Chapter I - The Group Of Triplets

Or rejection. According to the Cy. (344, 345), the various classes into which the states of the moral consciousness were distinguished (dhamma-vibhago) are now to be set forth by a method which, in its greater conciseness, is a rejection or discarding of the relatively more detailed exposition (vitthara-desanam) of Book I. 'Any intelligent person can recognise', for instance, that in the concise terms in which the answer to question [984] is couched, the answer to question [1], among others, is involved. Eelatively to the following Atthakatha, on the other hand (§ 1368 to end in the printed text), this method is in its turn less concise, more detailed.

By 'root' is meant 'cause, condition, bringing to pass, generating, originating, producing'. And 'since there is no such thing as good detached from a root', all good is hereby included. Asl. 344.

Manokammam, inadvertently omitted in the printed text. Cf, § 982 and passim.

Tad-ekattha ca kilesa. Ekattham is defined (Asl. 345) as located in one and the same thought by virtue of a common origin, or in one and the same person, by virtue of a common exclusion, to wit here, of corrupt or faulty states. On kilesa, see § 1229 et seq,

Apariyapanna. See below, § 992, also § 583.

To save much repetition throughout this division, these four skandhas are henceforward referred to as 'the four skandhas'.

Dhamma kiriya. Cf. § 566 et seq.

In the printed text sankhata should be asankhata.

The skandha of feeling is in this case the predominating factor, and not reckoned as merely an associate, or subordinate adjunct in consciousness. (Tarn should be inserted before sampayutto in the text.)

Sukha-bhumiyam. I have kept to the more literal rendering of bhumi here, in preference to some such term as ' stage ' (as in § 277 et seq.) or 'source', because of the analogy drawn by the Cy. (p. 346): — just as by saying 'This is a sugar-soil' or 'a rice-land' we mean localities where these products thrive, so by sukha-bhumi, etc., we mean a thought (or state of mind, cittam), which is the place (or occasion, than am) for the uprising of ease (or happiness).

K. invariably places a colon before that enumeration of four or more skandhas which is part of the usual procedure in these triplets. There is nothing explicit in the Cy. to justify my interpretation by the parenthesis 'in other words' of the somewhat amorphous construction of the answers thus punctuated. But I gather from its remarks that, in these concentrated replies, the skandha-list represents the preceding half of the answer, in which it occurs, under another aspect, viz., rasatthena, or that of groups in consciousness. This is really the method followed in detail throughout Book I., but here in mere outline: first a reply in terms of dh am ma, then the Summary, which is mainly, at least, in terms of skandha. Cf., e.g., §§ 431-441, 441a, 442. Also Asl. 152.

Vipakadhamma-dhamma, paraphrased (Asl. 42) by vipaka-sabhava-dhamma, states having a resultnature, or quality of result. See above, p. 164.

See § 653 et seq.

Sasava. See § 1096 et seq.

See p. 165, note 2. The term apariyapanna, when applied to dhamma and used in an ethico-psychological sense, is described as here in terms of path, fruit and uncompounded element. See § 1287. Its positive correlate is paraphrased, in Asl. 50, by 'contained in the threefold cycle of existence ' (i.e., the worlds of sense, form, etc.). I do not know whether apariyapannam with this lofty significance occurs in either of the older Pitakas. But it appears in K. Y. 507, where it is declared a heresy to hold that any mere speculative opinion was of the Unincluded, and where the content of the latter concept is more amply set forth than in our manual.

Read ca after maggaphalani. The commentator vindicates the status of the arahat, here alluded to, as being free from all 'grasping' as follows: Although the skandhas (the temporary being) of the arahat may become a cause of grasping to those who say. Our mother's brother, the Thera! Our father's brother, the Thera! yet there is no grasping, no infection, attaching to the Paths, the Fruits and Nirvana. For just as there is no inducement to mosquitoes to alight on a ball of iron which has been heated all day, so these Things, by their excessive glory, do not attract the grasp of craving, pride or false opinion.

Or corrupting. See § 1229 (note) et seq.

Beginning with the skandha of material form.

See § 160. Part of the formula for the First Jhana. The world, universe, or heaven of the Formless is omitted, being a 'soil' where these mental processes could not grow. See §§265-268.

They would else come under the skandha of syntheses. See § 62, and p. 251, n. 7.

Read tarn before sampayutto.

See § 168—a phrase borrowed from the 'System of Fivefold Jhana'.

See § 162 et seq.

'Joy' is not counted as a mode of feeling, but as a 'synthesis' (see p. 11, note 4); 'ease', however, and 'disinterestedness' being two of the three modes of feeling, this skandha ceases to be merely an associated state.

Dassanam, lit., seeing or vision. In view of what can and can not be put away by 'insight', it must be remembered that the term is here used in the technical sense it possesses for Buddhist ethics, and means the mental awakening, or intellectual conversion, by which one became a sotapatti and entered the First Path — and no more. Asl. 356, 357; 43.

It was the vehicle for breaking the three Fetters named here, and numbered as 4th. 5th and 6th in the list of ten named later (§§ 1113, 1123, note). It represented a certain vantage-point for mind and heart, from which the Promised Land of Nirvana was caught sight of, and the fact of impermanence first discerned (see the standard passage on this and nana-dassanam, D. i. 76), as well as the futility of Substantialist theories, and the impotence of a religion of rules and works.

Confidence in the new methods sprang up with the wider vision. Dassanam was powerless to remove the cosmic processes of life and mind: the collocations of phenomena, the evolution of karma, the infinite mystery of the extrasensuous (see § 1008 and note).

On various ways of attaining this insight, see the interesting Kimsuka Sutta, S. iv. 191. Relatively to the higher standpoints to be gained it might rather, says Buddhaghosa, be called no-vision. For even as a man, bound on some mission to a king, if he saw the latter pass afar off on his elephant, would say, if questioned, that he had not seen him, he not having accomplished his mission, so the convert, though he have caught his first glimpse of Nirvana, yet because of all he has to do in the getting rid of evil, is said to have no vision. His knowledge consists in a contemplation of the Path.

On the Fetters, see § 1113 et seq.

Sakkaya-ditthi, embodying one of the most dangerous of all delusions from the Buddhist point of view, is by the Cy. (p. 348) connected with kayo, the phenomenal compound of five skandhas, and either with sat, in the sense of (noumenal) being, or with say am, one's own. Cf. S. N., verses 950, 951; Dhp., verse 367. The latter explanation — svakaya — is probably correct (vide E. Muller, 'Pali Grammar', p. 19). 'Individuality', then, stands for this skandha-complex, which we should now speak of as 'body and soul' (or mind) . Both term and theory are discussed by Dhammadinna in M. i. 299 et seq, (See an article by the writer in J. R. A. S., 1894, p. 324.) The fourth Upadana, or 'Grasping after a theory of soul', is described in identical terms. See § 1217.

Ditthi, which is here rendered by 'theory', and which might with equal propriety be translated by 'speculation' or 'views' — all four terms having a common etymological basis in the notion of seeing, or things seen — is in the answer rendered by 'opinion', as fitting better that 'muss of notions current among the mass of men' which in the case of the puthujjano does service for organized knowledge. Gotama might possibly have approved the Platonic description of δοξα as 'something more dusky than knowledge, more luminous than ignorance'.

To translate by 'heresy' or 'delusion' has the disadvantage of necessitating the use of other terms in the case of sound ditthi, such as that described, in M. P. S., Bh. I., as ditthi ariya niyyanika. Cf. below, § 1366.

Idha, a term, as the Cy. says, either of localization, or of instance in giving instruction; here used in the former sense, and meaning occurrence in the world. Asl. 348.

Assutava, lit., one who has not heard, i.e., not been taught, who through lack of investigation, inquiry, acquiring, in such matters as skandhas, elements, spheres, conditions, constituents, meditations, is without proper tradition and attainment. Ibid.

Puthujjano, the common worldling. The Cy. cites verses distinguishing Vliomme sensuel moyen as either blind or amiable; of these the former is here meant.

In another quotation (also as yet unverified) he is described as given to various common vices, governed by the individuality theory,

• hanging on the lips of various ordinary preachers, immersed in every kind of re-birth;
• complicating life with various common complexities;
• carried away by divers vulgar currents;
• appeased or feverish with various low sources of gratification or of irritation;
• steeped in, greedy of, entangled in, infatuated with, involved in, sticking to, held fast and hampered by, the five low pleasures of sense;
• veiled, muffled, shrouded in, closed and cloaked and covered up by, the five low hindrances (§ 1152 et seq);
• as absorbed among the countless folk in the past of low character and conduct opposed to noble doctrine;
• or, finally, as one separate and distinct from those noble folk who are given to virtue and learning.

Ariyanamadassavi, referring either to the Buddhas, the Pacceka-buddhas and the disciples of the Buddhas, or to the Buddhas only. Buddhaghosa points out at some length that the inability to perceive, lit., see, holy persons is no mere visual shortcoming, but a lack of insight or of intelligent inference. The truly noble, as such, seen with the bodily, or with the 'divine' eye, are not really seen. Their appearance (van no) is apprehended, but not the area of their noble nature, even as dogs and jackals, etc., see them and know them not. Even the personal attendant of a Thera may not discern the hero in his master, so hard is it without insight and understanding to discern the standpoint attained by the saints, or the conditions of true nobility. 'What is to thee this vile body that thou seest, Vakkali? He who seeth the Doctrine, he it is who seeth Mel' S. iii., p. 120; Asl. 350.

Avinito. The Cy. enumerates, with examples, the five modes of the discipline (vinaya) of self-control, and of that of renunciation. These are given in Childers, s.v. vinayo.

Sappurisa, meaning Pacceka-buddhas and the disciples of the Buddhas. (Asl. 349.)

These four 'views' respecting the relation of each skandha to a conceivable central entity or atta are discussed in my Introduction. All, according to the Cy. (p. 354), are obstacles to the Paths, though not to heaven (maggavarana na saggavarana), and are overcome during progress through the First Path.

Ida-paccayata.

See § 425. The specific forma of doubt are thus commented on (Asl. 354, 355):

1. As to whether or no the Teacher has the 32 major bodily marks, or the 80 minor bodily marks of a Buddha, or the requisite omniscience with respect to things past, future and present;
2. as to the adequacy of the Paths and their Fruits to lead indeed to the grand ambrosial Nirvana;
3. as to whether those of the Order are indeed at various stages of the path to salvation, or have rightly won their way so far;
4. as to whether the Training is helpful;
5. as to whether evolution by way of skandhas, dhatus and ayatanas has held in the past, or will hold in the future;
6. as to whether there is a twelve-graded cycle of causation, taking effect here and now or taking effect at all.

Ito bahiddha.

I have ventured to adopt a reading differing slightly from that both of the text and of K. The sense seems to demand it and the Cy. to imply it. The latter has: S i 1 e n a ti gosiladina, vatena ti govatadina va (sic lege), sllabbatena ti tadubhayena, suddhi ti kilesasuddhi paramattha-suddhibhutam va nibbanam eva. But it would not be in accordance with the methods of the Cy. to quote vatena ti if suddhivatena stood in the text. (Asl. 355.)

As to the terms gosila, govatam, it is not clear what were the practices and mode of life followed in the 'bovine morals', etc., of those who were called govattika, or in the 'canine (? Cynic) practices ' of the kukkuravattika. Both are named in M. i. 387. Cf. also Kh. P. Cy., p. 26.

Suddhi, it will be seen, is distinguished as, on the one hand, the mere renunciation of the Kilesas (see § 1229), on the other, perfect holiness or Nirvana.

On silabbataparamaso, see Rhys Davids' 'American Lectures', 146.

These are said to be chiefly speculation and perplexity (regarded not as 'fetters', but as plagues or evils), and, besides these, lust, hate, dulness, pride, stolidity, excitement, unconscientiousness, disregard of blame.

Or practice: bhavana, the collective name for the systematized effort in self-training of the disciple who, having attained 'insight', leaves 'the principles of the doctrine ' that he may ' go on unto perfection ' (Heb. vi. 1) — in other words, travel along the three higher Paths to Arahatship.

On the 'powers of bhavana', see A. i. 52.

In A. i. 43, the ' one thing needful ' for the perfecting of bhavana is said to be kayagata-sati, mindfulness in what concerns the body, or bodily action.

Hence only akusala dhamma, 'bad states', can be put away by insight and culture. Nor can even these two avail in mutual independence, for see §§ 1258, 1260. The rest of one's karma goes on accumulating. The good and the indeterminate, the modes of matter, and Simple Element: — these cannot cease for any individual until, according to Buddhaghosa, his abhisankhara-vinnanam (Asl. 357) — his constructing, storing intellect, itself dies out with the extinction of his life as Arahat. See Sum. on the Kevaddha Sutta, D. i. 223; ' Dialogues of the Buddha', i. 272 etseq.

Pahatabba-hetuka, 'That is, the cause of them (hetu etesam) is to be put away by insight'. Asl. 43.

ere the reading in the text is obviously corrupt. I follow that in K., viz.:

Tattha katama sakkayaditthi? . . . pe . . . ayam vuccati sakkayaditthi

— and so on.

This paragraph, in which I again follow K., is not included in the text at all. Nevertheless, Buddhaghosa comments on it (p. 357).

Here again I follow K. in reading pahatabba-hetu for hetuka. Buddhaghosa quotes the former reading (p. 358), as referring to the putting away of dulness accompanied by excitement.

Apacayagamino. On its opposite, see p. 82, note 2. The latter is tantamount to going to Nirvana. The two processes are compared to the building up and pulling down of a wall. Asl. 44.

Sekkha, i.e. (Asl. 44), springing up in the three, or in the seven courses of training (cf. Childers, s.v.). Asekkha implies that the student or probationer has perfected his studies and training and is become an adept, an Arahat. Cf. P. P., p. 14. On the term 'fruits of the life of the recluse', see the Samaiinaphala Sutta, D. i. 47.

Uparitthimam, a term used in P. P. i. 42 et seq., where it is applied to the 'Fetters' which are put off last Cf. below, § 1113, and p. 303. See also p. 166, n. 1.

Parittam, understood as involving intellectual and ethical, as well as physical insignificance — the connotation of the French term borne. The illustration chosen is that of a lump of cowdung ! The essential quality is appanubhavata, i.e., of little importance or efficacy generally. Parittam itself is ranked as an equivalent of the whole sphere of sense-experience. Asl. 44.

Mahaggata, i.e., in respect of 'the ability to resist vice, of abundance of good result, of wide extension', or of the attainment to a high pitch of will, energy, thought or wisdom. Ibid.

Appamana,or without measure. Asl. 45.

This is a long and cumbersome periphrasis for cittacetasika dhamma, but a reference to §§ 1187-1190 will show that such is the content of the term. And Western psychology has not suggested to me any more compressed equivalent. Cf., however, §§ 1282, 1284. 'Emotional' must be taken in its more limited sense, as the adjective to bare feeling or hedonic consciousness.

See § 1021.

The three subjects of this triplet of inquiry — dhamma hina, majjhima, pa nit a — are paraphrased (Asl. 45) as lamaka (of poor quality, cf, Vin. ii. 76), midway between this and the third quality, and supramundane or ideal (lokuttara).

Micchattaniyata, thus explained by the Cy. (ibid.): 'Wickedness' is that wrongful disposition which, in its desire for happiness, sees benefit in things baneful and persists in this perversion. ' Fixed in its consequences ' (lit., 'reaching down to') means yielding a result immediately on the disintegration of the skandhas (i.e., after death). Cf. M. P. S. 17: asmi . . . niyato — I am fixed or sure (as to my future); also K. V. 609-612, and P. P. 13: katamo ca puggalo niyato? The answer to this question is practically identical with those given in these sections. It is the persons (pug gal a) who are decisively good and bad that are called anantaraka (incurring immediate destiny good or bad) instead of the ' acts ' or the ' Paths', as in the Dh. S.

These five acts, the Cy. says, refer to ' matricide, etc'., as though the Abhithanas were here alluded to, whereas the five usually classed under this name appear to be murder, theft, impurity, lying and intemperance. Cf. §§ 1290, 1291. Compare the passage relating to lohituppado, or the wounding of a Buddha, Yin. ii. 193, which is called an anantarika-kammam. I venture to think that, in the Mil., p. 25, the phrase kopaficanantariyakammam karotiis not intended, as the translator infers, to sum up the five offences previously specified, but is an allusion to five others, of which matricide was one and lohituppado another. It only remains to ascertain whether or not the other three coincide with any other three of the six Abhithanas.

As to the immediacy of their consequences, whereas, from the Devadatta incident in the Cullavagga, the outrages entailed at least some of their retribution in this life, it will have been seen that, according to Buddhaghosa, the effect is experienced immediately after the cessation of the present life. The Cy. goes on: In the case of these acts, it is impossible for any other conduct to push off the karma of any one of them, so as to obtain room for the realization of its own consequences. Neither could the agent effect this if he were to build a golden sthupa as big as Mt. Sineru, or a vihara covered with gems and like a world-orb, or if he filled it with bhikkhus and their Buddha and found them in the four requisites during a whole lifetime. Asl. 358.

The wrong views which are also niyata are specified in the Cy. as those held by the Anti-causationists (ahetuka vada, D. i. 53; M. i. 407), those who denied the efficacy of action (akiriya-vada, D. i. 52; M. i. 404, 405), and the Nihilists (natthika-vada, or uccheda-vada, D. i. 55; M. i. 401-403). These are past praying for; more literally rendered, not a hundred, nor yet a thousand Buddhas would be able to enlighten them. Ibid.

The reading should be sammatta-niyata. Cf. Asl. 45; K.; K. V. 609.

"Path" means the quest of Nirvana, or the progress in the destruction of the Kilesas. (Asl. 45.)

'Maggahetuka, i.e., the cause of those (states) in the sense of conditioning them is the Eightfold Path'.

Asl. 45.

Later (p. 359) the Cy. gives the purport of this triad as follows:

'In the first formula the kind of causal conjunction of the skandhas, in their connexion with the Path by way of cause, in the sense of condition, is set forth. In the second, the kind of causal conjunction of the other parts of the Path with Eight Views, which are a constituent of the Path and are reckoned as cause (am oho; cf. §§ 16, 34, 1054); and in the third, the kind of causal conjunction of Right Views with those causes that are operative in the Path, is set forth'.

Yet in the text it is the causal connexion of the four skandhas that is predicated about in all three formulae. Does this implicate discrepant versions of the text?

Ariyamaggasamangissa maggangani.

In the printed text, after a mo ho read ime dhamma magga-hetu. Cf. Cy. 45; K.; also above, § 1011.

Maggadhipatino, i.e., the Path, having them (those states) under its control in the sense of maintaining them, is their governor. Asl. 45. Later (p. 359) we get supplementary remarks showing that the relation of governor (or sovereign) and governed, in this connexion, resembles that between Christ and the believer who brings 'into captivity every thought to the obedience of Christ' (2 Cor. x. 5).

All such thoughts or 'states' are insignificant (par it t a) as compared with the one great object of devotion — the Path, the Fruit, Nirvana. Even to contemplate the progress of others in the Path, or to have seen the Tathagata work a double miracle, is not precious to the student as is his own discernment and realization of what the Path means to liim.

The construction in this sentence is obscure. Vimamsadhipateyyam is apparently in the nominative case. The Cy., however (p. 359), substitutes, in quoting, the instrumental — which only makes the reading obscurer.

Anyway, it proceeds to explain that the term shows a joint 'supremacy 'between the Path and an adhipateyyam to be only possible (cf. § 269) when the latter is either 'investigation' or 'energy'.

When the latter is 'desire' or a 'thought', then the Path yields its sway over the mind to the adhipateyyam. But when the student makes either of the former his governing influence, both it and the Path are his joint governors.

Uppanna, i.e., which from the moment they came into being, and for as long as they had distinguishable being, have come to pass and been sustained. Asl. 45.

Read nibbatta, abhinibbatta.

Uppadino, i.e.,

'will certainly arise, from the fact that their efficient cause is in part completed'

(Asl. 45).

Later (pp. 360, 361) the potential happening of these resultant states is declared to be due to the enduring validity of their conditions (dhuvapaccayatthena), which cannot fail to produce their effects, even though 100,000 aeons intervene. The gospel (lit.. Path) of the future Buddha, Metteyya, is anuppanno, but his (or anyone's) fruition belongs to the uppadino dhamma.

Avipakkavipakanam. Inserted in K., but, as is stated in that edition, not inserted in the Burmese or the European text.

The printed text reads niruddhangata; the Cy., niruddha vigata; K., niruddha parinata (not viparinata).

Abhinibbatta is omitted in the printed text. Cf. § 1035; also K.

Paccuppanna, the word rendered by 'present' in the question. Cf. our 'ob-vious', 'ob-jective', 'ob-ject', in its most general psychological sense, as something present to the subject of the mental 'states'.

Cf. § 1022.

On ajjhatta and bahiddha cf. §§ 742, 743. The Cy. distinguishes four varieties in the connotation of ajjhattam, namely, gocarajjhattam, niyakajjhattam, ajjhattajjhattam and visayajjhattam, two of which are identical with two of the three meanings cited by Childers. The specific meaning used here is said to be the second.

For niyata read niyaka.

'That is, all beings except one's self'.

Asl. 361.

Upadinna is omitted in the printed text.

Tad ubhayam is the curt answer. It is to be regretted that Buddhaghosa's fertility in illustration was not applied to this species of d ham ma. Incidentally one gathers that they alternate between self-reference and reference to other selves.

For whereas the dhamma in the first and third questions are said to be either 'limited' or 'enlarged' (see §§ 1019-1021), and those in the second are said to be 'infinite', states that are 'infinite' are said

'not to take as their object that which now relates to the external, now to the self'.

(Asl. 361, 362.)

Cf. § 1022 et seq.

See § 597 et seq., § 657 et seq.

See § 980.