Verse 1711-1716

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वथाऽपि ह्यतुल्यत्वे ह्यभिप्रेतेऽस्य वस्तुनः ।
वस्त्वन्तरेण नियतं वस्तुत्वमवहीयते ॥ १७११ ॥
वस्तुनो हि निवृत्तस्य क्वान्या सम्भविनी गतिः ।
लक्ष्यते नास्तितां मुक्त्वा तारापथसरोजवत् ॥ १७१२ ॥
तस्मात्खपुष्पातुल्यत्वमिच्छता तस्य वस्तुनः ।
वस्तुत्वं नाम सामान्यमेष्टव्यं तत्समानता ॥ १७१३ ॥
अन्यथा हि न सा बुद्धिर्बलिभुग्दशनादिषु ।
वर्त्तते नियता त्वेषा भावेष्वेवेति किं कृतम् ॥ १७१४ ॥
सारूप्यान्नियमोऽयं चेत्सामान्यं च तदेव नः ।
स्वभावानुगता शक्तिरनेनैवोपवर्णिता ॥ १७१५ ॥
अत्यन्तभिन्नता तस्माद्धटते नैव कस्यचित् ।
सर्वं हि वस्तुरूपेण भिद्यते न परस्परम् ॥ १७१६ ॥

sarvathā'pi hyatulyatve hyabhiprete'sya vastunaḥ |
vastvantareṇa niyataṃ vastutvamavahīyate || 1711 ||
vastuno hi nivṛttasya kvānyā sambhavinī gatiḥ |
lakṣyate nāstitāṃ muktvā tārāpathasarojavat || 1712 ||
tasmātkhapuṣpātulyatvamicchatā tasya vastunaḥ |
vastutvaṃ nāma sāmānyameṣṭavyaṃ tatsamānatā || 1713 ||
anyathā hi na sā buddhirbalibhugdaśanādiṣu |
varttate niyatā tveṣā bhāveṣveveti kiṃ kṛtam || 1714 ||
sārūpyānniyamo'yaṃ cetsāmānyaṃ ca tadeva naḥ |
svabhāvānugatā śaktiranenaivopavarṇitā || 1715 ||
atyantabhinnatā tasmāddhaṭate naiva kasyacit |
sarvaṃ hi vasturūpeṇa bhidyate na parasparam || 1716 ||

“If the intended entity is entirely not-equal to other things, then it ceases to be an entity; for that which is excluded from ‘entity’, where could there be any other position, except non-existence,—as in the case of the ‘sky-flower’? Thus then, one who wishes the entity to be not-equal to the ‘sky-flower’ must accept the universal ‘entity’ as the character common to all entities—(1711-1713)

“If it were not as asserted, then, to what would this fact be due—that the common notion of ‘entity’ does not appear in connection with the ‘crow’s teeth’, while it always appears as restricted to entities alone?—If it be urged that—the said restriction is due to similarity’,—then our answer is that, that same (similarity) is what we call ‘commonalty’.—This same remark applies also to the view that ‘the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in the nature of things’.—Absolute difference (from other entities) therefore is not possible for any entity; because entities do not differ from each other, on the point of being ‘entities’.”—(1714-1716)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts set forth another argument in favour of the view that every entity has a commonalty, a general character:—[see verse 1714-1716 above]

‘If it were not, etc. etc.’—If an entity were ‘not-equal’ to—different from—every other entity,—then how is it that the common idea of ‘being an entity’ is found to appear only in connection with the Jar and such things, and not in connection with the ‘crow’s teeth’ (and other non-entities)? The basis for this has to be explained.

It might be urged that—‘the basis for this lies in the similarity (among entities)’.

Then it becomes established that- that same Similarity is the ‘Commonalty’, the Common character; ‘similarity’ being synonymous with ‘Commonalty’ (Common character).

It might be explained that—‘the said comprehensive potency subsists in the Jar and other entities only, and not in the Crow’s Teeth and such non-entities; hence ‘the capacity of the nature of things’ is what forms the basis of the notion in question’.

This view also is dispensed with by what has been just explained; i.e. the answer to this is the same as that to the view regarding ‘Similarity’; because the said capacity may be regarded as the required ‘Commonalty’.

From all this it follows that, in the form of ‘entities’, all things—the Jar and the rest—are not-different from one another.—(1714-1716)