The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 195-196 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 195-196.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

मयेति प्रतिसन्धानमविद्योपप्लवादिदम् ।
क्षणिकेष्वपि सर्वेषु कर्त्रेकत्वादिभासतः ॥ १९५ ॥
मिथ्याविकल्पतश्चास्मान्न युक्ता तत्त्वसंस्थितिः ।
सामर्थ्यभेदाद्भिन्नोऽपि भवत्येकनिबन्धनम् ॥ १९६ ॥

mayeti pratisandhānamavidyopaplavādidam |
kṣaṇikeṣvapi sarveṣu kartrekatvādibhāsataḥ || 195 ||
mithyāvikalpataścāsmānna yuktā tattvasaṃsthitiḥ |
sāmarthyabhedādbhinno'pi bhavatyekanibandhanam || 196 ||

The ‘recalling’ of such notions as ‘by me (seen, heard)’, etc. must be due to perturbations of ignorance; as such notions of the one-ness of the agent (perceiver) are found to appear also in connection with all momentary things. from this false assumption, it cannot be right to deduce any conclusion regarding the true state of things; specially as even things that are diverse by reason of the diversity of their powers become the basis of an effect conceived of as one.—(195-196)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

As against the argument put forward by the Opponent under Text 180 above, to the effect that ‘the cognitions of Colour, etc. have one and several causes, etc. etc.’,—the Author urges as follows:—[see verses 195-196 above]

Seen by me and heard by me, etc. etc.’,—the ‘recalling’, in the ‘associating’ of several such cognitions, has been put forward as the reason for their having a single Cause (in the shape of the ‘Soul’).—But this reason is ‘inconclusive’;—as even in regard to momentary things, such ‘recalling’ is possible through the false assumption of their being due to a single Cogniser. Hence it cannot be right to deduce any conclusion regarding the true nature of things from the fact of such ‘recalling’,

Question—“In what way do your Moments (Momentary entities) come to be the cause of the said Recalling (of Cognitions)?”

AnswerBy reason of the diversity of their powers, etc.;—i.e. by reason of the peculiarity of its powers,—the thing which is many (diverse) becomes the ‘basis’—cause—of such single effects being recalled in one form; as is found in the case of such medicines of fever as Guḍūci and the rest; all which is going to be explained in detail later on.—(195-196)

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