The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2005-2006 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2005-2006.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

निर्भासिज्ञानपक्षे तु तयोर्भेदेऽपि तत्त्वतः ।
प्रतिबिम्बस्य ताद्रूप्याद्भाक्तं स्यादपि वेदनम् ॥ २००५ ॥
येन त्विष्टं न विज्ञानमर्थाकारोपरागवत् ।
तस्यायमपि नैवास्ति प्रकारो बाह्यवेदने ॥ २००६ ॥

nirbhāsijñānapakṣe tu tayorbhede'pi tattvataḥ |
pratibimbasya tādrūpyādbhāktaṃ syādapi vedanam || 2005 ||
yena tviṣṭaṃ na vijñānamarthākāroparāgavat |
tasyāyamapi naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedane || 2006 ||

Under the view that ‘cognition envisages a form’, though, in reality, there is difference between the two (the cognition and the form envisaged by it), yet, on account of the reflection having the same form as what is reflected, there might be ‘cognition’ (of one by the other) in the indirect sense.—But for one who does not regard the cognition as bearing the imprint of the object,—there can be no ‘cognition’ of the external object, even in the said ‘indirect’ sense.—(2005-2006)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus proved the ‘self-cognition’ of Cognitions, the Author proceeds to show that there can be no apprehension of the Object by Cognition which is formless (and envisages no form):—[see verses 2005-2006 above]

Reflection’—i.e. of the form of the Cognition.

Tādrūpyāt’—on account of its having the same form.

Indirect’—not primary; secondary.

Even this’—cognition in the secondary sense, assumed on the ground of similarity.—(2005-2006)

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