Verse 259

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

स्थिरत्वान्निर्विभागत्वान्मूर्त्तानामसहस्थितेः ।
बिभर्त्ति दर्पणतलं नैव च्छायां कदाचन ॥ २५९ ॥

sthiratvānnirvibhāgatvānmūrttānāmasahasthiteḥ |
bibhartti darpaṇatalaṃ naiva cchāyāṃ kadācana || 259 ||

As a matter of fact, the mirror-surface can never contain the reflection (of anything),—because it is lasting, because it is indivisible, and because several things with material shape cannot subsist together.—(259)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author now proceeds to refute the possibility of the perception of all Reflections,—under both theories—that things are momentary and that things are not-momentary:—[see verse 259 above]

Because it is lasting,—i.e. not momentary,—therefore the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection.

Even if it is momentary, it cannot contain the reflection because it is indivisible; when the reflection is perceived it is perceived as if it were inside the mirror, just as the Water is perceived inside the well; and yet the Mirror-surface has no parts—i.e. vacant space;—because its component particles are closely packed. Hence the perception of the Reflection must be an illusion.

Or the term ‘nīrvibhāgatva’, ‘indivisibility’, may stand for absence of difference between the previous and succeeding states; and the reason for this absence is ‘because it is lasting’; so that the meaning comes to be—‘because on account of its lasting character it is devoid of difference between its previous and succeeding states’; that is, because it has no previous or succeeding states.

Further, because several things with material shape cannot subsist together,—‘the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection’,—this has to be construed here. Because what are perceived in the Mirror-surface are only reflections occupying the same space; material things with forms can never occupy the same points in space; as if they did, they would become one and the same.

This objection is applicable under both views—of things being momentary or non-momentary.—(259)