Verse 340-342

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

भेदाभेदविकल्पस्य वस्त्वधिष्ठानभावतः ।
तत्त्वान्यत्वाद्यनिर्देशो निःस्वभावेषु युज्यते ॥ ३४० ॥
न वस्तुनि यदेतद्धि तन्नेति प्रतिषेधनम् ।
तद्वस्त्वन्तरवत्तस्माद्व्यक्तमन्यत्वमुच्यते ॥ ३४१ ॥
अतद्भावनिषेधश्च तत्त्वमेवाभिधीयते ।
नातिक्रामति तद्वस्तु तत्त्वं भेदं च वस्तुनः ॥ ३४२ ॥

bhedābhedavikalpasya vastvadhiṣṭhānabhāvataḥ |
tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣu yujyate || 340 ||
na vastuni yadetaddhi tanneti pratiṣedhanam |
tadvastvantaravattasmādvyaktamanyatvamucyate || 341 ||
atadbhāvaniṣedhaśca tattvamevābhidhīyate |
nātikrāmati tadvastu tattvaṃ bhedaṃ ca vastunaḥ || 342 ||

It is only an entity that can be liable to the alternatives of being ‘different’ or ‘non-different’; hence it is only in regard to things that are formless (i.e. non-entities) that it can be correct not to speak of them either as ‘different’ or ‘non-different’ (from one another);—not so in regard to an entity;—because in the case of the denial ‘this is not what that is,—like a different thing’,—it is difference that is clearly spoken of;—similarly when there is denial ‘this is not what that is not’, what is clearly spoken of is non-difference (between the two); thus it is that an entity can never escape from being either different or non-different from another entity.—(340-342)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

As a matter of fact, an Entity alone can be the substratum of difference and non-difference;—never a non-entity; hence the non-mention of both difference and non-difference is possible only in regard tongs that are formless,—i.e. have no character of their own; such non-mention is not right in regard to an Entity;—such is the construction of the sentence; and the reason for this lies in the fact that no third alternative is possible.

“Why is no third alternative possible?”

Answer:—Because in the case of the denial etc. etc.;—that is, when there is the denial, ‘The Pudgala is not of the nature of Colour and other things’, what is mentioned is the difference of the Pudgala from Colour and other things; because the denial of the fact of one thing being the same as another is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of a different character for the former. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is devoid of the character of another thing, it is different from it,—e.g. Colour is different from Feeling;—the entity named ‘Pudgala,’ is devoid of the character of Colour and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as different from them) based upon the nature of things.—Similarly where there is denial ‘this is not what that is’,—i.e. the denial of its not being of the same character as the other thing,—what is meant is its non-difference from thatng; because the denial of a real Entity being different from another thing is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of its being the same as that thing; if it were not so,—and no character is affirmed regarding that thing,—then all character being denied of it, it would become a non-entity; because a non-entity is characterised by the denial of all character in regard to it. This argument may be formulated as follows:—When one thing is denied the character of being something other than another thing, it must be the same as this latter,—just as Colour is denied the character of being something different from itself;—the Pudgala (according to the opposite party) is denied the character of being something other than Colour and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as non-different from the latter) based upon the nature of things.—Thus we conclude that an Entity cannot escape from the alternatives of being different or non-different from another thing; so that the Premiss of one main reason (against the doctrine of the Vātsīputrīyas) is fully established.—(340-342)