1.2. The Nyāya View

Gautama (the founder of Nyāya School) used some words for knowledge are cognition (buddhi), apprehension (upalabdhi). He defines knowledge as the manifestation of objects (artha prakāśa). Therefore, one can understand that knowledge means being aware of objects. The object of knowledge may be a thing or an attribute, an act or a feeling, the existent as well as the non-existent. Just as light reveals all the physical things which are placed before it similarly knowledge shows all things which come in its way.

Nyāya divided knowledge into two categories:

1. anubhava (presentative knowledge) and
2. smṛti (representative knowledge).

In memory or representational knowledge, knowledge is born out mental impressions.^[1] The object of knowledge is represented in the sense that it is from past knowledge. The object had been known and now when one says one knows, one is actually having mental impressions of the object known. Presentational knowledge or apprehension has been defined by the Nyāya as “knowledge different from that”. In other words, the knowledge which is not memory or not born of mental impressions is what can be termed as apprehension or presentational knowledge.

Knowledge in the sense of being apprehension is again further classified by the Naiyāyikas as valid apprehension (yathārthaanubhāva)^[2] and erroneous or invalid apprehension (ayathārthaanubhāva). A valid apprehension is that in which an object is known as possessing attributes which it really possesses.^[3] If one apprehends an object as possessing certain attributes and if the object in reality possesses those attributes, then the apprehension is said to be valid. If one apprehends an object as silver and the object is silver, then the apprehension is valid. On the other hand, when one apprehends an object as possessing certain attributes while the object does not possess them, then the apprehension is invalid. Nyāya gives the example of silver in nacre as a case of invalid apprehension. When one apprehends a thing as silver, but it is not silver, then it is a case of wrong apprehension.^[4]

For the Nyāya valid presentational knowledge or knowledge which is valid apprehension is pramā. In other words, pramā is characterized by truth and presentativenes.

First, pramā has to be yathārtha or true. Truth for the Nyāya is understood as faithfulness with which the object is revealed. Thus pramā or valid knowledge can be stated as that which informs us of the existence of something in a place where it really exists, or which predicates of something that it has a characteristic that is really possessed by it. To know a thing is to judge it as having such-and-such characteristic. The judgement will be true if the thing really has the stated characteristic. And if the thing does not have it, then the judgment will be false. However, it is to be kept in mind that for the Nyāya to apprehend a thing as a jar, for example, it is not to be understood as apprehending “jarness” in the jar. But it is apprehension that “jarness” is related to this object. According to the Nyāya, there is a direct contact of knowledge with the object.

And knowledge consists in judging an object as being related to a certain attribute. If the object holds the asserted relation to the attribute, the judgment is true, and if the object does not, then the judgment is false. This characteristic of pramā excludes error (bhrama) from being recognized as a kind of valid knowledge.

Second, the Nyāya says that pramā is apprehension or presentational (anubhāva) and not representational. It is this characteristic that excludes memory from valid knowledge. Memory can be true in the sense of faithfully representing the event or the action in its true characteristic. Still it is not pramā as it arises from a mental impression and is not due to the object presented. However, the Nyāya does not say that in apprehension the object is presented. Rather the Naiyāyikas argue that apprehension is that which is not due to mental impressions. Still it can be understood that as apprehension is not due to mental impressions, it must be due to the object given or presented. Thus, it can be said that the object of pramā or valid knowledge should be such that it is presented and not represented.

Valid knowledge is generated by four sources of knowledge: Perception, Inference, Comparison and Verbal testimony. While invalid knowledge is produced by memory (smṛti), doubt (saṃshaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka).^[5] Hence, valid knowledge is a certain, faithful knowledge. Invalid knowledge is not faithful knowledge. All the four things i.e. memory, doubt, error and hypothetical reasoning cannot produce valid knowledge. Memory cannot produce valid knowledge because it is a kind of representative cognition. In memory one recollects past experiences. The experience memorized is not directly presented to the self, but merely recalled in an indirect manner. When there is uncertainty in cognition is called doubt. Error is misunderstanding because it does not agree with the reality. Hypothetical knowledge is unreal knowledge. It can be understood like this-when one perceives rope as a rope one have right knowledge, when one is not certain about the object i.e. it is a rope or a snake, one have doubt. When one memorize the rope, one have seen, one have memory. When one perceives the snake in place of rope, one has error.^[6]

Smṛti (Memory):

According to Śivāditya, in memory one brings impression which he/she left behind by a former knowledge in the self. Annambhaṭṭa holds memory is only our mental impression. Here one revives past experience due to the present impression kept in the soul. He excludes recognition or pratyabhijña from the realm of memory. According to him, recognition is not memory because it is a presentative, real and direct apprehension of the thing whereas in memory there is direct apprehension but the thing memorized is always absent and bring by the rule of association in the mind. Memory is of two types: true (yathārtha) and false (ayathārtha), as it shows past experience correctly or incorrectly. Keśavamiśra maintains for a person memory may be true or false if the person is awake because it is associated with right or wrong cognition in the past. But when a person is in dream his cognition would be memory cognition and are false. Because in dream all non-presentative objects looks like presentative objects and thus they are not real.^[7]

The Naiyāyikas put memory under the category of invalid knowledge. According to them, it is distinct from experience. The thing memorized is different from the thing presented and there is no relation between memory and its object. Jayanta also maintains memory is invalid cognition. For him, memory does not directly come out of the objects. The object while existed in the past which try to memorize now does not exist but ceased. So, that object is not real and there is no relation between the vanished objects and their memory-images. He concludes that the basis of memory is not any given datum and it fails to provide valid presentative experiences. So, it does not call as a source of valid knowledge.

Saṃśaya (Doubt):

According to Gautama, Saṃśaya (doubt) is a kind of conflicted judgement of an object. Vātsyāyana divides doubt into five kinds. He maintains that—

1. It may arise from the perception of such qualities which are mutual to many objects. e.g., when a person sees a tall thing in the twilight he cannot decide whether it is a man or long dowel, for the quality of tallness is a part of both.

2. It may arise from the cognition of a unique quality, e.g., when we perceive a sound we uncertain about the sound like whether it is eternal or non-eternal things like water.

3. It may occur due to contradicted testimony e.g. by studying scriptures one cannot certain about soul whether it exists or not, for one school of philosophy soul exists while for another school it does not.

4. The irregularity of perception is also a cause of doubt, e.g., one perceives water in the river where it exists in real but it seems also to exist in the desert where it does not exist in real. So, it creates uncertainty about the water that is perceived that whether it really exists or not.

5. The last cause of doubt is irregularity of non-perception.^[8]

There are different views regarding the types of doubt. Uddyotakara and Vācaspati only accept three types of doubt. Gangeśa holds two while Keśavamiśra accepts three kinds of doubt. For Praśastapāda, there is only one type of doubt which is due to perception of qualities mutual to many things. The Naiyāyikas believe that we cannot call doubt as true knowledge and false knowledge. The Sāṃkhyas also consider doubt as a kind of an uncertain knowledge. It cannot be produced valid knowledge because it is neither definite nor positive knowledge.^[9]

Tarka (Hypothetical Reasoning):

According to Gautama, Hypothetical reasoning being an intellectual act helps in knowing reality by adding logical bases. It helps when the reality is not recognized by giving favour to one of the alternative possibilities. Vātsyāyana supports Gautama’s view and maintains that there are two opposite options and both looks possible with regard to reality and the mind vacillate between them, then hypothetical reasoning helps to solve the inconclusiveness. He also states that hypothetical reasoning is not pramāṇa but it helps pramāṇa. It was Uddoyotakara who explained that why the hypothetical reasoning cannot be considered as an independent source of knowledge. He believes that it simply helps the operation of a relevant source of knowledge but does not itself ascertain the desired properties of the datum. It helps to ascertain between two equal options on the ground of the superior strength of either of the two. Vācaspatimiśra endorses with Vātsyāyana and Uddyotakara but he also adds the concept of elimination which is a valuable contribution to hypothetical reasoning.

According to him, the method of elimination tries to eliminate that alternative which is logically not possible and keeps that option which is nearer to reality.

Jayanta maintains that Hypothetical reasoning helps to create a strong assumption to endorse the probandum. In order to make the concept of Hypothetical reasoning clear he analysed tarka as oppose to saṃśaya and nirnạya. He believes that when a person is in doubt both the options that he have are of equal strength but none of them carry any definite assertion. In nirnạya the doubt is cleared by analysing two alternatives and a final judgement is taken in favour of one of them. And tarka favours one of the options but it does not remain the other.

The types of tarka: According to Viśvanātha, there are five kinds of tarka, namely:—

1. Ātmāśraya,
2. Anonyāśraya,
3. Cakraka,
4. Anavasthā, and
5. Tadanyabādnitāthaprasaṅga.^[10]

Ātmāśraya: This argument does not dependent on anything. It is a kind of selfdependent regarding cognition and genesis. For instance: “B is the cause of B”. Here B is different from itself, as the cause and the effect both are two different things. In western logic, this is known as petitio principi.

Anonyāśraya: It is a kind of an argument which is jointly dependent. For instance: “X relies on Y, and Y relies upon X”, here X cannot rely on Y, since to say that “Y relies on X” is to refuse that “X relies on Y”.

Cakraka: It is a kind of circular argument. If X needs Y needs Z, and Z needs X. This is a case of circular reasoning.

Anavasthā: It is the regressus ad infinitum. If we clarify X by Y, Y by Z, Z by A and so on, it is a case of anavasthā because here we do not clarify things but simply our clarification lead to infinite regression.

Tadanyabādhitārthaprasaṅga: This is known as reduction ad absurdum. It tries to prove the validity of an argument indirectly by revealing that the contradictory of its conclusion irrational.^[11]

Viparyaya (error) :

One of the kinds of non-valid cognition is known as Viparyaya. When a thing is appeared in a form which does not belong to it, it is a case of error. It is a kind of undoubted knowledge, but still it is not true to the reality. For instance: when we see a snake in a rope in the dim light and have then not uncertain about the reality of what we perceive. Still this cognition is errorneous, as it is not a true apprehension of the object (yathārthānubhava).

Whether it is valid knowledge or invalid knowledge, it is generated in the self when it comes into contact with the not-self. An adventitious property of the self is knowledge which is producing in self by the object. If the producing conditions are free from defects and error, knowledge is valid; if they are defective, knowledge is invalid. A man whose sight is sound perceives a white conch while a man having disease like jaundice perceives it yellow. Knowledge must correspond with reality. It is the nature of truth. When knowledge agrees with reality, it is valid; when it does not, it is invalid. To corresponds with its object (yathārtha and avisamvādi) and reaches to successful activity (pravṛttisāmrthya) is the main task of valid knowledge. While when knowledge does not corresponds to its object (ayathārtha and visamvādi) and reaches to failure (pravṛttivisamvāda) is called invalid knowledge. The work of fire is to burn, cook and bring light. If it does not, it cannot be called fire.^[12]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Tarka-saṃgraha, III, 17

[2]:

C.D. Sharma, op.cit, p.192.

[3]:

Tarka-saṃgraha, III, 19

[4]:

Tarka-saṃgraha, III, 20

[5]:

C.D. Sharma, op.cit., p.193.

[6]:

S. Chatterjee & D. Datta, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, p.158.

[7]:

S. Chatterjee, The Nyāya Theory of Knowledge, p.25.

[8]:

Ibid, p.31.

[9]:

C. D. Bijalwan, Indian Theory of Knowledge Based upon Jayanta’s Nyāyamanjarī, p.33.

[10]:

S. Chatterjee, op.cit, p.49.

[11]:

Ibid.

[12]:

C.D Sharma, op.cit, p.192.