Chapter I - The Eight Main Types Of Thought Relating To The Sensuous Universe

The brackets enclosing this and all other headings indicate that the latter have been transposed from the position they occupy in the text. There each heading stands at the end of its section.

See Introduction.

Ibid.

Nana-sampayuttani. According to the Cy., a good thought deserves to be thus distinguished on three grounds:

1. from the karma it produces,
2. from the maturity of the faculties it involves,
3. and from the remoteness of mental and moral infirmity which it implies (Asl. 76).

Sampayuttam — lit., convoked — is, in the Kathavatthu, quoted by the Cy. (p. 42), described as including the following relations (between one "state" and another):

concomitant (sahagata),
connate (sahajata),
contiguous (sarnsattha),
having a common origin (ekuppada),
a common cessation (ekanirodha),
a common basis or embodiment (ekavatthuka),
a common object of attention (ekarammana).

In the present work the term is subsequently rendered by "connected", e.g., in § 1007, etc. The preceding adjectival phrase, somanassa-sahagatam, which I have rendered "accompanied by happiness", is virtually declared by the Cy. to be here equivalent to somanassa-sampayuttam, inasmuch as it is to be interpreted in its fullest intension.

Of its five distinguishable shades of meaning, the one here selected is that of "conjoined" (samsattham). And of the four distinguishable connotations of "conjoined", the one here selected is that of "connate". Hence "accompanied by" means here "connate".

And further, inasmuch as the concomitance is not between two corporeal phenomena, or between a corporeal and an incorporeal phenomenon, it is of that persistent and thoroughgoing kind — persisting beyond the common origin — which is described under the word "associated".

Thus far the intricate Buddhaghosa. But I have yet to discover any attempt to analyze the laws governing the process of association between mental states, such as we first find in Aristotle.

On "happiness", see §§ 10, 18.

Ruparammanam, saddarammanarn, etc., i.e,, either as a present sensation or as a representative image relating to the past or future ; in the language of Hume, as an impression or as an idea ; in the more comprehensive German term, as Vorstellung (Asl. 71). See Introduction.

Literally, an object that is tangible — the standard Pali term.

Dhammarammanam — the "object", that is, of representative imagination or ideation (ma no, cittam, Asl., 71), just as a thing seen is the object of sight. Buddhaghosa rejects the opinion that a dhammarammanam is something outside the range of the senses, and cites M. i. 295, where Sariputta declares that, whereas each sense has its specific field, the mano has all these five fields as its scope.

At the moment when an object enters "the door of the eye" or other sense, it enters also the door of the ideating faculty causing the consciousness, or one's being, to vibrate (bhavangacalanassa paccayo hoti), just as the alighting bird, at the same moment, strikes the bough and casts a shadow {ibid. 72). — As we might say, presentative cognition is invariably accompanied by representative cognition. —

Then, in the course of the mental undulations arising through this disturbance by way of sense impact, one of these eight psychoses termed Mahacittani may emerge. "But in pure representative cognition (suddha-manodvare) there is no process of sensory stimulation", as when we recall past sense-experience. —

The process of representation is illustrated in detail, and completes an interesting essay in ancient psychology. In the case of seeing, hearing, and smell, past pleasant sensations are described as being simply revived during a subsequent state of repose. In the case of taste and touch, it is present disagreeable sensations which suggest certain contrasted experience in the past. But the commentator is not here interested in "association by contrast" as such.

Lit., "or whatever [object the thought] is about". The gist of the somewhat obscure comment is that, while no new class of objects is here to be understood over and above those of present or past sensations, there is no serial or numerical order in which these " become material for thought.

According to Buddhaghosa the "states" numbered xxxiv-vi are considered as equivalents of those numbered xxxi-iii respectively, but as taken under another aspect. In the prior enumeration the threefold ' root of good ' is set out ; in the latter, reference to the "path of karma" is understood (Asl. 129).

Nine other states, according to the Cy., are here implied as factors in this psychosis, viz.,

desire (or conation, or volition, chando),
resolve (adhimokkho),
attention (manasikaro),
equanimity (tatramaj jhattata),
pity (karuna),
sympathy (mudita),
abstinence from evil conduct in act, speech,
and mode of livelihood.

And the opening words of this and similar supplementary clauses in the text are coined into a technical term — ye-vapanaka, "the or-whatever" [states], — to signify such groups.

The Cy. then "defines" the nine: desire, qualified as orthodox desire (dhammachando), to distinguish it from ethically undesirable desire (cf. § 1097, etc.), is the wish to act, the stretching forth the hand of the mind  to grasp the object in idea. Resolve is steadfastness, decision, the being unshaken as a pillar.

Attention is movement, direction of the mind, confronting the object. Equanimity — lit., the mean (medium) state — is the being borne along evenly, without defect or excess, without partiality. Pity and sympathy are described in § 258 et seq. The last three give those three factors of the Eight- fold Path unrepresented in the analysis of the thought (Asl. 132, 133).

It is not without interest to note that in this supple- mentary category all the purely psychological states are wholly, or at least mainly, volitional or emotional.

Touch or contact must be understood in a very general sense, as the outcome of three conditions: an impingeing sentient organ, an impingeing agency conceived as external to the sentient organ, and impact or collision. The similes in Mil. 60 of the rams and the cymbals are quoted in the Cy. The eye and its object are the usual illustration, but the representative imagination (mano or cittam) and its object are included as proceeding by way of contact, only without impact (sanghattanam).

The real causal con- nexion in every case — so I understand the, to me, obscurely worded comment to say (Asl. 109) — is mental, even though we speak of an external agency, just as when lac melts with heat we speak of hot coals as the cause, though the heat is in the lac's own tissue.

"Contact" is given priority of place, as standing for the inception of the thought, and as being the sine qua non of all the allied states, conditioning them much as the roof- tree of a storied house supports all the other combinations of material {iUd, 107).

Vedana is a term of very general import, meaning sentience or reaction, bodily or mental, on contact or im- pression. Sensation is scarcely so loyal a rendering as feeling, for though vedana is often qualified as "born of the contact" in sense-activity, it is always defined generally as consisting of the three species —

1. pleasure (happiness),
2. pain (ill),
3. and neutral feeling

— a hedonistic aspect to which the term 'feeling' is alone adequate. Moreover, it covers representative feeling.

This general psychical aspect of vedana, as distinct from sensations localized bodily — e.g., toothache — is probably emphasized by the term "mental" (cetasikam) in the answer. The Cy. points out that by this expression ( = cittanissitattam) "bodily pleasure is eliminated" (Asl. 139).

It also illustrates the general scope of vedana by the simile of a cook who, after preparing a number of dishes for his lord, tastes each critically to test them, the lord partaking of whichever he pleases. The cook represents all the associated states in the thought-complex, each functioning in one specific way. Vedana, the master, "enjoys the essence (taste) of the object" as a whole.

Tajja-manovifinanadhatu. Tajj a is paraphrased by anucchavikfi, sarupa. Cf. A. i. 207; S. iv. 215; M. i. 190, 191 ; Mil. 53. On the remainder of the compound term, see § 6. And on the hedonistic expressions in the answer, see § 10.

Ceto-samphassajam . . . vedayitam. The latter term (experience) is, more literally, that which is felt, das Empfundene. Ceto, cittam are used interchangeably in the Cy. on these terms (see § 6). The "contact" is that between idea or object and thought, or the ideating agency, conceived as analogous to the impact between sense-organ and sense-object. In consequence of this contact or presentation, emotional affection arises in consciousness.

The apparently capricious way in which the intension of the term sanna is varied in the Pitakas makes it difficult to assign any one adequate English rendering. In the Mahavedalla Sutta (M. i. 293) and elsewhere (c/. Mil. 61) it is explained as the relatively simple form of intellection or cognition which consists in the discernment, recognition, assimilation of sensations — e.g., of colours, as "blue", etc. — the process termed in modern English psychology sense- perception, except that it is not quite clear that, in Buddhist psychology, as in English, the perception is made only on occasion of sense-stiimdation.

The answer, indeed, in our § 4 alludes to representative activity only. In the Maha- parinibbana Sutta, however {cf. A. v. 105), sanna stands for the intellectual realization of a number of highly complex concepts, such as impermanence, non-substan- tiality, etc. In the Potthapada Sutta (D. i. 180-187), again, the sanna discussed is clearly what we should call consciousness, whether as opposed to the unconsciousness of trance, or as the raw material of nanam, or as conceivably distinct from the soul or Ego. Lastly, in a more popular sense the term is used (notably in the Jatakas and in commentators' similes) for sign, mark, or token.

Here, if we follow the Cy. (Asl. 110), sail ii a means simply that sense-perception which discerns, recognises and gives class-reference to (upatthita-visaya), the impressions of sense. Its procedure is likened to the carpenter's recognition of certain woods by the mark he had made on each to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of jewelry by the ticket on each ; to the wild animal's discernment in the scarecrow of the work of man.

The essence of saiina is said to be recognition by way of a mark. In this notion of mark and marking lies such continuity of thought as may be claimed for the various uses of the term. The bare fact of consciousness means ability to discriminate — that is, to mark. To mark is to perceive. And the ideas or concepts of "impermanence", "impurity", and the like, were so many acts of marking, though of a highly "rerepresentative" character. Sanna, no less than cittam (see Introduction), and "thought", stands for both faculty and any act or product of that faculty. And it is even objectified so far as to signify further the result of any such act — that is, in its connotation of mark or sign.

It is, I believe, when connoting the more specific sense of faculty, or of skandha, that it may safely be rendered by "perception" or "marking", and may be taken to mean the relatively "superficial", "transient" (Asl. 110, 111) play of cognition when concerned with objects of sense. In ch. xiv. of the Visuddhi Magga — in a passage the late Henry C. Warren was good enough to transcribe for me — sanna is in this way, and this way only, distinguished from viiina- nam and panna. The latter terms stand for cognition at (as we might say) a relatively higher and a still higher power, in virtue of the greater depth and complexity of the concepts they were exercised about (see §§6, 16).

There is no more difficult problem in interpreting the Dhamma Sangani than to get at the grounds on which its compilers, and subsequently its commentator, saw fit to set out mutually independent descriptions of terms etymologi- cally so identical as cetana and cittam. The only parallel that suggests itself to me is the distinction drawn, during a long period in British philosophy, between "reasoning" and "reason" — that is, between deductive inference and the nous, or noetic function.

Both pairs of terms are quite popular in form. Compare, e.g., in the Nidana-katha (Jat. i. 74), Buddha's reply to Mara: ' I have here no con- scious (or intelligent) witness. . . . Let this . . . earth, un- conscious though it be, be witness. . . . Sacetano koci sakkhi, etc. . . . ayam acetanapi . . . pathavi sak- khlti.' Again, in A. i., p. 224, the import seems simple and quite untechnical:

"Their thoughts (cetana) and hopes (lit., thinking and hoping) are fixed on lower things."

Hence I have kept to terms popular in form. This does not justify the use of terms so undifferentiated as 'thinking' and ' thought ' ; yet I have returned to them, after essaying half a dozen substitutes, for various reasons. They show the close connection between the Buddhist pair of terms, instead of obscuring it ; they are equally popular and vague in form and extension; the import of cetana has much in common with a psychological account of thinking ; no term misfits cittam less than "thought", unless it be "heart", on which see Introduction.

It is unfortunate that Buddhaghosa does not give a comparative analysis of the two, as he does in the case of vitakka-vicara and piti-sukham. Under cetana he expatiates in forcible similes, describing it as a process of activity and toil, and as a co-ordinating, order- ing function. He likens it to an energetic farmer, bustling about his fifty-five labourers (the fifty-five co-constituents in the thought-complex) to get in the harvest ; to a senior apprentice at the carpenter's, working himself and supervis- ing the tasks of the others ; to the leader of a warrior band, fighting and inciting. To these notions the definition of Nagasena (Mil. 61) only adds that of preparing (abhisan- kharanam), the other qualifying term being merely a denominative form (as if we should say "thinkifying") .

In so far, then, as "thinking" connotes representative, co-ordinative intellection, it coincides with cetana. In its narrower, technical sense of intellection by way of general notions, it does not (see Introduction). Any way, to call it thinking is sufficiently indefinite, and does not preclude the rendering of it elsewhere by such terms as "reflecting", "cogitating", "considering", etc. But the problem has still to be solved of how it is related to such terms as sarin as, c it tarn, and vinnanam. With regard to skandha, it is classed, not with cittam, but under the sankhara- skandha, § 62.

Cittam, together with the terms in which it is de- scribed, is discussed in my Introduction.

Vitakko and vicaro is another pair of terms which it is hard to fit with any one pair of English words. It is very possible that academic teaching came to attach a more preg- nant and specialized import to them than was conveyed in popular and purely ethical usage. Cf, M. i., Suttas xix. and XX., where vitakka would be adequately rendered by ideas, notions, or thoughts. In Asl. 114, 115, on the other hand [cf. Mil. 62, 63), the relation of the two to cittam and to each other is set out with much metaphor, if with too little psychological grasp. Vitakko is distinctively mental procedure at the inception of a train of thought, the deliberate movement of voluntary attention. As a king ascends to his palace leaning on the arm of favourite or relative, so thought ascends to its object depending upon the conceptive act (vitakko; Asl. 114).

Other metaphorical attributes are its impingeing upon, circum-impingeing upon (paryahanam), the object, and, again, bringing it near. Hence in selecting "conception" in preference to "reasoning", by which vitakko has often been translated, I wished to bring out this grasping, constructive, reaching-out act of the mind, this incipient fetch of the imagination, elaborated in the Buddhist scholastic analysis of the term ; but I had no wish to read our own logical or psychological import of con- ception as intellection by way of general notions, or the like, into the Eastern tradition. Yet just as conception may be so used as to include "reasoning" or "ratiocination", so vitakko is, in the reply, described by takko, the term used for ratiocinative procedure, argument, or logic {cf. D. i. 12, 21). "What", asks the Cy., 'does one reason about (takkesi) ? About a pot, a cart, the distance of anything. Well, vitakko is a stronger reasoning.'

On "disposition", "right intention", see § 21.

Appana vyappana, the latter an intensive form of the former (Asl. 142, 143). In the "Yogavacara's Manual" (p. xi and passim) appana denotes the dawn of the desired concept during the practice of regulated meditation. Bud- dhaghosa defines it thus: — ekaggam cittam arammane appenti.

Cetaso abhiniropana = arammane cittam . . . patitthapeti (ibid.)

Vicaro, as compared with vitakko, was used to express the movement and maintenance of the voluntary thought- continuum, as distinguished from the initiative grappling with the subject of reflection. Examining in detail, as com- pared with grasping the whole, is also read into it by com- mentators (Asl. 114). It is a pounding up (anumajja- nam), as well as a linking together. Metaphors are multiplied, to show its relation to vitakko.

It is as the reverberation of the beaten drum or bell is to the beating; as the planing movement of the bird's wings after the initial upsoaring ; as the buzzing of the bee when it has alighted on the lotus; as the scouring of the dirty bowl when clutched; as the manipulating hand of the potter, vitakko being represented by the hand which holds the clay to the wheel, and so on. "Investigation" would well represent the sustained activity ; "analysis", the cogitation in details ; "discursive thought" gives some of the import of both, without introducing modern and Western implications.

Like the adjusting of bow and arrow. "Focussing" is anupekkhamano.

Piti, as distinguished from sukham, is explicitly ex- cluded from the skandha of feeling, considered as the irreducible hedonic constituent, and referred to the composite psychoses of the sankhara skandha. It con- notes emotion, as distinct from bare feeling ; that is to say, piti is a complex psychical phenomenon, implying a "central psycho-physical origin" and a widely diffused "somatic resonance" (ef. Sully, ' The Human Mind,' ii. 56).

It arises out of a present idea, and suffuses the whole being. By Buddhaghosa's day it was divided into five species : the thrill of joy, just causing "the flesh to creep" ; the flash of joy, like lightning ; the flood of joy, like the breakers on a sea-shore ; ecstasy or transport, in which the subject could float in the air ; and overwhelming suffusing joy (Asl. 115, 116). Instances are related of the fourth species (ubbega-piti), the inspiring idea being 'Buddharammanam^ (see also Visuddhi Magga, ch. iv. ; "Yogavacara's Manual", vii.). The same word (ubbego) is used to describe the anguish or trembling over guilt discovered. See below, § 31 n.

Vitti, meaning literally, as the Cy. points out, prosperity, wealth, and used here by analogy as a state conditioned by a source of pleasure. ' Happiness arises to him who is joyful through his joy, as it arises to the wealthy through his rice-possessions.' (Asl. 143.)

Attamanata cittassa. Buddhaghosa, who did not know the true etymology of this term, is ready as ever with a guess : attano manata, or mentality of one's self, not of another, subjective experience. If I am pained or pleased, that is peculiarly my aft'air (ibid.). Psychologically it is interesting to note that he is prepared to find this intimate, subjective reference in a state of intense feeling. "Feeling is subjective experience jjar excellence . . . our feelings . . . are all our own." (Sully, ' The Human Mind,' ii. 2 ; G. C. Eobertson, ' Elements of Psychology,' 185-188.)

To contrast piti with sukham, Buddhaghosa draws a charming picture of the traveller who, fordone with journeying through a desert, hears with joy of a pool in a grove, and with joy comes upon it, and who, on drinking, bathing, and resting in the shade is filled with ease. Sukham, it is true, is not bare quiescence ; it is positive, pleasurable feeling, and may have active concomitants; its "essence" is expansion or increase (upabruhanam).

But just as dukkham means, not so much pain as ill-being or misery, so does sukham mean well-being or sane and sound csenaesthesis. And as "joy" is the satisfaction of gaining (potentially or actually) what we desire, so is 'ease' the enjoyment of the flavour (French, savour er) of what we have gained (Asl. 117). See further § 60. "Mental ease" (cetasikam sukham) is perhaps more correctly somanassam, rendered (§ 1, etc.) by 'happiness,' sukh am being sometimes distinguished as bodily (kayikam) only. See S. v. 209.

"Citt" ekaggata, the one-peaked condition of mind, is a name for concentration (samadhi), says the Cy. (p. 118). And accordingly, whereas under § 15 it gives no further description of samadhi, it here applies to citt' ekaggata the metaphors used in Mil. 38 to illustrate samadhi, viz., the centre part of a tent-shaped hut, and a chieftain leading his army.

It then adds that this samadhi, which is called self-collectedness, has, as its characteristic mark, the absence of wandering, of distrac- tion ; as its essence, the binding together of the states of mind that arise with it, as water binds the lather of soap ; and as its concomitants, calmness, or wisdom — for it is said, "he who is at peace he understands, he sees things as they really are" — and ease. The steadfastness of thought is likened to the steadiness of a lamp-flame in a windless place.' See ' Yogavacara's Manual,' p. xxvi.

These three cognate terms are in the text cittassa thiti santhiti avatthiti. According to the Cy. (p. 143), the standing unshaken in or on the object (arammane) connoted by thiti is modified by the prefix sam to imply kneading together (sampindetva) the associated states in the object, and by the prefix ava to imply the being im- mersed in the object. The last metaphor is in Buddhist doctrine held applicable to four good and three bad states — faith, mindfulness, concentration ( = self-collectedness) and wisdom ; craving, speculation and ignorance, but most of all to self-collectedness.

Avisaharo, avikkhepo [v. § 57). Distraction and loss of equilibrium are attributed to the presence of ' excite- ment and perplexity ' (§§ 425, 429 ; Asl. 144).

Samatho. Distinguished as of three species : mental calm (so used here) ; legal pacification, or settlement ; calm in all the sanskaras, by which, according to the Cy. (144), is meant the peace of Nirvana.

On "faculty", see Introduction.

Faith is characterized and illustrated in the same terms and approximately the same similes as are used in Mil., pp. 34-60. That is to say, it is shown to be a state of mind where the absence of perplexity sets free aspiration and energy. It is described as trust in the Buddha and his system. There is, however, no dwelling just here on any terminus ad quern, as St. Paul did in speaking of "the prize for the mark of the high calling", etc., towards which he pressed in ardent faith.

There is, rather, an insistence on that self-confidence born of conviction of the soundness of one's methods and efforts which is, as it were, an aspect of faith as a vis a tergo. In the simile of the stream, the Cy. differs from Trenckner's version of the Milinda to the extent of making the folk afraid to cross because of alligators and other monsters, till the hero takes his sword and plunges in. See the note on ' faith ' in the translation of Mil. i. 56.

I.e., in the Buddha, the Doctrine and the Order. Buddhaghosa is only interested in making the etymology bear on ethics, and compares the "downward plunge" of confidence (o-kappana) in the attitude of faith to the "sinking" in "mindfulness", the "grounded stand" in "con- centration", and the "sounding" penetration of "wisdom" Asl. 144, 145).

The Cy. puts forward an alternative explanation of the repetition in the description of this and following com- pounds of the first term of the compound, viz., "faith". According to the former, it is the method of Abhidamma to set out in isolation the adjectival part of a compound on which the substantival part depends: faith-faculty = faith (faculty of).

According to the latter, the identity between the two abstractions, faith and faith-faculty, is brought out. The case of woman and attribute of femininity, it remarks, is different. (This may be a groping after the distinction between concrete and abstract.)

Viriyam is by Buddhaghosa connected with

(a) vira, the dynamic effectiveness which is the essence of the genus "hero" (viro),

(b) iriya, vibrating movement. He charac- terizes it by the two notions, "supporting" and "grasping at", or "stretching forward" (paggaho), and, again, by "exerting" (ussahanam). Of. Mil. 36; Sum. Vil. 63.

And he cites the same similes as nppear in the Milinda. He seems to have wished, as modern psychologists have done, to account for the two modes of conscious effort : Resistance and Free Energy. But he also emphasizes the fact that the energy in question is mental, not bodily (pp. 120 et seq., 145).

Arambho (c/. ar am man am), overt action as distin- guished from inaction, hence action at its inception, is dis- tinguished by the Cy. as having six different implications, according as there is reference to karma, to a fault com- mitted, to slaying or injury, or to action as such (k iriya), or energy as such.

I do not pretend that the four following pairs of words fit those in the text exactly. They are mere approximations. 'Endeavour' is vayamo, the term representing 'energy' in the Noble Eightfold Path. "Unfaltering" effort (asithila-parakkamata) is the attitude of one who has made the characteristic Buddhist vow : Verily may skin and nerve and bone dry up and wither, or ever I stay my energy, so long as I have not attained whatsoever by human vigour, energy, and effort is attainable ! (M. i. 480). The desire sustained — lit., not cast down — is that felt on an occasion for making good karma.

Buddhaghosa's comment on sati, in which he closely follows and enlarges on the account in Mil. 37, 38, shows that the traditional conception of that aspect of conscious- ness had much in common with the Western modern theory of conscience or moral sense. Sati appears under the metaphor of an inward mentor, discriminating between good and bad and prompting choice. Hardy went so far as to render it by "conscience", but this slurs over the in- teresting divergencies between Eastern and Western thought.

The former is quite unmystical on the subject of sati. It takes the psychological process of representative functioning (without bringing out the distinction between bare memory and judgment), and presents the same under an ethical aspect. See also under hiri, §30; and the notion as described in "Questions of Milinda", 38, n. 2.

The threciold mention of sati in the reply (c/. § 12) agrees with K., but not with Puggala Panfiatti (p. 25). It is not noticed by the Cy.

Apilapanata. The Atthasalini solves the problem pre- sented by this term (see Milinda (S.B.E.), vol. i., p. 58, n. 2) by deriving it from pilavati, to float, and interprets: — "not floating on the surface like pumpkins and pots on the water", sati entering into and plunging down into the object of thought. Cf. § 11, n. 2 ; § 12, n. 2, in which connection the term is again used. The positive form occurs m/m, §1349. P. P.has(a)vilapanata (21,25). (Asl. 147; cf. 405.) I should have rendered the word by "profundity", had I not preferred to bring out the negative form of the original.

Buddhaghosa's etymology — "arammane cittam samma adhiyati, thapeti ti" — is no doubt incorrect, sam-a-dha being the sounder analysis; nevertheless, he brings out that voluntary and deliberate adjustment of the attention with a view to sustained mental effort which is connoted by samadhi (Asl. 122).

To fit the term pa fin a with its approximate European equivalent is one of the cruces of Buddhist philosophy. I have tried in turn reason, intellect, insight, science, under- standing, and knowledge. All of these have been, and are, used in the literature of philosophy with varying shades of connotation, according as the sense to be conveyed is popular and vague, psychological and precise, or transcen- dental and — passez-moi le mot — having precise vague- ness. And each of them might, with one implication or another, represent paiifia.

The main difficulty in choice lay in determining whether, to the Buddhist, panna stood for mental function, or for the aggregate product of certain mental functioning, or for both. When all the allusions to paniia in the Sutta Pitaka have been collated, a final trans- lation may become possible.

Here it must suffice to quote two. In M. i. 292, he who has pa fin a (paiinava) is declared in virtue thereof to understand (pajanati) the nature of the phenomenon of pain or ill (the Four Noble Truths). In D. i. 124 Gotama asks : What is this panna? and himself sets out its content as consisting in certain intellectual attainments, viz., the Jhanas, insight into the nature of impermanence, the mental image of one's self, the power of Iddhi, the cosmic Ear, insight into other minds, into one's own past lives, the cosmic Eye, and the elimination of all vitiating tendencies.

Buddhaghosa also (Vis. M., ch. xiv.) distinguishes panna from sanna and vinnana. He describes it as adequate to discern not only what these can, viz., sense-objects and the Three Marks (impermanence, jpain, and non- substantiality) respectively, but also the Path. For him, then, it might be called intellect "at a higher power". And in Gotama's reply, all those attain- ments are described in terms of intellectual 'process.

Nevertheless, it is clear that the term did not stand for hare mental process of a certain degree of complexityy but that it also implied mental process as cultivated in accordance with a certain system of concepts objectively valid for all Buddhist adepts. Hence, I think it best to reject such terms as reason, intellect, and understanding, and to choose wisdom, or science, or knowledge, or philo- sophy. Only they must be understood in this connexion as implying the body of learning as assimilated and applied by the intellect of a given individual. See further under nan am (Introduction) and vijja (§ 1296).

l.e., the doctrines of the "Four Truths" (Asl. 147). Cf Mil. 83.

Wisdom compared to the breadth and amplitude of the earth (Asl. 147, 148).

Medha. The Cy. explains the specific wisdom of this term to lie in "slaying" vice, or else in "grasping and bearing" (148).

Parinayika.

Literally, a goad.

"For the slaying of vices" (Asl. 148 ; cf Jat. iv. 174).

"In the sense of something lofty" (ibid. ; cf Dhp. v. 28 = Mil. 387).

Ang. ii. 139.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Repeated by way of antithesis to "dulness" (Asl. 148).

In the text, hoti before idam is probably an error.

This answer is exceptional in the omission of tasmim samaye('on that occasion ') at the beginning of the sen- tence. Cf. §§ 82, 295, 441. The reason of its omission is probably that in the presence of life, by which the com- plex of dhammas is sustained as lotuses by water, or as an infant by its nurse (Asl. 124), there is nothing contingent on the ethical quality (good, bad, or indeterminate) of the given complex.

For a discussion of the term ditthi, see § 1003. On these five factors of the Path see Introduction.

Sankappoisby the Cy. especially identified with the expression cetaso abhiniropana, application of the mind, the disposition or adjustment of attention, that on which the heart is set, hence aspiration, intention, purpose, design.

Hiri and ottappam, as analyzed by Buddhaghosa, present points of considerable ethical interest. Taken together they give us the emotional and conative aspect of the modern notion of conscience, just as sati represents it on its in- tellectual side. The former term "is equivalent to shame (lajja)", the latter to "anguish (ubbego) over evil-doing". Hiri has its source within ; ottappam springs from with- out. Hiri is autonomous (attadhipati) ; ottappam, heteronomous, influenced by society (lokadhipati).

The former is established on shame ; the latter on dread. The former is marked by consistency ; the latter by discernment of the danger and fearsomeness of error. The subjective source of hiri is fourfold, viz., the idea of what is due to one's birth, age, worth and education. Thus, one having hiri will think,

"Only mean folk (fishers, etc.), children, poor wretches, the blind and ignorant, would do such an act",

and he refrains. The external source of ottappam is the idea that "the body of the faithful will blame you", and hence one refrains. If a man have hiri, he is, as said the Buddha, his own best master. To one who is sensitive by way of ottappam, the masters of the faith are the best guides (Asl. 126).

In a supplementary paragraph (p. 127) the "marks" (consistency, etc.) are thus explained: In hiri one reflects on the worth of one's birth, one's teacher, one's estate, and one's fellow-students. In ottapparn. one feels dread at self-reproach, the blame of others, chastisement, and retribution in another life.

Hiriyat'i, paraphrased by jigucchati (Asl. 149 ; D. i. 174; M. i. 78).

Ottappati, paraphrased by ubbego (Asl. 124).

I.e., the fundamental condition, the cause of goodness. On "covetousness" and "infatuation", see §§ 35, 1059. Alobho and its two co-ordinate virtues, the threefold "root" of goodness, lose all their force in English negatives, but to a Buddhist convey doubtless as much impressive- ness, as much of positive import, as the negative ' immor- tality ' does to the Christian. Alobho, e.g., involves active altruism ; a d o s o, active sympathy ; a m o h o, a life of culture (see § 34, n.). I do not know any positive terms meet to represent them.

The "mark" of the first is absence of greed, or of adhe- sion, as a drop of water runs off a lotus leaf. Its essence is independence, like that of the emancipated bhikshu (Asl. 127).

K. reads adusana, adusitattam. The "mark" of a do so is said to be absence of churlishness and crossness (see § 1060) ; its essence the suppression of annoyance and fever ; its immediate result is loveliness — like the full moon (Asl. 127).

"The opposite of the pain felt when one is angry" (Asl. 150).

Buddhaghosa expatiates at some length on the excellencies of the fundamental trinity of Buddhist virtue. To take a few only:

alobho (1) involves health,
adoso (2) youth (hate ages quickly),
amoho (3) long life (through prudence).

(1) tends to material good through generosity (cf. "he that soweth plenteously", etc.) ;
(2) to the acquisition of friends, won and held by love ;
(3) to self-development.

(1) leads to life in the devaloka,
(2) to life in the Brahma- loka,
(3) to Arahatship.

(1) gives insight into imperma- nence, and, conversely,
(2) and
(3) into the other two marks ("pain" and "non-substantiality", respectively).

Abhijjha and lobho are synonymous. See §§ 1059 and 1136, where abhijjha stands for lobho.

Described (Asl. 129) as the being void of any wish to destroy welfare of others, bodily or mental, their advantages in this or other worlds, or their good reputation.

Cf. § 1 (xxxvi), footnote.

On the meaning of kayo see Introduction.

Passaddhi is described as a state free from pain — where pain is allayed and suppressed ; where tremor or unquiet is replaced by "coolness" — the opposite to the states called kilesas, especially excitement (§ 1229). Cf. D. i. 73 ; M. i. 37.

 Literally, lightness, described as the opposite of heavi- ness, sluggishness and the rigidity of stolidity and stupor (§ 1185).

"The capacity of changing quickly" (Asl. 150). Cf. Childers Dictionary, s.v. parivatti.

Read adandhanata. K. reads adandhata, but adandhanata in § 43 and § 639.

 The suppression of stiffness and resistance, or oppug- nancy ; the attitude antithetical to that belonging to the kilesas of opinionativeness and conceit.

Kammannata, literally workableness, or serviceable- ness — for good action (Asl. 151), by which one "succeeds in constructing objects of thought" (ibid. 130).

The antithesis to illness and diffidence (ibid, 131).

Defined as the antithesis of crookedness, deception (may a) and craftiness (Asl. 131).

Or comprehension ; to know anything according to its usefulness, its expediency, its scope, and to know it clearly. Named as approximately equivalent to "wisdom", the Cy. assigns to it as well the characteristics of mindfulness (ibid.), Cf the frequent twin qualification of sati-sampajano — e.g,, M. i. 274.

"The opposite of excitement or fluster" (Asl. ibid.). Literally, "the absence of wavering" (or vacillation or unsteadiness).

See above, p. 5.

The constituent dhammas of the first of the eight schemata of "good thoughts" (cittangani) are now rehearsed with reference to class and number. The motive probably was to aid the student either to a conspectus of the psychosis in question, or mnemonically. Thus, if the constituent factors of the thought be regarded under the aspect of classified aggregates (rasatthena, or khandhatthena), they all fall under four heads.

All that do not belong to the skandhas of feeling, perception, or intellect, come under the sanskara-skandha. Kegarded under the aspect of collocation or conjuncture (ayatanam), they all fall under two heads, corresponding to the fourth, and to the first, second, and third, of those four skandhas respectively. Regarded under the aspect of phenomena, of non-noilmena (sabhavatthena, suiliiatatthena, nis- sattatthena), they all fall under two heads, corre- sponding to the two preceding. We then come to partial aspects.

The omission in both this and the next answer of the phrase, used in § § 3 and 4 —

"born of contact with the appropriate element of representative intellection"

— is not noticed in the Cy. K. draws attention to it in a footnote, not at this passage, but at §§ 108-110. The omission is probably accidental.

See Introduction,

These three incorporeal nutriments or foods, together with the fourth or corporeal food, are given in the Sutta Pitaka: M. i. 261 ; S. ii. 11. In the A. they are not classified under the Catukka Nipata ; but in the Dasaka Nipata (A. v. 136) ten species of aharo are named, which have no reference to the four. E.g., "appropriate action is the aharo of health".

Buddhaghosa, dwelling on the etymology, calls them not so much conditions as supplementary casual "adducts" (a-har). Given, e.g., a living individual, adduce contact, and you get feeling : adduce cogitation, and you get the three "becomings" (in the universe of sense, etc.) ; adduce intellect, and you get conception and name- and-form (Asl. 153).

On the significance of the term "emptiness", see Introduction ; c/. § 344. The significance of this section in the student's course of study seems to have consisted simply in this : That the interest being withdrawn from the nature and numbers of the particular constituents in each of the species of mental activity to which the thought-complex is reducible, emphasis is laid on the principle that this same thought-complex is an aggregate or combination of such phenomenal factors, and nothing more.

"There are states of consciousness" (dhamma honti); that is (Asl. 155), "there is no permanent entity or self which acquires the states".

"The states are to be understood phenomenally. There is no other being or existence or person or individual whatever".

Sasankharena. Buddhaghosa's explanation of the term is terse and explicit. Sa = co-, sankharo = compound, is here used in the sense of concomitant with spring, motive, means, or cause (ussaho, payogo, upayo, paccayo-gahanam). For instance, a bhikshu dwelling in the neighbourhood of a vihara is inclined, when duty calls him to sweep the terrace round the sthupa, wait on the elders, or listen to the Dhamma, to find the way too far, and shirk attendance.

Second thoughts, as to the impro- priety of not going, induce him to go. These are prompted either by his own conscience (attano va payogena), or by the exhortation of another who, showing the dis- advantage in shirking, and the profit in attending, says, "Come, do it !" And the "good thought", i.e., of course, the resolve to go, is said 'to have arisen by way of a concomitant motive, by way of the taking hold of a cause.' Asl. 156.

This explanation is not discrepant with that of sasank- hariko, given to Childers by Vijesinha Mudliar. He was not, I take it, so bad a Buddhist as to mean that an asankharikam cittam was a thought in and for itself spontaneous, i.e., uncaused. He would mean only that the subject of the thought experienced it without being conscious of its mental antecedent as such, without paccaya-gahanam. In a cittam sasankharena, on the other hand, the thought presents itself in consciousness together with its mental conditions. In the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha the terms used in a similar connexion are asankharikam and sasankharikam. J. P. T. S., 1884, p. 1 et seq. Cf . Warren, "Buddhism in Translations", 490.

In the text (§ 146), at the omitted repetitions indicated by ". . . pe . . ." reference is made to § 147. More cor- rectly reference should be made to § 1. The second type- thought is in all respects (including Summary and 'Empti- ness ' Section) identical with the first (Asl. 156), with the sole exception of the additional implication "by the prompt- ing of a conscious motive". With the same exception the fourth, sixth, and eighth type-thoughts are identical with the third, fifth, and seventh respectively. Hence the reference in § 159 of the text should have been to § 157.

K. reads Dutiyam Cittam, and so on for the eight.

Sammaditthi should have been here omitted in the text, just as it is rightly omitted at the place of its second mention between avyapado and hiri. Its absence from the third type of thought is involved in the qualifying phrase "disconnected with knowledge", just as "wisdom", "insight", etc., are. Cf, K. In 147a the Path is said to be fourfold only.

That of "wisdom" being omitted.

See preceding note.

"Absence of dulness" being omitted.

In the text the reader is referred to § 62 without reservation, and is thereby landed in inconsistencies. K. enumerates the content of the skandha in full, omitting all those factors which are incompatible with a thought divorced from knowledge. I have thought it sufficient to name only these excluded factors.

Placed erroneously in the text after § 147.

So K. The text, by omitting not only the repetitions, but also the essentially distinctive factor sasankh arena, renders the insertion of the "Fourth Thought" quite unintelligible.

Buddhaghosa gives a different illustration of this type of thought in harmony with its resemblance to and difference from the former cittarn sasankharena, viz.: in its involving a pleasurable state of mind, but not any great understanding or discernment. Such is the thought of little boys, who, when their parents duck their heads to make them worship at a cetiya, willingly comply, though doing so without intelligent conviction. Asl. 156.

Upekkha. "This is impartiality (lit., middleness) in connexion with the object of thought, and implies a dis- criminative knowledge" (Asl. 157). Cf. its significance in the cultivation of Jhana, § 165. In the Jhana that may arise in connexion with the first type of thought, which is concomitant with "joy" and "ease", it is replaced by "self- collectedness". See § 83.

Here, again, the excision, in the text, of practically the whole answer, and the reference to § 156, where the sixth thought is differentiated from this, the fifth thought, by the quality sasankharena, quite obscures the classifica- tion adopted in the original.

Substituted for "joy" and "ease", §§ 9, 10.

Consisting presumably in "conception", "discursive thought", "disinterestedness" (superseding "joy" and "ease"), and "self-collectedness". Cf. § 83. The last-named attitude of mind does not usually figure in the Pitakas as the culminating (or other) stage of Jhana {cf, § 160 et seq.). In the Abhidhammattha-Sangaha, however, it does occur as such, and side by side also with "disinterestedness". J. P. T. S., 1884, p. 3.

K. gives the skandha in full, omitting "joy", joy and upekkha being mutually exclusive.

Nanindriyam in the text should be manindriyam.