception the contact of mind with the senses stands on the same footing as the contact of mind with the soul, because these two contacts exist in the mind. This is why the mind-sensecontact has not been stated in the definition of perception.^[2]

Uddyotakara admits the term avyapadeśyam as “unnameable” but he does not elaborate it. Again he supports Vātsyāyana in interpreting the term vyavasāyātmaka. He states that both the contacts i.e. the contact of mind with the soul and the contact of senses with the object can be the cause of generating a doubtful cognition. He says the mind is different from the other sense-organs as the mind is associated with all kinds of apprehension, while the other sense-organs are effective upon particular objects only. The difference does not rely upon their being non-material or material because the mind is neither material nor non-material thing.^[3]

 

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

indriyenārthasya sannikarṣādyadutpadyate jñānam tat pratyakṣam. Nyāyavārtīka , on Nyāyasūtra , 1.1.4.

[2]:

Ibid., 1.1.4.

[3]:

kāryadharmāvetau bhautikamabhautikaṃ ca, na kāryaṃ manaḥ, tasmānna bhautikaṃ nāpyabhautikamiti. Nyāyavārtīka , 1.1.4.